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In a recent publication on the history of the unconscious in the nine-
teenth-century German culture, Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher
state that “Immanuel Kant arguably determined the way in which uncon-
scious phenomena were understood in nineteenth-century German
thought more than any other philosopher of the eighteenth century”.1
The present volume aims to assess Kants account of the unconscious
in its manifold aspects, and to discuss it from various perspectives: psy-
chological, epistemological, anthroprological, and moral. We aim to
show Kants relevance for future discussions on the topic. Kants philos-
ophy of the unconscious has for a long time been a neglected topic in
Kant scholarship, especially in English language publications. In his
Transzendentaler Idealismus, romantische Naturphilosophie, Psychoana-
lyse, Odo Marquard outlined some seminal ideas on the philosophy of
the unconscious in the German intellectual milieu, but he limited his dis-
cussion mainly to the Romantic intellectual background and to their re-
ception of Kants philosophy.2 In Vor Freud: Philosophiegeschichtliche
Voraussetzungen der Psychoanalyse, Wilhelm W. Hemecker dealt very
briefly with Kants notion of the unconscious relating it with the Leibni-
zian standpoint on petites perceptions.3 The impact of the Leibnizian and
Wolffian perspective on the philosophy of Enlightenment has been the
subject of Hans Adlers investigation on Johann Gottfried Herders phi-
losophy,4 but no parallel researches have been devoted so meticulously to
Kants philosophy. In Kant and the Mind, Andrew Brook, who is a world-
wide expert on Kant and Freud, gives some insightful remarks on Kants
theory of the unconscious beginning from the Kantian conception of con-
1 Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher, Thinking the Unconscious: Nineteenth-
Century German Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 2010), 9.
2 Odo Marquard, Transzendentaler Idealismus, romantische Naturphilosophie,
Psychoanalyse (Kçln: Dinter, 1987).
3 Wilhelm W. Hemecker, Vor Freud: Philosophiegeschichtliche Voraussetzungen
der Psychoanalyse (Wien: Philosophia 1991).
4 Hans Adler,Die Prgnanz des Dunklen. Gnoseologie–sthetik–Geschichtsphilo-
sophie bei Johann Gottfried Herder (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990).
sciousness and self-awareness.5 In 2005, two important works on the un-
conscious came out. Micheal B. Buchholz and Gnter Gçdde edited
three volumes on the pre-history of the notion of the “unconscious”
from the early modern philosophy, which first and foremost addressed
medical and psychoanalytical issues only.6 Elke Vçlmicke, in Das Un-
bewußte im deutschen Idealismus, suggested the relevance of Kants prob-
lematic conception of the unconscious for the post-Kantian scholars such
as Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Schelling, but without a careful
examination the Kantian position.7 Recently, the most important investi-
gation on the unconscious in a broad sense has been carried out by Rob-
ert Hanna focusing on the “non-conceptual”.8 The notion of the “uncon-
scious” still remains a stumbling block of the Kantian scholarship, prob-
ably because Kant himself leaves undetermined and unthematized his
very idea of it.
If we look at the dictionaries on the Kantian philosophy,9 just two of
them present an entry on the unconscious, which in addition both narrow
5 Andrew Brook, Kant and the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), 46–68.
6 Micheal B. Bucholz and Gnter Gçdde (eds.), Das Unbewusste. 3. Vol. (Gießen:
Psychosozial-Verlag, 2005–2006).
7 Elke Vçlmicke,Das Unbewußte in deutschen Idealismus (Wrzburg: Kçnigshau-
sen & Neumann, 2005).
8 Robert Hanna, “Kant and Nonconceptual Content,” European Journal of Phi-
losophy 13 (2005): 247–290; Robert Hanna, “Kantian Non-Conceptualism,”
Philosophical Studies 137 (2008): 41–64; Robert Hanna and Monima Chanda,
“Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self Knowledge,” Europe-
an Journal of Philosophy 17 (2010); Robert Hanna, “Kants Non-Conceptual-
ism, Rogue Objects, and the Gap in the B Deduction,” in Robson Ramos dos
Reis and Andra Faggion (eds.), Um Filsofo e a Multiplicidade de Dizeres
(Campinas: CLE, 2010), 335–354.
9 These dictionaries have not an entry on the “unconscious”: Carl C. E. Schmid,
Wçrterbuch zum leichtern Gebrauch der Kantischen Schriften (Jena: Erdker-
schen, 1788); Samuel Heinicke, Wçrterbuch zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft und
zu den philosophischen Schriften von Herrn Kant (Perssburg: Malher, 1788);
Karl H. Heydenreich, Propaedeutick der Moralphilosophie nach Grundstzen
der reinen Vernunft (Leipzig: Weygandschen, 1794); Georg S. A. Mellin, Ency-
clopdisches Wçrterbuch der kritischen Philosophie (Leipzig: Frommann,
1797–1804); Georg Wegner, Kantlexikon: Ein Handbuch fr Freunde der Kant’
schen philosophie (Berlin: Wiegandt, 1893); Thorsten Roelcke, Die Terminolo-
gie der Erkenntnisvermçgen. Wçrterbuch und lexikosemantische Unterschung
zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Tbingen: Niemeyer, 1989); Howard Cay-
gill, A Kant Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), Helmut Holzhey and Vilem
Marco Sgarbi2
the question to the topic of the obscure representations.10 But is Kants
philosophy of the unconscious restricted only to the problem of obscure
representation? Did Kant addressed the “unconscious” not also in
other ways? Does it or does it not have a prominent position in Kants
philosophical system?
The purpose of the present volume is to fill a substantial gap in Kant
research while offering a comprehensive survey of the topic in different
areas of investigation, such as history of philosophy, philosophy of
mind, aesthetics, moral philosophy, and anthropology. The essays collect-
ed in the volume show that the unconscious raises relevant problems for
instance in the theory of knowledge, as non-conceptual contents and ob-
scure representations (Kitcher, Heidemann). In the philosophy of mind, it
bears on the topic of the unity of the consciousness and the notion of the
transcendental self (Crone, Schulting). It is a key-topic of logic with re-
spect to the distinction between determinate-indeterminate judgments
(Lee), and to mental activity (Duque, Rockmore). In aesthetics, the prob-
lem of the unconscious appears in connection with the problems of reflec-
tive judgments and of the genius (Otabe, Giordanetti). Finally, it is a rel-
evant issue also in anthropology and moral philosophy in defining the ir-
rational aspects of the human being (Pollock, Snchez Madrid, Tuppini).
Murdoch, Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism (Lanham: Scarecrow,
2005).
10 Heiner Ratke, Systematisches Handlexikon zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1929), 258; Rudolf Eisler, Kant Lexicon, Nachschalgewerk






The main doctrines of Kants epistemological theory are well-known:
Cognition requires both intuitions and concepts; it requires both a priori
and a posteriori elements; it is empirically real, yet transcendentally ideal.
Oddly, however, none of these well-known claims can be fully appreciat-
ed without also understanding his view that cognition requires uncon-
scious representations. In the next three sections, I try to clarify the
role of unconscious representations in Kants theory by contrasting his
reasons for assuming such representations with those of his predecessors,
in particular, with Leibnizs arguments for petites perceptions, and by fill-
ing in the sparse account of unconscious representations in the Critique of
Pure Reason by drawing on some of his unpublished notes and lectures.
This material will show the direct link between his hypothesis of uncon-
scious representations and his doctrines that cognition requires intuitions
and a posteriori elements, and is empirically real.
In Mind and World, John McDowell argues that Kants transcenden-
tal epistemology makes unacceptable use of the “Given”,1because it has
an isolable contribution from sensibility, namely the susceptibility of re-
ceptivity “to the impact of a supersensible reality, a reality that is sup-
posed to be independent of our conceptual activity.” (1994, 41)
McDowells criticism rests on the widespread assumption that, for
Kant, cognition must begin with noumenal “affection.” In section 5, I
argue that, despite solid textual evidence for this attribution, Kants ulti-
mate defense of the necessity of introducing noumena is not that empiri-
cal cognition must be grounded in noumenal objects affecting a noumenal
self. The considerations raised in sections 2 and 3 lay out the distinctively
Kantian reasons for maintaining that human cognition can only begin
with the receipt of unconscious representations. In section 6, I show
1 McDowell (2008) revises this estimation. There he suggests, in essence, that
Kantian intuitions provide a model for a non-objectionable given. As I argue
in section 5, however, intuitions can play their role in Kants empirical realist
epistemology only because they depend on materials given in unconscious sen-
sations.
that his theory of an unconscious given opens up a sound middle way be-
tween the myth of the Given and the myth that there is no isolable sen-
sory contribution to cognition—but a way that is available only to those
who are willing to follow other doctrines of transcendental idealism.
Why Assume Unconscious Representations?
In prefatory remarks to the New Essays on Human Understanding, Leib-
niz presented a classic, if not entirely satisfactory, argument for the exis-
tence of unconscious perceptions. When a person is aware of the roar of
the ocean, he is not conscious of (cannot distinguish) the sounds of the
individual waves. Yet he must be aware of the sounds of the individual
waves in some sense or he would not hear the combination of these
sounds as a roar (Leibniz 1765/1982, 54). Hence
[e]very moment there is in us an infinity of perceptions, unaccompanied by
awareness or reflection … of which we are unaware because these impres-
sions are either too minute and too numerous, or else too unvarying, so that
they are not sufficiently distinctive on their own. But when they are com-
bined with others they do nevertheless have their effect and make them-
selves felt, at least confusedly, within the whole. (Leibniz 1765/1982, 53)
Perhaps, however, each ocean wave does not make a sound, but contrib-
utes to a large sound-wave, which is then propagated to the hearer.2 Leav-
ing this problem aside, it is natural to read Leibnizs preface as setting the
stage for one of main controversies in the ensuing “dialogue,” Philaleth-
ess and Theophiluss debate over the existence of innate principles.
In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke had taken up
the Cartesian challenge of providing an empirical basis for ideas claimed
to be innate. With the ancient debate about nativism rejoined, Leibniz of-
fered a critique of Lockes rejection of innate ideas and principles in the
New Essays. Leibniz (in the persona of Theophilus) argued that since the
principles of logic and mathematics were necessarily true, they could not
be established by experience (Leibniz 1765/1982, 50, 86, 80). He coun-
tered Lockes preemptive rebuttal (delivered by Philalethes), that princi-
ples such as “everything that is, is” could not be innate, because they were
unknown to children (Leibniz 1765/1982 ,76), with the hypothesis that the
minds of cognizers have many principles of which they were not immedi-
ately conscious (Leibniz 1765/1982, 76). Thus, they know the principles,
2 I owe this objection to Philip Kitcher.
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but not explicitly; they cannot articulate them. Again, Locke had consid-
ered this move and dismissed it as incoherent:
It seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted
on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify
anything, being nothing else but the making of certain truths to be per-
ceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the minds perceiving
it, seems to me hardly intelligible. (ECHU 1:1:5)
Leibniz/Theophilus replies that there is another possibility:
Why couldnt the soul … contain things without ones being aware of them?
… Must a self-knowing subject have, straight away, actual knowledge of ev-
erything that belongs to its nature? … [and] [o]n any view of the matter, it is
always manifest in every state of the soul that necessary truths are innate,
and that they are proved by what lies within, and cannot be established
by experience as truths of fact are. (Leibniz 1765/1982, 78–79)
At this point, Leibniz has Philalethes make the obvious reply on behalf of
Locke. Knowledge of any truth must be subsequent to possession of the
ideas from which it arises, and all ideas come from experience. Theophilus
then notes that the ideas that are contained in necessary truths are intel-
ligible (meaning presumably, that their elements are clear and distinct),
whereas any idea that comes in from the senses is confused (Leibniz
1765/1982, 81).
The reply seems somewhat off the mark. The possibility of principles
of which the possessor is unaware raises the specter of unconscious ideas,
though it does not require it. Explaining that thinkers have clear and dis-
tinct intellectual ideas—of which they are conscious—exacerbates, rather
than lessons, the problem of innate, but unknown principles. If cognizers
have a clear conscious grasp of the ideas “from which they [the principles]
arise” (Leibniz 1765/1982, 81), then why are they not also cognizant of the
principles?
Philalethes returns to the issue, observing that the ideas in which in-
nate principles are couched are so general and abstract as to be alien to
ordinary minds (Leibniz 1765/1982, 83). Leibniz/Theophilus replies that
general principles are nevertheless in all thinking,
General principles enter into our thoughts, serving as their inner core and as
their mortar. Even if we give no thought to them, they are necessary for
thought, as the muscles and tendons are necessary for walking. The mind
relies on these principles constantly; but it does not find it so easy to sort
them out and to command a distinct view of each of them separately, for
that requires a great attention to what it is doing, and the unreflective ma-
jority are highly capable of that. (Leibniz 1765/1982, 83–84)
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This reply also seems somewhat askew. Philalethes complains that general
ideas are “alien” to the ordinary person, that is, the ordinary person is un-
familiar with them, unaware of them. Theophilus replies that the innate
principles are necessary for thinking.
Although Theophilus allows that innate principles are not known by
children, he is less concessive about uneducated adults. He thinks that
principles such as non-contradiction are known implicitly by laypeople.
People constantly use the principle, when, for example, determining
that someone is lying. And when presented with the principle, they imme-
diately assent (Leibniz 1765/1982, 76). Leibnizs hypothesis is that just as
reasoners use enthymematic premises in spoken and internal argumenta-
tion, laypeople make tacit use of the principle of non-contradiction in
reaching their judgments (Leibniz 1765/1982, 76). To support the claim
that people make constant use of implicit principles, he invokes the stan-
dard test of acceptance upon first hearing.
In a sense, Leibnizs argument for innate and so unconscious princi-
ples runs parallel to his argument for unconscious perceptions of the
sound of each wave: It is possible to make sense of conscious mental
states—hearing the roar or judging someone to be a liar—only on the as-
sumption of that these depend on perceptions or principles that are un-
conscious. As we have seen, however, the hypothesis that innate princi-
ples and their constitutive concepts are unconscious does not fit very
well with his view of the relevant concepts. He regards those concepts
not as confused, but as intelligible—indeed as far clearer than sensory
perceptions. They would not be at all like his parade case of unconscious
perceptions: the minute, numerous, and easily confused sounds of individ-
ual waves. Hence I think that Leibnizs prefatory example is not intended
to pave the way for an acceptance of innate principles. He does not and
need not rely on the existence of unconscious perceptions in this case, be-
cause he has two knockdown arguments for such principles—the princi-
ples are in constant use and, as necessary and universal, they could not
be acquired from experience. Further, since they are recognized on first
hearing, it is not much of a stretch to see them as known implicitly.
If not the argument about innate principles, then what is the famous
discussion of the roar of the ocean intended to presage? Since Leibniz ap-
peals to minute, indistinguishable perceptions in his discussion of the met-
aphysics of personal identity, that seems a likely candidate. Leibniz/The-
ophilus introduces Lockes familiar view that personal identity is secured
by continuity of consciousness or memory and immediately endorses it:
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I am also of the opinion that consciousness or perception of the ego proves a
moral or personal identity. (Leibniz 1765/1982, 236)
Leibnizs support for the memory criterion is unsurprising, since he had
advocated it himself in the Discourse on Metaphysics, published four
years before Lockes Essay (Discourse §34, Loemker, 1969, 325).
But the agreement on the importance of memory to moral identity
masks a deep metaphysical disagreement between Locke and Leibniz.
For Leibniz, the moral identity must rest on real substantial identity:
[he] should have thought that, according to the order of things, an identity
which is apparent to the person concerned—one who senses himself to be
the same—presupposes a real identity obtaining through each immediate
[temporal] transition accompanied by reflection, or by the sense of I. (Leib-
niz 1765/1982, 236)
The transitions in question are from one conscious perception to another.
Leibniz holds our consciousness of such transitions to be indubitable.
Such consciousness cannot, in the natural order of things (i. e. without Di-
vine intervention), be mistaken (Leibniz 1765/1982, 236). In a slightly
later, discussion, however, he suggests that the real bond across the states
of an individual rests on unconscious perceptions. In considering whether
a spirit could lose all perceptions of past existence, Theophilus demurs:
[A] spirit retains impressions of everything which has previously happened
to it … but these states of mind are mostly too minute to be distinguishable
and for one to be aware of them … It is this continuity and interconnection
of perceptions which make someone really the same individual. (Leibniz
1765/1982, 239)
That is, self-identity is carried by the train of “petites perceptions.”
This doctrine is clear in the Monadology as well as in the New Essays.
After explaining, in effect, how Monads could be substances—because
they perdure through change understood as changes in their percep-
tions—he preemptively rebuts the obvious criticism that rocks, and so
forth, do not have perceptions:
Monadology § 20. For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we
remember nothing and have no distinguishable perception; as when we
fall into a swoon or when we are overcome with a profound dreamless
sleep. In this state the soul does not perceptibly differ from a bare
Monad; but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out of it, the
soul is something more than a bare Monad.
Monadology §21. And it does not follow that in this state the simple
substance is without any perception. That, indeed, cannot be, for the reasons
already given; for it cannot perish, and it cannot continue to exist without
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being affected in some way, and this affection is nothing but its perception
…
Monadology §22. And as every present state of a simple substance is
naturally a consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present
is big with its future.
Monadology §23. And as, on waking from stupor, we are conscious of
our perceptions, we must have had perceptions immediately before we
awoke, although we were not at all conscious of them; for one perception
can in a natural way come only from another perception, as a motion can
in a natural way come only from a motion. (Loemker, 1969, 645)
What is interesting about the reasoning of the Monadology is that it is ex-
clusively metaphysical. Leibniz does not press the necessity of assuming
petites perceptions in order to explain conscious cognitions, but in order
to avoid gappy substances. If all perceptions had to be conscious, then
his Monads would be liable to the same objection as Descartes souls
whose fundamental attribute was (conscious) thought: They would be an-
nihilated by bouts of unconsciousness, including dreamless sleep. Leibniz
turns this objection on its head and claims that waking from a stupor es-
tablishes the existence of unconscious perceptions in souls—on the fur-
ther metaphysical assumption that perceptions can arise only from
other perceptions. But if unconscious perceptions must be assumed in
this case, they must be possible and so could also exist in soulless Monads.
Kant then was aware of Leibnizs claims in the Monadology, since he
criticized one of them3 in one of his earliest writings, the Nova Dilucidatio
of 1755. That Leibnizs theory of self-identity rested on the assumption of
petites perceptions also seems to have been generally accepted at the time.
Johan Nicolaus Tetens catalogued and synthesized many then contempo-
rary psychological and philosophical theories in his Philosophische Versu-
che ber die menschliche Natur and ihre Enwicklung of 1777. Tetens at-
tributes this view to Leibniz without explanation or argument: “The foun-
dation and basis of the soul consists, as Leibniz said, in unperceived rep-
resentations.” (1777/1979, vol. I: 265)
Since Kants reading of Tetenss Versuche4 has been well-document-
ed, it is clear that he would have been aware of the metaphysical charac-
3 The thesis he criticizes is that a Monad can change from having one perception
to having another through the work of an inner principle (1.411).
4 The oft-recounted story from Hamann is that Tetenss book lay open on Kants
desk as he wrote the Crituque. See Bona-Meyer (1870, 56). Kant also reports his
reading of Tetens in a letter to Marcus Herz of April 1778 (10.232).
Patricia Kitcher10
ter of Leibnizs support for petites perceptions both first-hand and as a
matter of common knowledge.
Although Leibnizs striking hypothesis of a teeming unconscious was
bound up with Monad metaphysics, other contributors to the debate of-
fered epistemological arguments. For example, in “An Essay On the Ori-
gin of Knowledge,” the French Sensationist, Etienne Bonnot de Condillac
(1746/1987, 445) considered several phenomena that illustrated the prob-
lem of insensible or unreportable perceptions. In reading, the subject is
aware of the sense, but not of the shapes of the letters. Condillac main-
tained that subjects must have been conscious of these shapes, because
their conduct, reading, proved that they were. On his view, consciousness
could sometimes be so superficial that it left no memory trace. Some of
Kants remarks indicate that he was aware of a position very like Condil-
lacs. In “Negative Magnitudes” (1763), he exclaimed:
But also what admirable bustle is concealed in the depths of our minds,
which we fail to notice as it is exercised … and that because the actions
are very many and because each is represented only very obscurely. The
good proofs of this are known to all; among these one only needs to consid-
er the actions which take place unnoticed within us when we read.5 (2. 191)6
Condillacs countryman, the naturalist Charles Bonnet, argued for a dif-
ferent view in the Essai de Psychologie (1755/1978). Bonnet starts with
scientific assumption that the mind or brain is barraged by sensory infor-
mation. It is an assumption also made by Hume when he noted that all we
need to do is turn our heads to be confronted with an “inconceivably
rapid” succession of perceptions (1739/1978, 252–53). Since the brain
can only be in one state at a time, Bonnet thought it more reasonable
5 Kants view seems to be somewhat different from Condillacs, since he focuses
on the unconscious acts of perceiving the letters, rather than on the unconscious
perceptions of the letters.
6 References to Kants works, other than the Critique of Pure Reason, will be to
Kant 1900—and will be cited in the text by giving volume and page numbers
from that edition. References to the Critique of Pure Reason will be in the
text, with the usual A and B indications of editions. In providing English
translations, I usually rely on Pluhar (Kant 1996), but I also use Kemp Smith
(Kant 1968), and Guyer and Wood (Kant 1998) at points. I do not, however, fol-
low Pluhar rendering Vorstellung as presentation, but use the more standard
representation. When I alter a translation beyond rendering Vorstellung	 as
representation, I indicate that the translation is amended. In all citations I fol-
low the suggestion of Guyer and Wood and indicate Kants emphasis with bold-
face type. When citing Kants literary remains, I follow standard practice and cite
the R (for Reflexion) number assigned by the editors of the Academy edition.
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to assume that, when many stimuli come at once, the result is an impres-
sion that is a composite in which the different stimuli are weighted ac-
cording to their intensity. That is, it is not that each perception is con-
scious for a flash, but then unrecallable. Rather, under these circumstan-
ces, the brain cannot represent the perceptions as distinct from one anoth-
er (1755/1978, 113).
Christian Wolff, who is often taken to be a follower or even a system-
atizer of Leibnizs philosophy, tacitly invoked unconscious perceptions in
a somewhat different epistemological debate. He began Vernnfftige Ge-
danken von Gott, Der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen

berhaubt (1751/1983) , the so-called German Metaphysics, with an ap-
parent endorsement of Descartes claim for the epistemological priority
of the cogito:
No one can doubt that he is conscious of himself and other things; …. For,
how can he deny to me or bring into doubt if he is not conscious of himself
or other things? … Whoever is conscious of the one, which he denies or
brings into doubt, is the same as that one (1751/1983, 1).
In fact, he is criticizing Descartes priority claim, as a later passage makes
clear:
This difference [between ourselves and other things] appears directly as we
are conscious of other things. For should we be conscious of that which we
cognize through the senses, we must recognize the difference between that
thing and others … This differentiation is an effect of the soul, and we cog-
nize therefore through it the difference between the soul and the things that
are represented (1751/1983, 455–56).
That is, cognitive subjects can be conscious of themselves as such only
through differentiating objects of consciousness. On Leibnizs view, not
all perceptions were conscious or apperceived. Apperceiving takes
some effort, perhaps like the effort of attending. In that case, however,
self-consciousness could not precede consciousness of some object of con-
sciousness, because the self as differentiator, must itself be differentiated
from the things it differentiates.
Besides this indirect argument for unconscious perceptions, percep-
tions that must be present to be differentiated, thus allowing object and
self consciousness, Wolff also provides a telling example in support of as-
suming them. A person might see something white in a far-off field with-
out knowing what he is seeing, because he cannot separate one part from
another [even though he must see the parts to see the white patch].
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Under these circumstances the thought is said to be “obscure” [dunkeI]
(1751/1983, §199, 111).
Kant offers a very similar example when introducing unconscious rep-
resentations in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Standpoint:
If I am conscious of seeing a man in a far away meadow, though I am not
likewise conscious of seeing his eyes, nose, mouth, etc., then actually I
only conclude that this thing is a man; for if I wanted to say that, because
I am not conscious of seeing these parts of the head (and also the other
parts of the man), I do not at all have representations of these parts in
my intuition, then I would also not be able to say that I see a man; for
the whole representations is composed from these part representations.
(7.135)
Although the passage is somewhat difficult to follow, the point seems to
be that even though the observer cannot distinguish the parts of the head,
he must still be intuiting those parts; otherwise he would not be seeing the
man, but merely inferring his presence. On the other hand, the knowledge
that he is intuiting these parts is not immediate, but inferential.
Taking stock, as Kant came to write the Critique, the reasons for as-
suming unconscious representations were many and varied. The scientific
evidence pointed to a constantly changing stream of representations on
the retina. Particular examples demonstrated the need to assume uncon-
scious representations as the foundation of conscious cognitions acknowl-
edged by all. Metaphysical considerations led Leibniz to hypothesize a
myriad of unconscious perceptions as the basis of the continuity of Mo-
nads. Given the scientific, epistemological, and metaphysical support
for unconscious ideas at this time, it is astonishing—or worse—that
Freud claimed to have discovered them nearly two hundred years later.
Kants Appeal to Unconscious Representations
Although Kants anthropology lectures always assumed the existence of
unconscious representations, his attitude towards them changed dramat-
ically. In his early lectures (perhaps from 1772)7, he is reported as suggest-
7 Beyond Anthropology from a Pragmatic Standpoint, Kants views on anthropol-
ogy are available in the form of student lecture notes from his Anthropology
courses, now available in Vol. 25 of the Academy edition (Kant 1900-), and in
his own notes published in Vol. 15 of that edition. Although the student notes
cannot be presumed to be accurate representations of Kants changing views (es-
pecially since they are not actual lecture notes, but later transcriptions that are
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ing that the teeming world of the unconscious presented a large field of
obscure perceptions that it was up to the philosopher to clarify (25.22).
The published Anthropology of 1798 still holds that we must conclude
that there are a vast number of unconscious representations. He charac-
terizes the immeasurable field of obscure sensory intuitions and sensa-
tions as a huge map in which just a few places are illuminated by con-
sciousness (7.135). Nonetheless, he now maintains that the study of un-
conscious perceptions does not belong even to pragmatic anthropology
(let alone to philosophy). Since the obscure representations are sensory,
the topic belongs to physiological anthropology (7. 136).
Since the notes from the early lecture course are cryptic, it is not clear
why Kant thought that unconscious representations would be such a fer-
tile field for philosophy to study. Perhaps he had hoped that examining
them might reveal how the mind dealt with sensory information. He
took the study of logic to be important, because it made explicit the im-
plicit principles by which people thought (see 16.18,19,31–32, 24.791). So
he may have believed that studying unconscious perceptions would ena-
ble philosophers to determine the principles by which the mind organized
conscious percepts. In the Critique, however, he clearly realized that it
was not possible to study the minds way of taking unconscious sensations
and turning them into conscious perceptions. Both the data and operation
of synthesizing them were closed from view (A78/B103). To determine
the minds contributions to sensory representations, a different method
was required—what he called the method of “isolation”: first separate ev-
erything from a representation that is conceptual and then separate ev-
erything that belongs to sensation (i. e. everything that can be understood
as being received through the sensory apparatus we have). The well-
known results of applying the method were that representations of
space and time did not enter cognition through the senses, but were
“forms of intuition” (A23/B38, A30/B46).
At this point, we can see a clear and distinctively Kantian reason for
accepting unconscious representations. No one doubted that it seems to
humans that they are aware of a succession of mental states. In the Inau-
gural Dissertation, Kant had objected to Leibnizs view that the represen-
tation of succession is abstracted from experience:
often hard to date), I appeal to them when they are consistent with, but amplify,
views expressed in his published work. For fuller discussion of this issue, see my
2011, chapter 2 and accompanying endnotes.
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They [one sort of realist about time] conceive of it as something real that
has been abstracted from the succession of internal states—the view main-
tained by Leibniz and his followers. Now the falsity of [this] … opinion
clearly betrays itself by the vicious circle in the commonly accepted defini-
tion of time (2.400–401).
Two pages earlier, he had laid out the definitional problem:
it is only through the idea of time that it is possible for the things which
come before the senses to be represented as simultaneous or successive.
Nor does succession generate the concept of time; it makes appeal to it.
And thus the concept of time, regarded as if it had been acquired through
experience, is very badly defined, if it is defined in terms of the series of ac-
tual things which exist one after the other. For I only understand the mean-
ing of the little word after by means of the antecedent concept of time
(2.399).
Although the criticism is directed at Leibniz, it applies equally well to
Lockes account of the acquisition of the idea of succession:
Tis evident to any one who will but observe what passes in his own mind,
that there is a train of Ideas, which constantly succeed one another in his
Understanding … Reflection on these appearances of several Ideas one
after another in our Minds, is that which furnishes us with the Idea of Suc-
cession. (ECHU 2.14.3, 182, my emphasis).
I will not try to evaluate the justice of this objection to Leibniz (or to
Locke). My interest is in what the resulting view implies about the role
of unconscious representations in Kants epistemology.
Similarly, no one doubted that humans perceived objects to be repre-
sented in space. That was the common assumption of the Newton-Leibniz
debate. But, again, Kant will argue that the intuitive representations of
objects in space do not supply but presuppose the “form” of space.
When these doctrines are considered in relation to his claims about intu-
itions, the implications for unconscious representations are evident:
In whatever way and by whatever means a cognition may refer to an object,
still intuition is that by which a cognition refers to objects directly, and at
which all thought aims as a means. Intuition, however, takes place only in-
sofar as the object is given to us; but that, in turn, is possible only—for us
human beings at any rate—by the minds being affected in a certain manner.
The capacity (a receptivity) to acquire representation as a result of the way
we are affected by objects is called sensibility (A19/B33).
This observation is interesting, in part, for its seamless blending of norma-
tive and psychological considerations. Cognition must refer to an object
[and that is possible only insofar as there is a necessary relation between
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the cognition and the object (A92/B124)]. Given the psychological limi-
tations of the human mind, this necessary relation can be secured only
when the mind is affected by the object. But since space and time cannot
be received by human sensibility, the representations it receives cannot be
conscious representations, since human intuitions are either of “outer”
objects in space or “inner” mental states in time (A22/B37). More simply,
true cognition requires sensory inputs; the senses cannot take in the spa-
tial and temporal information required to form conscious perceptions;
therefore the representations received from sensory stimulation by ob-
jects (A1/B1) that are necessary for cognition must be unconscious.
Hence Kants well-known Stufenleiter of representations has a clear
place for unconscious representations (A320/B376).
Given that his theory clearly implies that unconscious representations
are necessary for cognition, it might seem strange that Kant did not high-
light them. There are two complementary explanations for this apparent
neglect. The first, which we have already seen in part, is that the Leibni-
zian tradition already accepted them. Both Leibniz and Wolff offered ro-
bust defenses of them, and Kants discussion in the Anthropology sug-
gests that the issue was already settled (7.135). On the Lockean side, Tet-
ens also assumed the existence of unconscious perceptions. What Tetens
thought had to be explained was how a unified and seemingly simple per-
ception emerged from unconscious representations:
This impression [Empfindung] may consist in a multitude, and a multitude
of uncountable small feelings that follow each other. And each may contain
many simpler simultaneous ones in it, it is, for me, a unitary feeling, and one
and the same act of consciousness through which I join these small feelings
in a total feeling, distinguishes it as one impression. I observe no multiplicity
in this act, and no series [Folge] and no parts … (1777/1979, 1.389)
With then contemporary Lockeans on board with unconscious percep-
tions, there would be no pressing need to defend them. Indeed, as DeV-
leeschauwer first observed, Kant appear s to draw on Tetenss discussion
of perception in offering his account of the first synthesis (of apprehen-
sion) in the A edition (1962, pp. 85–90).
The second, and complementary, explanation is that, as we have just
seen, Kant does allude to unconscious representations in the Critique.
Given the wide acceptance of such representations, he does so, however,
with little fanfare. To a knowledgeable reader, his discussion of the syn-
thesis of apprehension would carry a clear implication of unconscious
representations:
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In order for this manifold to become unity of intuition (as, e. g., in the rep-
resentation of space), it must first be gone through and gathered together.
This act I call the synthesis of apprehension. (A99)
What can the pre-synthesized, non-spatial representations be but uncon-
scious? Perhaps because he had moved away from Tetenss views, Kant
was more explicit about the role of unconscious representations in the
B edition transcendental deduction:
First of all, let me point out that by synthesis of apprehension I mean that
combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition whereby perception,
i. e., empirical consciousness of the intuition (as appearance) becomes pos-
sible. (B160)
Again, if conscious perception requires a synthesis, then the representa-
tions that are available to be synthesized can only be unconscious.
As we see in the next section, it is not easy to figure out exactly how
Kant thinks unconscious representations can provide a basis for synthe-
sizing conscious representations. My point here is that his belief that
they must is an integral and unwavering part of his empirical realist epis-
temology. When first introducing his hypothesis of the forms of intuitions
in the Inaugural Dissertation, he explains that
just as the sensation which constitutes the matter of sensory representation
is evidence for the presence of something sensible … so to the form of the
same representation is undoubtedly evidence of a certain respect of relation
in what is sensed. (2.393)
Thus, Kants theory of forms does not commit him to the implausible view
that the sensations a cognizer receives are irrelevant to whether he per-
ceives something to be square or triangular; spatial representations re-
flect something in the sensory data.
In the Inaugural Dissertation, Kant distinguished a world of sense
from a world of intellect, so that, whatever it was about sensations that
was supposed to be reflected in the spatial or temporal properties of rep-
resentations, it could not be something tied to conceptual representation.
This doctrine is changed completely in the Critique. As noted, one of its
central themes is that cognition requires both intuitions and concepts.
Further, he had come to believe that the synthesis that was necessary
to form conscious perceptions (the synthesis speciosa in the B edition)
was carried out by the imagination under the guidance of the understand-
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ing (B151, B160).8 In that case, if he still held that the spatial or temporal
properties of a perception reflect something in the sensations, then that
something would be reflected in the perception through originally
being reflected in the way the sensations were conceptualized.
Were there no reflection of sensory elements—if categories and forms
were applied irrespective of the given sensory materials—then Kants
epistemological theory would be liable to the charge he raises against Ra-
tionalist metaphysics. This field is rife with errors precisely because its
proponents forego the touchstone of experience. So, for example, rather
than seeing the idea of a simple soul as a regulative idea of reason (the
Psychological Ideal), they take the idea to amount to knowledge:
[It is] indeed very easy for reason, but it also entirely ruins and destroys all
natural use of reason according to the guidance of experiences. [It leads the
dogmatic spiritualist to bypass] … for the sake of his convenience, but with
the forfeiture of all insight—the sources of cognition that are immanent in
experience (A 690/B 718).
And, for reasons we have seen, the “guidance” provided by experience
can only be the guidance provided by unconscious representations.
Since this guidance is a pervasive and systematically necessary feature
of Kants view, it is reasonable to believe that he had some notion of
how it might be possible.
Searching for Substances and Causes
At the dnouement of the transcendental deduction in the A edition,
Kant lays out the central claim of transcendental idealism:
Hence the order and regularity in the appearances that we call nature are
brought into them by ourselves; nor indeed could such order and regularity
be found in appearances, had not we, or the nature of our mind put them
into appearances originally. (A125)
Since that order and regularity cannot be independent of sensory evi-
dence—or the guidance of experience would be forfeited—his account
8 In notes that are often regarded as an early draft of the transcendental deduc-
tion, the so-called Duisburg Nachlab, Kant had suggested that the syntheses of
the understanding depend on those of apprehension: “Everything that is given
is thought under the universal condition of apprehension. Hence the subjective
universal of apprehension is the condition of the objective universal of intellec-
tion” (R4675, 17.653.).
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of how the understanding puts order into experience would be a promis-
ing place to look for his understanding of the relation between uncon-
scious sensory or a posteriori elements and the a priori forms of cognition.
I quote his subsequent discussion of the issue at some length:
The understanding is always busy scrutinizing [durchzusphen] appearances
with the aim of uncovering some rule in them. Rules, insofar as they are ob-
jective (and hence attach to cognition of an object necessarily) are called
laws. Many laws are indeed learned by us through experience. Yet these
laws are only particular determinations of still higher laws. And the highest
among these (those under which all others fall) issue a priori from the un-
derstanding itself. These laws are not taken from experience; rather, they
must provide appearances with the latters law-governedness, and precisely
thereby must make experience possible. Hence understanding is not merely
a power of making rules for oneself by comparing appearances; understand-
ing is itself legislative for nature. I.e., without understanding there would
not be any nature at all, i. e. any synthetic unity in the manifold of appear-
ances according to rules; for appearances, as such, cannot occur outside us,
but exist only in our sensibility. (A126–27)
This passage may seem merely to repeat the claim that the regularities
found in nature are put there by the understanding rather than to explain
it. One thesis is clear: Particular empirical laws that are discovered
through comparing observations can be found in the appearances of the
senses only because they are species of higher level laws that were put
there perhaps by the understanding.
Much later in the text, in the discussion of the Regulative Use of the
Ideas of Reason (in the Appendix to the Dialectic), Kant suggests that
the understanding succeeds in forming concepts and finding laws, because
reason has prepared the realm in which the understanding is to operate:
Hence reason prepares the understandings realm by these means: (1) by a
principle of the homogeneity of the manifold under high genera; (2) by a
principle of the variety of the homogeneous under lower species—and in
order to compete the systematic unity , reason adds (3) also a law of the af-
finity of all concepts… (A657/B685).
My concern is not with the details of Kants claims about the regulative
ideas of reason, but with the general picture he presents.
According to the A deduction passage, the understanding operates by
scrutinizing appearances to find a rule in them. An obvious way to illus-
trate this process is through a search for causal laws. The understanding
would run through the representations provided to it by the senses to
see if any can be understood as instances of causation, as an instance of
an object altering from being in state A to being in state B in the presence
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of some other object C.9 However many instances of A-type properties
being succeeded by B-type properties in the presence of objects of type
C, it is impossible to conclude that the succession from A to B in the pres-
ence of C is necessary. The law that Cs cause objects to alter from state A
to state B could never be extracted from sensory data. Yet some sensory
data can be interpreted as instances of it.10 The understanding looks for
possible instances of causal rules and when it finds candidates, when A-
type properties are always followed by B-type properties in the presence
of C, it pronounces the relation to be one of cause and effect.
But how is the understanding guaranteed to succeed? Why must
there be rules to be found? It is not enough that the understanding is
urged by reason to look for the homogeneous, although this might be a
necessary condition for discovering laws. In a way, success cannot be guar-
anteed. If there is nothing homogeneous to be found in the data of sense,
then the search for laws is hopeless. Even assuming some homogeneity,
however, the search for laws of nature will still be doomed unless the un-
derstanding not only seeks the homogeneous, but excludes or ignores, the
totally irregular. The only way that the understandings scrutiny in search
of empirical causal laws could be guaranteed to succeed is if the appear-
ances had gone through an earlier scrutiny that culled all and only repre-
sentations that exhibited the regularity necessary to make them possible
instances of causal laws. In effect, this earlier scrutiny would be governed
by the principle that all alterations that count as such are caused. Under
these circumstances, the search for natural laws can succeed and the laws
discovered empirically will be species of the higher level law that the only
appearances of alterations or events that count as real are those that fall
under causal laws—because that law has been put into appearances.
Kant does not present what I have described as an “earlier” scrutiny
in the Critique, except perhaps obliquely in the claim that the understand-
ing is constantly scrutinizing. He does so, however, in a Reflection from
around 1772–73 that Wolfgang Carl (1989) regards as the first draft of
the transcendental deduction. The main point of the Reflection is to
draw a contrast between (merely) logical actions or functions and
“real” functions:
9 Here I follow Arthur Melnick (1973) and, subsequently Guyer (1987) in inter-
preting Kant as taking causation to be a three place relation among powers or
events, and earlier and later properties of substances.
10 My discussion here is dependent on Hannah Ginsborgs clear and useful analysis
of the argument of the Appendix to the transcendental ideal (1992 draft)
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The real function consists in the way in which we posit a representation in
and for itself; thus it is an action (a priori) which corresponds to every dato
(a posteriori) and by means of which the latter becomes a concept … From
these arise all cognition: namely how we can grasp data and form something
for ourselves that is called cognition. In nature no data can come before us
unless, when one perceives the laws therein, they correspond to the univer-
sal kinds according to which we posit something, because otherwise no laws
would be observed, or any object whatsoever, but only confused internal al-
terations. Therefore, since we can represent objects only by means of our
alterations, insofar as they have in themselves something in conformity
with our rules for positing and negating, the real functions are the ground
of the possibility of the representation of things, and the logical functions
are the ground of the possibility of judgments, and consequently of cogni-
tions (R4631, 17.615, see also R1608, 16.34—35).
Kants view is that a posteriori or sensory materials may arrive in the
mind, but they can come before the mind as sensory data (perceptual ap-
pearances) for human cognizers only if there is something in them that
accords with the principles associated with universal kinds (i. e. catego-
ries). Only in this way is cognition possible, because the realm in which
understanding is to produce cognition is prepared for it.
It is tempting to object that I am misreading a straightforward norma-
tive claim as an endorsement of a suspect psychological process. Perhaps
Kants point in the dnouement of the A deduction, the ensuing discus-
sion, and even the Reflection is just that humans use the essential cogni-
tive norm that pututative alterations and events that cannot be given
causal explanations must be rejected as phantasms. He would certainly
endorse this claim. What he is trying to argue in the transcendental de-
duction and principles chapter, however, is that the categories of the un-
derstanding apply not only to all judgments about objects, but also to ev-
erything that is presented in intuition:
The categories of understanding … do not at all represent to us the condi-
tions under which objects are given in intuition. Therefore, objects can in-
deed appear to us without having to refer necessarily to functions of under-
standing, and hence without the understandings containing a priori the con-
ditions of these objects. Thus we find a difficulty that we did not encounter
in the realm of sensibility: viz: how subjective conditions of thought could
have objective validity, i. e., how they could yield conditions for the possibil-
ity of all cognition of objects. (A89-/B122)
That is, the aim of the transcendental deduction is to show that whatever
is represented in (conscious) perceptions must fall under the categorial
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concepts.11 He makes the same point in summarizing the B deduction in
section 26:
We must now explain how it is possible, through categories, to cognize a pri-
ori whatever objects our senses may encounter—to so cognize them as re-
gards not the form of their intuition, but the laws of their combination—
and hence as it were, to prescribe laws to nature, and even to make nature
possible. (B159–60)
Given this more ambitious goal, his claim cannot be just that falling under
a causal law is a normative principle governing what is to count as an
event. It must be that the higher faculties somehow use this principle in
working up “the raw material of sense impressions into a cognition of ob-
jects that is called experience.” (B1)
Otherwise, there would be no guarantee that everything the senses
may encounter must fall under the categories. This processing of sensory
impressions is not further discussed in the Critique, except perhaps in the
“scrutiny” passage, but it seems to be the topic of the Reflection cited
above.
Unfortunately, none of this material sheds any light on how the proc-
essing of raw materials could operate so that it both depends on the char-
acter of the sensations and regiments them under categories. The problem
becomes more difficult when we realize that what I have called the “ear-
lier” scrutiny cannot work in the way that I have presented the under-
standing as scrutinizing for particular laws of nature. The understanding
could not fasten on cases of regular succession in the sensory data, be-
cause the senses do not register succession. It is this aspect of Kants
view that stands behind the frequent complaint that his account of the ne-
cessity of using the causal concept in the Second Analogy is circular (e.g.
Cheng, 1997, 368). He argues that humans can determine the succession
of their mental states only by tying them to objective succession or events,
and so to causation (A193/B238), but he knows that the standard view is
that causal laws can be discovered only by observing the constant succes-
sion of different states of affairs (A195/B240).
Although Kant does not say what it is about sensations that the scru-
tiny of the understanding can latch onto, we have a description of the fea-
ture: It must be something that is a reliable indicator of the presence of
succession and/or causal relations. Further, he would have been aware of
11 The view that the transcendental deduction is supposed to establish the applic-
ability of the categories to anything that can be sensed is a central theme of
Wolfgang Carls (1989, 1992, 1998). See also Ginsborg 2006.
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the obvious candidate.12 Motion, or real motion, was widely understood
as a sign of causation; further, common motion was widely understood
as an indicator of a single object. What is different now is that we have
some understanding of how the brain detects motions.13 The nervous sys-
tem is set up so that some higher level visual cells fire only if the lower
level cells to which they are connected fire in a particular order, e.g.,
n1, n2, n3, whereas others fire only when the lower level cells fire in the
opposite order. In effect, these assemblies allow the nervous system to
register a point of light, say, moving from left to right or from right to
left in the visual field; hence they also allow it to derive right position
after left position or vice versa. Although the nervous system makes
use of temporal relations—it is set up to take advantage of the time lag
in which it receives different information—it does not detect time, but
motion.
A motion detector singles out sensory data that could be involved in
three interconnected types of claims: a light moves from A to B, the light
was at B after it was at A, the succession of the state of being at A to the
state of being at B is necessary or rule-governed. It is thus an ideal can-
didate for the means by which the understanding scrutinizes sensations
in order to find materials that are likely to stand in lawful relations.
Those alterations that were unrelated to motion (or to the surrogates
of other categorial principles) would fail to be posited as representations
of objects or events. Still, the mechanism, as I have described it, does not
do justice to Kants claims that the understanding scrutinizes for rules or
that it is guided by reason to look for homogeneity. So the process needs
to be more complex. To be presented to the mind as sensory data, mate-
rials must not only be singled out by a motion detector, but those singled
out must be surveyed to see if they contain successions of similar repre-
sentations and only those which do will be retained as representations of
real events. This additional processing would presumably require some
12 Kant links the concept of succession to mental motion: “What first produces the
concept of succession is motion, taken as act of the subject (rather than as a de-
termination of an object) and consequently as the synthesis of the manifold in
space” (B154–55).
His point here is not that motion indicates succession or causation, but that
the representation of succession presupposes a spatial representation, which in
turn presupposes the mental act of constructing a spatial representation. In mak-
ing the point, however, he tacitly acknowledges that object motion is a standard
way of explaining the representation of succession.
13 Here I follow Harpers (1984) helpful presentation of the relevant science.
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further mechanisms which register when sensations are qualitatively sim-
ilar. With this more complex preceding scrutiny, the understanding can
succeed in scrutinizing appearances for the (particular) laws in them.
My claim is not that Kant had a fully worked out theory of how the
mind scrutinizes unconscious impressions in order to introduce order into
its conscious perceptions. As we have seen, and as he seemed to under-
stand, any such theory would need to invoke physiological mechanisms
that he was in no position to discover. Further, I have considered only
one category, causation, and I have given no reason to think that Kant
was right that similarity was essential to working up sensory impressions
into suitable materials for causal cognition. Perhaps humans do not fasten
on causal relationships by looking for constant conjunctions, but by seek-
ing a causal mechanism (Ahn and Bailenson, 1996). My concern has only
been to show that the scrutiny process that he sketched (in Reflections
and briefly in the Critique) could be developed in a way that it honored
his goals: the order and regularity in the appearances that humans call na-
ture is made possible through the activities of the “higher” faculties, yet it
is still guided by—because dependent on—the receipt of sensations and
their particular qualities. It is still grounded in unconscious representa-
tions.
The Unconscious and the Noumenal
As I understand it, the beginning of the cognitive process that Kant de-
scribes in the familiar opening statements of the Introduction involves un-
conscious representations:
There can be no doubt that all our cognition begins with experience. For
what else might rouse our cognitive power to its operation if objects stirring
our senses did not do so? In part these objects by themselves bring about rep-
resentations. In part they set in motion our understandings activity, by
which it compares these representations, connects or separates them, and
thus processes the raw material of sense impressions into a cognition of ob-
jects that is called experience (B1, my emphasis).
For reasons we have seen, the representations brought about by objects
can only be unconscious. A venerable critical tradition takes a very differ-
ent view of Kants account of how cognition must originate. It does not
begin with unconscious representations caused by (phenomenal) objects,
but with real or noumenal objects affecting a noumenal self and thereby
Patricia Kitcher24
making possible the creation by that self of a phenomenal world of ap-
pearances.
McDowells rejection of Kants “transcendental story” of epistemol-
ogy (1994, 41) is rooted in the long-standing view that he must—but can-
not legitimately—appeal to noumena to explain cognition of appearances.
And since noumena are, by definition, outside the realm of human con-
cepts, the dependence of Kantian epistemology on noumena means that
it relies on the myth of the Given. Many careful scholars have agreed
that Kants theory commits him to an incoherent notion of noumenal af-
fection,14 so the interpretation must rest on fairly substantial evidence. We
dont have to look far to find the evidence, since Kant provides it himself
in justifying the introduction of the concept of noumenon in the A edi-
tion15:
But as for the cause why one, being not yet satisfied by the substratum of
sensibility has added to the phenomena also noumena that only the under-
standing can think, it rests exclusively [lediglich] on the following. Sensibil-
ity—and its realm, viz. , that of appearances—is itself limited by the under-
standing so that it deals not with things in themselves but only with the way
in which, by virtue of our subjective character, things appear to us. This was
the result of the entire Transcendental Aesthetic; and from the concept of
appearance as such, too, it follows naturally that to appearance there
must correspond something that is not in itself appearance. For appearance
cannot be anything by itself and apart from our way of representing; hence
if we are not to go in a constant circle, then the word appearance already in-
dicates a reference to something the direct representation of which is indeed
sensible, but which in itself—even without this character of our sensibility (on
which the form of our intuition is based)—must be something, i. e. , an object
independent of sensibility.
Now from this consideration arises the concept of a noumenon. But this
concept is not a determinate cognition of some thing, but signifies only the
thinking of something as such—something in which I abstract from all form
of sensible intuition. (A251–52, my emphasis)
That is, it is necessary to find some correlate of sensory appearance—the
thing whose representation is sensible. Kant believes that it follows from
transcendental idealism that the thing in question cannot be characterized
14 Among others, F. H. Jacobi (1787/1983) was the first to offer this objection be-
tween the editions of the Critique ; P.F. Strawson (1966) provided its canonical
20th century version in terms of the notion of noumenal affection; Robert
Adams (1997) offers a recent version.
15 Other passages also suggest noumenal affection, but the passage I discuss pro-
vides the strongest support. Further, as I show in my 2011, they can be handled
in the same way in which this key passage is handled.
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in terms of the forms of intuition, because those elements of cognition are
not received from objects, but added through the processing of what is re-
ceived. Since the object must then be understood in abstraction from such
forms, it can only be thought in this abstract manner and not sensed, and
thus should be understood as a creature of the mind or as a noumenon.
Notice, however, that this claim seems inconsistent with the claim on
which it rests—namely that the direct representation of this thing is sen-
sible.
There is also a serious, but understandable, flaw in Kants reasoning.
By his theory, a green thing, such as a tree, does not produce a spatial rep-
resentation in a subject when it strikes her senses; it conveys only green-
ness and other sensory qualities. Now assume the standard account that
objects produce sensations of green in humans because some feature of
their surface structures reflects green light that is received by the cone
cells of the retina. Even if he is right that the immediate effect of objects
on the senses conveys no spatial information, it hardly follows that spatial
predicates cannot be used to describe what it is in objects that enables
them to produce sensations of green. Alternatively, whatever information
is conveyed to cognitive subjects through objects stirring their senses, cog-
nitive theorists are not restricted to that information in describing how
objects stir the senses.
Kants error is understandable, because the empirical psychology of
his day was limited to introspection. In a passage in the Amphiboly of
Concepts of Reflection, he returns to the difficulty of determining the
causes of sensations and pins the problem on the inadequacies of inner
sense:
[W]e have not been given [the ability] to observe even our own mind for it
in lies the secret origin [Ursprung] of our sensibility—by means of an intu-
ition other than that of our inner sense. Sensibilitys reference to an object,
and what may be the transcendental basis of this objective unity, this doubt-
less lies too deeply hidden so that we, who are acquainted even with our
own selves only through inner sense and hence as appearance, might with
so unfitting an instrument of our investigation discover anything other
than what are always in turn appearances—whereas it was the nonsensible
cause [Ursache] of those appearances that we hoped to explore (A278/B334,
my emphasis).
The immediately preceding discussion highlights the problem of descrip-
tion, noting that humans could not understand an account of the cause of
appearances even if it were offered, because they cannot understand any-
thing that does not supply an intuition to give the words meaning (A287/
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B334). As noted, this problem can be overcome by contemporary science.
In the text just cited, the problem is one of access. The states to which
inner sense has access are inner appearances or conscious perceptions.
With no access to what is immediately received by the senses, there is
no opportunity to investigate the reception of information by the senses
in order to determine how appearances are constructed on that basis. This
limitation is consistent with his crucial appeal to the method of isolation:
The method works by determining properties that cannot be received by
the senses; it cannot reveal how the senses receive the information they
do or how that information is used by the minds active faculties to
form appearances.
The passage from the chapter on phenomena and noumena was omit-
ted from the second edition. Still, it was present in the first edition for all
to see, and it seems to give Kants imprimatur to the interpretive thesis
that transcendental idealism is committed to noumenal affection. Fortu-
nately he also returns to the issue of the reception of sensory data in sec-
tion 6 of the Antinomy of Pure Reason. The focus of the passage is anoth-
er key concept, that of a “transcendental object”:
Our power of sensible intuition is, in fact, only a receptivity, i. e., a capacity
to be affected in a certain way with representations. The relation of these
representations to one another is a pure intuition of space and time
(which are nothing but forms of our sensibility); and insofar as these repre-
sentations are connected and determinable in this relation according to laws
of the unity of experience, they are called objects. With the nonsensible
cause [Ursache] of these representations we are entirely unacquainted,
and hence we cannot intuit it as object. (1) For such an object would
have to be represented neither in space nor in time (which are merely con-
ditions of sensible representation), and without these conditions we cannot
think of any intuition at all. We may, however, call the merely intelligible
cause of appearances as such the transcendental object, just so that we
have something that corresponds to sensibility, which is a receptivity. (2)
To this transcendental object we may attribute the whole range and coher-
ence of our possible perceptions, and about it we may say that it is given in
itself prior to all experience. But appearances are given, in conformity with
the transcendental object, not in themselves but only in this experience. For
they are mere representations, which signify an actual object only as percep-
tions; they do so, viz. , if such a perception coheres with all others according
to the rules of the unity of experience (A494–95/B522–23, my numbering).
The point of the passage I label (1) is to explain the difficulty in charac-
terizing the correlate of sensory appearances, or that which corresponds
to sensible representations. Kant maintains that given the theory of tran-
scendental idealism, it cannot be described in terms of time or space. The
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issue here is thus exactly the same as that in the passage from the A edi-
tion “Phenomenal/Noumenal” chapter: There must be correlate of a sen-
sible appearance, yet that correlate could not be represented sensibly
[even though it is directly sensed].
So how is that which gives what the senses receive to be character-
ized? Kant solves the problem in this passage by introducing an abstract
description, “transcendental object.” Since he describes the transcenden-
tal object as “nonsensible” in segment (1), it is somewhat shocking that he
then claims in the segment I indicate as (2) that humans attribute to it the
whole range and coherence of their possible perceptions. This abrupt
change has led Henry Allison to claim that the passage presents two
very different roles for “transcendental object” in Kants theory (1983,
251–52).16 One difficulty with Allisons hypothesis is that Kants discus-
sion flows seamlessly from the occurrence of this expression in (1) to
its occurrence in (2). The second usage is explicitly tied back to the
first by the anaphoric description, “to this transcendental object.” I
offer a simpler hypothesis.
What Kant means by “transcendental object” in the Antinomy pas-
sage is basically what he meant by the “transcendental object=X” at
A105, namely, a formal description of an object of empirical cognition.
Since, roughly,17 any object of empirical cognition must (a) cause sensory
representations in subjects and (b) have properties that could all belong
to one object both characteristics are part of the description. With the no-
tion of a “transcendental object,” he is able to solve what he takes to be
the difficulty of characterizing the correlate of sensation without using
forms of intuition—and without sacrificing his empirical realist principles.
Even if humans cannot have an intuition of the correlate of sensation,
they can still think abstractly about aspects of empirical objects as the
causes of sensations. As indicated in condition (b) above, at the end of
the cognitive process, subjects attribute a range of sensory and other
properties to empirical objects. The ordinary person has no qualms
about characterizing the causes of sensations as objects with various prop-
16 The two roles are that of the correlate of sensibility and the cause or ground of
the “matter” of human knowledge in general. (Allison 1983, 251–52)
17 I say roughly, because I am leaving out objects that cannot be sensed, such as
the other side of the moon, or objects that can no longer be sensed, because they
existed in the past. Kant takes these sorts of objects to be knowable by a chain of
inference from objects that can be sensed (A225/B272-A226/B273) and A493/
B521). The discussion of how to understand receptivity is introduced in terms
of the problem of knowledge of the past.
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erties. By contrast, the scientifically informed epistemologist who knows
the limits of the senses believes (falsely, it turns out) that he must be cir-
cumspect in characterizing the correlate of sensibility, and so falls back on
an abstract description, “transcendental object.” In introducing the con-
cept of the “transcendental object”, he thus saves the phenomena as caus-
es of sensations. What he does not do in the passage is appeal to noume-
nal causes.18
As we have seen, however, in the first edition, Kant employed the
concept of a “noumenon” to characterize that “which corresponds to ap-
pearance.” Since a “noumenon” is a creature of the mind—i.e. something
thought of as independent of sensibility, there is something very odd
about this terminology. He acknowledges as much, with the admission
that the representation of this correlate, is “indeed sensible” (A252,
cited above). The discussion takes an even stranger turn after the intro-
duction of the concept “noumenon.” He points out that it is entirely neg-
ative—meaning that it with it we think of something as such—“something
in which [we] abstract from all form of sensible intuition”. (A252, also
cited above)
He goes on to discuss the notion of a “transcendental object”:
[this is] the wholly indeterminate concept of something as such. This object
cannot be called the noumenon. For I do not know concerning it what it is in
itself, and have no concept of it except merely the concept of the object of a
sensible intuition as such—an object which, therefore, is the same for all ap-
pearances. I cannot think it through any categories; for a category holds only
for empirical intuition in order to bring it under the concept of an object as
such. (A253, my emphasis).
Given the Antinomy passage, which is common to both editions, and the
Amphiboly passage, which also labels that which is the basis of appearan-
ces a “transcendental object”19 and which is also common to both edi-
tions, he is being inconsistent. Both the “noumenon” and the “transcen-
dental object” correspond to appearances, but they are not to be identi-
fied.
The difference between the concept of “noumenon” and that of
“transcendental object” is that the former is a label for an object thought
18 On this basic point, I am in agreement with Allisons analysis (1983, 251–54).
19 This is the text: “The transcendental object, however, which may be the basis of
this appearance that we call matter, is a mere something, about which we would
not understand what it is even if someone were able to tell us. For we cannot un-
derstand anything except what carries with it, in intuition, something corre-
sponding to our words.” (A278/B334)
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of as independent from any form of sensible intuition at all, whereas the
latter is a label for an object thought of as independent from any partic-
ular form of sensible intuition—as an object of sensible intuition in gen-
eral. This difference suggests that the way to resolve the inconsistency is
to drop the already implausible idea that the noumenon is that which is
directly represented sensibly. And that appears to be what happens in
the second edition, where the two passages assigning the correlate of sen-
sation to the “transcendental object” are retained and the passage assign-
ing it to the “noumenon” is dropped. The argument for the necessity of
using the concept of a noumenon in the second edition is reduced to
the consideration raised at the end of the first edition (and repeated in
the second):
The concept of a noumenon, i. e. of a thing that is not to be thought at all as
an object of the senses but is to be thought (solely through a pure under-
standing) as a thing in itself, is not at all contradictory; for we cannot,
after all, assert of sensibility that it is the only possible kind of intuition
… (A254/ B310).
That is, what transcendental idealism implies is that since some properties
of objects reflect the forms of human sensibility, it is possible to think of
objects that are independent of those (or any other) forms of sensibility.
On this point, I agree with the main conclusion of Gerold Prausss ex-
haustive study of Kants uses of “thing in itself,” “transcendental object,”
and “noumenon.” This “restriction” argument is the central consideration
in favor of the necessity of using a concept of “noumenon” (1974/1989
90 ff.).
By contrast, Kants “considered” (i. e. second edition) view is that the
origins of human cognition are beyond its purview, not because they are
noumenal, but because they are inaccessible by either human sense or in-
tellect. They are inaccessible by sense, because outer sense cannot divulge
the workings of the mind (as Kant believes) and inner sense can display
only conscious perceptions already cloaked in the form of time. And since
temporal determinations do not enter through the senses, what does enter
is not an inner appearance/conscious perception. Neither can this process
be understood intellectually, since the minds intellectual resources—the
categories—can be employed to produce knowledge only when they can
be applied to intuitions (A253, cited above, second underscored seg-
ment). Still, despite the human incapacity to know how cognition works
in any detail, some general features are known (and admitted by all in de-
bates about cognition): knowledge of particular states of affairs and of
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particular concepts can be acquired only by causal interaction with ob-
jects. Hence the confident assertion at B1 that there can be no doubt
that cognition begins with objects stirring the senses. Kant believes that
humans can also come to understand through reading the Critique (or
through their own efforts20) that their cognition must (or seems to) em-
ploy certain universal principles as norms for empirical reality. Thus
they may have an explicit—but certainly have an implicit—abstract no-
tion of a sensible object as such, an object that corresponds to the sensa-
tions it causes and whose properties meet certain standards of coherence.
So, although he emphasizes the opacity of cognitive processes for humans,
he thinks that they are far from clueless about the bases of their knowl-
edge.21 To capture what humans do know implicitly (and possibly explic-
itly) about objects of cognition, while acknowledging what they dont
know, he introduces the concept of a “transcendental object.” This con-
cept, which is importantly different from that of a “noumenon,” fits
very well with his account of the blind synthesizing of obscure represen-
tations in the transcendental deduction.
How Can an Unconscious Given “Guide” Cognition?
McDowell believes that Kant would have avoided the myth of the Given
if he had not offered a transcendental story of noumenal affection (1994,
41, 46). Since noumenal affection is not Kants considered view, it may
seem that all is fine. In fact, the situation is more complicated. In a recent
essay, McDowell endorses the Kantian position that while cognition de-
pends on both intuitions and concepts, there is no reliance on an aconcep-
tual Given, because the unity of intuitions is also a result of the activities
of the understanding that produce the unity of concepts (2008, 8). Be-
cause of this fact “an intuitions content is all conceptual, in this sense:
it is in the intuition in a form in which one could make it, that very con-
tent, figure in discursive activity” (2008, 8).
This position is part of Kants view. It captures his claim that cogni-
tion is possible only because reason “prepares” the field for the under-
20 For further discussion, see Chapter 13, section 4 of my 2011.
21 This point is crucial for Kant, since he thinks that what is distinctive about
human cognition (as opposed to lower types of cognition common to animals)
is that humans know the reasons for their judgments. I offer evidence for this
claim in Chapter 9, section 3 of my 2011.
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standing in such a way that all perceptions can be brought under the cat-
egories (and so under concepts). It does not, however, do justice to his
insistence that intuitive and conceptual representations must be anchored
in sensations—in the effects that objects produce in cognizers.
McDowell takes Kant, as well as Sellars, to reject the idea that “sen-
sibility by itself could make things available for the sort of cognition that
draws on the subjects rational powers” (2008, 2).
This claim admits of two interpretations. On one it is incontestable:
No cognizer could justify a perceptual claim by appealing to a sensa-
tion—especially one of which he is unconscious. On the other, however,
it denies exactly what Kant asserts: The understanding is able to direct
the imagination to construct conscious perceptions only because sensibil-
ity has made available a pattern of sensations that can serve as an input to
the mechanisms that carry out the construction.
McDowell may be struck by the fact that when Kant characterizes the
synthesis speciosa, he lays great emphasis on the spontaneity of the under-
standing in directing the synthesis and contrasts that with the receptivity
of sense: “The synthesis of imagination is an exercise of spontaneity,
which is determinative, rather than merely determinable, as is sense”
(B151–152).
But three cautions are in order. Although the synthesis of apprehen-
sion is spontaneous, it does not produce concepts, but intuitions. Further,
the production of the intuition is not a rational, but a causal process, since
both the materials and the processing of them are unconscious. Finally,
although the understanding and its imaginative synthesis are determining
rather than determinable, they cannot float free of the character of the
sensations or Kantian epistemology would lose the guidance of experi-
ence. The understanding may dispose, but only when the senses pro-
pose—only when they make available a pattern of sensations that can
be determined in one of the ways in which the understanding is able to
determine.
In a recent paper, Hannah Ginsborg has objected to the approach to
the given just sketched on the grounds that it concedes too much to Em-
piricism and so ends up begging the question against the position. It con-
cedes too much because Kants
empiricist opponent might well simply insist … that, insofar as the uncon-
ceptualized manifold determines whether an object is to be represented
as a substance endowed with the quality of being green, or as a substance
endowed with the quality of being blue, then it is, eo ipso representing
what is given to us as green or as blue. (2006, 72)
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I think the term “determine” is not quite right. As I understand Kants
view of the relation between a sensation and a perception, it is analogous
to the relation between a planar projection and a solid object.22 A planar
projection does not determine the object of which it is a projection, since
differently sized and oriented objects can produce identical projections.
The object information is not given in the projection. Nonetheless, the
projection provides guidance for its three-dimensional interpretation;
the interpretation does not float free of the projection. By analogy, the
patterns and characters of sensations do not determine the conscious per-
ceptions to which they give rise, because they dont determine the types
and patterns of sensations that can be made into conscious perceptions.23
The understanding does that. In actual cases, however, the determination
can be carried out only when a suitable determinable has been made
available by the senses. Hence the question is not begged against the Em-
piricist, since the materials made available through the senses are guiding
but not determining in producing the conscious perception that is able to
provide a reason for a judgment. On Kants picture, the unconscious
given and the conceptual capacities of the understanding provide con-
straints on each other in the production of an intuition that can be the
basis of a rational belief.
As I present it, the Kantian solution to the problem of the myth of the
Given has a very odd feature. Although the understanding is supposed to
be spontaneous and the basis rational thought, its “direction” of the syn-
thesis of apprehension by the imagination is a “blind,” “brute causal”
process. Both McDowell and Ginsborg recognize that the understanding
can be involved in both the production of intuitions and the production
and use of concepts only if it operates in somewhat different ways in
the two cases (Ginsborg, 2006, 9124). Still, it is reasonable to object that
my Kant has the understanding functioning in perception in a most un-
understanding fashion. It seems to operate here just like the mechanical
22 This analogy would have been familiar to Kant, because Leibniz used it in the
new Essays to characterized the relation between primary and secondary quali-
ties (1765/1982, 131). On the other hand, Ive used the analogy before (1999) in a
discussion with which Ginsborg is familiar, so she may not find it persuasive
(though the context was somewhat different).
23 Ginsborg (2006, 73) rejects this sort of account on the grounds that it under-
mines the distinction between empirical and a priori concepts. As a general
point, this is correct, but on Kants view, empirical concepts are merely specifi-
cations of categorial concepts.
24 See also Longuenesse (1998, 63).
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processes of the animal mind that Kant, Leibniz, and other moderns used
as the contrast case for the human mind.
In a sense, this is correct. The only “rationality” involved in the un-
derstandings direction of the synthesis of apprehension is that of Mother
Nature; it is her “norms” that lead to the “positing of a representation as
such” (R4631, 17.615) or to the construction of a conscious perception
(A120n.). There is, nonetheless, a crucial difference between the cases,
one that provides a warrant for Kants claim that the understanding is
at work in constructing perceptions. In the human case, Natures norms
have an additional purpose, because they are useful to humans in a spe-
cial way. Unconscious processes work up the raw materials of sensation in
such a way that they are apt for the understandings capacity to look for
rules in the appearances of conscious perception. In this way, the under-
standing can discover or make explicit the rules operating in the phenom-
enal world and so come to use such rules normatively, by testing and re-
jecting them, by appealing to them to explain why the world is as it is.
Kant could assign the task of processing sensations into understanding-
friendly conscious perceptions to a different higher faculty. As noted,
he sometimes assigns it to “reason.” Since the fit is so close—representa-
tions are posited as representations of objects insofar as they conform to
the principles associated with the categories of the understanding—it
seems extravagant to hypothesize two faculties that operate in accord
with the same basic principles. So he opts instead for one faculty with
two modes of operation, one blind and one where the cognizer can be
aware of his representations as instantiating rules and so of the rational
relations among them.
Although I have defended Kants use of unconscious representations
in avoiding the Myth while preserving the essential role of the sensory
given in ways that his successors, as well as his predecessors, have not al-
ways managed, his solution comes at a high cost. It is only because he in-
sists that human cognition is possible only if it conforms to the categorial
principles that the first scrutiny works. Without this (in essence simplify-
ing) assumption, he could account for the inevitable suitability of con-
scious perceptions for the application of concepts only by the implausible
proposal that rules associated with all concepts conjointly act as norms for
positing representations of objects as such. Similar hypotheses are cur-
rently on offer, but most philosophers reject them as extravagant. Since
most philosophers are equally incredulous about Kants categories, its
far from obvious that looking to his philosophy for a dissolution of the
myth is going to be fruitful. This is not surprising, because he wasnt try-
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ing to solve the problem of the a posteriori, the given, but that of the a
priori, the constructed. Thats why the solution his theory implies for
the given depends on a commitment to a priori categories.
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The I Think Must Be Able To Accompany
All My Representations
Unconscious Representations and Self-consciousness in Kant
Dietmar H. Heidemann
Introduction
The proposition “The I think must be able to accompany all my represen-
tations” (CPR B 131) is one of the linchpins of Kants critical philosophy.
It is pivotal for several reasons: First, and foremost, it stands for the core
idea of the critical theory of apperception. Second, it plays a crucial role
in the argument of the transcendental deduction of the categories, and,
third, it mirrors Kants critical stance towards metaphysical conceptions
of the thinking I. Commentators from different philosophical back-
grounds have attacked the “I think”-proposition, not least because of
its odd wording. The formulation “must be able”, they argue, illegitimate-
ly conflates necessity and possibility, and thereby renders the whole
sentence contradictory. In this respect one of the most striking criticisms
is Schopenhauers interpretation according to which the proposition does
not make sense since it is “a problematic-apodictic enunciation, or, in
plain English, a proposition taking away with one hand what it gives
with the other.”1 In substance, Schopenhauers unease about the “I
think”-proposition is unjustified for the oddity of its formulation is due
to the ambitious epistemological goal Kant is aiming at. This goal is two-
fold. It not only consists in an epistemological explanation of the possibil-
ity of consciousness of representations as elements of cognition. As a by-
product the “I think”-proposition likewise explains by means of a theory
1 Cf. Schopenhauer (1977, 554) (“[…] eine problematisch-apodiktische Enuntia-
tion; zu Deutsch, ein Satz, der mit der einen Hand nimmt, was er mit der ander-
en giebt.” Cf. Schopenhauer (1977, 54). For a similar criticism see Strawson
(1966, 93).
of self-consciousness the possibility of unconscious representations, i. e.,
representations we have without being conscious of them.
The explanation of the possibility of unconscious representations on
the basis of a theory of self-consciousness shouldnt be taken for granted
since the connection between (self-)consciousness and unconscious repre-
sentations seems to be paradoxical. As Kant himself puts it: “A contradic-
tion appears to lie in the claim to have representations and still not be
conscious of them; for how could we know that we have them if we are
not conscious of them?”2 According to Kants own theory, we can in
fact have representations and still not be conscious of them. For we
have obscure, i. e. , unconscious, as opposed to clear representations. Com-
mentators usually agree that in Kants theory unconscious representa-
tions are restricted to the field of obscure representations. As I argue,
in the transcendental theory also the clear but indistinct representations
must be considered as unconscious representations. Moreover, they are
not unconscious as such but either indistinct conceptual or indistinct in-
tuitional representations. It follows that for Kant there is a certain kind
of conceptual or intuitional representations that are unconscious, or, to
put it another way, there is mental content that is not accompanied by
the “I think”. From this it follows that although the “I think”-conscious-
ness, or self-consciousness, is discursive since it forms an “analytical
unity” (cf. CPR B 133), not all conceptual mental content is accompanied
by the “I think”. This is quite remarkable since this means that there
would be unconscious conceptual or intuitional representations bearing
phenomenality and intentionality. I argue that it is the “I think”-proposi-
tion that provides the explanatory ground for that very possibility.
The paper is divided into three sections: The first section presents an
outline of the distinction between obscure and clear representations in
Kants philosophy on the backdrop of the Leibnizian-Wolffian theory.
Section two moves on to a more detailed analysis of the relation Kant es-
tablishes between clear representations and transcendental apperception.
Here it becomes evident how the transcendental apperception must be
conceived of as regulating principle of conscious as well as of unconscious
representations. The concluding section points to some important conse-
quences unconscious representations have for the possibility of non-con-
ceptual content. It develops the argument according to which there is
2 Cf. Anthropology, Kant (2007, 246), AA 7:135. If not otherwise mentioned all
citations from Kants works refer to the Akademie Ausgabe (AA) of Kants Ge-
sammelte Schriften (1900ff).
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non-conceptual content and that on the basis of the “I think”-proposition
non-conceptual content must count as unconscious mental content. Thus
the theory of unconscious representations explains the possibility of non-
conceptual content.
1. Obscure and Clear Representations
In his own account of the unconscious Kant critically reinterprets the ra-
tionalist conception of the distinction between obscure and clear repre-
sentations. Although Kants discussion of that conception provides the
ground for the transcendental distinction between sensibility and under-
standing, his account of the unconscious itself is independent of the dis-
tinction between the two sources of knowledge in transcendental philos-
ophy. That is to say, his arguments against the rationalist distinction be-
tween obscure and clear representations do not at the same time justify
the transcendental distinction between sensibility and understanding, or
intuition and concept respectively. Whereas his criticism of the rational-
ists distinction between obscure and clear representations points to an
immanent misconception of their analysis of clear representations as con-
fused and distinct ideas, his objections to the rationalist explanation of the
difference between sensibility and understanding identify inconsistencies
in their account of intuition and concept as kinds of representations. As
we will see this turns out to be a crucial point.
1.1. Leibniz on Unconscious Ideas
Though his transcendental theory of consciousness is in many ways
unique, Kant, in his explanation of the possibility of unconscious repre-
sentations, to a certain extent relies on the rationalist antecedents. This
goes especially for the terminology he makes use of.3 For that reason,
in Kants critical conception of representation, rationalist philosophers
like Wolff, Baumgarten, and Meier loom large. These authors more or
less directly rely on Leibniz who by and large shapes the modern discus-
sion of the distinction between conscious and unconscious representa-
tions.
3 Since this fact has been widely acknowledged in the literature I will only point to
those aspects of Kants reception of rationalist accounts of the unconscious that
are indispensable for my argument. For a somewhat broader discussion cf. La
Rocca (2008b, 48–58), and especially La Rocca (2007, 65–76, 76–87).
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Leibniz theory is particularly helpful to grasp the main differences
between the rationalist and the Kantian account of the unconscious. In
this respect the essay Meditationes de Cognitione, veritate et Ideis (1684)
is most revealing. There, as a critique of Descartes, Leibniz sets out to de-
termine the difference between true and false ideas. He writes:
Est ergo cognitio vel obscura vel clara, et clara rursus vel confusa vel distinc-
ta, et distincta vel inadaequta vel adaequata, item vel symbolica vel intuiti-
va: et quidem si simul adaequata et intuitiva sit, perfectissima est.4
At the top level Leibniz distinguishes between obscure and clear cogni-
tion. The latter can either be confused or distinct, and distinct cognition
can be inadequate, adequate, symbolic or intuitive. If cognition is both,
adequate and intuitive, it is most complete. With respect to the problem
of the unconscious the distinction obscure-clear cognition on the one
hand, and confused-distinct cognition on the other, is the most signifi-
cant one. Leibniz doesnt speak of obscure cognition but of obscure no-
tion (“notio”) as a kind of representation, obviously because in his eyes
cognition as such cannot be obscure.5 Accordingly, obscure, i. e., uncon-
scious notions are those ideas that are not sufficient for recognizing some-
thing actually represented. If I am, for example, remembering a flower
that I have seen before, without being able to recognize it, i. e. , to distin-
guish it from similar things, then the notion I have of that flower is ob-
scure. Whereas in this case Leibniz refers to perception and memory im-
ages, the same goes for concepts. Hence, those concepts that I cannot ad-
equately define are obscure concepts.6 The opposite of what Leibniz calls
obscure notion is clear cognition which in turn he describes according
to the possibility of recognition of that cognition. Thus the criterion of
distinguishing between obscure and clear cognition is recognition.
Leibniz differentiates two kinds of clear cognition. Clear cognition is
confused if I cannot list enough features or marks pertaining to a thing
that nevertheless really has them. For instance, in sensation we are able
to sufficiently distinguish between colors, tastes, smells etc. However,
we are unable to sufficiently discriminate sensations by means of concep-
4 Leibniz (1684, 422).
5 In the Nouveaux Essays (cf. Leibniz (1704, 236 ff. ; I. xxix, §§ 2 ff.)) Leibniz ba-
sically makes the same distinction like in the Meditationes. The term he uses
there is “ide”. This indicates that “notio” in the Meditationes should be trans-
lated as idea or representation, not as notion or concept in the narrow sense
of the word.
6 Cf. Leibniz (1684, 422).
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tual descriptions. Clear but distinct notions, on the other hand, are those
that enable us to distinguish one thing from another similar thing with the
help of a sufficiently great and precise number of marks, e.g., if someone
clearly distinguishes between different kinds of metal. The adequate list
of such marks is what makes up the nominal definition of distinct con-
cepts like number, size or shape. Although non-composite concepts
cannot be defined, Leibniz is not willing to give up the possibility of dis-
tinct cognition of simple concepts.
The Nouveaux Essais (1704) are more explicit about the last point.
Contrary to what his interlocutor, Philalethes, the representative of
Locke, claims with respect to simple ideas, which he just takes to be
clear (“Nos Ides simples et claires […]”), Theophilus, the representative
of Leibniz, maintains that what already has been exposed in the Medita-
tiones is equally true of clear ideas no matter whether they are simple or
composite (“[…] jay donn une definition des Ides claires, commune
aux simples et aux composes […].”).7 With respect to the distinction be-
tween obscure and clear ideas the Nouveaux Essais basically proceed like
the Meditationes. Leibniz yet points out that Philalethess characteriza-
tion of distinct ideas in terms of the possibility to clearly distinguish
ideas from one another with the help of differentiating marks is unsatis-
factory since in this case clear ideas couldnt be distinguished from dis-
tinct ideas. However, they must since confused ideas form the second sub-
species of clear ideas. Leibniz insistence on confused and distinct ideas as
the two subspecies of clear ideas is of utmost importance for his concep-
tion of unconscious representations since for Leibniz not only obscure but
also confused ideas count as unconscious ideas. According to the Nou-
veaux Essais, obscure ideas are those ideas we have that are insufficient
for distinguishing one thing from another. Leibniz believes that ideas
we receive from sensible objects (“choses sensibles”) are obscure, since
even if sensible objects appear to be identical they nevertheless can reveal
differences that we were not aware of, that is to say differences that in fact
existed but that we were unconscious of in our perception of the object.
Clear ideas, on the other hand, enable us to unambiguously discriminate
things.8 Now confused ideas are those clear ideas that cannot be defined,
and that we can only know from examples (“par des examples”) like a
particular taste or smell.9 Like distinct ideas they enable us to distinguish
7 Leibniz (1704, 236; I. xxix, § 2).
8 Leibniz (1704, 236 f.; I. xxix, § 2).
9 Leibniz (1704, 237; I. xxix, § 4).
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between things, nevertheless only the distinct ones enable us to discrim-
inate things and give definitions of their ideas. Confused ideas dont,
for they are deficient simply in that they lack conceptual clearness.
Now in order to further elucidate his conception of unconscious ideas,
in the Nouveaux Essays Leibniz illustrates their significance and function
with the help of several examples. The idea of a heap of stones, for in-
stance, is confused as long as one doesnt recognize the number of the
stones and other properties that can be ascribed to the heap. Suppose
the heap is composed of thirty six stones. If someone perceives the
heap without recognizing the exact number of stones, that person
wouldnt be aware of the fact that the stones could form a square of a cer-
tain size (62). The same goes for a thousand-sided figure. Unless we know
the exact number of sides we only have a confused idea of that figure. In
fact, Philalethes considers the case where someone might think of a thou-
sand-sided figure thereby having an obscure idea of the figure and a dis-
tinct idea of the number of the sides. For one cannot have, he maintains,
an exact idea of a thousand-sided figure such that one would be able to
distinguish it from a figure that only has 999 sides. Leibniz objects to
this that it is perfectly possible to have both, a distinct idea of the figure
as well as of the number one thousand for Philalethes just mixes up the
idea of a thousand-sided figure with its image: “je nay quune ide con-
fuse et de la figure et de son nombre, jusqu ce que je distingue le nom-
bre en comptant. Mais layant trouv, je connois trs bien la nature et les
propriets de polygone propos […].”10 Hence, someone who is able to
determine the exact number of sides a figure has just by sight, or someone
who is able to determine the exact weight of a body just by carrying it,
does not have a clear but only a confused idea of that figure, or weight
respectively since this idea does not convey any information about the fig-
ures or weights nature.11
So Leibniz basically distinguishes between two kinds of unconscious
ideas. First, unconscious ideas are obscure ideas. They are a kind of per-
ception, as he says in the Monadologie (1714), “[…] dont on ne sapper-
Åoit pas” though they are different from sense-perception and conscious-
ness.12 Unconscious ideas of this kind are “petites perceptions, o	 il y a
rien de distingu”. In cases where our mental state is predominated by
10 Cf. Leibniz (1704, 242 f; I.xxix, § 13).
11 Cf. Leibniz (1704, 242 f; I.xxix, § 13).
12 Cf. Leibniz, Monadologie, (1714, 608 f; § 14).
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them, we literally loose consciousness or fall unconscious.13 Secondly, un-
conscious ideas are confused ideas, i. e., clear ideas that allow for differ-
entiation, however, not in a distinct way which requires knowledge of
the nature of something. Consequently, obscure and confused ideas are
distinguished in that obscure ideas do not provide any basis for the differ-
entiation between things whereas confused ideas do, however, without
telling us more than a particular thing being different from another thing.
The Leibnizian account of unconscious ideas, to be more precise, of
the distinction between obscure and clear, or confused and distinct cogni-
tion is highly ambiguous. One problem among others is that in his de-
scriptions he obviously does not determine the nature or essence of ob-
scure and clear, or confused and distinct cognition respectively, i. e., he
does not define what these kinds of ideas are. Leibniz rather lays out cri-
teria by means of which we can identify ideas of that sort. Another prob-
lem is that within the field of obscure ideas there seem to be different de-
grees of obscurity which range from completely unconscious, unnoticed
ideas to less unconscious ideas like ideas of unnoticed parts of consciously
perceived objects. One would expect Leibniz to explain when and how an
unconscious idea passes the threshold of consciousness, and in turn when
and how a confused idea passes the threshold to the unconscious. Since he
believes that all ideas we receive from external objects are obscure or at
least confused, one might ask oneself why there couldnt be cases in
which sense-perception is clear and distinct.
1.2. Kants Critique of the Leibnizian Account of Unconscious Ideas
It was not before Kant that Leibniz theory of ideas was fundamentally
questioned although in his own account of the unconscious Kant in
some respects still relies on Leibniz. Yet there are two fundamental differ-
ences between Leibniz and Kants account of unconscious ideas which
make both conceptions incompatible. First, for reasons to be explained,
for Kant the opposition distinct-confused is mistaken. Clear ideas are
rather distinct or indistinct; confused ideas form a subset of indistinct
ideas. Second, unlike unconscious ideas conscious ideas are rule governed
due to the spontaneous activity of the “I think” which must be able to ac-
company all my representations. The logical function of the “I think” ex-
plains why, unlike in Leibniz, also ideas derived from sense-perception
can be clear and distinct. In the Anthropology from a pragmatic point
13 Cf. Leibniz, Monadologie, (1714, 610 f; § 21).
The I Think Must Be Able To Accompany All My Representations 43
of view Kant agrees with Leibniz and his followers that there are obscure
as opposed to clear ideas or representations (“Vorstellungen”). Obscure
representations are representations that we have without knowing that
we have them, i. e., without being directly conscious of them. Clear rep-
resentations are those representations we are directly conscious of, and,
as Kant specifies, “[…] when their clarity also extends to the partial rep-
resentations that make up a whole together with their connection, they
are then called distinct representations, whether of thought or intu-
ition.”14 The specification according to which distinct representations
can be equally of thought or intuition, already indicates the major differ-
ence between Kants and Leibniz theory of representation. Whereas for
Leibniz sensible ideas cannot be distinct, for Kant they can. On the other
hand, Kant concurs with Leibniz that in sense-perception there can be ob-
scure representations, for instance, “[w]hen I am conscious of seeing a
human being far from me in a meadow, even though I am not conscious
of seeing his eyes, nose, mouth, etc. […].”15 From my conscious percep-
tion of the human being I can conclude that I have obscure representa-
tions of what I cannot actually see or discriminate from the distance.16
In this sense we indirectly know that we have unconscious representa-
tions. Like Leibniz Kant maintains that the elucidation of sense-percep-
tion with the help of technical means like the “telescope” or “micro-
scope” proves that in the aftermath sense-perception contains much
more than we normally are aware of in ordinary perception. This holds
true for all of our senses, and this is why “[…] the field of obscure repre-
sentations is the largest in the human being.”17
Only until this point Kant, to a greater or lesser extent, agrees with
Leibniz; however, concerning the differentiation of clear representa-
tions their theories fundamentally diverge. Accordingly, “clarity” is
“[c]onsciousness of ones representations that suffices for the distinction
of one object from another”. “But that consciousness by means of which
the composition of representations also becomes clear is called distinct-
ness.” Distinctness is what makes representations knowledge. It includes
14 Cf. Anthropology, Kant (2007, 246), AA 7:135.
15 Cf. Anthropology, Kant (2007, 246), AA 7:135.
16 Similarly in the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant says that in the percep-
tion of the pyramids in Egypt from too far away “the parts that are apprehended
(the stones piled on top of one another) are represented only obscurely”. Cf.
Kant (2000, 136), AA 5:252.
17 Cf. Anthropology, Kant (2007, 247), AA 7:136.
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“order”, “unity of consciousness” and a “rule for the combination”.18 As
we know from the first Critique the “I think” or transcendental appercep-
tion is the source of all synthetic, rule-governed cognitive structure. Now
the point Kant makes is that, unlike Leibniz does, one cannot contrast dis-
tinct representation with confused representation since the opposite of
“distinct” is “indistinct”. The argument is an indirect one. Every confused
idea must be composite since confusion means lack of order and order
implies composition of elements. By definition simple ideas are non-com-
posite. Hence, they cannot exhibit (order or) confusion. Although Kant
doesnt give an example he nonetheless maintains that simple ideas can
be (distinct or) indistinct such that we are (conscious or) unconscious
of them. Here he seems to directly refer to Leibniz who argues that dis-
tinct ideas are composite since we can define them in nominal definitions.
On the other hand, he is well aware of the difficulty that in this case sim-
ple ideas, since they are not composite and hence indefinable, couldnt be
distinct. However, this seems to be implausible for why shouldnt simple
ideas be distinct by the same token. For the sake of the generic distinction
confused-distinct Leibniz nevertheless holds onto the view that simple
ideas, though not composite and indefinable, can be distinct which is in-
consistent with his overall theory.19
For Kant this inconsistency results from the mistaken analysis of clear
ideas. In order to explain the possibility of conscious or unconscious sim-
ple ideas, clear ideas must be analyzed in terms of their distinctness or in-
distinctness, not as Leibniz does in terms of distinctness and confusion.
This is in line with the standard example of a simple representation
Kant gives in other contexts, i. e., “the simple representation of the I”
(CPR B 68).20 In self-consciousness I can explicitly refer to myself as
“I”, i. e., as the subject of thought. However, I can equally direct the
focus of my consciousness on an activity I am performing, e.g., playing
chess, and thereby not being constantly aware of the thought that its
me who is performing though I am so to speak in the background of
my mental activity. In the first case, I have a distinct idea or representa-
tion of myself. In the second, the representation I have of myself is indis-
tinct but not confused since “I” is a simple representation. Order and con-
18 Cf. Anthropology, Kant (2007, 248 f), AA 7:137 f).
19 Cf. Leibniz (1684, 422 f).
20 Cf. CPR B 135: “For through the I, as a simple representation, nothing manifold
is given; […]”. Translations from the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (CPR, first edi-
tion A, second edition B) are taken from Kant (1998).
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fusion, as Kant argues, are factors that only seem suitable to explain how
in some representations distinctness and indistinctness comes about.
“Confusion is”, he says, “the cause of indistinctness, not the definition
of it” whereas order is the cause of distinctness.21 Therefore each “con-
fused cognition” is indistinct, however, not every indistinct cognition is
confused.22 As mentioned earlier, according to Kant non-composite, sim-
ple cognition neither exhibits order nor confusion. Consequently, simple
representations that never become distinct are unconscious (indistinct)
not because they are confused but because they are non-composite. Cor-
respondingly, the indistinctness of composite representations, i. e., repre-
sentations that do contain a manifold of marks, does not arise from con-
fusion but from consciousness itself. For I can be conscious of the order of
the manifold of a representation while the degree of consciousness dimin-
ishes.23 So distinctness and indistinctness of representations cannot in
each case be traced back to order and confusion, no matter whether
they are simple or composite. Hence, those distinct representations that
are caused by order of their elements only constitute a subset of distinct
representations. In parallel, those indistinct representations that originate
in the confusion of their elements only constitute a subset of indistinct
representations.
This account of distinct and indistinct representations has far-reach-
ing consequences for the distinction between sensibility and understand-
ing, or intuition and concept respectively. Although Kant concedes to the
rationalists that sensibility can contain unconscious representations, he
disagrees with them that sensibility must be conceived in terms of indis-
tinct (confused) representations. For the distinction distinct-indistinct is
“formal” rather than “real”. However, the difference between sensibility
and understanding is not merely a formal or logical one; it also concerns
“the content of thought”: It
was a great error of the Leibniz-Wolffian school […] to posit sensibility in a
lack (of clarity in our partial ideas), and consequently in indistinctness, and
to posit the character of ideas of understanding in distinctness.24
21 Cf. Anthropology, Kant (2007, 249), AA 7:138, and Lectures on Logic (J
sche),
Kant (1992, 545), AA IX:34.
22 Cf. Lectures on Logic (J
sche), Kant (1992, 545), AA IX:34.
23 Cf. Lectures on Logic (J
sche), Kant (1992, 546), AA IX:35. What Kant says
here is similar to what he explicates in the “Anticipation of Perception” of the
first Critique (A 165/B 207ff) with respect to objects of sensation.
24 Cf. Anthropology, Kant (2007, 251), AA 7:140n.
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Intuitive (sensibility) and conceptual (understanding) representations
rather are distinct in that cognition is a composite of two independent el-
ements that are epistemic factors on their own. They are not just two sides
of the same coin, i. e. the distinct and indistinct sides of representations.
Kant lays the foundation of this new, i. e., critical account of sensibility
and understanding in his semi-critical period, in his short essay Concern-
ing the Ultimate Foundation of the Distinction of the Directions in Space
(1768). There he argues against Leibniz that the directions of space can-
not fully be grasped merely by conceptual descriptions since spatial direc-
tions are represented through intuition, and intuitional representation
cannot be reduced to conceptual representation:
Our considerations make it plain that the determinations of space are not
consequences of the positions of the parts of matter relative to each
other. On the contrary, the latter are the consequences of the former.25
It follows that intuition and concept are independent elements of cogni-
tion. Two years later in his Inaugural Dissertation On the form and prin-
ciples of the sensible and the intelligible world Kant formulates this insight
in the following way:
[…] one can see that the sensitive is poorly defined as that which is more
confusedly cognised, and that which belongs to the understanding as that
of which there is a distinct cognition. For these are only logical distinctions
which do not touch at all the things given, which underlie every logical com-
parison. Thus, sensitive representations can be very distinct and representa-
tions which belong to the understanding can be extremely confused.26
The Critique of Pure Reason still presents the same line of argument. In
the Transcendental Aesthetics Kant declares once again that it is a “fal-
sification of the concept of sensibility” to maintain that “our entire sensi-
bility is nothing but the confused representation of things, which contains
solely that which pertains to them in themselves but only under a heap of
marks and partial representations that we can never consciously separate
from one another”. This explanation is mistaken since the opposition in-
distinct-distinct is “merely logical, and does not concern the content.”
25 Concerning the Ultimate Foundation, Kant (2003, 371), AA 2:383.
26 Cf. On the form and principles, Kant (2003, 387), AA 2:394. See also Prolegome-
na, Kant (2002, 85), AA 4:290; What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in
Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff, Kant (2002, 368 f; 372–375),
AA 20:278, 281–285; Lectures on Metaphysics, Kant (1997, 47, 248 f) AA
28:227; 29:879).
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(CPR A 43/B 60 f) Kant shows why with the help of the following exam-
ple:
Without doubt the concept of right that is used by the healthy understand-
ing contains the very same things that the most subtle speculation can
evolve out of it, only in common and practical use one is not conscious of
these manifold representations in these thoughts. Thus one cannot say
that the common concept is sensible and contains a mere appearance, for
right cannot appear at all; rather its concept lies in the understanding and
represents a constitution (the moral constitution) of actions that pertains
to them in themselves. […] The Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy has there-
fore directed all investigations of the nature and origin of our cognitions
to an entirely unjust point of view in considering the distinction between
sensibility and the intellectual as merely logical […]. (CPR A 43 f/B 61).27
The Logic has even a more differentiate take on this crucial point. Ac-
cordingly, it is perfectly possible to have both, indistinct intuitional and
conceptual representations as well as distinct intuitional and conceptual
representations: (1) As we know already, Kant like Leibniz allows for in-
distinct representations in sensibility since in our perception of, e. g., a
country house from the distance we may not see, i. e., be conscious of
all parts of the house like windows, doors, etc. Theses unconscious intui-
tional representations are indistinct. The same goes for concepts. We may
have a clear concept of beauty although we might not be in a position to
list all the marks pertaining to that concept like being sensuous, pleasing
universally etc. In this case the concept we have is indistinct. (2) Likewise
intuitions and concepts can be distinct. In ordinary perception we see the
Milky Way as an unstructured manifold of heavenly appearances. By
means of a telescope it is, however, possible to make our perception dis-
tinct in that now the perception of individual stars and structures becomes
possible. Again, the same goes for concepts. Concepts can be distinct in
that we can analyze them, i. e., become conscious of the marks they con-
tain. The concept of virtue, for instance, can be analyzed such that we be-
come conscious of its marks like freedom, duty, overcoming of inclina-
tions etc. There is thus no doubt that sensible intuitions can be not only
indistinct but also distinct as concepts can be not only distinct but also in-
distinct.28
The conclusion to be drawn from Kants critique of the Leibnizian-
Wolffian distinction between (indistinct) sensibility and (distinct) under-
standing is that sensibility is capable of distinct representations as well
27 Cf. CPR A 269 ff/325 ff.
28 Cf. Lectures on Logic (J
sche), Kant (1992, 546), AA 9:35.
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as the understanding is capable of indistinct representations. Consequent-
ly the Leibnizian-Wolffian distinction does not hold. Recalling Kants ob-
jection to the Leibnizian-Wolffian distinction between distinct and con-
fused ideas according to which the accurate distinction is between distinct
and indistinct ideas, the whole argument appears rather embarrassing. For
Kant objects to the Leibnizian-Wolffian distinction between sensibility
and understanding in terms of the distinction distinct-indistinct that
this distinction is inaccurate since it is purely logical. To be sure, this is
not a contradiction since in the first case the critique exclusively refers
to the question of how to correctly analyze clear as conscious and uncon-
scious representations. Although there is a systematic relation to the
problem of the difference between sensibility and understanding, the re-
sponse Kant gives to this question only applies to the problem of the un-
conscious. With respect to the second case it does not provide an explan-
ation since the difference between sensibility and understanding as such
does not affect the problem of the unconscious.29 This is why Kant can
claim that clear representations are either distinct or indistinct, although
the distinction between sensibility and understanding cannot be explained
in terms of distinctness-indistinctness. However, for the purpose of my ar-
gument both cases must be considered.30 It turns out that there are two
main classes of unconscious representations, namely obscure and indis-
tinct representations whereby indistinct representations can be intuitional
as well as conceptual. This is an important detail of his theory of the un-
conscious since for Kant there obviously are two different kinds of uncon-
scious representations. Now the difficulty arises of how in particular we
must conceive of clear as unconscious or indistinct representations. For
clear representations are accompanied by the “I think” which, according
to the “I think”-proposition, ensures their being objects of clear con-
sciousness. If this is so, how then can clear but indistinct ideas be uncon-
scious?
29 Cf. La Rocca (2008b, 56).
30 What I am not going to consider in this paper is the question of whether or not
Kants criticism does justice to Leibniz theory. Such an examination would in-
volve a much too broad discussion and comparison of both theories. It is, how-
ever, obvious that in his metaphysics, i. e., in his monadology, Leibniz starts from
premises that are very different from the Kantian fundaments, especially since
he conceives of representing monads as the ontological basis of reality. Kants
theory of representation is independent of ontological assumptions of this
kind. I think La Rocca (2008b, 50) is right in pointing this out.
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2. Unconscious Representations and Transcendental Apperception
As we have seen above, on the top-level Kant distinguishes between ob-
scure and clear representations. Unfortunately, in his work he frequently
uses obscure in the broadest sense of unconscious. Thus he even refers
to clear but indistinct representations as obscure representations. In order
to avoid confusion, in what follows, let me call all top-level obscure rep-
resentations unconscious simpliciter. For Kant conceives of them as rep-
resentations that we have without being conscious of them. By contrast,
clear but indistinct representations are unconscious but not unconscious
simpliciter. Let me call them unconscious by degrees. Analogously,
clear and distinct representations are conscious simpliciter whereas
clear but indistinct representations are conscious by degrees. Hence indis-
tinct representations are neither unconscious simpliciter nor conscious
simpliciter, they are both unconscious by degrees and conscious by de-
grees.
It is somewhat striking that Kant is not particularly interested in rep-
resentations that are unconscious simpliciter. The Anthropology only in-
forms us that obscure representations are contained in sense-perception
(“and thus also in animals”) such as in sight or in the “sensations of hear-
ing, when a musician plays a fantasy on the organ with ten fingers and
both feet and also speaks with someone standing next to him.”31 Here
Kant envisages complex practical or intellectual activities that involve
multitasking of a certain kind which only allows for consciously focusing
on one activity while, like the musician, having other representations un-
consciously in the mind. Another example Kant gives of obscure, i. e.,
representations that are unconscious simpliciter is “sexual love”.32 In
fact obscure representations not only appear as the mere feeling or con-
tent of sensation but also as higher cognitive ideas like the “feeling” of
“supersensible determination”33, reason of law34, or as the idea of meta-
physics.35 Even the understanding itself can operate obscurely, or uncon-
sciously simpliciter.36
31 Cf. Anthropology, Kant (2007, 247), AA 7:136.
32 Cf. Anthropology, Kant (2007, 247), AA 7:136.
33 Cf. CJ, Kant (2000, 172), AA 5:292 (translation modified).
34 Cf. Metaphysics of Morals, AA 6:345.
35 Cf. Metaphysics of Morals, AA 6:216, 376.
36 For details see La Rocca (2008a). Cf. CJ, Kant (2000, 122), AA 5:238.
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Although it might be difficult to draw the exact line between obscure
and indistinct representations the general idea is that representations that
are unconscious simpliciter do not exhibit logical order or unity whereas
representations that are unconscious by degrees do to a certain extent.
They do since we do have cognitive access to them. In Kants theory of
representation having cognitive access means to be able to accompany
representations with the “I think”; this implies bringing about logical
structure among representations, i. e., logical unity in judgment. Hence
obscure representations, although they might have an impact on our psy-
chological life, are cognitively inaccessible to us for they are unconscious
simpliciter such that we do not even know that we have them. On the
other hand, representations that are unconscious by degrees are cogni-
tively accessible according to the epistemological function Kant attributes
to the “I think”-proposition. This function is to be understood in terms of
the central argument of § 16 (CPR B 131–136) that has the “I think”-
proposition as its first premise:
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations […].
That representation that can be given prior to all thinking is called intuition.
Thus all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the I think […]
(CPR B 131 f).37
Though the conclusion tells us that the “manifold of intuition” has “a nec-
essary relation to the I think”, the argument is not that the “I think” nec-
essarily accompanies intuition. Kant rather claims that since intuition is
representation it is necessarily related to the “I think” according to its
possibility. From this it obviously follows that, given premise one, there
can be representations that are not per se thought by the “I think” al-
though as such they must be able to be accompanied by the “I think”.
Hence, representations actually accompanied by the “I think” are con-
scious representations, i. e., representations I am explicitly aware of.
Kant illustrates this by considering what it would mean if the “I think”
wouldnt be able to accompany representations. In this case “something
would be represented in me that could not be thought at all”. There
are two possibilities of unthinkable representations: representations
that would be (i) “impossible”, or (ii) “nothing for me” (CPR B 131 f).
In either case the “I think” is unable to accompany representations, how-
ever, for different reasons. In the first case it is unable to accompany rep-
resentations contentswise. Here representations are “impossible” if they
37 See also Cramer (1987, 167).
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are contradictory or illogical like the idea of a round circle, the mathe-
matical equation 5+7=13, or the thought that the reader of this article
does not exist. I might be able to somehow mentally generate such con-
tradictory ideas yet I am not able to make them intelligible, i. e., to ac-
company them with the “I think” since they are logically “impossible”
ideas. In the second case the “I think” is unable to accompany represen-
tations for cognitive reasons. Here Kant alludes to unconscious represen-
tations, to be more precise, representations that are unconscious simplicit-
er. For representations that are unconscious simpliciter are “nothing for
me” not because of what they represent or for logical reasons but because
I do not know that I have them.
It not only seems natural to classify representations that are “nothing
for me” as obscure representations but also to call those representations
that are able to be accompanied by the “I think” clear representations.
Representations that are actually accompanied by the “I think” would
then be conscious simpliciter, i. e. , clear and distinct. But what about rep-
resentations that are unconscious as well as conscious by degrees, i. e.,
clear and indistinct? According to the argument of § 16, all representa-
tions that can be accompanied by the “I think”, henceforth also represen-
tations that are unconscious as well as conscious by degrees, are governed
by the principle of transcendental self-consciousness. For transcendental
self-consciousness is “original apperception” and “produces the represen-
tation I think” (CPR B 132). The “transcendental unity of self-conscious-
ness” thus explains why representations are “my representations”. They
are mine because they belong to my self-consciousness as the unity of
my thinking such that I am able to refer to them as content of my con-
sciousness. Kants crucial point is that representations that are my repre-
sentations nonetheless do not need to be representations I am conscious
of, i. e., do not need to be conscious simpliciter. Kant emphasizes that
“even if I am not conscious of them as such” (CPR B 132) representations
can be my representations as long as they stand under the “transcenden-
tal unity of self-consciousness”, that is to say as long as the “I think” is
able to accompany them. Thus representations that I am not conscious
of as such, although they are not unconscious simpliciter but unconscious
by degrees, must be classified as clear and indistinct. The fact that I can
cognitively access them explains why they are unconscious as well as con-
scious by degrees. According to the “I think”-proposition cognitive access
to them is possible since the “I think” is able to actualize its accompany-
ing function. In the Logic (AA 9:33 f) Kant explains this by means of the
following example: A “savage” who perceives a house from the distance
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without being familiar with its function, i. e., that it is a habitation for hu-
mans etc., sees the same physical object as someone who is familiar with
its function. Whereas this person has clear cognition of the house accord-
ing to its intuition and concept, the “savage” only has an intuition of an
object of some sort. In this case the representation is obscure. The argu-
ment obviously is that the representation of the house is unconscious sim-
pliciter because the “savage” does not know that the object she is repre-
senting is a house; and representations we have without knowing that we
have them are by definition unconscious simpliciter.38 Kant now varies the
case, arguing that if we perceive a house from far away while being aware
that the perceived object in fact is a house, we would necessarily co-rep-
resent its windows, doors and other parts it has, although we cannot ac-
tually identify them as such in perception. In this case the representation
of the house is indistinct since we are not conscious of the manifold of its
parts. The fundamental difference between the two cases is that in the
first case the representation is unconscious simpliciter because the repre-
senting person, the savage, does not have available conceptual knowledge
of what a house is. In the second case such knowledge is available; how-
ever, there are cognitive reasons (perception from the distance) why the
representation is nevertheless indistinct. It is indistinct because the house
is perceived from the distance so that the parts of the house cannot be
clearly distinguished.
The reason why indistinct representations are not unconscious simpli-
citer but by degrees is thus that they fall within the scope of the “I think”.
However, the “I think” is not in any case responsible for the fact that
there are indistinct representations for there might be external circum-
stances like lack of information, or conditions of perception that account
for their being unconscious. Transcendental self-consciousness is to be
conceived as the principle that governs the cognitive access to represen-
tations we have. If, Kant argues, our consciousness not only “suffices for
the distinction of one object from another” but also makes “the compo-
sition of our representations […] clear”, it is distinct. Hence distinctness is
what makes up “knowledge”, “in which order is thought in this manifold,
because every conscious combination presupposes unity of consciousness,
38 The question is not whether or not the “savage” has a clear and distinct repre-
sentation of a physical object. Of cause she has since she knows that there is a
physical object in her visual field. However, her representation of the same ob-
ject as house is unconscious simpliciter.
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and consequently a rule for the combination.”39 As is well-known from
the transcendental deduction “unity”, “order”, and “rule” originate in
the transcendental apperception or the “I think” for “we can represent
nothing as combined in the object without having previously combined
it ourselves” (CPR B 130). This is why Kant says that logical rules
which govern cognition can only be applied to clear representations.40
For the rule-governed combination of a manifold of representations
through which an idea becomes clear and distinct is a necessary condition
of cognition. It is only in the case where the manifold of a clear idea is not
conscious that the representation is indistinct. Combination of represen-
tations according to logical rules takes place in judgments like in the
proposition “All bodies are extended” (CPR B 11). This judgment is
clear and distinct in so far as it contains the logical combination of a mani-
fold of representations, i. e., the synthesis of subject term and predicate
term such that the predicate term elucidates the subject term. It is by
means of “the analysis of the concept in regard to the manifold” (Kant
(1992, 546); “Zergliederung des Begriffs in Ansehung des Mannigfalti-
gen”, AA 9:35) that we know through which predicates an indistinct con-
cept becomes distinct. By contrast, the judgment All bachelors are un-
married. would count as indistinct since here the logical combination
of the manifold of representations is incomplete since the proposition
does not consider the predicates young and male that necessarily be-
long to the clear and distinct representation of bachelor. Again the anal-
ysis of the concept demonstrates through which predicates the concept
becomes distinct.41 The analysis of concepts is analogous to the clarifica-
tion of intuition which makes an indistinct perception distinct, for in-
stance by approaching a perceived object in order to see its parts in
more detail which then allows for adequate perceptual judgments. Like
39 Cf. Anthropology, Kant (2007, 248 f), AA 7:139 f.
40 Cf. Lectures on Logic (J
sche), Kant (1992, 545), AA 9:34.
41 It should be noted, however, that Kant conceives the definition of concepts in
terms of the completeness of the predicates they contain as impossible: “For I
can never be certain that the distinct representation of a (still confused [i.e. in-
distinct, D.H.]) given concept has been exhaustively developed unless I know
that it is adequate to the object. But since the concept of the latter, as it is
given, can contain many obscure [i.e. unconscious, D.H.] representations,
which we pass by in our analysis though we always use them in application,
the exhaustiveness of the analysis of my concept is always doubtful, and by
many appropriate examples can only be made probably but never apodictically
certain.” (CPR A 728 f/B 756 f).
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in the case of intuition the analysis and combination of concepts is carried
out by the “I think”. More specifically it is the “analytical unity of apper-
ception” which, on the basis of the “synthetic unity of apperception”,
makes possible that indistinct representations become distinct since cog-
nition as clear and distinct representation involves conceptual capacities
as they are active in judging. Kant therefore writes:
The analytical unity of consciousness pertains to all common concepts as
such, e.g., if I think of red in general, I thereby represent to myself a feature
that (as mark) can be encountered in anything, or that can be combined
with other representations; […] A representation that is to be thought of
as common to several must be regarded as belonging to those that in addi-
tion to it also have something different in themselves (CPR B 133 f, fn.).
In this way the “analytical unity of consciousness” makes a manifold of
representations into a concept (conceptus communis), which is itself an
analytical unity of predicates. The concept is indistinct as long as we
are not aware of the manifold of predicates it contains. Once we have
found out about that manifold with the help of conceptual analysis the
concept is clear and distinct. The making distinct of an indistinct concept
takes place in judgment and presupposes the synthetic activity of tran-
scendental apperception like in the judgment “All bodies are extended.”
This is particularly clear with respect to the analytic judgment which Kant
explicitly defines on the basis of the distinction indistinct/confused-dis-
tinct : “Judgments are analytic […] if their predicate merely presents
clearly (explicite) what was thought, albeit obscurely (implicite), in the
concept of the subject”.42 To give another example: “Analytic judgments
say nothing in the predicate except what was actually thought already in
the concept of the subject, though not so clearly nor with the same con-
sciousness.”43 By “not so clearly” Kant means “confusedly” (CPR B 11)
or “obscurely” (B 17). Again, what is thought “confusedly” or “obscure-
ly”, that is to say indistinctly, in a concept can be brought to consciousness
by way of logical order in judgment. Since “a judgment is nothing other
than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of appercep-
tion” (CPR B 141), the “I think” finally proves to be the regulating prin-
ciple not only of distinct representations that make up cognition as such
but also of indistinct representations, i. e., representations that are uncon-
scious and conscious by degrees.
42 What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany?, Kant (2002, 404), AA
20:322.
43 Cf. Prolegomena, Kant (2002, 61, 64), AA 4:266; see also 4:269.
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Thus the “I think”-proposition seems to be fundamental for conscious
as well as unconscious representations which for Kant play a major role in
our cognitive household. This is quite remarkable since at first sight un-
conscious representations do not seem to contribute a great deal to cog-
nition. What should be clear by now is that indistinct representations, i. e.,
representations that are unconscious be degrees, in fact do fulfill a crucial
epistemological function. On the basis of the “I think”-proposition they
explain how a certain class of unconscious representations enters our cog-
nitive processes and contributes to knowledge formation. It should be
noted that Kants conception of the unconscious is not restricted to indis-
tinct concepts that become distinct in analytic judgments. The theory like-
wise explains how indistinct representations are contained in ordinary
sense-perception and can be made distinct in perceptual judgments.
This seems to be rather controversial. In the concluding section I will
therefore point to some consequences the Kantian account of uncon-
scious representations has for the possibility of non-conceptual content.
3. Conclusion: Unconscious Representations and
Non-conceptual Content
If my argument is correct then there are, according to Kant, unconscious
representations. Unconscious representations are not just there without
us knowing that we have them. They rather bear cognitive relevance to
the human mind since the “I think”-proposition certifies that it is possible
to access them, for instance by way of analysis of the subject term in an
analytic judgment such that the predicates, pertaining to the subject, be-
come clear. This conceptual clarification is made possible through the “I
think” since judgments are governed by transcendental apperception. As
demonstrated, indistinct representations must count as cognitively acces-
sible in this sense since they are unconscious by degrees. Obscure repre-
sentations are not for they are unconscious simpliciter.44
This finding seems to be of some explanatory value with respect to
the question of whether or not there is non-conceptual mental content
and how this would be possible. In contemporary epistemology and phi-
44 Although we do not know that we have them, there even might be obscure rep-
resentations that can come to mind, e.g., in psychological therapy or with the
help of memory. However, in actual cognition they do not count as relevant epis-
temological elements.
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losophy of mind the problem of non-conceptual mental content is one of
the most controversial issues. The central claim non-conceptualism raises
is that there are cognitive capacities that are not determined by concep-
tual capacities such that there can be, for instance in sense-perception,
non-conceptual mental content, content that is not determined by con-
cepts.45 The issue is important especially since the existence of non-con-
ceptual mental content proves that there are aspects of human cognition
that cannot be grasped in a purely rational or conceptual way such that its
justificatory function is fundamentally different from that of concepts.
Kants account of the unconscious seems to provide good evidence in
favor of non-conceptualism since indistinct representations, to be more
precise, indistinct intuitional representations, must count as representa-
tions that are non-conceptual. As Kants aforementioned example of
the house illustrates a person can perceive a house from far away without
seeing its windows, door, chimney etc. There can be no doubt that the
parts of the house are contained within the persons perception of the
house, however, according to the Kantian account of clear representa-
tions, not in a distinct way. Hence, the persons perception of the parts
is indistinct, i. e. , the perception of the parts is unconscious by degrees.
But on the basis of the “I think”-proposition the person is able to bring
these parts to mind, e.g., by focusing on them while approaching the
house and thereby accompanying the relevant representations with the
“I think”. Another example is phenomenal consciousness. A person per-
ceiving a rainbow might not be distinctly aware of a certain color; but by
means of the “I think” she can bring to her mind or become self-conscious
that she herself sees this particular color shade although she might not be
able to conceptualize what it is like to see it. The phenomenal conscious-
ness of that color shade was in her phenomenal consciousness before the
person brought it to her mind, however, that consciousness was indistinct
such that she was unconsciously conscious of it. To be unconsciously
conscious is by no means contradictory if we take it to mean unconscious
by degrees. By contrast, the Kantian taxonomy of clear as distinct and
indistinct representations allows for a strong explanation of how it is pos-
sible to have representations and still not be conscious of them. Conse-
quently, if there were no place for indistinct representations in our cogni-
45 For a broader discussion of non-conceptualism cf. Grne (2009) and Hanna
(2008). For the counter position, conceptualism, cf. Ginsborg (2008). See also In-
ternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 19/3 (2011): Special Issue “Kant and
Nonconceptual Content”.
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tive household there likewise were no place for non-conceptual content.
Since the existence of non-conceptual content seems undeniable, the idea
of indistinct representations provides a straightforward justification of its
possibility. This is why the Kantian conception of the unconscious is noth-
ing circumstantial but plays a systematic role in theory of knowledge.46
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Illusion and Strategy of Reason1
Flix Duque
The entire Kantian philosophy seems guided by a deep mistrust of the
condition of man in the world—to the point that it was easy for Hegel
to suspect that “that very fear to err is the error itself” (PhG (Gçrland),
Einl. 56). In fact, we know that Kant finds that among the characteristic
traits of our species, “foolishness rather than malice” is the determining
one (Anthr, VII 334). As far as the faculty of cognition is concerned,
Kant defines understanding as that which dissipates the darkness of igno-
rance, force of judgement as that whose task is “preventing the errors
proceeding from the crepuscular light in which the objects appear” and
reason as the “blind source of prejudgements” (Anthr, VII 228). More
perturbing is to observe that—to a high degree—the darkness, the crepus-
cular light and the source of prejudices are within ourselves, because
while the senses do not deceive us, the understanding does (Anthr §11).
To be more precise, the illusion lies in the relation of the object to our
knowledge, i. e. in the judgement, the place of truth as well as the place
of illusion (B350/A293).
“One can put all illusions down to that the subjective condition of
thinking is taken as knowledge of the object” (A396). I am not going
to deal here with either illusions that can be corrected by the right use
of the understanding—such as those produced by sensible appearances,
natural or artificial (Anthr §§11/13)—, nor with the illusion that we
could denominate “social illusion”—the illusion that allows the indirect
growing of the morality through the masks of human relationships
1 This work is part of the research project FFI2009–10097 of the General Departe-
ment for Research Projects of the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation.
The paper has been translated by Francisco J Gutierrez. All citations and references
to Kants works are located by volume and page number as in Kants gesammelte
Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian (later German, then Berlin-Brandenburg)
Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co.,
1900-). Roman numerals indicate the volume and Arabic numerals the page number
of this edition. The one exception to this rule is the Critique of Pure Reason, where
passages are located by numbers from A, the first edition of 1781, and/or B, the
second edition of 1787. Translations are mine.
(Anthr §14)—, nor with the logical illusion which is due to the mere imi-
tation of the form of reason (B353/A296). There are, though, more illu-
sions: the illusions that are naturally uncorrectable because they are
found either in the depths of the human soul (the dreams) or in its heights
(the ideas of reason, Anthr §86). Now we must see how reason uses these
illusions in its own interest (strategy) and, more importantly, how reason
(by believing and fostering them) configures itself as an illusion—the illu-
sion of reason is the illusion that is reason itself: the subject that becomes
object and in this basic fallacy inaugurates life as knowledge and action.
I begin with the illusions of reason. Kant is quite histrionic in dealing
with them. They do not exist because of mens sophisms—he says—, but
because of reason itself (B397/A339). The illusions of reason do not
cease, not even after such sophisms have been resolved by the self-cri-
tique of reason. They are unavoidable and natural illusions that are not
due to the transcendental use of the understanding (always restrainable),
but to “effective principles that expect that we knock down all those
boundary posts [of the possible experience] and claim a completely
new ground that does not acknowledge any demarcation at all” (B352/
A296): the transcendental principles. Reason is, by its own nature, dialec-
tic in itself (B354 f/A298 and B877/A849). If this is so, it is quite puzzling
that Kant affirms that “the ideas of pure reason can never be dialectic in
themselves […] for they are entrusted to us by the nature of our reason
and it is impossible that this highest court of all rights and demands of
our speculation should contain original deceptions and phantasmagoria”
(B697/A669). Despite the fact that this supposed contradiction could be
attributed (with good grounds maybe) to an ambiguity in the Kantian
use of reason, I believe that there is more to the problem than that.
The apparent contradiction can be solved by establishing a careful
gradation of the faculties in which the ideas of reason are employed
and the interest that guides reason in each case. We need to pay attention,
firstly, to the ideas as far as the faculty of cognition is concerned. Gener-
ally speaking, the transcendental concept of reason is “none other than
that [concept that proceeds] from the totality of the conditions to a con-
ditioned given” (B379/A322). Now, in the faculty of cognition “pure rea-
son leaves to the understanding everything” which is concerned with the
synthesis of objects of intuition (B382/A325). Here, therefore, the ideas
have no other function than reaching the “universality of the cognition
by concepts” (B378/A321): i. e. they grant the maximum unity and the
greatest possible extension to the concepts of understanding (only legis-
lator in the sphere of speculation). Moreover, it is precisely the under-
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standing, driven by interests that exceed it, what applies fallaciously to the
“transcendental object which is at the base of the phenomena” an idea
whose strict object is just a problematic Verstandesbegriff (B397/A339).
The understanding makes a transcendental use of something that only ad-
mits a logical use. Thus the three hypostases of the speculative reason
come into being: soul (transformation of the absolute unity of the think-
ing subject), world (transformation of the absolute unity of the series of
the conditions of the phenomenon) and God (transformation of the abso-
lute unity of the conditions of all the objects of thought in general, B391/
A334). It is precisely the speculative use of the ideas what makes them
become dialectic, for in that use the ideas act as concepts of the under-
standing—an understanding (allegedly) released from the limitations of
possible experience, because reason does not legislate in the faculty of
cognition and, properly speaking, it does not produce any concept at all
(B436/A409). Actually, the concepts of reason have their origin in the fac-
ulty of desire and burst into the faculty of cognition precisely to set a limit
to the transcendental claims of knowledge (BXXX). By doing so, they
generate a (never accomplished) disposition of the understanding to go
beyond its own sphere. On the one hand, this tendency renders possible
the establishment of rules for scientific research (regulative principles
without objective validity: mere heuristic fictions, B779/A771) and, on
the other hand, it renders possible a completely new sphere: that of the
supersensible. If the critique of speculative reason strived for taking
“the objects of experience as such—and among them, even our own sub-
ject—only as phenomena,” that was because of its highest practical inter-
est: not to consider “all supersensible as fiction and its concept as devoid
of content” (KpV Vor, V 6).
Thus the ideas of reason are not dialectic in themselves (i. e. as gen-
eral principles of morals); they only become dialectic because of the tran-
scendental use that the understanding makes of them. In view of the fal-
lacies that the understanding falls necessarily into, the ideas force the un-
derstanding to retreat and they reveal themselves as what they really are,
the final object of metaphysical research: God, freedom and immortality
of the soul (B395). Reason uses the science of nature as mere means to
show man his true and only interest (B694/A666): the practical inter-
est—the sphere in which man recognises himself as man. “It is morality,
and not the understanding, what firstly makes man a man” (Streit, VII
72).
Now, before we abandon the sphere of knowledge, it is necessary to
take note of the fact that proprie dictae the practical ideas of reason
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God, freedom and immortality do not coincide entirely with the theoret-
ical Ideas of reason God, immortality of the soul and world. This last con-
cept cannot be assumed by the practical reason, since in cosmological
matters—and only in cosmological matters—reason answers satisfactorily
its (apparent) self-contradiction: in effect, the object of this transcenden-
tal idea is empirically given “and the question concerns only the adequacy
thereof to an idea” (B506/A478). As it is known, the third and fourth an-
tinomies leave open the possibility of conceiving God and the effects of
freedom in the world and thus Kant can affirm that such antinomy con-
stitutes “in fact the most beneficial error that the human [speculative]
reason could have fallen into” (KpV, V 107). Guided by the critical solu-
tion to his error, we enter the sphere of life, for “life is the capacity of a
being to act in accordance with laws of the faculty of desire” (KpV, V 9).
Thus the faculty of desire is defined as a beings capacity “of being the
cause—by means of its own representations—of the empirical reality of
the objects of those representations” (KpV, V 9). In its highest function
(when this faculty is determined by the representation of a pure form)
reason does not reason but legislate. By this legislation we are aware of
ourselves as free beings: the freedom is the only case where a supersen-
sible object of the category of causality acquires objective reality, through
the Faktum of the moral law in me (KpV, V 6—Cf KU §91, V 468). This is
so because freedom is the only idea that—through its real activity—shows
itself in the experience, which in return—and it is important to note it—is
the only territorium of human knowledge (KU II, V 174).
Now, the faculty of desire has its own antinomy of reason. In fact, the
immediate determination of the will by the reason produces an analogon
of the feeling of pleasure: a state of satisfaction—that through a necessary
illusion in the self-consciousness leads to confuse what one does and what
one feels (KpV, V 116). The pure negative satisfaction is taken for the
feeling of a passion, mistaking so a sensible impulse for a moral motor
(which cannot be but the law itself). The solution of the antinomy of
the accomplishment of the highest good in the world (conciliation in in-
finitum of the happiness and morality) takes place—as it is known—
through the hope in the immortality of the soul and the belief in the ex-
istence of God: the two postulates of the practical reason (KpV II, III, IV
and V).
In any case, this highest interest of reason depends for its accomplish-
ment on two agreements. The first agreement consists in the free play
among imagination, understanding and reason—so that reason can deter-
mine the understanding to think analogically the supersensible in the in-
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tuition, bringing closer the idea of the freedom of the imagination to a
feeling (Gefhl, GMS II, IV 436). The other agreement necessary for
the realisation of reasons highest interest is the contingent agreement
(teleologically thought) of the sensible nature itself, so that it does not op-
pose the effect of freedom: “the final end (or its phenomenon in the sen-
sible world) must exist, for which it is presupposed the condition of pos-
sibility in nature” (KU, V 196). Only thus can be bridged the “big gap that
separates the supersensible from the phenomena” (KU, V 195).
So we are lead to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, the deepest
of the soul (Gemths). Here as well we can find a higher form that—rath-
er than receiving the feeling passively—is its subjective ground and con-
dition. Great importance has here Kants warning: without an undeter-
mined concordance of our faculties, all communication—and therefore
all knowledge—would be impossible. Moreover, without such agreement
even all practical determinations would be unconceivable: reason legis-
lates over a (relatively) docile human nature. Such agreement is the sen-
sus communis aestheticus (KU §40): a twofold feeling. On the one hand, it
is the disinterested feeling of the agreement between the free imagination
and the understanding that subsumes the imagination under an undeter-
mined and undeterminable concept: the supersensible substratum of hu-
manity when judging about the beautiful. On the other hand, the sensus
communis is the feeling of agreement or disagreement that makes the
imagination recognise itself when faced with the idea of an absolute total-
ity that goes beyond its limits (brought about by the sight of something in
nature that is formless or deformed) and fall back on itself—establishing
in this way its own limits: the feeling of the sublime. Here we witness the
birth of ideas that, despite being brought about by subjective principles of
reason, burst in the sphere of the imagination: the aesthetic ideas, corre-
lative of the ideas of reason, are representations of the imagination that
give something to think about, despite the fact that no thought can corre-
spond to them. In this way, secretly moved by reason (which frees the
imagination from the unavoidable claim for a Darstellung by the under-
standing), the imagination becomes creative and sets reason itself in
movement: the faculty of intellectual ideas. This way the force of judge-
ment of taste is the capacity for rendering moral ideas sensible (symbolic
hypotyposis). But here as well we find an antinomy produced by the illu-
sion of mistaking the aesthetic pleasure individually and subjectively felt
for the ground of such a feeling, which despite its being subjective is uni-
versally valid for all mankind. The antinomy is resolved—as we pointed
out before—when we discover the possibility of an exhibitio originaria
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of the imagination under an intellectually undetermined concept in func-
tion of the practical interest of reason, which thus finds the ground for the
establishment of an intersubjective community: the mankind in the world.
Now, the free action of mankind in the world presupposes that the
world is pre-shaped to receive the effects of mankind. We need to find,
then, an agreement (even if it is merely subjective) between acting by
freedom and natural causality. Such agreement is proposed in analogy
with the productive human art as the technique of nature. We act in
the world as if it constituted teleological system. The occasion to do so
is given to us by the spectacle of living beings in which we feel a unity
that cannot be expound in a concept. This unity, though, can be conceived
by the determining force of judgement through an analogy with the
human activity. This agreement—merely contingent—allows us to discov-
er man as Endzweck of the sensible nature: final end—and at the same
time, subject to the moral law under divine commandments. Also in the
teleological sphere there are antinomic illusions that can be solved by
the critique. These illusions point towards something beyond the sphere
of the empirical. The antinomy of the reflecting power of judgement pres-
ents in the thesis a maxim taken from one particular experience: the ob-
servation of living beings leads us to state that at least some natural prod-
ucts are in agreement (purposive) with final ends. The illusion here can be
easily solved: we have applied the reflecting power of judgement as if it
was the determining power of judgment. The proposition stated in the
thesis does not forbid that—apart from (and in conjunction with) the me-
chanical laws—some natural products are in agreement with the finality.
That is in effect the case, proven by the Faktum of the moral law, of the
practical doing of man and the case (analogically understood) of living
beings and the system of the universe as a whole. However, given the
fact that the human action postulates the existence of God, this produces
the sane illusion of rendering valid the physical-teleological argument
that, starting from the final beauty and order of the world, intends to
prove the existence of its Creator. Even though this argument persuades
at a popular level, it prepares us to accept an ethical theology. Despite
being miles away from a physical theology (the same gap that separates
the speculative from the practical interest of reason, nature from free-
dom), this ethical theology persuades that “reason cannot prescribe to
pursue an end that is not known but as a mere fantasy of the mind”
(KU §91, V 472).
This way we close the sphere of the natural and unavoidable illusions
of reason. In all of them we have observed the same inclination to expand
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beyond the limits the territorium of experience with a view to guarantee-
ing in indefinitum the moral actions of man in the world under the postu-
lates of the immortality of the soul and of the existence of God.
We still must discuss two other illusions that despite being natural
cannot be controlled by neither reason nor will : the dreams and the
games. Without dreams we could not live, since life itself originates in
the faculty of desire and, precisely for that our organism must be excited
constantly (and freely) by the imagination: the Lebenskraft itself feeds on
dreams (Anthr §31). Kants deep theory of playing is equally important:
playing is brought about by an inner delirium that in practice has for ob-
jective what is subjective in the principle of the action. Without this delir-
ium we would lose the feeling of life in the satisfaction of our desires
(pleasure). Thus nature directs us wisely and invisibly so that we would
follow our tendencies to obtain honour, power and money. Even in the
case of deeply innocent games, such as those of children or simple hazard
games, nature incites us to risk our forces in a rivalry of a combat in order
to maintain excited our vital energy—so that that, when we competitively
fight each other we believe we play, when in reality nature is playing with
us (Anthr §86). This guarantees the realisation of two basic human in-
stincts: the love for life and the sexual love. As a matter of fact, the latter
turns out to be entertaining because of the womans constant longing for
domination over the man—and because of the game the man plays in
order to establish, through the pretence of surrendering to such domina-
tion (gallantry), the solid basis for the human community: the family
(Anthr §87). In this way, dreams and games reveal themselves as manifes-
tations of the instincts (Antriebe) that guarantee the highest physical
good: the subsistence in indefinitum of the life of mankind in the world.
Now, in the same way that the illusions of imagination prepare the
asymptotic advent of the highest physical good, the illusions of reason
(as we have seen) guarantee the advent of the highest moral good. Cer-
tainly, they cannot be mistaken for each other, since their geneses are rad-
ically different: the deepest and the highest of the human soul. But they
can, and must, be connected synthetically, in such a way that opposing
each other (zusammenstossenden) they determine our total end (den gan-
zen Zweck) under the indisputable practical interest: enjoying a happi-
ness subject to moral laws (Genuss einer gesitteten Glckseligkeit). The
way of thinking (Denkungsart) of the synthetic unity of the wellbeing
(Wohlleben) and virtue (Tugend) makes mankind (Menschengeschlecht)
humanity (Humanitt). (Anthr §88, VII 277).
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The strategy of practical reason consists in using the plexus of human
illusions (the rational and the aesthetic ideas and the illusions of imagina-
tion) in order to realise “the kingdom of God on Earth, which is the ul-
timate destination of man” (Refl Anthr, XV 608). “In the case of all the
other animals—abandoned to their fate—each individual reaches its
own destination, but in the case of man only the species does” (Anthr
II E, VII 324). Only the species will realise (at least that is what all
men hope) the destination (Bestimmung): to bring about through its
own activity (Ttigkeit) the development of good starting from the orig-
inal discord (separating passions)—and all this according the ideal that
reason itself presents (vorstellt) man with (Anthr, VII 328): the provi-
dence (Vorsehung) is the destination (Bestimmung, Anthr, VII 328).
At this stage, it seems that the conclusion we have reached contra-
dicts our starting position: mistrust becomes hope, pessimism becomes
optimism. We can and we must trust a universal history in a cosmopolitan
standpoint. But there is no contradiction: optimism is rooted in a radical
hollowness, namely the foundation (Grund) is built on an abyss (Ab-
grund) and the strategy of reason as truth (altheia) is built upon the ob-
livion (lethe) that is reason itself. To prove this thesis I will focus mainly
on the so-called “last Kant”: the Kant of the Anthropology (1798) and the
Opus postumum (1796–1802).
We need to de-construct the steps taken paying attention to the
cracks that the system aims to hide. Let us first turn our attention to rea-
son in its speculative use. The criterion of all truth lies on the possibility of
the joint application (Anwendung) of the two supreme principles of
human cognition: the principle of non-contradiction and the principle
of synthetic judgements. It is a question of exhibiting (darstellen) in one
and the same representation (Darstellung) the agreement between the
logical and the transcendental possibility on the one hand and the fact
of being given empirically on the other. Now, according to the first Cri-
tique such thing never takes place, for it would require closing the system
beforehand by presupposing the identity of the logical principle of deter-
minability and the transcendental principle of through-going determina-
tion. But such presupposition was unmasked by the Critique as the great-
est of all fallacies: the hypostasis of the Ideal of reason (God). The con-
cordance between the two principles is possible only in general, never in
concreto. The empirical truth is then impossible, since it is based on the
transcendental truth: the anticipation of the possible experience as a
whole (B185/A146). Kant states explicitly that such anticipation is just
an idea: “the systematic unity (as a mere idea) is only just a projected
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unity which cannot be considered as given, but as a problem” (B675/647).
In any case, the systematic unity, the Probierstein of the truth, could only
be applicable in concreto if it coincided with the highest principle of unity
of the phenomena, principle that is “a regulative principle in itself” (reg-
ulativer Prinzip an sich) because it is “empirically unconditioned” (empir-
isch unbedingt, Cf B876/A618). This statement seems disconcerting, first-
ly, when put in connection with the acceptance of an idea of mechanism
(B675/A647) which is toto caelo alien to reason, since reason is by nature
architectonic (B502/A474), and secondly, when we are forced to acknowl-
edge that the concept of matter is taken from the experience (B876/
A848). This inner contradiction of reason is unavoidable and it splits
the cognitive subject in two. This explains why Kant should resort,
when taking about the Ich bin, to expressions as strange as “this I, or
he, or it (the thing), which thinks” (B404/A346), “the being (Wesen)
that thinks in us” (A401).
The contradiction will be overcome in the Opus postumum, but at
risk of bringing down the very system. In fact, Kant will need to antici-
pate, problematically and in favour of the experience (zum Behuf der Er-
fahrung), the concept of matter. “To establish and classify conveniently
[the empirical] the sensible objects must first be thought as [given] in
the phenomenon in accordance with the subjective of the form of their
representations (phaenomena) in order to be coordinated in space and
time” (OP, XXII 364). “The phenomenon precedes a priori, hence the
subjective goes before the objective” (OP, XXII 364). This is “disconcert-
ing” (befremdlich) and even “contradictory” (widersinnig), as Kant him-
self admits on several occasions. How is it possible a phenomenon a pri-
ori? Only if “the subject affects itself and makes itself object in the phe-
nomenon, in the composition of the motor forces of the matter for the
foundation of experience [conceived] as the determination of an object
as a completely determined (existing) thing” (OP, XXII 364). Now, the
self-affection projected a priori for the experience, not being taken there-
from, can neither be founded on the principle of non-contradiction nor on
the principle of synthetic judgements. If it was founded on the principle of
non-contradiction, then how could be the pure spontaneity deduced from
the pure receptivity? It cannot be founded on the principle of synthetic
judgements either, because the coincidence of the general conditions of
experience with the conditions of the objects of experience presupposes
that the subject is the (transcendental) object and that in such composi-
tion (Zusammensetzung) the I itself produces the time. “I produce the
time itself in the apprehension of the intuition” (B182/A143). It is neces-
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sary to find then a highest principle whereby the other two can originate:
this is no other than the principle of identity, the true vault of the last
Kant. Thanks to this principle “the experience […] as far as the sensible
object is concerned—in accordance with the principle of identity—can
only be one” (OP, XXII 365). Kant does not define explicitly the princi-
ple in the Opus postumum—he had already done so in the Critique—but
only now we can understand its true importance. In fact, in the observa-
tion to the antithesis of the second antinomy we can read: “The subject
that thinks is at the same time its own object […] since all object is,
with respect to itself, an absolute unity” (B471/A443). The second state-
ment depends on the first one. It is because, and only because, the think-
ing subject is its own object (Objekt) that the object (Gegenstand) is seen
as an absolute unity when it is the same with itself. The principle does not
affirm the mere tautology A=A, but the meaningful words of Plato: “now
each of them is different from the other two, but it itself is itself for itself”
(Soph 254d).
In the sphere of the fundamentum inconcussum veritatis in which the
Kantian philosophy operates, the principle says: the consciousness of my-
self in the formula “I am” is identical [to the that] of the proposition “to
myself I am an object of inner intuition (dabile) and [an object] of the
thought of determination of something that I attribute to myself (cogita-
ble)” (OP, XXII 449). But this self-position (Selbstsetzung) has two impli-
cations. Firstly, that the thing in itself “is an ens rationis, that =X of the
position of seiner Selbst in accordance with the very principle of identi-
ty—in which the subject is thought as affecting itself” (OP, XXII 27).
The other implication is that “such phenomenon qua talis is the product
of the self-position, a phenomenon of the phenomenon: “that whereby the
subjective becomes objective because it is represented a priori” (OP,
XXII 363). “What is considered metaphysically is taken as a phenomen-
on, in its physical respect it is a thing in itself (phenomenon of the phe-
nomenon) and can be cognised as the merely formal of the connection
a priori” (OP, XXII 363). Thanks to the phenomenon of the phenomenon
every thing “is physically considered as a substance that remains always
identical” (OP, XXII 328). Thus it is possible to reconcile what in the
first Critique remained split in two: the I am on the one hand and the om-
nimoda determinatio (God) on the other. The I does not become God
thanks to the principle of identity; now that hypostasis is revealed as
what it was already, even at the time of the Critiques: the analogon to
the scheme of a thing in general, i. e. the Inbegriff aller empirischen Real-
itt (B610/A582). Kant is extremely careful about it: what we had taken,
Flix Duque70
illusorily, for omnitudo realitatis is now realised (realisiert) but only prob-
lematically and as necessitas phaenomenon, not as necessitas noumenon.
Thus the paralogism and transcendental ideal of pure reason are revealed
as the double position of the subject—as I and as thing in general—on the
ground of the principle of identity. Now, at what cost? This subject that
posits itself and, at the same time, proposes the whole of the reality
(that appears before him empirically and successively) cannot be simulta-
neously considered as part qua talis of such reality. It must be regarded as
a mere idea: “difference between an ens per se and ens a se: the former is
an object in the phenomenon that is affected by other [while] the latter
[is] an object that posits itself and is a principle of its own determination
(in space and time). […] The subject is not a particular thing, but an idea”
(OP, XXII 33).
As such the subject is an ens rationis ratiocinantis in which—and
through which—reason generates itself: “the theoretical-practical rea-
son—in accordance with its own nature—creates objects for itself, i. e.
self-subsistent ideas: the system of an omni-comprehensive reason that
constitutes itself in its own object. The transcendental philosophy does
not deal with something supposedly existent, only with the human spirit,
which is mans own thinking subject” (OP, XXI, 78).
Thus the entire faculty of cognition depends on the identical proposi-
tion: “I am (object).” On the other hand, the faculty of cognition was ori-
entated, as we know, towards the practical interest of reason. The antin-
omy of the highest good takes place in this domain: happiness versusmor-
ality. Such antinomy is irresolvable within the positions of the first Cri-
tique despite the uninterrupted Kantian efforts. The (supposed) solution
consisted in admitting as postulates the immortality of the soul and the
existence of God. Both postulates are contradictory within the Kantian
framework. The immortality of the soul has been postulated in order to
achieve the conciliation in indefinitum (since the whole is not given) of
happiness and morality. But happiness is not but the satisfaction of all
our inclinations (B834/A806). Now: “inclination (inclinatio) is the sensi-
ble desire that is used by the subject as a rule” (Anthr §80, VII 265). In
turn, it is precisely the faculty of desire, as we know, what defines the liv-
ing being. Then it is absolutely unconceivable (not even in the practical
sphere) a life detached from the sensibility, since the higher function of
this faculty is absolutely orientated towards the action in the world.
Therefore it does not make sense to talk about immortality outside the
world—neither it does, as far as the individual is concerned, to deal
with immortality within the world. This is why Kant afirms in the Anthro-
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pology that the destiny of man is only realised by mankind. Moreover, al-
ready in the third Critique it has been stated that “because the life with-
out the feeling of the corporeal organ is merely consciousness of its exis-
tence, but not a feeling of well- or ill-being, i. e. the excitation or inhibition
of the forces of life—because for itself the soul is complete life (the prin-
ciple of life itself) […]—, then [the feeling of well- or ill-being]” must be
sought in the combination with its body” (KU, V 277 f).
Consequently, the concept of highest good disappears in the Opus
postumum. By that time, Kant had defined the supreme good as a colli-
sion (Zusammenstoss) in which the destiny of mankind in the world is
at stake. Coherently, he states that “all living beings perish, only the spe-
cies […] lasts eternally. We must admit this also as far as man is con-
cerned” (OP, XXI 346). It is accepted that “there is a life with conscious-
ness for man after death,” but only as a “good and hardly avoidable hy-
pothesis in order to explain this phenomenon of the improvement” of
mankind (OP, XXI 346). That is, man must act in the world as if he
could live outside the world. Man must (strive to) reach happiness by
being worthy thereof. Astuteness of reason to avoid the horrible feeling
that men are ultimately to be swallowed by a wide grave (regardless
whether they had been honest or dishonest) and they, “who could have
believed to be the final end of creation, will be thrown again altogether
into the aimless chaos of matter whence they had been taken” (KU
§87, V452).
As far as the postulate of the existence of God is concerned, things do
not look any better. God was postulated because otherwise men, lead by
their passions, would not obey the moral law as a command: “For that
reason, in them the moral law is an imperative that commands categori-
cally, because the law is unconditioned” (KpV, V 32). But passions are
more powerful than all the other sensible inclinations and they blind rea-
son before a possible choice (Anthr §80, VII 265).
Therefore, if God is seen as ens extramundanum, there is eo ipso no
practical necessity thereof. On the other hand, if it is seen as ens intra-
mundanum it would not be God, but either the anima mundi (OP, XXI
18 f) or a despot (OP, XXII 61 and 34). What is God then? “God is
not a substance, but the embodiment of the idea of right and benevolence
that limit each other in order to set limits to a principle of wisdom by
means of the other” (OP, XXII 105).
In the Opus postumum Kant rejects the existence of God understood
as anything different from a mere idea of reason—and idea in which rea-
son creates itself. And in the same way that the omnimoda determinatio in
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the speculative sphere was the product of the self-position of the subject as
object—allowing so the experience to take place—, in the practical sphere
God is the “amalgam (complexus) of all the duties of man as divine com-
mands in accordance with the principle of identity” (OP, XXII 53).
So we encounter again the principle of identity, now as the fundament
of the human community in accordance with juridical laws. Again this
projected identity is not but the correlate of the cognitive Ich denke. In
this way, our actions are subordinate to the being that thinks in us: “In
him (the man that thinks morally in accordance with the commands of
the duty in ourselves) we live (sentimus), we act (agimus) and we are (ex-
istimus, OP, XXII 55). The transformation of Pauls quote (Acta Aposto-
lorum. 17, 28) cannot be more significative. However, it is important to
notice—against all accusations of moral anthropocentrism—that in Kant
the problem is more severe. It is not a question of destroying God to
put the human being in its place, because this inner human being is just
a mere idea: ens rationis in function of which the practical reason creates
itself. I am not the inner human being, rather I am in him, since I create
my own life by acting in accordance with that invented (gedichtete) idea.
And in the same way that already in the first Critique the subject had ap-
peared as idea from the principle of identity, also in that idea was already
the inner man: “we have no other criterion to measure our actions that
the behaviour of that divine man in us, so comparing ourselves to him,
we value ourselves in accordance with him and in this way we improve
ourselves, even though we can never achieve such behaviour” (B597/
A569).
The free I, self-generated by reason as person (subject of rights and
duties as divine commands), is not identical to cognitive “I am”. The
gap between nature and freedom still remains open in the “last Kant”.
It is one and the same that which acts in the world under divine com-
mands, but this unity is synthetic because it develops in time: “God
and the world, each containing absolute unity—though through different
principles: practical-technical (as world) and practical-ethical (as Lord of
the world)” (OP, XXII 63). So “man considers himself as a sensible object
in the world, but also considers his own autonomy as independent” (OP,
XXI 61).
This is the highest standpoint (Standpunkt) of Kantian philosophy:
two ideas (I and freedom) connected synthetically in the idea of man,
which in turn connects and gives meaning to the ideas of God and
world. But we must always remember that here we are dealing with
“merely subjective beings of reason […]—prototypa” (OP, XXI 61).
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Beings of reason are nothing: “an empty concept without an object”
(B348/A292), noumena that are mere possibilities. In other words, the
possibility whence obtains meaning everything that exists. This idea pro-
poses: I am (what I must become). Have we already reached the highest
point? Certainly, but all heights stand from dark grounds. Can we still ask
about for the foundations of that nothing that is the idea of man? Of
course; check hyphenation it would not be conceivable that Kant
would have refused to bridge the gap between nature and freedom, be-
tween I am (object) and I am (persona). The Grund of the possibility
opens from the Abgrund of the impossibility: the correlate of the ens ra-
tionis is the nihill negativuum, the naked contradiction: an empty object
without concept. I am not opposes itself to I am—and it founds it. The
idea of ones own death, according the fundamental text of the Anthro-
pology: “the natural fear of all men (that of even the most unfortunate
and also that of the wisest) of death is not a terror of the fact of dying,
but […] a terror of the thought of dying (i. e. of being dead)—thought
that even the one that is going to die expects to have after having died,
thinking about the corpse, that that it is not him anymore, as still being
himself in the dark grave or anywhere else. We must not suppress the il-
lusion here, since it lies in the very nature of thinking (understood as talk-
ing to and from oneself). The thought I am not” cannot exist at all, since
if I am not I cannot be aware of not being […] speaking in first person
denying the subject itself—so that the subject annuls itself—is a contra-
diction“ (Anthr §27, VII 167). It is not a mere contradiction, it is the im-
possible, what erases all possibilities. Nevertheless, “we must not suppress
this illusion;” i. e. it is not just a natural and unavoidable illusion. Kant or-
ders us not to rid ourselves of the illusion—because we live in that illu-
sion. Thinking is talking about oneself to oneself (principle of identity).
But the dissonance between the speaking subject and the subject spoken
to is called “life-in-the-world.” From the (illusory) rejection of the no we
create the (feeling of the) world. The world is saved from death because
we have it inside—the secret motor of our existence. The animal is “free
from death. We alone see that.” Thanks to death always there is world,
and never the nowhere without the not Death takes place because we
live, and for that we can live as if there was no death, “Since near to
death one no longer sees death, and stares ahead, perhaps with the
large gaze of the creature.” (Rilke, Eighth Duino elegy).
Is Kant possibly the first thinker of the nihilism? It is Kants firm con-
viction that reason does not order to pursue ends that are not but a Hin-
gespinst (KU §91, V 472). But what is reason itself but the self-creation
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(Selbstgeschçpf) in, and of, beings of reason (nothing) to draw a veil over
its origins in the reasonlessness of all beings (nothing)? What was of the
great hope? It is possible to answer the question what can I expect by say-
ing calmly: nothing? No. The illusion of reason in its speculative use en-
ables the truth—the illusion of reason in its practical use enables life.
What can we do if we unveil the veil of Isis (the mother nature sung by
Kant in the third Critique (§49, V 316)? There is one thing to do: to
laugh. For “laughter is an affection produced by the sudden transforma-
tion of a tense wait into nothing” (KU §54, V 332). Are we ready for this
laughter or should we first go beyond the man and, as superior men, learn
to laugh?
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The Unconscious as Root of Kants
A Priori Sentimentalism
Piero Giordanetti
In this paper I shall argue that the concept of the unconscious plays an
important role in Kants ethical thought and constitutes the basis to
which he appeals on many occasions when he tries to justify the structure
of moral consciousness, although he does not devote a special section or
chapter to this subject. I will first try to legitimate the idea that since the
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kants moral theory has been
based on the very important role of feelings and that it cannot be consid-
ered as absurd or as contrasting either with the intentions or with the re-
sults achieved by the philosopher to interpret his ethical position as a par-
ticular kind of sentimentalism. Second, I will focus my attention on the
relation between Kants “sentimentalism” and the relevant functions
that unconscious processes fulfill within moral consciousness. The aim
of this paper is to shed new light on elements that could make possible
a wider and more thorough revaluation of dimensions in Kants philoso-
phy that have been either in part or wholly neglected: ethical sentimen-
talism and its relation to the unconscious.
1. Kants Rationalistic Ethics in the Critique of Pure Reason
The ultimate lines of the “Introduction” to the first edition of the Critique
of pure reason give evidence for the conception that moral philosophy
cannot be regarded as a part of transcendental philosophy.
The chief target in the division of such a science is that absolutely no con-
cept must enter into it that contains anything empirical, or that the a priori
cognition be entirely pure. Hence, although the supreme principles of mor-
ality and the fundamental concepts of it are a priori cognitions, they still do
not belong in transcendental philosophy, for, while they do not, to be sure,
take the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, of desires and inclinations,
etc., which are all of empirical origin, as the ground of their precepts,
they still must necessarily include them in the composition of the system
of pure morality in the concept of duty, as the hindrance that must be over-
come or the attraction that ought not to be made into a motive. Hence tran-
scendental philosophy is a philosophy of pure, merely speculative reason.
For everything practical, insofar as it contains incentives, is related to feel-
ings, which belong among empirical sources of cognition.1
The reason for the strict distinction between moral and transcendental
philosophy is here reduced to the function of the sentiments in moral phi-
losophy; they are “motives” of moral action. The comprehension of the
foundation of Kants thesis will, thus, strictly depend on the meaning
that the philosopher intended to assign to the two concepts we are dealing
with. Hence, it will be necessary to ask what “motive” means for Kant in
1781 and what shape his conception of sentiment assumes.. I will then in-
vestigate the reason why he connects them and sees them as a central link
in the inner articulation of his system.
In the Critique of Pure Reason there is only a trace of a negative con-
ception of feeling. Feeling always has to be considered as being of an em-
pirical and subjective nature and cannot have any positive function for
knowledge. In the chapter “On the Canon of Pure Reason” in the “Tran-
scendental Doctrine of Method” section of the first Critique, Kant writes:
All practical concepts pertain to objects of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, i. e.
of pleasure or displeasure, and thus, at least indirectly, to objects of our feel-
ing. But since this is not a power for the representation of things, but lies
outside the cognitive power altogether, the elements of our judgments, inso-
far as they are related to pleasure or displeasure, thus belong to practical
philosophy, and not to the sum total of transcendental philosophy, which
has to do solely with pure a priori cognitions (CPR A 801 note, p.675).
In this passage Kant reiterates that the constitutive elements of judg-
ments formulated in the practical field are represented indirectly in the
sentiments because they concern objects of pleasure and displeasure, of
joy and pain: however, the feeling does not belong to the representative
faculty, it cannot be included in the domain of cognition because there is
no possibility of establishing a connection between a feeling and a cogni-
tive power. So, moral philosophy, which concerns the faculty of desire and
the will, cannot leave aside the link to feeling, and exactly for this reason
it cannot be included in a transcendental philosophy, whose object is rep-
resented from pure a priori cognitions.
1 Cfr. CPR A 14/15. Translations from the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (CPR, first
edition A, second edition B) are taken from Kant (1998). If not otherwise men-
tioned all citations from Kants works refer to the Akademie Ausgabe (AA) of
Kants Gesammelte Schriften (1900ff).
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We now move on to the concept of “motive”. Once we have establish-
ed that practical philosophy cannot be assumed as a constitutive part of
moral philosophy, it is necessary to clarify how it would be possible to an-
swer the fundamental question of morals, the question: “what ought I to
do?” What ought to be the “motive” of moral action? Kant gives two dif-
ferent answers. We can refer, first of all, to individual happiness. It is the
fulfillment of the totality of our inclinations and concerns, their multiplici-
ty, their degree and their duration; it is a practical, pragmatic, and empiri-
cal law as a rule of prudence. It suggests “what we shall do if we want to
enjoy happiness” and it can be grounded only on experience because only
through a posteriori experience can we achieve the knowledge of the na-
ture of our sensible inclinations. In the passage of the “Introduction,” the
term “motive” indicates the mere empirical nature of inclinations con-
nected with happiness.
If we would like to provide a foundation for moral philosophy, we
cannot ground it on the motive of happiness but it is necessary to single
out a second type of motive. If it is true that practical philosophy, having
to do not with the faculty of knowledge but with the faculty of desire, is
constrained to presuppose feeling, it is also true that there is the possibil-
ity of indicating a realm in which the motive of morality can be set in di-
rect relation to the idea of morality and is hence a priori. The concept of
the worthiness of happiness is a true ethical law because it does not need
inclinations and their satisfaction and regards freedom of a rational, non-
sensible being, in general, not individually and it analyzes the necessary
conditions through which freedom can agree with happiness. This is an
a priori dimension that is grounded upon ideas of pure reason. Kant
calls this an a priori corpus mysticum, a term that he derives from Leib-
niz: inclinations and individual sentiments are banned from this world in
which impediments to morality which derive from the weakness and im-
purity of human nature can be removed. The corpus mysticum is merely a
practical idea which exercises an influence on the sensible world and al-
lows to reduce it to that idea. It is thus that Kant expresses his distinction
between an empirical and a pure motive of the will : “The practical law
from the motive of happiness I call pragmatic (rule of prudence); but
that which is such that it has no other motive than the worthiness to be
happy I call moral (moral law)” (CPR A 806/B834 677). “I assume that
there are really pure moral laws, which determine completely a priori
(without regard to empirical motives) i. e. happiness) the action and omis-
sion, i. e., the use of the freedom of a rational being in general” (CPR A
807/B835 678).
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The problem that the discussion on the theme of the Bewegungsgrund
has to face is uniquely that of the objective reality of morals and freedom
of a rational being in general: the treatment of the Bewegungsgrund and
the introduction of the concept of the worthiness of happiness is the anal-
ysis of the necessary conditions solely by virtue of which freedom can har-
monize with happiness (CPR A 806/B834). “What ought I to do?,” this is
the question raised by moral philosophy. The answer sounds: “do that by
which you would be deserving of being happy.” The objective reality of
freedom is hence proved through the concept of the pure principles of
morality and is realized in an intelligible world. Sentiment does not
play any role in this process of demonstration, which appeals exclusively
to the concept of reason and of rational beings and moves away from any-
thing that has a relation to the sensible.
The theme of the Bewegungsgrund, thus, constitutes the true object of
the second question and is abandoned as soon as Kant passes to the third.
Now he asks “what can I hope” and so he transcends the limits of moral
philosophy by facing a problem which is both moral and speculative. Al-
though happiness has been excluded from the a priori theory of the mo-
tive of morality, it cannot be denied that the interest of reason is in any
case connected with the idea of happiness. The task of the research will
be to define in what happiness may consist if we want to avoid that it
is interpreted empirically. Up to this point we have dealt only with the
“motive” (Bewegungsgrund) of morality but we have not yet treated
the theme of the incentive (Triebfeder). Now Kant affirms that “without
a God and a world that is now not visible to us but is hoped for, the ma-
jestic ideas of morality are, to be sure, objects of approbation and admi-
ration but not incentives for resolve and realization, because they would
not fulfill the whole end that is natural for every rational being and deter-
mined a priori and necessarily through the very same pure reason” (CPR
A 813/B 841 681). The argumentation leads us from the Bewegungsgrund
to the Triebfeder. Even in this context Kant avoids any reference to senti-
ments that are always regarded as empirical. The reality of the moral law
and the reality of happiness concern man as a rational being, whereas the
link between morality and his sensible nature cannot be resolved.
If we now turn to the initial citation and to the reason of the exclusion
of moral philosophy from the transcendental system, we can grasp why
feeling has been connected with the concept of the Bewegungsgrund:
feeling is empirical and concerns empirical happiness which Kant con-
trasts with the worthiness of happiness and only the theme of the motive
is an object of moral philosophy whereas the incentive pertains to both
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moral and speculative philosophy. Feeling is an individual sensation or
impression that differentiates one human being from another and cannot
serve as the basis of a universal and necessary judgment. In part 2 we will
see that this rationalistic conception of morality which tends to exclude
all sentiments from the a priori dimension of the moral system has
been radically alterated by Kant in the second Critique and that this sig-
nificant modification has been caused by the introduction of the idea that
it is possible to derive a priori sentiments from the idea of moral. In these
pages, I will not discuss the reasons why and the different documents in
which this modification is documented but will rather concentrate my at-
tention on the new theory2.
2. Kants Pure Ethical Sentimentalism in the Critique of Practical Reason.
The Discovery of A Priori Feelings
I shall try to show, first, that Kants demonstration of the objective reality
of morality is not fulfilled by the introduction of the fact of reason, but
that for this sake Kant needs to appeal to other four theories. In order
to prove that the moral law exists, Kant establishes a strict relation be-
tween rational consciousness of morality and feelings. He introduces in
the first place the feeling of respect. Further he develops the idea that re-
spect leads to a feeling of satisfaction. Thirdly, he appeals to the feeling of
the exigency of reason in the section, the “Dialectic of Pure Practical
Reason,” and, finally, he theorizes the union of all these feelings in the
concept of the heart of the individual which is treated in the “Doctrine
of Method” section. This constitutes what might be called Kants a priori
ethical sentimentalism in the second Critique.3
What does it mean for Kant that the concept of moral consciousness
is an innate feature of human beings? He determines moral consciousness
by denying that the consciousness of morality can be considered an intel-
lectual intuition, because this would mean to admit that human beings are
able to achieve a knowledge that pertains only to God. He denies further
that our awareness of the moral law could be defined as an a priori sen-
2 On this problem, see Klemme (2010, 11–30).
3 It should be added that the new conception of morality presented in the second
Critique is anticipated in the “Preface” to the second edition of the Critique of
Pure Reason of 1787 in which Kant proposes to regard his new theory as a New-
tonian revolution. See Giordanetti (2003).
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sible intuition because moral consciousness has nothing to do with space
or time. The last possibility of identifying morality and intuition could be
to regard moral consciousness as an empirical intuition, but in this case,
too, Kant is explicit and does not accept that moral consciousness could
be set on the same level as psychological intuition.
I purpose that when he addresses the theme of our consciousness of
the moral law he has the intention of underlining that this consciousness
is the result of the relation between a priori reason and a priori feelings.
By this way of reading the text, the third part of the “Analytic” does not
include a moral psychology nor the application of the moral law to human
beings as is often maintained, but rather is part of the justification of the
reality of moral reason. Since human beings are endowed both with sen-
sibility and reason, their consciousness of the universal law of the morali-
ty can be represented to them only through cooperation between the su-
perior and the inferior faculty of desire. In different passages of his work
he refers to the consciousness of morality not only as a rational objective
knowledge but also as a particular sensation, as an a priori feeling. In
order to maintain these theses, it is useful to refer to a passage of the
“Critical Elucidation of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason,” in
which Kant states that he could carry out “very well and with sufficient
certainty,” “the justification of moral principles as principles of pure rea-
son by a mere appeal to the judgment of common human understanding”
because there is “a special kind of feeling,” which is able to make known
the difference between empirical and rational determining grounds, be-
tween good and evil. This feeling is not to be confused with the feeling
of gratification or pain that arouses desire, because it is a special kind
and doesnt have an empirical origin in our bodily experience. The special
kind of feeling is the feeling of respect that does not precede the lawgiv-
ing of practical reason because it is not produced by the senses nor by ob-
jects acting on them, but is produced only by reason. This is the reason
why “no one, not even the most common human understanding, can
fail to see at once, in an example presented to him, that he can indeed
be advised by empirical grounds of volition to follow their charms but
that he can never be expected to be anything but the pure practical law
of reason alone.”4 These passages show that it is not misleading to inter-
pret Kants moral consciousness as grounded not only on reason but also
on the feeling of respect and that the latter has not merely to be regarded
4 Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, Kant (1997, 78), AA 5:92.
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as the subjective part of morality, but also plays a very important role in
the justification of the reality of the moral law for human beings.
The analysis of the a priori genesis of the feeling of respect is not the
terminal point of the argumentation of the second Critique ; this work
pays also attention to another particular feeling when it gives its first an-
swer to the problem of the “Antinomy of the Pure Practical Reason.” In
that context, Kant elaborates on the idea that there is a way to demon-
strate the possibility that happiness necessarily corresponds to virtue. Al-
though it is not possible to show the existence of a necessary connection
between virtue and happiness in the mechanical course of natural events,
the particular nature of the feeling of respect can lead us to another par-
ticular feeling, which Kant calls “contentment with oneself.” This word
does not denote enjoyment as the word happiness does, but indicates
rather a satisfaction with ones existence, an analogue of happiness that
must necessarily accompany the consciousness of virtue.
The genesis of this feeling is analogous to the genesis of the feeling of
respect. If we ask what the moral law in its majesty produces in us, we can
answer this difficult question by referring to an initial feeling of empirical
pain, which is soon followed by a feeling of a priori pain. The feeling of
empirical pain arises from the fact that the majesty of the moral law acts
on us producing the humiliation of our inclinations. This discloses to us
the realm of freedom, because we are now free to feel an attraction for
the law of God. In an analogous way, the feeling of respect produces a
feeling of satisfaction, which makes sensible incentives worthless. This
feeling is neither beatitude nor empirical happiness, but is merely a neg-
ative pleasure that consists in having consciousness that we do not need
things that are present in nature, but only our freedom. As the feeling
of respect the contentment derives from the humiliation of the sensible
inclinations that is made possible by the feeling of respect.
This is not the last feeling whom we meet in the second Critique ; even
when Kant deals with the problem of the postulates, through which he
achieves a real demonstration of the reality of God and immortality of
the soul, he introduces another type of feeling; the need of reason to
which is dedicated chapter VIII of the “Dialectic”section: “On Assent
from a Need of Reason.” Kant states that postulates can be admitted
only if we assume that a need of pure practical reason leads to them.
“But in the present case it is a need of reason arising from an objective
determining ground of the will, namely the moral law, which necessarily
binds every rational being and therefore a priori justifies him in presup-
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posing in nature the conditions befitting it and makes the latter insepara-
ble from the complete practical use of reason.”5
It is interesting to note that even in the “Doctrine of Method” feel-
ings represent the center of the theory although the horizon has changed.
Whereas in the first part of the work we never meet the concept of the
heart, in the “Doctrine of the Method of Pure Practical Reason” the anal-
ysis relies especially on this concept. In the heart of the individual all feel-
ings that we have encountered until now are acting. The feeling of re-
spect, the feeling of satisfaction and the need of reason build a unity
and guarantee the possibility of grounding the reality of the moral law
in the human individual. Only on account of this unity does it make
sense to speak of a method of education toward the moral law.
After having proved that virtue really exists in the human heart and
that pure virtue has much more strength and power on human heart than
inclinations based on pleasure and pain, Kant exposes his method of
moral education. It should be stressed that this method is not empirical
and that Kant is not developing here a mere a posteriori pedagogy, but
rather that merely by tracing the outlines of this procedure he is thinking
in terms of a two-stage process whose basis lies in the a priori sentiments
of the morally beautiful and of the morally sublime. The starting point of
Kants method is constituted by conversations about morality. Every
human being is endowed with sentiment of the propensity (Hang) of rea-
son; this leads him to act in accords with pleasure in even the subtlest ex-
amination of practical problems; it is worthwhile to note that this proves
the existence of a certain interest in the beauty of moral action. The pres-
ence of a Socratic component in the attribution of a maieutic function to
the conversations between the moral philosopher and the scholar is unde-
niable. It also seems to me to be evident that as in the Foundations and
the other parts of the second Critique these considerations presuppose
the use of the obscure representations of Leibnizian provenance.6
5 Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, Kant (1997, 119), AA 5:143 note.
6 In order to prove the real existence of the moral law within the heart of the in-
dividual, Kant appeals to the distinction between the right and the left hand, that
he has already illustrated in the essay of 1786, “What Does It Mean to Orient
Oneself in Thinking.” In this essay, Kant lays bare the a priori dimension of
the feeling of geographical, mathematical and logical orientation. In all of
these cases, Kant maintains that we cannot leave aside subjective feeling,
which alone makes the triple orientation possible. Even in this case, subjective
sentiment is a priori and orientation in space is not guaranteed from a pure in-
tuition but rather from a pure feeling. This seems to me to be the new element
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There are two theses that Kant intends to demonstrate. The first con-
cerns the subject of the action, the second, the observer of it. As to the
subject, the idea is that “an honest man” is truthful, without wavering
or even doubting.”7 Whoever would be calumnious because he was of-
fered “gains, great gifts or high rank” or because he was threatened
with loss of friendship, freedom and life, could not regard himself as
moral, because he would act against the innocence of the honest man
against whom he is calumnious. In the case in which he would find himself
in an analogous situation, what would be moral is to renounce the calum-
ny. One might however formulate an objection: would it not be against
the moral law if a person were disposed toward personal sacrifice or to
the sacrifice of his family? It is essential to note at this point that Kant
distinguishes between Wert and Zustand, between “value” and “condi-
tion”; only the first can be considered as moral, the second is merely em-
pirical. What could be compromised by honesty is not the value of the
honest and truthful person, neither the personal value of his family but
only its empirical condition. The sacrifice of the empirical condition is
not to be conceived as opposite to the moral law, but is a condition
which makes possible an elevation of the value of the subject. Kant is
here a scholar of the Stoics and of the Christian idea of humility. This ex-
ample demonstrates that he who does not submit himself to calumny
grounds his action on the feeling of respect for the law and, hence, on
the feeling of respect for other human beings. This is the reason why
pain can elevate and raise the value of the subject. Again, the feeling
of respect is described as constituted by an a priori pain from which fol-
lows a feeling of a priori attraction to the moral law. As to what happens
in the observer, it is important to highlight that Kant is interested in a pri-
ori sentiment and the affects that arise on the basis of it. The scholar of
the moral philosopher is not attracted to law only from reason and supe-
rior faculties of the soul. He has feelings which are disposed in a climax
which leads from the “mere approval and applause,” to “admiration, to
amazement and to the greatest veneration,” and finally to the “lively
that this essay introduces if we compare it with the writing On the First Ground
of the Distinction of Regions in Space (1768), the Prolegomena (1783) and the
Metaphysical Principles (1786) in which the example of hands has been already
adduced. In the writing of 1768, the example was used to prove that space is not
a concept but rather an object; in the other two writings Kant appeals to it in
order to demonstrate that the distinction between right and left hand does not
derive from a concept but rather from an intuition.
7 Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, Kant (1997, 128–129), AA 5:156.
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wish that himself could be such a men.” If we value it from the standpoint
of the inclinations, virtue has no utility but is founded merely on the pu-
rity of moral character which depends on the purity of the moral princi-
ple. The conclusion of these considerations is that morality has much
more force on the human heart the more purely that it is represented, al-
though this does not mean that he admits that morality always has to be in
contrast with empirical happiness.
When Kant says that “virtue is worth so much only because it costs so
much,”8 this does not concern a positive definition of morality, as Scheler
has objected. It costs much to abandon all that is an obstacle to the real-
ization of the moral law but it does not cost much to embrace the spiritual
dimension of the law. Virtue costs much from the standpoint of the incli-
nations, not from the standpoint of the sublime feelings to which it gives
rise in the “listener.” So, moral beauty is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for the moral law having access to the heart and becoming the
principle that leads its resolutions. The second exercise, thus, has the task
not only of awakening a certain interest, but also of founding a true moral
interest, which, as pure interest, is possible only on the grounds of a pre-
ceding feeling of a priori pain to which follows an a priori lust, namely,
respect. It is significant that Kant connects it, as in the “Dialectic,” to
the destruction of needs and inclinations, from which follows a feeling
of liberation from the discontentment. The soul is made capable of receiv-
ing a sensation of contentment which has a different, namely an a priori
origin.
It emerges with clarity that feelings do not have a subordinate role in
the Critique of Practical Reason, so that we can interpret them as the sub-
jective reflex of the action of reason. Rather, they are essential to the
structure of the proof that morality is not a vain chimera, but something
that can be translated into practice.
I will now turn to the theme of the unconscious by maintaining that
there is no possibility for Kant to justificate the reality of moral con-
sciousness through the a priori feelings without adopting the view that
the origin of them lies in the fundus animae.We become further conscious
of the moral law when we are able to produce in us several feelings,
namely a feeling of respect, a feeling of satisfaction and a feeling of the
exigence. According to the doctrine of the Faktum der Vernunft, the
fact of reason, which is explicitly introduced in the second Critique the
philosopher neither needs, nor wants to invent or introduce any new prin-
8 Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, Kant (1997, 129), AA 5:156.
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ciple of morality, but only a new formula. The ground for this is that
moral consciousness has already been present to all human beings since
they were created on the earth and is an essential feature of their nature.
The world has never been ignorant of what good and evil are and has
never been in thoroughgoing error about this. “But who would even
want to introduce a new principle of all morality and, as it were, first in-
vent it? Just as if, before him, the world had been ignorant of what duty is
or in thoroughgoing error about it.”9.
The thesis that Kants theory of sentimental and rational moral con-
sciousness cannot leave aside the admission of the relevant role of uncon-
scious representations and processes in the soul can be strengthened by
citing a passage from the Foundations, where we read that it is not re-
quired “subtle reflection” to distinguish the sensible from the intelligible
world. Even “the commonest understanding” is able “in its own way” to
note, that there is a difference between the representations which come to
us involuntarily, as do those of the senses, and “enable us to cognize ob-
jects only as they affect us and the nature of the objects as they are in
themselves so that, as regards representations of this kind, even with
the most strenuous attentiveness and distinctness that the understanding
can ever bring to them we can achieve only cognition of appearances,
never of things in themselves. As soon as this distinction has once been
made (perhaps merely by means of the difference noticed between repre-
sentations given us from somewhere else and in which we are passive, and
those that we produce simply from ourselves and in which we show our
activity), then it follows of itself that we must admit and assume behind
appearances something else that is not appearance, namely things in
themselves, although, since we can never become acquainted with them
but only with how they affect us, we resign ourselves to being unable to
come any closer to them or ever to know what they are in themselves.”10
It is very important to stress what Kant says only incidentally and without
further argument about it: this distinction can be made by even the com-
monest understanding for the reason that the commonest understanding,
has been endowed with “an obscure discrimination of judgment which it
calls feeling.”
9 Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, Kant (1997, 7) AA 5:8.
10 Cf. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant (1997, 56) AA 4:451.
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Genius as a Chiasm of the Conscious and Unconscious:
A History of Ideas Concerning Kantian Aesthetics
Tanehisa Otabe
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) Kant argues, “art can be
only called beautiful if we are aware that it is art and yet it looks to us like
nature” (5:306).1 At first glance Kant appears to specify the conditions
under which art can be beautiful. It would follow that there could also
be non-beautiful art, but we would then miss Kants meaning. By art
Kant understands art in the broadest sense, including the craft in art,
not limiting art in the modern sense of fine art. Kants thesis determines
the criteria under which art in the modern sense is to be distinguished
from art in the broad sense, the specific difference of fine art. For Kant
fine art should be beautiful without exception. Apart from Hegel,2 Kon-
rad Fiedler (1841–95) first questioned the connection between fine art
and beauty.3
The Kantian thesis is based on a principle of classical rhetoric prohib-
iting speech from betraying the hidden intention of the speaker. Aristotle
argues that “authors should compose without being noticed and should
seem to speak not artificially but naturally. The latter is persuasive, the
former the opposite.”4 Aristotle does not relate this poietic argument in
the Rhetoric to his natural-philosophical proposition in the Physics that
“art imitates nature,”5 by which he means that nature is the model guiding
the principal structure of art in the broad sense of the word. By late an-
tiquity, however, this natural-philosophical proposition in the Physics was
already associated with the critique against artificial speech proposed in
the Rhetoric.6 Several lines from Pseudo-Longinuss first century A.D. ar-
1 All references to Kants work appear in parentheses in the text. Page references
are to the Akademie-Ausgabe. For quotations from Kant, unless otherwise indi-
cated, I use The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.
2 See Gethman-Siefert (2000, 37).
3 See Fiedler (1991, 9).
4 Aristotle (1991, 222).
5 See Bolotin (1998, 35).
6 See Otabe (2009, 8).
ticle, “On the Sublime,” serve as a quintessential example: “the best
prose-writers . . . imitate nature and achieve the same effect. For art is
only perfect when it looks like nature; and Nature then succeeds when
she conceals what assistance she receives from art.”7 Kant agrees with
Pseudo-Longinus in emphasizing the symmetrical or complementary rela-
tionship between nature and art: “Nature [is] beautiful, if at the same
time it look[s] like art; and art can only be called beautiful if we are
aware that it is art and yet it looks to us like nature” (5:306). The Kantian
proposition, corresponding with that of Pseudo-Longinus after an interval
of seventeen centuries, provides evidence of the mighty tradition of clas-
sical rhetoric.
We are not concerned with the influence of classical rhetoric on Kant
though. Our concern is considering what Kant meant by his proposition,
what extent he innovated in the tradition of classical rhetoric, and what
reverberations his theory met with.8
1. Kants Reflection on the Relationship between Nature and Art Before
the Critique of the Power of Judgment
Before publishing the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant expresses
his view on the relationship between nature and art in a number of notes
in preparation for his logic and anthropology lectures. In notes written be-
tween 1776 and 1778 we find the seeds for his theory.
In R 962 Kant mentions the symmetrical or complementary relation-
ship between nature and art, as did Pseudo-Longinus: “Beautiful nature
is that which seems to be art and yet is nature. Hence also art which ap-
pears like nature . . . is beautiful art” (15:424). The question is what Kant
understands by nature in this context. In R 1855 we read, “Nature signi-
fies what is unforced [das Ungezwungene] in beauty, art what is purposive
and orderly [das Zweckm
ßige und Ordentliche]. What is painstaking is,
however, artificial [geknstelt]. Everything is natural that seems to have
arisen in accordance with a universal law of efficient causes. / If art resem-
bles the contingent [Zufall] and the contingent art, this is the unexpected”
(16:138—slightly modified by the author). Kant here equating nature
with the contingent does not mean that nature lacks laws. On the contra-
7 Longinus (1932, 193), slightly modified by the author.
8 For the influence of classical rhetoric on Kant, see sterreich (1992) and Paet-
zold (1995).
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ry, nature is determined by universal natural laws. Kant simultaneously
opposes a teleological worldview, denying that nature has any intention.
Therefore, we can certainly inquire into the causes of natural phenomena,
but not into their grounds. In this sense Kant regards nature as contingent
in itself. For art, we can certainly consider it as contingent because art de-
pends on human capacity for choice. As far as art presupposes human in-
tention or purpose though, we can ask for its grounds. In this sense art is
not contingent, but purposive, which is why Kant describes beautiful na-
ture in the Critique of the Power of Judgment as that which “shows itself
as art, not merely by contingency [durch Zufall] , but as it were intention-
ally [absichtlich]” (5:301—italics are mine; slightly modified by the au-
thor). If art which is essentially grounded on a determinate purpose is
not bound by the purpose, and presents itself as contingent, as with na-
ture, or conversely, if nature which is essentially contingent presents itself
as intentional, as with art, we are faced with the unexpected. To Kant the
unexpected is the beautiful.
Nature and art should coexist in beauty. Art without nature, art
bound by rules, degenerates into artificiality; nature without art, nature
that lacks order, cannot be beautiful. In R 823 Kant contrasts nature
with art:
Nature and art. [Art and contingency]. The contingent is opposed to that
which is contrived [das Gesuchte]. Gout baroc. The contingent [Zufall]
and intention [Absicht]. Natural play.9 Nature combines art and the contin-
gent. Art: nature and contingent.10 The contingent is in free motion and in
the action of the powers of the mind. There is nevertheless method therein;
in the conflict or change of representation: that something is art and yet
only contingent, that it is nature and yet seems to be art, etc.: that is
where the gratification actually lies (15:367–368—slightly modified by the
author).
9 What Kant understands by natural play corresponds with what Addison argues
in “The Spectator” (No. 414, 25 June, 1712): “we find the Works of Nature still
more pleasant, the more they resemble those of Art. . . . Hence it is that we take
Delight in a Prospect which is well laid out, and diversified with Fields and
Meadows, Woods and Rivers, in those accidental Landskips of Trees, Clouds
and Cities, that are sometimes found in the Veins of Marble, in the curious
Fret-work of Rocks and Grottos, and, in a Word, in any thing that hath such a
Variety or Regularity as may seem the Effect of Design, in what we call the
Works of Chance.” See Addison (1965, 549–550). See the unconscious concern-
ing the Critique of the Power of Judgment, see Bloch (1976, 97–99) and Nicholls
and Liebscher (2010, 16–18).
10 Kant probably wrote “the contingent” where he should have written “intention.”
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The question now arises as to how Kant appreciates the baroque taste. In
a marginal note to Anthropology written between 1796 and 1797, Kant re-
gards the gout baroc as false taste together with “[t]he grotesque, . . . the
a la Grec, and the arabesque” (7:409). However, in the Critique of the
Power of Judgment he approves the “baroque taste in furniture” which
is akin to “the grotesque” (5:242) and refers to “designs  la grecque”
as a typical example of “free beauty” (5:229). From this perspective
Kant positively mentions the baroque taste in R 823. This note, criticizing
what is contrived, anticipates his proposition in the Critique of the Power
of Judgment that “everything contrived and laborious in [beautiful art]
must be avoided” (5:321).
In his anthropology lecture (1781/82) Kant says, “If art looks like na-
ture, even though we are aware of it as art, it pleases much more. English
gardens please because art is driven so far that it looks like nature. Sim-
ilarly the eloquence that looks like natural expression is the best one”
(25:1101). The reader first notices that Kant is under the influence of clas-
sical rhetoric, but Kant referring to English gardens is more noteworthy.11
This passage reminds us of his mentioning English gardens in the Critique
of the Power of Judgment: “the English taste in gardens […] pushes the
freedom of the imagination almost to the point of the grotesque, and
makes this abstraction from all constraint by rules the very case in
which the taste can demonstrate its greatest perfection in projects of
the imagination” (5:242). Kant contrasts the English taste in gardens
with a “pepper garden where the stakes on which the plants [are] trained
form[] parallel rows” which can be compared to French gardens because
of the geometrical order (5:242–243). Kant argues, “All stiff regularity
(whatever approaches mathematical regularity) is of itself contrary to
taste” (5:242).
As these examples show, Kant expresses his opinions on the relation-
ship between nature and art in notes from the 1770 s and 1780 s. In 1790,
in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, he examines the issue. Now we
turn to his theory of beautiful art in §§ 43–54 of the Critique of the Power
of Judgment.
11 For English Gardens, Kant says in R 298 (1762–63?) that “English gardens give
alternation” (15: 115).
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2. Art in General and Beautiful Art
In § 43 Kant determines art in general in contrast to nature. Nature exists
in a chain of causes and effects in which an end or purpose does not share.
While a work of art also has a cause, this cause is distinguished from the
cause of an effect of nature in that art presupposes an end. The cause that
produces a work of art conceives of an end, which determines the form of
the product. Only human beings who have freedom, a capacity for choice,
can conceive of an end. A work of art is always understood as a work of
human beings (5:303).
In § 44 Kant classifies art in general as follows:
If art, adequate for the cognition of a possible object, merely performs the
actions requisite to make it actual, it is mechanical ; but if it has the feeling
of pleasure as its immediate aim, then it is called aesthetic art. This is either
agreeable or beautiful art. It is the former if its end is that pleasure accom-
pany the representations as mere sensations, the latter, if its end is that it
accompany these as kinds of cognition (5:305).
Kants definition of mechanical art reminds us of the Aristotelian defini-
tion of skill [technÞ]. In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues, “Every
skill is to do with coming into being [genesis], and the exercise of the
skill [technazein] lies in considering [therein] how something that is ca-
pable of either being or not being, and the first principle of which is in the
producer and not the product, may come into being.”12 Skill in the Aris-
totelian sense is activity accompanied by cognition to realize a possible
purpose; this determination of skill corresponds to Kants definition of
mechanical art.
Mechanical art is distinguished from aesthetic art. By aesthetic, Kant
understands that the art in question has no connection to cognition or
concept. Aesthetic art is not identified with beautiful art; aesthetic art
is classified into agreeable and beautiful art. This classification is based
on Kants theory of the agreeable and the beautiful. While the agreeable
depends on the “matter of the representation, namely mere sensation”
(5:225), for example, colors and tones, and is based on passive feeling,
the beautiful “concerns merely form” (5:223) that makes a “subjective
play of the powers of representation” (5:238) possible and thus presup-
poses active feeling. The beautiful is distinguished from the agreeable
in that its reception requires the powers of representation to act.
12 Aristotle (2000, 106).
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Kant distinguishes beautiful art from mechanical art (see § 44) while
simultaneously claiming that “there is no beautiful art in which something
mechanical, which can be grasped and followed according to rules, and
thus something academically correct, does not constitute the essential
condition of the art” (5:310). Something mechanical means proficiency
or skill in accordance with rules; without skill beautiful art is impossible.
Excellence only in skill or demonstrated proficiency is, however, insuffi-
cient for beautiful art. According to Kant art that clings to rules is merely
mechanical and “would not please as beautiful but as mechanical art”
(5:306) because such art simply aims at the specific purpose of accordance
with rules. Kant explains what characterizes beautiful art:
[T]he purposiveness in the product of beautiful art, although it is certainly
intentional, must nevertheless not seem intentional; i. e., beautiful art must
be regarded as nature, although of course one is aware of it as art (5:306–
307).
Beautiful art differs from art in general in reaching accordance with rules
“without the academic form showing through, i. e., without showing any
sign that the rule has hovered before the eyes of the artist and fetters
his mental powers” (5:307). Even if skill underlies beautiful art, the
skill should not stand out, but should escape the attention of the recipi-
ents.
From this poietic perspective, Kants argument agrees with classical
rhetoric, but his thesis that “art can only be called beautiful if we are
aware that it is art and yet it looks to us like nature” (5:306) cannot be
fully explained from this poietic perspective. In the next section we ad-
dress Kants theory of aesthetic ideas: the nucleus of his theory of art.
3. A Surplus of Representation of the Imagination
Kant defines aesthetic ideas as the “representation of the imagination
that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any de-
terminate thought, i. e., concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently,
no language fully attains or can make intelligible” (5:314). An aesthetic
idea is a representation of the “imagination, as a faculty of intuition”
(5:292), which is distinguished from a representation of the imagination
in general in that the aesthetic idea has a specific relationship to a con-
cept.
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Kant says that, first, an artist “presupposes a determinate concept of
the product, as an end, hence understanding, but also a representation . . .
of the material, i. e. , of the intuition, for the presentation of this concept,
hence a relation of the imagination to the understanding” (5:317). That is,
artists should have a determinate concept of their product to achieve sen-
sible imaginative representation. A specific plan must precede execution.
To this extent, however, such activity belongs to mechanical art because it
merely aims at realizing a determinate purpose. Therefore, according to
Kant, what is required of an artist is, second, that “the imagination is
free to provide, beyond that concord with the concept, unsought [unge-
sucht] extensive undeveloped [unentwickelt]13 material for the under-
standing, of which the latter took no regard in its concept” (5:317—italics
are mine). Artists presuppose a specific plan, but their work extends be-
yond merely intuitively realizing the plan through adherence to instruc-
tions of the understanding. Rather, an artists imagination brings forth ex-
tensive material that surpasses understanding. Such a representation of
the artists imagination is to “let one think more than one can express
in a concept determined by words” (5:315). No concept can be “adequate
to it” (5:314). The artists representation is too opulent to be adequately
determined by understanding.
Kant names such a representation an aesthetic idea because of this
discrepancy between a representation of the imagination and a concept
of the understanding. This idea is the “counterpart (pendant) of an idea
of reason,” which is “a concept to which no intuition (representation of
the imagination) can be adequate” (5:314), which cannot be adequately
intuited. Cognition is acquired when a representation of the imagination
is subsumed under a concept of the understanding. However, for ideas,
such a subsumption never occurs because no concept is sufficient for aes-
thetic ideas, and no representation of the imagination is sufficient for
ideas of reason. According to Kant, an artist is characterized by the abil-
13 Development is a technical term of logic. In Acroasis logica (1761) Baumgarten
explains it as follows: “Propositio ex affirmante et negante cryptice composita,
exponibilis (ein zu entwickelnder Satz) dicitur (A proposition that is cryptically
composed of an affirmative and a negative proposition is called an exponible
proposition, i. e. a proposition that is to be expounded or developed).” See
Baumgarten (1761, 47; §162). Development generally consists in making explicit
those elements which are implicitly contained in a concept or proposition. In
Logic (1800) Kant writes, “Implicitly identical propositions … clarify the pred-
icate which lay undeveloped [unentwickelt] (implicite) in the concept of the sub-
ject through development (explicatio) [Entwicklung]” (9:111).
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ity to bring forth an “inexponible14 representation of the imagination”
(5:342).
This artistic ability is free from the “constraint of the understanding”
(5:316) and cannot be determined by the understanding. Therefore, it is
not by an intentional, but an unsought process that an artist provides ex-
tensive material for the understanding.15 That is, an artist “does not know
himself how the ideas for [the product] come to him, and also does not
have it in his power to think up such things at will or according to
plan” (5:308). An artistic creation cannot be reduced to a conscious activ-
ity, but is based on “nature in the subject,” or on an “inborn productive
faculty of the artist” (5:307). Therefore, Kants proposition that “art
can only be called beautiful if we are aware that it is art and yet it
looks to us like nature” (5:306) concerns more than beautiful art looking
to us, the recipients, like nature. His proposition means that artistic crea-
tivity “belongs to the nature” (5:307) of the artists and breaks free from
their consciousness.
We may reasonably conclude that Kants definition of beautiful art
escapes clear dichotomic classification. First, beautiful art is, as far as it
is a subdivision of art, “distinguished from nature” (5:303), and yet
“looks . . . like nature” (5:306). Second, beautiful art is, as far as it is a
subdivision of aesthetic art, opposed to mechanical art (5:305), and yet
“there is no beautiful art in which something mechanical, which can be
grasped and followed according to rules, . . . does not constitute the es-
sential condition of the art” (5:310). This paradox underlies beautiful art.
4. Reverberations of Kantian Theory
In this section, examining Schelling and Schiller, we address the reverber-
ations Kantian theory met in post-Kantian aesthetics. Being based on
Kantian proposition, Schelling introducing the concept of the uncon-
scious is noteworthy.
Kant argues that a work of art is “certainly intentional, must never-
theless not seem intentional” (5:307). Schelling calls these two moments,
namely the intentional and the unintentional, conscious and unconscious
14 For the adjective “inexponible,” see note 13.
15 As has been indicated, Kant argues in the Critique of the Power of Judgment that
“everything contrived [alles Gesuchte] and laborious in [beautiful art] must be
avoided” (5:321).
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activity. In the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800),16 Schelling ex-
plains: The “conscious activity” is “usually called art [Kunst],” but “mere-
ly one part of art.”17 This art is “practiced with consciousness, delibera-
tion, and reflection, which can also be taught and learned, received
from others, and attained by ones own practice,” in a word, “the merely
mechanical features [das bloß Mechanische] of art.”18 Therefore, con-
scious activity cannot be identified with art in the proper sense of the
word. What is needed here is unconscious activity. This is what “cannot
be learned, cannot be attained by practice or in any other way, but can
only be inborn by the free gift of nature,” that is, “what we may call in
one word the poetry [Poesie] in art.”19 Art consists of art and poetry, or
conscious and unconscious activity. Schelling says, “neither poetry nor
art can produce a perfected work singly each by itself,” but “only the
two in conjunction can bring forth the highest.”20 What Kant denoted
by beautiful art in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) is what
Schelling ten years later simply called art, without any qualification.
The question then arises as to what distinguishes art without poetry
(the merely mechanical features of art) from art in the true sense of
the word; how art in the proper sense of the word is to be distinguished
from mechanical art. Schelling answers that the product of art without po-
etry is “nothing other than a faithful impression of the conscious activity
of the artist,” because “intention and rule lie on the surface.”21 Both artist
and recipient can certainly understand the meaning of the product, which
means that such a product “simulates the character of a work of art”22 and
the result is “a semblance of poetry.”23 The lack here is infinity:
… the artist, however specifically purposeful [absichtsvoll] he may be, nev-
ertheless, in regard to what is truly objective in his creation, seems to stand
under the influence of a power that sets him apart from all other men and
16 Page references to Schellings System of Transcendental Idealism are to the
Smtliche Werke, vol. 3, Stuttgart and Augsburg 1858. For quotations from Schel-
ling, unless otherwise indicated, I use the System of Transcendental Idealism,
translated by P. Heath, Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia
1978. For the place of the unconscious in Schellings philosophy see Vçlmicke
(2005, 118–194).
17 Schelling (1858, 618).
18 Schelling (1858, 618).
19 Schelling (1858, 618).
20 Schelling (1858, 618).
21 Schelling (1858, 620).
22 Schelling (1858, 620).
23 Schelling (1858, 619).
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compels him to express or represent things he does not himself fully see
through and whose meaning is infinite…The artist seems to have presented
in his work, as if instinctively, apart from what he has put into it with obvi-
ous intent, an infinity which no finite understanding can fully develop [ent-
wickeln]… each [work of art] is susceptible of infinite interpretation, as
though there were an infinity of intentions within it.24
Art is worthy of being designated as art when it is free from the finite in-
tention of mechanical art and presenting an infinity that cannot be unam-
biguously interpreted by finite understanding. The possibility of infinite
interpretation characterizes true works of art. A work of art can present
infinity when the “ego” of the artist “begin[s] with consciousness (subjec-
tively) and end[s] in the unconscious, or objectively.”25 When the artists
conscious activity results in unconscious activity, he or she “puts into
his work involuntarily” the “inexhaustible depth”26 that cannot be devel-
oped by finite understanding.
Kant argues that, first, an artist “presupposes a determinate concept
of the product, as an end” (5:317) and that, second, the artists imagina-
tion is “free to provide, beyond that concord with the concept, unsought
extensive undeveloped material for the understanding, of which the latter
took no regard in its concept” (5:317—italics are mine). To this extent
Schellings argument that the intersection of the conscious and uncon-
scious characterizes art agrees with that of Kant. Both argue that art,
which is Kants beautiful art, ought to be more than art, which is
Kants mechanical art.
Schiller disagrees with Schelling about the proposition in the System
of Transcendental Philosophy. In a letter to Goethe on March 27, 1801,
Schiller reports his conversation with Schelling:
Only a few days ago I attacked Schelling about an assertion he makes in his
Transcendental Philosophy, that “in Nature one starts from the Unconscious
in order to raise it to the Conscious; whereas, in Art, one proceeds from the
Conscious to the Unconscious.” … [However], in experience the poet …
starts with the Unconscious… There can be no poetic work without an ob-
scure, but mighty total-idea of this kind, which precedes all technical work;
and poetry seems to me, in fact, to consist in being able to express and com-
municate that Unconscious state—in other words, to transfer it to some ob-
ject.27
24 Schelling (1858, 617, 619–620—italics are mine).
25 Schelling (1858, 613—slightly modified by the author).
26 Schelling (1858, 619—italics are mine).
27 Schiller (1890, 371–372).
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While Schelling argues that artistic creation begins with consciousness
(subjectively) and ends in the unconscious (objectively), Schiller empha-
sizes that artistic creation ought to be preceded by an obscure, but mighty
total-idea. This argument seems to rest on his experience as a poet. “The
musical (i. e. the harmonious tones) [das Musikalische] of a poem,” writes
Schiller to Kçrner in a letter on May 25, 1792, “much oftener engrosses
my being when I sit down to write, than any clear notion of what I pur-
pose writing.”28 Schillers position is also opposed to that of Kant who
claims that an artist “presupposes a determinate concept of the product,
as an end, hence understanding” (5:317). Schiller regards the unconscious
as musical because there is “as yet no idea of what the poem will be, but a
presentiment.”29
However, Schiller is not against the participation of the conscious in
artistic creation, regarding the creative operation itself as entirely con-
scious. He says that a poet “may consider himself fortunate if, by being
most clearly Conscious of his operation, he gets to that point where he
meets again in the work he has completed, with the first, obscure total-
idea of his work, and finds it unweakened.”30 The conscious is necessary
for a poet to realize his or her unconscious idea in a poem. Schiller con-
cludes, “Unconsciousness combined with reflection constitutes the poet-
artist.”31 To this extent, Schiller shares Schellings opinion that art is in
the intersection of the conscious and the unconscious.32
Schiller is quite familiar with Kants proposition that “art can be only
called beautiful if we are aware that it is art and yet it looks to us like na-
ture” (5:306), even proceeding so far as to argue that only his own theory
can explain Kants thesis, as his letter to Kçrner on February 23, 1793
shows.33 However, Schiller applies Kants proposition to ethics against
Kant to whom, as he correctly summarizes, “an action out of duty cannot
be brought into harmony with demands of nature.”34 “A moral action,”
writes Schiller to Kçrner in a letter on February 19, 1793, “might be
only then a beautiful action if it looks like a spontaneous effect of na-
28 Schiller (1849, 173—slightly modified by the author).
29 Schiller (1849, 173).
30 Schiller (1890, 372).
31 Schiller (1890, 372).
32 In his reply to Schiller on April 6, 1801, Goethe writes, “I not only agree with
your opinion, but go even further. I think that everything that is done by genius
as genius, is done unconsciously” (Schiller, 1890, 374).
33 Schiller (1992, 209).
34 Schiller (2005, 161).
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ture.”35 Such reinterpretation implies that by nature Schiller understands
something quite different from what Kant does. That is, he no longer
means something contingent, but “what is by itself.”36
As discussed, Kant argues that the artists imagination is “free to pro-
vide, beyond that concord with the concept, unsought extensive undevel-
oped material for the understanding, of which the latter took no regard in
its concept” (5:317). Based on Kants proposition Schelling argues, “The
artist seems to have presented in his work, as if instinctively, apart from
what he has put into it with obvious intent, an infinity which no finite un-
derstanding can fully develop.”37 Combining all this, a work of art whose
meaning can neither be traced back to the intention of its author nor dis-
solved into each interpretation is open by its nature and has its own inde-
pendent life. The Kantian proposition, “art can be only called beautiful if
we are aware that it is art and yet it looks to us like nature,” would refer
to this quality in a work of art.
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Kants Defeated Counterpart1
Moses Mendelssohn on the Beauty, Mechanics, and Death
of the Human Soul
Anne Pollok
In his letter from September 11, 1770, Marcus Herz sings the swan song
for any possible reconciliation between the dawning Critical Philosophy
and traditional metaphysics. Moses Mendelssohn, he writes, follows
Baumgarten word by word, incapable of accepting any aspect of Kants
thoughts that contradicted Baumgartens premises (AA 10, 100). Clearly,
such a thinker is not willing to accept any aspect of Kants ground-break-
ing reshaping of philosophical inquiry.
Indeed, although Kant asked him more than once for critical com-
ments, Mendelssohn never seriously considered Kants philosophy as
grounds for changing his own point of view. In his second-to-last work,
the Morning Hours (Morgenstunden, 1785), he ultimately admits the de-
structive force of Critical Philosophy. Indirectly, Mendelssohn seems to
imply that the old system is not done for. But he also complains that
Kant fails to replace the edifice he tore down with a better one.2 Accord-
ingly, his Morning Hours could also be interpreted as offering an even
more refined refutation of Transcendental Idealism3, thereby turning
1 I want to thank Lanier Anderson and Paula Schwebel for revising my paper.
With the hope that I could address their concerns and follow their suggestions
for improvement I should also stress that all remaining mistakes are entirely
due to obscure parts of my own understanding. I dedicate this paper to Reinhard
Brandt, who introduced me to the exciting field of the Long&Grand Eighteenth
Century and whose wonderful sense of humor I am still trying to emulate.
2 See JubA III/2, 3. From Kants point of view, however, it is understandable that
he did not feel all obliged to enter into the infamous Pantheism-debate between
Jacobi and Mendelssohn a few years later. And it was also not necessarily due to
his favor for Mendelssohn, that he finally raised his voice (in: “Was heißt, sich im
Denken orientieren?”; which offers a friendly, but not overall supportive read-
ing of Mendelssohns works), but more that he feared for his own undertaking
being understood under the guise of pantheism (Zammito 1992, 12).
3 Most recently, Dyck (“Turning the Game against the Idealist: Mendelssohns
Refutation of Idealism in the Morgenstunden and Kants replies”, unpublished
Kants Critique into a mere correction of the status quo, but not its rev-
olution. Apparently Mendelssohn himself did very little or nothing to
contribute to a radical philosophical reform—at least it seems so on the
surface, since in his published works of this time he mainly sticks to
Baumgartian or Leibnizian assumptions. But that does not necessarily
mean that Mendelssohn was in no way innovative. In this paper, I intend
to show that Mendelssohns philosophical potential becomes particularly
obvious in his treatment of the unconscious. In different philosophical
areas, Mendelssohn inverts the immediate impression that anything un-
conscious must be irrational in that he shows it as the enabling condition
of rationality. Wherever the unconscious seems to be at work, in aesthetic
appreciation, in moral reasoning, and—most fundamentally—in the mak-
ing of our personality, it proves our deeply ingrained rational weaving
pattern rather than making us subject to irrationality and chance. I will
attempt to support his thesis by the following arguments:
a) Thinkers of the Enlightenment obviously had their problems inte-
grating the unconscious into their philosophy (section 1). Nevertheless, it
plays a decisive role in Mendelssohns metaphysics. Elsewhere I argued4
that it is more appropriate to view Mendelssohns version of metaphy-
sics as a form of rational anthropology in that it is less concerned
with a general approach to metaphysical issues, but with their respective
effects on our notion of humanity. Thus, his philosophy takes human be-
ings actual life into consideration, in that it inquires into the role and im-
portance of sentiments, the body, human instincts (and our ability to act
against or to re-form them), hopes, and our cultural outreach. In this
paper I shall limit my scope to Mendelssohns treatment of psychology
as a part of rational anthropology, and more specifically as a science of
the human soul, considering both its metaphysical foundation and its phe-
nomenal side.5 However, the unconscious is not only the foundation of
mental phenomena, as I intent to show in the first part of this paper (sec-
manuscript) argued convincingly that in fact the Morning Hours are a more re-
fined rejection of Kants Critique, especially the Transcendental Aesthetics, as
previously noticed. Mendelssohns ultimate counter-argument against Kants
Transcendental Idealism, once more, rests on his attempt to secure all uncon-
scious parts of ourselves within the divine mind (see “Turning the Game…”, 9).
4 See Pollok 2010.
5 Actually, the two aspects are not easily distinguishable. According to the Leib-
nizian postulate of continuity, the transition from obscure to clear perceptions
is in principle continuous, hence the distinction between the sensible and the in-
telligible is gradual, not categorical.
Anne Pollok104
tion 2), but also a main aspect in Mendelssohns metaphysical-practical
argument about the nature of the human soul (section 3).
b) The center of Mendelssohns philosophy, the human soul, is not as
empty, or formal, as the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception
(see KrV, B157–8). Instead, Mendelssohn argues that it must be substan-
tial. For him, this notion contains more than pure functionality. It has to
be seen as what we may call ontologically furnished in that it possesses
certain innate properties that unfold over time. It has to be stressed here
that Mendelssohn apparently did not look very deeply into Kants much
more sophisticated take on the different aspects of this functionality as
presented in the first Critique6, but limits the apperceptional activity to
two parts: i) having perceptions at all, and ii) uniting them under the ap-
perception of the soul itself. Mendelssohns main reason to cling to the
idea of a substantial notion of the soul is not only a result of his aforemen-
tioned belief in Leibnizian metaphysics, but ultimately rests on practical
reasons, as the third dialogue in his most famous work, the Phaedon (first
published in 1767) shows. In sections three and four of my paper, I will
focus on how Mendelssohn reformulated the unconscious in order to se-
cure the validity of personal immortality, guaranteed by divine provi-
dence.
1. Accessing the Unconscious
The Cartesian Cogito, or its subject, the Cartesian “I”—as the uniting
force behind any sort of mental activity—is the point of perspective
from which to understand and to reconstruct most of 18th century psychol-
ogy. What, then, did philosophers make of the negation of this particular
mode of awareness, or consciousness; how did they treat the seemingly
blind aspects of human behavior and conduct? It seems that the need
to integrate the unconscious perceptions (Vorstellungen) and sensations
(Empfindungen) into the full picture ultimately led to the abolition of tra-
ditional metaphysics. This is illustrated by the emergence of new disci-
plines from prima philosophia, first rational psychology, then, more rad-
6 For a deeper discussion of Kants ideas see Lanier Anderson: “Synthesis, Cog-
nitive Normativity, and the Meaning of Kants Question, How are synthetic cog-
nitions a priori possible?, in: European Journal of Philosophy 9/3, 2001,
pp. 275–305 and Konstantin Pollok: “An Almost Single Inference: Kants De-
duction of the Categories Reconsidered”, in: Archiv fr Geschichte der Philoso-
phie 90/3, 2008, pp. 323–345.
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ically, empirical psychology, aesthetics, and ultimately anthropology, all of
which include a new awareness of these dark areas of our minds.
According to contemporary vocabulary, the unconscious is defined as
the area of obscure perceptions.7 They seem completely useless for ration-
al understanding, for we lack the ability to intrinsically differentiate their
composition—which would make them “distinct”—and even to extrinsi-
cally separate these perceptions from each other—which would render
them “clear”. Leibniz and others refer to the unconscious as an
“ocean” of minute perceptions (petite perceptions), thus marking the in-
distinguishability of its parts, but also its enormous share in the human
mind. These unconscious areas mainly govern sensory contents and reac-
tions. They refer to what we may call the mental representation of our
body. Others represent too distant and too vague impressions of our en-
vironment, due to our perspective on the world and the human incapabil-
ity of representing everything sub specie aeternitatis. These perceptions
never reach the higher state of clarity that accompanies apperception,
or self-awareness as the conscious separation of the activity of perception
from its content. Therefore they mark the purely passive aspect of the
human “mind” and do not show clear signs of self-reflectivity.8
Thus, passivity and obscurity are prima facie not overwhelmingly ad-
vantageous attributes, since they do not seem to enable us to practically
or theoretically cope with the world. But undeniably they are important
aspects of human nature and may therefore be worth philosophical atten-
tion. Baumgarten made it clear that the “logic of the senses” (logica sen-
sitiva), a science of sensible cognition and its perfection, is a necessary
correlate to the investigation into metaphysics and logic. Even more, it
7 See Leibniz Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis, 1684 (see Pollok 2010,
158–67). A somewhat hilarious approach to this topic can be found in Kants
lectures on Anthropology. See for example Anthropologie Dohna-Wundlacken
(1791/92), Konvolut 75–83. Man is merely the toy of his obscure perceptions,
but he also plays with them. He does never know what is on his mind if asked
to come up with a story. But if others tell a story he will be more than happy
to jump in. In the first case he thinks he knows nothing, but the latter case
makes him wonder about the God in his head…. Generally, obscure and there-
fore unconscious perceptions as Kant defines them here seem to be rationally
not justifiable. Kant depicts this with the wish of having a dry place for ones
grave: this cannot be rationally justified if death is accepted as the end of the
living body, for which the place of burial does not make any difference.
8 I put this in quotations because this kind of “mind” already includes body as well
as soul: it is not their nature which is different, but their respective status of
clarity.
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would be a shame for humanity to miss this opportunity for exhaustive
self-assessment. Therefore, understanding the perfection of sensibility is
not only supplementary, but marks the completion of philosophy. The mi-
nute or obscure perceptions are not epistemologically void, but offer a
more refined picture of a humanly possible perception of the world. In
a first step, Baumgarten refers to the richness (ubertas) of inherently ob-
scure notions (which are defined as “clear and confused ideas”) as “ex-
tensive clarity” (extensive Klarheit).9 In such extensively clear representa-
tions we do not gain conceptual knowledge out of which we can form no-
tions of the understanding, but we—nearly instinctively—grasp a poten-
tially endless field of perceptions at once. In its most elaborated forms,
such as in poetry, this extensively endless field cannot be completely re-
duced to clear and distinct parts except at the price of utterly reducing
its richness. Thus, neither can art be translated into science, nor a Ho-
meric epic into a scientific description. On the one hand, this points to-
wards our limitations; the complexity of our world can only be grasped
by abstractions, or conceptual abbreviations of what is “really there”.
But on the other hand it allows for grasping the universes richness in a
uniquely human way. Poetic representation may be less exact than sci-
ence, but it offers an indispensable human perspective and a distinctively
human way to understand our cosmos.
Following Baumgarten, different schools developed different per-
spectives on this phenomenon. Johann Christoph Gottsched used the
Baumgartian scheme to develop his version of poetics as an instrument
to improve human sentiment and thought by means of aesthetically pleas-
ing lessons in the theater. His opponents, Johann Jakob Bodmer and Jo-
hann Jakob Breitinger, promoted the faculties of wit and imagination.
Both schools had a huge impact on the development of aesthetics as a lit-
erary discipline, in particular on the theory of tragedy and the develop-
ment of the novel. Further reaching were the concepts developed by
the promoters of the Enlightenment in Berlin, such as Friedrich Nicolai,
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, and—philosophically most distinguished—
Mendelssohn. With their critical journals they not only changed the
face and usages of literary criticism; they also promoted the value of
human sentiments for the improvement of human understanding and be-
havior. Ultimately they offered what one could in a broader sense call a
holistic approach towards the understanding of the human mind and the
9 See Meditationes philosophicae de nonullis ad poema pertinentibus (1735), § 16,
Metaphysica (1739), § 531.
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respective limits of pure rational thought without falling prey to irration-
alism. Still, it seems as though all of them were more concerned to explain
and justify merely clear and confused, but not entirely obscure notions. I
will argue that Mendelssohns philosophy shows an awareness of the im-
portance of this wider and more challenging area, which renders his phi-
losophy more provocative than it may seem on the surface.
Generally, his version of a rationalistic anthropology does not negate
the impact of biology and history on humankind.10 But its focus lies on the
human ability to individually and socially develop within culture, whose
beneficial influence he views as being secured by divine providence.
The establishment of this culture needs enlightened people, who are
able to make unhindered use of their own reason, and who rely on
their own conscience. This sounds as if the unconscious, in good rational-
istic tradition, needs simply be overcome and illuminated, i. e. turned
from obscurity to clarity. However, Mendelssohn had a more refined
view on this phenomenon, which stresses the importance of the uncon-
scious as a means for the success of human enlightenment. First, the un-
conscious explains our pleasure in art and the motivation of our actions,
and, second, it guarantees for our personhood, and that is, our immortal-
ity. For Mendelssohn, this is the real achievement of his age.
2. Yet Another Rational Psychology?
As mentioned, the unconscious plays an important role both in Mendels-
sohns thoughts on aesthetics and in his consideration of moral motiva-
tion. Ultimately both aspects could be reformulated as a kind of mental
training, where a rational, clear thought is “translated” into an obscure
intuitive motion. A Kantian might claim that this kind of unconscious
is not unconscious at all, for it is in principle open to clarification.11 But
this potentiality is foreign to Mendelssohns idea, since he subscribes
10 The areas of biology and history served as counter-pieces to a still viable me-
chanical approach to explain the nature of humankind. See for example Zammi-
to 2002, 230.
11 See Kants lectures on Logic. According to him, it does not make sense to talk
about “unconscious cognition” (“unbewusste Erkenntnisse”), because what is
unconscious cannot be known in principle. Any such reference to unconscious
notions actually refers to the fact that these notions are not immediately (instan-
taneously/actually) conscious—but potentially open to clarification by (logical)
reasoning (AA 24:341)
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the Leibnizian claim that there are only gradual differences among partic-
ular mental contents. Therefore, ideally any one of them could be grasped
and dealt with rationally. But Mendelssohns theory of the unconscious is
more sophisticated than those of his predecessors. As I shall show first, in
following Baumgartens account of the emotional impact of poetry
through the sheer amount of perceptions it has to offer to the human
mind, Mendelssohn achieved a more refined approach toward the explan-
ation of aesthetic pleasure in seemingly un-pleasurable objects. With that
he helped to uncover the all-too-human delight in ambiguity.12 Addition-
ally (see 2.b), he applies this effect to (moral) deliberation, thus providing
possible explanation of the problem of weakness of will. But due to an
overly instrumentalizing view his take may be seen as an insufficient soul-
tion to this problem.
2.1 The Aesthetic Unconscious: The Complicated Case of Pleasures
In his 1757 essay On the Main Principles of the Fine Arts and Sciences13
Mendelssohn stresses the importance of aesthetics for our understanding
of the human soul. As he mentions already in the introductory passage,
on the “obscure paths” (JubA I, 427/Dahlstrom, 169) of aesthetic phe-
nomena we can gather information about the functioning of our mental
apparatus that we could never have detected through mere rational anal-
ysis. In other essays of that time, Mendelssohn continues to explore this
vast ocean of the unconscious for “improving” our understanding (i. e.
making it more clear), or at least as a means to enhance the full range
of our aesthetic approval. Instead of just accepting the unconscious, Men-
delssohn seeks to reconstruct the unconsciously effective pleasure, and
therewith to provide us with the means to deliberately and rationally in-
fluence it.
The necessary existence of obscurity within our consciousness—and
the possibility of its rational improvement without turning it into con-
scious clarity—is a major issue in his first publication on the topic: the
Letters on Sentiments (1755). This is reflected in its very composition,
for Mendelssohn tackles the problem in two voices: the elderly British ra-
12 See Kaus 1993, and 1995.
13 
ber die Hauptgrundstze der Schçnen Knste und Wissenschaften. First publish-
ed in Bibliothek der schçnen Wissenschaften und der freyen Knste I, 2 (Leipzig
1757), pp. 231–68. With some revisions Mendelssohn includes it 1761 (2nd edi-
tion 1771, 3rd edition 1777) in the second volume of his Philosophical Writings.
See JubA I, 165–190, 425–452, Dahlstrom 169–91.
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tionalist—if this were not already a condradictio in adiecto—Palemon,14
and the younger, more feverish enthusiast (Schwrmer) Euphranor, ironi-
cally a German. Mendelssohns position is revealed in the interplay15 be-
tween the two characters. One could even add that with his purposeful re-
versing of the standard applications of certain character traits of specific
nationalities (i. e. rationality=German; enthusiasm=British) Mendels-
sohn aimed at reversing a whole set of standard expectations in academic
philosophy. It is indeed possible for a German not to be a convinced ra-
tionalist—as it is for a Jew (in this case: Mendelssohn himself) to offer
philosophical insight.16 On this line, it is Palemon who offers the more ra-
tional, Leibnizian point of view, which is seriously challenged by Euphra-
nors objections and demands for which is counterpart Palemon is obvi-
ously unable to give.
In essence, the Letters on Sentiments inquire into the nature of senti-
ments, how they function within human life, and whether they benefit our
being or not—up to the point of whether their total absence is desirable
or not.17 The mode of presentation reveals the inherent problems in these
areas: the ambiguity of the issue (and Mendelssohns take on it) is shown
by two conflicting voices which ultimately do not achieve sufficient agree-
ment. Euphranor favors pure pleasure and fears the destructive, or at
least the cooling effect of thought on aesthetic pleasure. Palemon, on
the other hand, holds that a “refined” understanding of our sentiments
improves our general world perception (see the fourth letter, JubA I,
54–58/Dahlstrom, 18–20). In particular, it enhances our pleasure in aes-
thetics and the speed and correctness of our decisions in practical issues.
Taking up Euphranors suggestion that our pleasure in clear and con-
fused, or even in obscure perceptions enhances our overall appreciation
of beauty, Palemon introduces a process of the productive interplay of
14 To make his rationalistic point of view even more obvious Mendelssohn re-
named him as Theokles in the second edition from 1761.
15 Other scholars hold that Mendelssohn speaks through Palemon alone. But Men-
delssohns high esteem of British thinkers and the circumstances of Euphranors
possible role in the Letters seem to stand against such one-sided reading. It is not
by accident that Mendelssohn favors the ambiguous Platonic style. See Pollok
2010, 169.
16 This twist, of course, was fairly hidden by the date of the first publication. The
Letters on Sentiments appeared anonymously. But after the reviewers found
out about Mendelssohns identity, this book also stirred a debate about contribu-
tions to philosophy by Jews.
17 The Letters thus also deal with the justification of suicide. I will leave this issue
aside here.
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thought and passion. First we need to clarify every single perception, and
find the grain of rationality that allows us to put it in a justifiable connec-
tion to related perceptions. This, of course, is not a matter of aesthetic
pleasure, but of scientific inquiry. But the process could and should be re-
versed to enable bodily and mental pleasure in its results. Palemon illus-
trates this with the activity of a mathematician (see JubA I, 91/Dahlstrom,
54). This poor fellow has to investigate into the meaning of each equation,
each term in question first—a merely exhausting and dry activity. But
after having understood and reconstructed the whole mathematical
proof, our mathematician is able to take a step back and intuitively
enjoy the proof as a whole. This is not possible by a clear and distinct per-
ception of every single step, but rather by letting all distinct parts delib-
erately pass back into confusion, up to the point where they become in-
distinguishable, or obscure, and thereby form a whole. While the mathe-
matician is enjoying the whole proof, all steps are indeed obscure in that
they are internally and externally indistinguishable for the moment, but
potentially each step could be brought back to clarity again. Thus,
there is no unconscious as such but a deliberate re-making of the uncon-
scious: aesthetic pleasure becomes a whole piece of work by the perceiv-
ers ability to turn perceptions into qualitatively different states, thereby
improving the quality of their impact by a renewed understanding of their
connections, and an improved insight into their actual quantity. The deci-
sive point is that, without painstakingly distinguishing each and every as-
pect, the concept of extensive clarity does not come to its full force. In
other words, the formerly completely obscure aspects have to become
clear, that is distinguishable, in one instance of the process. Put back
into obscurity, they serve to enrich the immediate intuition. What changes
is not their actual nature, but their potential capacity to become clear
again more easily. In the moment of aesthetic enjoyment, they are not
confused but obscure, to be sure, since in the moment of pleasure they
are taken as one indistinguishable whole. But the potential awareness
that this whole is formed out of actually different parts makes the expe-
rience richer overall, thus fulfilling the Baumgartian notion of extensive
clarity in a diachronic mode.
According to Palemon, this has an effect on the body as well; the fi-
bers and nerves get the tension and relaxation they need to set the whole
system in a pleasurable mood. Thus, the mathematician has enjoyment on
all levels: rationally, emotionally, and bodily. The obstacle of obscure per-
ceptions is translated into one side of the coin of aesthetic pleasure which
also becomes more complex in its temporal order.
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Mendelssohns theory sounds somewhat plausible for a certain kind
of pleasure in artworks. We can, for example, enjoy an antique fresco
which is beautiful in itself, but which becomes even more beautiful
when we know about its history and the pictorial specifics—and this is
so even if this knowledge is only virtually at hand, but not explicitly con-
scious at the moment of our perception of the fresco. If we were clearly
conscious of it, we would be merely engaged in its rational assessment
rather than enjoying it. But one cannot help but notice that this refine-
ment does not cover all areas of unconscious impressions of artworks. Ad-
ditionally, the “bodily pleasure” that Palemon refers to seems to be more
of a byproduct than an essential part of Mendelssohns account of aes-
thetic appreciation. Moreover, Baumgartens theory of the irreducibility
of aesthetics appears in a different light. Rather than insisting on the pe-
culiarity of aesthetic pleasure as in principle untranslatable into clear and
distinct notions, Mendelssohn characterizes this pleasure as a mere mode
of thinking, whose parts (if seen distinctly) are by no means different
from any rational inquiry. Thus, the aesthetic dawn is essentially already
daylight.
Along the same lines, the explanation of our enjoyment in prima facie
unpleasant or evil aesthetic beauty remains problematic, too. In the Let-
ters on Sentiments Euphranor mentions the enjoyment of witnessing war
scenes or of observing a sinking ship; a well-known topos since Lucretius.
Palemon tries to explain all these phenomena as an effect of curiosity and
reassurance: since we know that we can only perceive the bad event but
are helpless and cannot do anything to improve it, we seek to satisfy our
drive for knowledge and therewith to at least improve ourselves. None of
this, Palemon tries to explain, shows any trait of human evil but could be
reformulated as an intrinsically positive trait of character in that we al-
ways strive, within the scope of our abilities, to become more perfect.
Thus, a seemingly negative joy in other peoples suffering just shows
our unconscious drive to self-perfection. What he cannot deny, however,
is the obvious human need to perceive and enjoy such scene.18 In the Let-
ters Mendelssohn refers (with both his “voices”) to Dubos theory of
human beings natural propensity to avoid ennui and therefore seek the
most compelling, exciting, and emotionally uplifting sensations, be they
inherently good or evil. What makes them aesthetically pleasing is the
level of passion they allow for, not their moral worth. “The theatre has
its own morality”, concludes Palemon (JubA I, 94). However, these
18 See Zelle 1987, 353, Pollok 2010, chapter III.3.
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evil or unpleasant situations tend to be more interesting for us than Pa-
lemons positive characterization for humankind allows: to put it briefly
in Euphranors terms, it arouses more aesthetically relevant passion to
enjoy seeing the sinking ship than to admire a beautifully crafted, but
safely sailing one. We seem to be less interested in witnessing a serene
scene, and more interested in observing conflicts, or experiencing action
rather than passive enjoyment, being appalled rather than lifted up.
Obviously Mendelssohn himself was not fully satisfied by his own ex-
planations. In the Rhapsody19, a subsequent reflection on the themes from
the Letters on Sentiments, he makes several attempts (here in his “own”
voice) to explain this unsettling pleasure via a further differentiation of
the human apparatus. What we enjoy in these ambiguous scenes is not
their content, but our ability to reject this content—and, on a more formal
level, to still enjoy it as artfully crafted. What could be seen as a (per-
verse) enjoyment of a bad situation actually turns out to be an uncon-
scious training of a whole set of (positive) human powers: being able to
distinguish form and content, and judging each of them according to
their criteria—all in one moment of aesthetic pleasure, now a peculiar
mix of appreciation and rejection. These movements, which Mendelssohn
coins as a “mixed sentiment”, explicitly call for a “secret consciousness”
of the fact that what we aesthetically enjoy is actually not real. This sets us
free to distinguish content and form, which in turn enables us to take a
more critical stance.20 Thus, pleasure in ambiguity proves to be more so-
phisticated than pleasure in mere beauty, even though we are not aware
of our role as art critics, while we seem to be simply attracted by a power-
ful painting or an intoxicating tragedy.
Overall, it may be convincing that our delight in these ambiguous
kinds of situations is more complex than our pleasure in, say, a beautiful
rose. For convinced rationalists it may also be convincing that a painted
beautiful rose offers a richer enjoyment than a real rose. Perceiving the
former includes not only the enjoyment of beauty, but also the flattering
yet probably unconscious notion that it is within human power to artfully
19 The Rhapsody was first published in the Philosophical Writings in 1761, and
modified in 1771. I argued elsewhere (Pollok 2010, 184–86) that the modifica-
tion is not as fundamental as other scholars see it, see Zelle 1987, 348.
20 On the theory of mixed sentiments see Zelle 1987, Pollok 2010, and Guyer 1996
and 2005. This mode of consciousness of artistic imitation is mentioned in the
Rhapsody, JubA I, 390; Dahlstrom translates it with “inner consciousness” (p.
138).
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craft this beauty.21 Still, the problematic aspect of our pleasure, not in
roses, but in witnessing forms of human suffering, is unclear. By experi-
encing these mixed sentiments we may in fact improve by viewing par-
ticular artfully crafted scenes, but we improve just and only ourselves—
admitting the cost of other peoples actual (or potential, if in a painting)
suffering. Mendelssohn addresses this concern by turning it upside down:
our pleasure in these ambiguous modes shows that unconsciously our nat-
ural propensity to feel pity is affected. Thus, self-perfection does not in-
clude the actual miserable other, but our ability to exercise this funda-
mentally human trait by seeing the potential harm of such an event.
If we would only take similar pains in art as the mathematician does
in his calculation, we could become consciously aware of this mechanism
of artistic attraction and ethical repulsion. Seen in this light, Mendels-
sohns treatment of unpleasant pleasure or mixed sentiments reveals
an explicitly functionalist take on the unconscious. In his analysis emo-
tions are in fact translated into unclear knowledge, which ensures that
they cannot be essentially irrational, or unethical. This should guarantee
their internal positive worth. With this, Mendelssohn tries to prove that
the unconscious is an inherently positive feature, showcasing our benev-
olent, rather than egoistic traits. He further sees it as rationally justifiable,
therefore, as being potentially open to rationalization. Thus, perceiving
something obscurely does not mark it as a specific kind of mental content
as such. Its higher efficiency is not only a matter of difference in quality,
in that its parts and shape cannot be differentiated at any given moment,
but it is mostly due to a difference in quantity, in that more of these im-
pressions together offer more occasions for the soul to exercise its powers.
For a theory that strives to make qualitative propositions about art and
aesthetic judgments, this may very well be too little. But it could indeed
explain why some sensory impressions work in a particular way—and how
this could be translated back into the key points of Leibnizian metaphy-
sics: that everything is due to the best possible reason, and that every-
thing is connected within a greater whole. This rational super-structure
of our being is not confined to aesthetic appreciation, but also becomes
visible in moral reasoning.
21 See Main Principles, JubA I, 433–34/Dahlstrom, 174.
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2.b The Practical Unconscious: A Training of the Mind
Crafted as a response to David Humes skeptical implications against the
reality of causality, Mendelssohns Rhapsody as well as earlier drafts (On
the mastering of our inclinations, 1756/57, and shortly afterwards, On the
Kinship of Beauty and Good), his essay On Probability (1756), and his
prize-essay On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences (1763) plus some relat-
ed notes explicate the role of the unconscious in human motivation.22
Thus, Mendelssohns theory mostly covers the ground of a Humean ap-
proach to the (empirical) laws of mental association and reclaims it for
Rationalism.
Parallel to his argumentation concerning aesthetic pleasure, Mendels-
sohn holds that the deliberate darkening of perceptions by the mere
speed of their succession could be used to train specific actions.23 In Men-
delssohns model of the human mind this ability is represented by the so-
called minor faculties: the sense of truth (Wahrheitssinn, which Mendels-
sohn sometimes also calls “common sense”), conscience, and taste.24
“Conscience is a proficiency at correctly distinguishing good from evil
by means of indistinct inferences, and the sense for the truth is a profi-
ciency in distinguishing good from evil by similar means.” (JubA II,
325/Dahlstrom 303)25 Accordingly, taste is the ability to sense the higher
quality of a work of art (or any other kind of “beauty”). All three are
structurally equivalent to the working of the higher faculties, which on
their side deal with “higher” forms of perception—i.e. clear and distinct
22 I will not deal with Mendelssohns argument concerning causality, which paral-
lels our inductive reasoning about similar events with the laws of probability.
I will also not deal here with similar ideas by Johann Georg Sulzer.
23 It must be noted, though, that Mendelssohn did not follow a more extreme po-
sition as held by Johann Georg Sulzer, who claimes in his Anmerkungen ber
den verschiedenen Zustand, worinn sich die Seele bei Ausbung ihres Hauptverm-
çgens, nmlich des Vermçgens, sich etwas vorzustellen, und des Vermçgens zu
empfinden, befindet (1763, cit. from Vermischte philosophische Schriften Bd. 1,
225–43, here 213) that only obscure ideas have motivational force; see Pollok
2010, 306–08.
24 Kant will call this the aesthetic perfection of cognition, which is characterized as
the subjective impression of easiness (Leichtigkeit), interest (Interesse) and live-
liness (Lebhaftigkeit) in the act of cognition (see Anthropologie Dohna-Wund-
lacken, 1791/92)—in short, it is defined by a merely subjective mode of cogni-
tion.
25 “Das Gewissen ist eine Fertigkeit, das Gute vom Bçsen, und der Wahrheitssinn,
eine Fertigkeit, das Wahre vom Falschen durch undeutliche Schlsse richtig zu
unterscheiden.” (JubA II, 325)
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ideas. The “senses” for truth, beauty and morality on the lower part of the
scale have the advantage that they work on an instinctive basis, do not de-
mand any conscious deliberation, and are therefore faster than their
“higher” equivalents. They are not inborn, but are developed throughout
human life; this allows for the possibility that they could go astray, but
also that they could be improved.
The speed and number of ideas perceived mark their motivational as
well as their qualitative state: “With every sensitive feeling an ocean of
notions enters our soul. The soul thinks if it perceives some of these no-
tions distinctly; and it feels if it surrenders to the impression which con-
tains them all.”26 To actually act badly is therefore grounded on a false
ratio between what is clearly known and what is (unconsciously) felt.27
Accordingly, the appropriate aim is to control the content of the latter
area. Mendelssohn identifies this as the aim of “applied morality” (aus-
bende Sittenlehre, see On Evidence, JubA II, 315).
Mendelssohns account of the senses for truth, morality, and beauty
could be seen mostly as a pragmatic abbreviation of thought-processes.
By training a particular action, it is transformed into an obscure pattern.
This means that, first, the intellectual apparatus is not actively involved
anymore, and, second, that this one pattern could be joined with other,
similar patterns. They together form an “accumulation of compelling rea-
sons”28, with all the “reasons” being merely unconscious motivations.
26 “Mit jedem sinnlichen Gefhl strçmt ein Meer von Begriffen in unsere Seele.
Die Seele denkt, wenn sie einige von diesen Begriffen deutlich wahrnimmt;
und sie empfindet, sobald sie sich dem Eindruck berl
ßt, der sie alle faßt.”
(JubA II, 183, Verwandtschaft des Schçnen und Guten/On the kinship of beauty
and good) This is even applicable to the artistic genius who—despite an innate
predisposition, or talent—could improve his skills by learned rules, which, if ap-
plied correctly, serve as orientation in the back of ones mind (i.e. obscurely).
But when we as perceivers can sense that the artist slavishly followed rules
which were conscious and clear to him in the moment of the creation of his art-
work, the sensory experience and hence the aesthetic impression of the artwork
will be severely limited. Mendelssohn does not claim, as Young or Warton (see
Zammito 1992, 28), that genius is destroyed by any knowledge of rules. But the
ratio between knowledge and unconsciously working talent is to be taken seri-
ously. A mere improvement in knowledge, so the not-so-rationalistic conclusion,
does not necessarily serve to improve the genius.
27 See Von der Herrschaft ber die Neigungen/On the Mastery over the Inclinations
(around 1756/57), JubA II, 149.
28 Mendelssohns term “Bewegungsgrnde” could also be translated with “moti-
vating reasons”. See Rhapsody (1761), JubA I, 571; On Probability, JubA I,
164/Dahlstrom, 250, On Evidence, JubA II, 327/Dahlstrom, 305.
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Given their number and speed, they work merely intuitively. Mendels-
sohns example is the pianist, who practices a certain movement long
enough to reach a state of mastery where he does not have to think
about what he is doing. Apparently, the better he is acquainted with his
work and the more he practices, the more the formerly artificial move-
ments become part of his “nature” – hence, the more natural his perform-
ance.
But this accumulation of actions or “Beweggrnde” does not exhaust
Mendelssohns treatment of the workings of the unconscious. In the Leib-
nizian tradition he also mentions the innumerable amount of “petite per-
ceptions” as being responsible for the ultimate weight in decision-making.
According to Leibniz principle of sufficient reason, it is impossible to re-
main undecided in any case, since the perfect equilibrium between two
things is a chimera. There will always be a “reason” why we decide on
a particular action, even though this reason might be indefinitely small
and hardly recognizable. Mendelssohn discusses this case in light of his
theory of probability (see JubA I, 512–15/Dahlstrom, 248–49) as an ar-
gument against voluntaristic notions of a divine freedom of choice. In es-
sence, his argument runs like this: we have to suppose that every free ac-
tion is indeed decisively influenced by “compelling reasons” (ibid.) and
therefore not free in the sense of being arbitrarily chosen, because other-
wise not even god could have probable prescience. Taken down to earth,
Mendelssohn reiterates Humes argument that we do indeed expect cer-
tain actions from a certain kind of character (see Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding, VIII, footnote), even though we view this charac-
ter as having free will. That “the soul cannot choose otherwise than ac-
cording to compelling reasons and impulses” (JubA I, 515/Dahlstrom,
250), however, does not mean that the agent herself perceives all of
them clearly. Indeed, quite a few are hidden in the “vast ocean” of her
“sensitive feelings”, or the unconscious, which is legible only to a divine
mind.
In line with this, Mendelssohn does not explicitly state one obvious
conclusion from the aforementioned remark about the enormous amount
of obscure notions entering the soul with every “sensitive feeling”. Given
that the soul perceives some notions distinctly, this still leaves a vast part
of this “ocean” obscure. Mendelssohn mostly deals with those parts that
become clearer and subsequently are moved back into obscurity again—
which does not say anything about those petite perceptions which are not
involved in this mechanism, nor in any way related to it. One could argue
that some of these minute perceptions are indirectly formed by those
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which are part of the process and that therewith potentially all uncon-
scious areas are affected by conscious acts. Still, this does not and can
not take into account the possibility that it merely works the other way
around and the minute perceptions have their own influence on our men-
tal apparatus. Mendelssohns argumentation does not offer an answer to
this concern, and therefore leaves the works of the unconscious in prac-
tical philosophy ambiguous.
The relatively unsuccessful story of Mendelssohns version of “ap-
plied ethics” might have two main reasons, both connected to this diagno-
sis. First, his notion of mental training is far too close to human condition-
ing and therefore does not quite cohere with Mendelssohns call for En-
lightenment as the ability to make use of ones reason, not ones “senses”.
Perhaps his later insistence on the value of culture, and his warning that
reckless enlightenment produces more depressed outlaws than reason-
guided citizens could be traced back to his earlier moralistic views. Sec-
ond, it conveys a far-reaching problem of Leibnizian metaphysics due
to a confusion of qualitative and quantitative aspects of perception. If
the faster and deeper reaching obscure perceptions always outwitted
our reasoning, what could be the need of deep rational analysis; what
could be the worth of what Mendelssohn calls “dead ideas”, which may
be clear and distinct, but carry no motivational power at all? On the
other hand, in line with Ploucquets criticism (see JubA I, 97 and 139), mi-
nute perceptions could also be seen as highly ineffective, even if a vast
amount of them is put together. Any amount of “nearly zero” could hard-
ly add up to a positive (here in the sense of effective) notion. Mendels-
sohn himself constantly shifts between promoting the power of obscure
feelings and the necessity and predominance of clear reasoning without
offering a resolution of the resulting tension.
Perhaps a view on his metaphysics can help to clarify and define the
role of practically and aesthetically relevant obscurity, since this vast
ocean plays an equally important role here. In accord with Leibniz cen-
tral doctrine of the monads as mirrors of the whole universe Mendelssohn
holds that the soul indeed represents the whole world, may it be uncon-
sciously or with active apprehension (see On Evidence, JubA II, 277–78/
Dahlstrom, 260; also in Phaedon, JubA III/1, 96–97, Morning Hours,
JubA III/2, 141). As the following section will show, the human “inner
ocean” should also ensure the individuality and personality of the
human soul even beyond death. This was Mendelssohns greatest hope.
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3. Practical Ends, Eternal Aims
Mendelssohn can claim the dubious honor of having been referred to by
name in Kants Critique of Pure Reason. The second edition contains an
explicit refutation of his proof of the immortality of the soul (KrV, B413–
15), as an example of a paralogism in rational psychology, where the mis-
take lies in confusing the metaphysical and empirical nature of the middle
term in the argument. Several scholars before me have already noticed
that Kant did not bother to argue against the whole set of proofs put for-
ward by Mendelssohn. More accurately, he only argues against the souls
permanence—which says nothing about immortality of the soul as a per-
son at all. Given that the account for immortality is the key point to un-
derstand how Mendelssohn utilizes the unconscious in metaphysics, it is
important to figure out whether Kants refutation is appropriate.
Lets start from the fundamentals. For Mendelssohn (and, even if jus-
tified in a new and groundbreaking way, also for Kant), the unity of the
soul is not factual as the unity of an atom, but it is an act of unifying
all perceptual activity.29 The synthesis done by the faculty of thinking
(Denkungsvermçgen) is thus the enabling condition of complexity. With-
out the “thinking being,” all manifold entities, such as beauty, perfection,
and harmony are nothing. The “infinite amount of concepts, cognitions,
inclinations, passions, which occupy us incessantly” (see JubA III/1,
9630) are the material out of which the mind forms its world. Hence,
the vast ocean of impressions is potentially given shape by our under-
standing. Without being formed and thereby focused, its force remains
decisively low. By indirectly referring to Ploucquet31, Mendelssohns Soc-
29 To a certain degree, this is a refined version of the Platonic proof, which draws
on the souls knowledge of the forms. Any being which could claim such knowl-
edge must be of the same kind as the forms. This evokes quite some objections,
which Mendelssohn seeks to avoid with his version. Against Sassen 2008, 223,
who finds it “surprising” that Mendelssohn mentions this function as the
souls essence, I claim that this is good school philosophy and simply reiterates
the main points of Leibniz Monadology.
30 “—Sage mir, mein lieber Simmias! finden wir nicht in unsrer Seele eine fast un-
endliche Menge von Begriffen, Erkenntnissen, Neigungen, Leidenschaften, die
uns unaufhçrlich besch
ftigen?—Allerdings!” (JubA III/1, 96).
31 See also JubA III/1, 97 and 139: here Mendelssohn mentions Ploucquets re-
mark, that a vast number of perceptions which have the quality of “nearly
zero” can never add up to any perception of qualitative value. Therefore, the mi-
nute perceptions are merely meaningless because they cannot be effective at all.
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rates holds: “Set all obscure, inadequate, and unsteady concepts side by
side. Does this result in an enlightened, complete, and defined con-
cept?—It does not seem so.—Where there is no mind (Geist), which com-
pares them and by consideration and contemplation builds a more perfect
cognition from them: there these concepts will never cease to be obscure,
deficient and unsteady.” (JubA III/1, 97)32 In this understanding, clear no-
tions do not simply contain any number of obscure aspects, but order and
concentrate them in a particular way; may the perceiver be aware of the
constitutive parts as in clear and distinct ideas, or just be able to perceive
its overall shape, as in clear and confused ideas.
On the other hand, this mental activity of shaping the “vast ocean” is
not necessarily always conscious, since Mendelssohn let his Socrates claim
that personality as the shaping force remains even within “sleep, fainting,
vertigo, enchantment” (JubA III/1, 103), all only delivering obscure no-
tions. That said, self-awareness, the most fundamental mode of appercep-
tion, is not necessarily and always given within the activity of unifying per-
ceptions.33 But apart from its complicated set-up, having self-awareness is
taken as the decisive source of knowledge in general. As Mendelssohn
lets one character in the dialogue, Philolaus, hold (JubA III/1, 53), real
knowledge does not come about by observation of external events, but
by inward observation of the souls inferences from these events, or bet-
ter, by the souls own working on all sensory material. Thus, real knowl-
As mentioned here in section 1, Mendelssohn himself is not explicit enough as to
whether he sides with Ploucquet or Sulzer.
32 “Setze viele verworrene, mangelhafte und schwankende Begriffe neben einand-
er, wird dadurch ein aufgekl
rter, vollst
ndiger und bestimmter Begriff hervor-
gebracht?—Es scheinet nicht.—Wo nicht ein Geist hinzu kçmmt, der sie verglei-
chet, und durch Nachdenken und Ueberlegen sich eine vollkommnere
Erkenntniß aus derselben selbst bildet: so hçren sie in Ewigkeit nicht auf
viele verworrene, mangelhafte und schwankende Begriffe zu seyn.” Possibly
“Geist” should be translated with “spirit” (not “mind”) to stress the fact that
Mendelssohn takes it as an equivalent to “soul”.
33 Here Kant is of course much more clear. The transcendental apperception, the
“I think” (Ich denke), is referred to modally: it does not necessarily have to ac-
company all my perceptions in actio. But all unified perception, i. e. thought, is
only possible as being unified under it. So, in reconstruction, all thoughts can
only be understood as being potentially accompanied and formed by the “I
think”, even though one was not aware of this connection in actio. This is the
guise of the very formulation: “Das Ich denkemuss alle meine Vorstellungen be-
gleiten kçnnen” (B 131). Thus, it is not only a mere state of awareness, but the
enabling condition of unity.
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edge is gained by observing mental operations.34 Aside from Kants argu-
ments against introspection, these notions at least correspond to Kants
view in that they stress activity or function versus gathering material.
In Mendelssohns case, this serves to elucidate the essential properties
of a simple, non-extended substance called “soul”. In Kants case, howev-
er, this serves as a counter-argument to the apparent immediacy of inner
experience. But before considering the differences, let us turn to Men-
delssohns proof: In the first dialogue, he argues in line with Leibniz
that since the soul is simple, it can only cease to exist by a divine act of
destruction. Each and every step, however small it may be, is taken
under the law of continuity.35 Under this law the decisive step from an in-
finitely small degree to nothingness (i. e. death) is an incredible jump.
Therefore, under regular circumstances (that is: by natural laws)36 the
soul cannot just cease to exist. The proof that the soul indeed is this
kind of substance follows in the second dialogue, which is the main target
of Kants refutation. Irritatingly, Kant does not directly address the prob-
lematic aspect of the souls substantiality, nor does he mention (as in the
“Anticipations of Perception”, see A207/B252) the empirical status of our
perception of continuity.37 Instead, his argument against Mendelssohns
reasoning draws on the difference between extensive and intensive mag-
nitudes, and therewith concentrates on the souls activity. In the “Antici-
pations of Perception” Kant has already argued that, “in all appearances,
the real that is object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a de-
gree” (KrV, B207) “of influence on the senses.”38 In the later refutation of
Mendelssohns proof in the “Paralogism”, he stretches the qualification of
34 “Alle unkçrperlichen Begriffe, sprach Philolaus, hat die Seele nicht von den

ußern Sinnen, sondern durch sich selbst erlangt, indem sie ihre eigenen Wir-
kungen beobachtet, und dadurch ihr eigenes Wesen und ihre Eigenschaften ken-
nen lernt.”
35 Later Mendelssohn stresses that this is not only Leibniz, but also resting on Pater
Boscovichs mathematical works; see Mendelssohns addendum to the second
edition, 1768, JubA III/1, 135. Kant also subscribes to this law, but just and
only for empirical issues; see also Prolegomena, AA 4:306 f., §24.
36 See the discussion in the first footnote in Falkenstein 1998, 561–62.
37 As Powell 1985, 204–05 points out, Kant has his own transcendental version of
continuity. I will not go into this issue here.
38 Powell 1985, 214 is correct in his criticism of Chisholms reading of the refuta-
tion, that Kant is not referring to a “degree of reality” here (which would put
his own refutation of reality being a predicate at risk, see Powell 1985, 212),
but to the degree of the object of sensations influence on our “mental image”
of it. Thus, once more, any mental operation of the “I” requires empirical data.
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having intensive magnitude not only to “objects of sensation” but also to
its subject, the “soul”. If the soul is seen under this light it becomes noth-
ing more than another object of sensation. This soul is not an extensive
magnitude (like matter, for instance), but always (empirically) contains
a degree of perceptual content. This intensive magnitude could very
well approximate zero, which is not achieved by any alteration of parts
but by gradual diminution of degree. Thus, the soul ceases to exist simply
by the lack of any perceptible quality of inward activity.
Kants argument seems simple, but also uncharacteristically picky.39
First, to conflate zero with the infinitesimally small may be adequate
for a pragmatic approach, but it is not aedequate for questions of meta-
physics.40 It could hence be argued that what is left after gradual diminu-
tion is perhaps not a conscious empirical “I”, but an unconscious one,
which might still be capable of doing the job of the transcendental apper-
ception (A166/B208). Second, Kant charges Mendelssohn of neglecting a
suitable option (i. e. gradually ceasing), whereas Mendelssohn indeed
mentions it several times.41 We can therefore hold that Kants objection
against Mendelssohn is at least incomplete as the very argument is con-
cerned.42 But why does he choose this mode of argumentation, which
could be criticized as either unfair or inaccurate?
One way to defend Kants choice is somewhat ad hominem: he might
have quoted Mendelssohn from memory, or perhaps even according to
the discussions which followed the Pantheism debate, which ultimately
lead to the breakdown of Mendelssohns philosophical reputation.43 Ac-
39 Altmann 1972, 179 is pretty short on Kants Refutation: “Kant did not do full
justice to Mendelssohn”, since, for instance, Boscovichs law of continuity indeed
includes intensive magnitudes. For a more detailed account, see Falkenstein
1998, Appendix A, 587–88.
40 In particular I do not quite buy into Powells argument that Mendelssohn had
not shown the possibility that nothing can just vanish. He is definitely not relying
on “experimental” information here. Powell does not only seem to ignore Leib-
nizian metaphysics, but also the whole second dialogue of the Phaedon (see Po-
well 1985, 202—more arguments against Powell are to be found in Falkenstein
and Dyck).
41 See JubA III/1, 71–73, 83, 103, and then again in the Addendum to the third Ed-
ition of the Phaedon 1769, ibid., 155.
42 See Falkenstein 1998, 587, Sassen 2008, 216, 220, among others.
43 See Alexander Altmann: “Das Bild Moses Mendelssohns im deutschen Idealis-
mus”, in: Moses Mendelssohn und die Kreise seiner Wirksamkeit. Ed. by Michael
Albrecht, Eva J. Engel, Norbert Hinske. Tbingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag 1994,
pp. 1–24.
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cording to this reading, Kant would not refute Mendelssohn, but would
only object to a secondary understanding of Mendelssohns main point.
Regardless, this is not satisfying and most likely not correct. Another op-
tion is to argue from an architectural point of view. From this perspective,
the main counter-arguments against Mendelssohns proof are already
mentioned in the constructive part of the Critique, the “Analytic”.
What remains to be said in the “Dialectic” are the results from denying
the soul any substantiality. This could justify why Kant restricts himself
to attacking Mendelssohn via the consequences of this view for the
souls degree of intensive magnitude, because he indirectly shows how
Mendelssohns argumentation only allows him to admit the souls essence
as an accompanying44 function of perception. Thus, no further step to-
wards proving its substantiality could be taken and hence immortality
as a substance rests only on the “souls” ability to unite perceptions. If
this function is gradually annihilated, it cannot be said to endure eternal-
ly.45
As Kant has shown in the preceding parts of the Critique, the soul is
not a substantial entity, but can only be understood as the pure function
of apperception46—as pointed out, for instance, in the “Deduction”, the
“Anticipations of Perception” (A 176/B 217), and repeatedly in the “Pa-
ralogism” (B 407–8). The soul—or what traditionally is referred to as a
soul—does not “cease to exist” as any kind of substance (e.g. matter
with extensive quality), since it does not exist the same way. All we can
say about it as a transcendental subject is that it enables experience.
All claims beyond this, as claims about the soul materialiter are bound
to empirical information, hence not part of metaphysics. Any possible
way of thinking about the “soul” means either thinking about its opera-
tions, or about its empirical content. If it is the latter, the stage is open
for Kants refutation of Mendelssohns proof. If it is the former, Mendels-
sohns claims go not far enough.
44 Not, as Kant himself claims to have proven, as the enabling condition of experi-
ence.
45 See Powell 1985, 205 who argues that Kant first shows how any such proof could
be still true in light of Critical Philosophy and then, second, reveals the most
crippling argument in the Refutation. This clever version of charitable reading
and then even more forcefully destroying the previous option seems to hint
into the right direction.
46 It also follows that rational psychology is impossible (A 347/B 405–6; see Hat-
field 1992 et al.).
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Stripping the soul of all metaphysical content is exactly what Men-
delssohn seeks to avoid, since it would lead to abolishing the Leibnizian
philosophy of perfectibility. For a suitable defense he deems it necessary
and sufficient to refute materialism47, since he takes this as being the only
possible option besides Leibnizian Ontology. At the end of the second
dialogue (JubA III/1, 93) he stresses that even though the essence of
the soul is its functioning as giving unity to the (perceived) manifold,
its origin is not this mere functioning but its being a simple substance
(up to p. 97). With this, his option against any form of materialism be-
comes obvious: the soul is different from matter. Therefore, its thoughts
are fundamentally different from all quantifiable bodily reaction to a
given stimulus (see ibid, 99) and are suitable for a metaphysical proof.
It is also clear that the unconscious serves as the material of the sub-
jects activity and guarantees its continuity. As considered in the previous
section (2), it could be used to explain different phenomena and therefore
even serve to explain the unconscious perceptions as a part of the souls
activity. Unfortunately, however, this cannot prove the thinking subjects
primacy as a substance, or at least of this substantiality being anything
more than its function. The aforementioned claim (see JubA III/1, 103)
that unconsciousness over a period of time does not harm continuous per-
sonality remains questionable. One way to justify how “unconscious per-
ception” without any consciousness of oneself (Selbstgefhl, JubA III/1,
106) still serves to define one particular person as the unifying function
could be to hold that the unifying force does not rest within the person,
but within god as the supervening power over all monads. But: Mendels-
sohn does not make this claim at all. The invulnerability of the monad re-
mains untouched. All he mentions (especially in the third dialogue) is
that it is only due to gods benevolence that the fundamental persistence
of the soul after death still includes this “consciousness of oneself”
(Selbstgefhl). And this is necessary to offer the path to further perfec-
tion. Here the unconscious is crucial, since Mendelssohn argues that
every impression and even the remembrance of it leaves a tiny trace.
This might grant an—unconscious—continual activity within the soul
without its body as a sensorium. But there is no sufficient argument as
to why this is enough to preserve the essence of the soul and ensure its
further perfection apart from heavily resting on gods benevolence
(here—as always in Mendelssohns works—treated as the ultimate em-
bodiment of the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason). In the “Adden-
47 The main topic of the second dialogue, see Sassen 2008, 221–22.
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dum” to the second edition of the Phaedon (1768) Mendelssohn mentions
some of his readers skeptical comments on the substantiality of the soul
(JubA III/1, 133) and addresses them. Here he concentrates on the souls
activity as its distinctive mode of being, but essentially he does not get fur-
ther than in the last part of the second dialogue. And again, Mendels-
sohns arguments do not lead further than to mere functionality, thus
leaving room for the third way: Kantian Idealism.
Unfortunately, on the other hand, if we go this route we cannot rea-
sonably say more about the souls immortality than just acknowledge the
possibility48 of a severe decrease of mental activity and therefore its ceas-
ing to serve its essential function. Given that the mode of existence is the
activity of unifying given sensory material, this mode becomes the crucial
aspect in any “proof” for its eternity (“immortality”). The fundamental
“force” of the souls activity, as it seems here, can only be captured in
its degree of consciousness, i. e. the souls intensive degree of activity.
Just given the argument that the soul is simple, then, does not hinder
that natural forces can reduce the souls activity to approximately zero,
thus preventing its “fundamental function” (B406). If consciousness is
all there is, a nearly zero degree of consciousness is insufficient. Thus,
the soul as a pure function has indeed ceased to exist, since there was
just and only a function to cease. Given unconsciousness about each
and all activities and contents within the soul, including their relation
to the “I” itself, no distinction is possible, no apperception, no applica-
tion, no content gathering.49 Without the notional presupposition of the
“I” neither cognition nor sensitivity is possible, lest their mutual applica-
tion—therefore, the “soul” indeed ceases to exist and any substantial per-
manence remains impossible to prove (see B415). And even if the latter
could be proven, it would not suffice to reasonably talk about the souls
permanence, since it is not preserved in its essence. This is worth pointing
out: for Mendelssohn, obscure perceptions serve to guarantee person-
hood for they are part of the complete (and in rationalistic diction:
real) notion of every soul. For Kant, they prove to be metaphysically use-
less since we cannot take up the divine perspective which has to serve as
their ultimate basis.
48 See Powell 1985, 216–17: it does not show the fact that the soul ceases to exist.
All Critical Philosophy shows is the impossibility to prove either way.
49 Kant also refers to this issue in a letter to Herz about Salomon Maimon, see AA
XI, 51–52.
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Kant himself claims that the proof for the souls substantiality would
be crucial (B409) for the further proof of the continuance of the souls
personality after (bodily) death. Unfortunately, after the fire bath of crit-
ical philosophy, souls are left as functions of apperception, but not as sub-
stantial or at any rate “furnished” entities. It seems almost mocking to
refer to the decrease of intensive magnitudes if Mendelssohns proof is al-
ready done for with the denial of substantiality, but one could also say
that with this step Kant manages to assign and clarify the new paradigm
of functionality. Kant treats Mendelssohns proof as the representative
case of rational psychology, and that is certainly correct. But taken for it-
self, the possibility of a death-like (but not death-identical) state of nearly
zero consciousness remains as an unsatisfactory remnant of Kants overall
successful refutation of traditional metaphysics, for Kant could have re-
futed Mendelssohn much more clearly and distinctly.50 The only aspect
left to discuss is the aforementioned aspect of gods benevolence. Ongo-
ing consciousness after death—and therefore no ceasing in its essential
function, as Mendelssohn claims, could be gods best reason to ensure
the souls perfection. If only he existed.
4. Why Immortality Matters. Concluding Mendelssohnian Remarks
It is not only Mendelssohns, but also the pre-critical Kants claim in his
lectures in the 1770 s that the real issue at stake is not whether the soul as
a substance endures, but whether the souls personality remains after
death: “personality [is] the main matter with the soul after death” (AA
28:296) An issue he already claims being an issue of “hope”, not knowl-
edge.51
As Dyck52 points out, in traditional rational psychology it is not nec-
essarily identity of consciousness (or the decisive part of consciousness in
50 Especially in this context it seems worthwhile to include the Refutation of Ideal-
ism from the second edition of the Critique (B274–79) into the anti-Mendels-
sohn picture, see Dyck, “Turning the Game…”, 18.
51 Perhaps Kant supports Georg Friedrich Meiers claim here, that immortality is
far more an issue of faith than of metaphysics; see Meier Gedancken von dem
Zustande der Seele nach dem Tode (Thoughts on the State of the Soul after
Death, 1746), Dyck 2010, 106–7. Likewise, it might also be possible that
Kants discussion of these issues was influenced by the published debate be-
tween Mendelssohn and Abbt about the vocation of man (see Pollok 2010, 416).
52 See Dyck 2010, 97.
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the “I”) over time that guarantees personhood, but only “the very capaci-
ty for a consciousness of its own identity” which should serve “to distin-
guish it from animal souls”. Mendelssohn, however, indeed requires more
than this “very capacity”, but builds his main proof of the immortality of
the soul around the notion of personal identity as the awareness of being
the same person over time and keeping this personhood eternally. Thus,
the soul should not only be seen as separated from the worldly body
(which is Mendelssohns main concern in the first two dialogues in the
Phaedon), but it should also be eternal as this particular individual.53
Mendelssohn lets his Socrates argue that the state of the soul after the
body has died cannot be mere unconsciousness. However, this does not
follow from any logical reasoning (since “a complete lack of conscious-
ness does not contradict the pure nature of a mind”, JubA III/1, 103),
but only from Gods benevolence. Like Leibniz, when it comes to this
topic Mendelssohn heavily draws on the principle of sufficient reason.
Apart from his considerations concerning natural law, which will not be
treated in this paper54, he focuses on the main trait of humanity: the
human capacity for perfectibility. In a passage pointing once again to
the vast ocean of “notions” entering our soul, Mendelssohn claims that
the idea of our perfection is essentially the active improvement of our
overall world-perception, which cannot simply stop at the end of our
physical life (see JubA III/1, 105–6). For Mendelssohn, the souls inher-
ent tendency to infinity (“Unendlichkeit”) is proof of its actual, dynamic,
and enduring realization of its telos—and necessarily, but only from the
53 In fact, but for other reasons, Mendelssohn in much closer to Locke than to
Wolff; see Dyck 2010, 103 (not mentioning Mendelssohn). It is also worth men-
tioning that the word “should” implies Mendelssohns own ambivalence as con-
cerning claims about reality and aspects which essentially presuppose gods ex-
istence. With Kantian Philosophy, this latter aspect becomes normative, not (as
Mendelssohn himself had always tried to show) descriptive.
54 This argument starts off ex negativo: what would be the consequences given the
soul were indeed mortal? If the continuance after her physical death left the soul
in the state of a mere unconscious point (i. e. a less than vegetative state, even for
a Leibnizian), the worth of this worldly life would dramatically increase. If man
had nothing to expect after his physical death he would do whatever is suitable
to provide him with a longer life-span. And even god would have no sufficient
reason to decide whether one or another individual is right if it comes to the
clash of interests (which would inevitably happen, see JubA III/1, 117–22).
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human perspective, presupposes the unconscious as the material out of
which the soul forms its world.55
Moreover, not only the souls own improvement but all of nature can
reveal perfection if represented by an apperceiving (conscious) soul.56
Hence, the worlds richness just becomes meaningful if perceived by a
mind, and it is ultimately and completely formed if this mind stretches
out to every aspect of it, may it be conscious or—given the vastness
and sheer number of unclear impressions—unconscious of it.
This highly rhetorical passage directly appeals to the necessary reality
of the principle of sufficient reason. If this principle were not actually re-
alized the world would be senseless, and human perfectibility in vain.
Kant seems to be willing to allow for a “belief” in personhood “for prac-
tical use” (zum praktischen Gebrauche, A365–66), but not in issues of
theoretical insight into the nature of the human soul. The “practical
use” of the notion of personal immortality, however, is aptly portrayed
in the third dialogue of the Phaedon57, not at all addressed by Kants ref-
utation in the KrV, since Kant could even subscribe to it—but only as an
Ideal of Pure Reason. Idealism, though, was not what Mendelssohn want-
ed to deal with.
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Pre-conceptual Aspects of Self-consciousness in Kants
Critique of Pure Reason1
Katja Crone
A question that has gone unasked for a long time in Kant research is
whether and to what extent, in the Critique of Pure Reason, the central
concept of apperception or the so-called transcendental or original self-
consciousness implies a form of concrete consciousness beyond purely
formal and functional characteristics. It is thought to be entirely uncon-
troversial that that which produces objective knowledge and which
Kant denoted with the concept of apperception only has transcendentally
necessary significance and is entirely inaccessible to concrete conscious-
ness. This deeply entrenched interpretation can be explained by program-
matic reasons above all, whereby the lesson of the paralogisms chapter in
the Critique of Pure Reason plays an important role. Here Kant shows
that there can be no justification for assuming a Cartesian soul that
would be accessible to knowledge. This can only make it seem substan-
tially wrong-headed to wish to interpret the consciousness involved in ap-
perception, which according to Kant underlies all structured thought, as a
form of phenomenal consciousness that could somehow be made appa-
rent from the first-person perspective. One could even argue that the
very attempt to locate any phenomenal self-consciousness in the Critique
of Pure Reason is contrary to the entire project of the critique of knowl-
edge, since Kant is concerned to justify propositional knowledge through
conditions that are independent of experience and can be legitimately ap-
plied to the material of empirical intuition. This sort of approach neces-
sitates a strict distinction in the theory between a priori structures on
the one hand and empirical or psychological aspects of the consciousness
of objects on the other hand—a distinction famously reflected in the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason in the sharp terminological oppositions of attributes
such as “empirical” and “pure/transcendental”, “a priori” and “a posteri-
1 This paper was originally published in German in 2007 under the title “Vorbe-
griffliches Selbstbewusstsein bei Kant?”. Translation by Karsten Schçllner.
ori”, etc.2 A “phenomenal consciousness” that is neither conceptually
structured experience nor purely aprioristic in form clearly cannot be sen-
sibly incorporated into the underlying Kantian epistemological structures.
If we accept the theoretical necessity of Kants dualistic structure of prin-
ciples, it does in fact seem rather logically doubtful to offer, alongside the
purely principle-oriented description of apperception, an explanation of it
as being at the same time phenomenal consciousness, since apperception
is explained as being absolutely simple in its essence and the condition of
all concrete consciousness.
However, the past years have seen individual interpretations here and
there that at least point towards the idea that Kantian apperception in-
volves more than just the analytic characteristics of purely logical self-
consciousness—that in contrast with concrete empirical self-conscious-
ness, apperception also introduces a pre-theoretical component. This is
suggested by the interpretations of Konrad Cramer and Dieter Sturma,
for example, who draw in particular on Kants statements in the paralo-
gisms chapter.3 The following will examine whether these text passages
are sufficient to support the thesis of a pre-theoretical self-consciousness.
However, this also raises the question of what could have led Kant to
refer to a phenomenal self within the framework of his rigorous critique
of knowledge, since the programmatic goal of that critique is precisely to
ascertain whether the phenomena of consciousness can be justified as in-
stances of knowledge whose objects can be described by means of specific
characteristics.
However, in looking for evidence of a theory of phenomenal, pre-the-
oretical self-consciousness it would be amiss to restrict oneself to the A
and B editions of the paralogisms chapter.4 To avoid a reductionist inter-
pretation it is necessary to turn as well to Kants arguments from the de-
ductions of the pure concepts of understanding in the transcendental an-
alytic, where he establishes the consciousness he calls apperception as the
highest principle of thought presupposed by the concepts of the under-
2 Citations from Kants works, except for the Critique of Pure Reason, are by vol-
ume and page numbers of the Akademie edition of Kants gesammelte Schriften
(Berlin, 1900); the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) is cited by the standard A and
B pagination of the first (1781) and second (1787) editions respectively. The
translations are taken from Guyer and Wood, 1998.
3 Cf. e.g. Cramer, 1987 and 2003; Frank, 1993; Sturma, 1997.
4 Rolf-Peter Horstmann has quite correctly made this point. Cf. Horstmann, 1993,
p. 409.
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standing.5 Thus my first step will be to analyze Kants basic argumentative
strategy for the assumption of this consciousness as well as its functional
characteristics. The preliminary goal of this analysis is to bring to light
those aspects that already, taken on their own, can point to a phenomenal
content of apperception accessible in the first-person. The second step
will be a closer reading of those passages from the paralogisms chapter
where Kant turns to the theoretical features of the judgment I think.
Here I will argue that the Critique of Pure Reason does in fact speak of
a phenomenal self-consciousness—if only in a limited sense—which, how-
ever, stands in an irresolvable tension to the program of the critique of
knowledge.
1. Apperception and the First-person Perspective
In § 16 of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant defines pure apperception as
the identity of consciousness and the synthetic unity of the manifold,
which is given a priori and produces “the representation I think”. This
characterization of the original self-consciousness, as Kant calls it, follows
from the transcendental arguments in §15, which display a specific theo-
retical perspective: the structural conditions of concrete mental acts are
brought into view from the objective third-person perspective in order
to justify the transcendental necessity of assuming an “original” self-con-
sciousness. Although the thinking subject is here the object of the theory,
§15 avoids any reference to the perspective of the thinking subject in dis-
cussing the acts of the understanding that “combine” the manifold, which
combination (“synthesis”) has to be seen as an act of spontaneity that at
the same time implies the concept of unity: “Combination is the represen-
tation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this
unity cannot, therefore, arise from the combination; rather, by being
added to the representation of the manifold, it first makes the concept
of combination possible.” (CPR B131)
Thus Kants justification starts from the structure of the mental acts
that bring the manifold of the data given in intuition under a concept
and combine multiple representations with each other. To explain this
5 While Heiner Klemme has emphasized that the arguments of the paralogisms
chapter of the later edition no longer directly connect up with the deduction
of the table of categories, this aspect is not relevant here, as I am not concerned
with the systematic consistency of the various parts of the critique. Cf. Klemme,
1996, p. 289 f.
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structure, a spontaneous synthesis and unity that is detached from all em-
pirical implications is assumed to underlie the concrete act of thinking—
thus, put in coarse outline, is the general argumentative goal of §15.
Now §16 begins to approach the (first-person) perspective of the sub-
ject of knowledge, as it seeks to justify the central thesis that the I think
produced by apperception “must be able to accompany all my represen-
tations”. (CPR, B 131 f.) Here Kant describes two functional characteris-
tics in particular that he ascribes to the “original self-consciousness”: syn-
thesis and unity. Synthesis describes the central and foundational function
of cognitive activity, namely the rule-bound combination of data received
by the senses and considered by means of this process under a specific
general aspect, i. e. a concept of the understanding. This active rule-
bound combination of the disordered material of intuition is, for Kant,
the very act of acquiring knowledge: an object of knowledge is a data
set combined into a unity according to rules. However, the fundamental
significance of this function of synthesis only becomes sufficiently clear
once we see how it explains the thesis that the judgment I think must
be able to accompany all my representations. For this thesis expresses
the requirement of the theory of consciousness that various representa-
tions must all belong to one self-consciousness, for which the function
of synthesis of apperception is a precondition: “this thoroughgoing iden-
tity of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition contains a synthe-
sis of the representations, and is possible only through the consciousness
of this synthesis.” (CPR B133) Kant then goes on to explain how this con-
sciousness arises: “The latter relation [to the identity of the subject]
therefore does not yet come about by my accompanying each representa-
tion with consciousness, but rather by my adding one representation to
the other and being conscious of their synthesis.” (CPR B133) The
point, then, is that when in the course of a complex cognitive act I
bring together various representations and relate them to each other ac-
cording to a rule, I have not only a consciousness of the unity of these rep-
resentations, but at the same time a consciousness of myself as the same
subject bearing different representations. Thus it is a condition of this
consciousness of identity that representations are added together and
combined with one another according to a rule. I only attain to a unified
consciousness of myself in the course of this active rule-bound combina-
Katja Crone134
tion.6 In contrast to a sense-data model of a Humean bent, Kants theory
of apperception implies the consciousness of a subject understanding it-
self as the same throughout the changes of various acts of thought.7
Thus it is that Kant can write: “The synthetic proposition that every dif-
ferent empirical consciousness must be combined into a single self-con-
sciousness is the absolutely first and synthetic principle of our thinking
in general.” (CPR, A 117, note) Moreover: “It is […] absolutely necessary
that in my cognition all consciousness belong to one consciousness (of
myself).”
In the justification outlined here for assuming the a priori conscious-
ness that is apperception, the primary theoretical emphasis is clearly on
the internal characteristics of apperception in terms of the functional ar-
chitecture of conditions. In contrast, the question of to what extent this
consciousness can be described from the first-person perspective—from
the perspective of the subject that has representations and performs
acts of thinking—is almost entirely neglected.
Transcendental apperception is brought somewhat closer to the first-
person perspective in being described in § 16 as that a priori conscious-
ness that produces the representation I think, which Kant says must
be able to accompany all of my representations. Thus under a certain
point of view the initial interpretation of the relation between the abstract
concept of transcendental apperception and the representation I think
would be that the transcendental apperception, as an a priori structure
of consciousness that we must necessarily assume, expresses itself in the
proposition I think, which Kant describes as a “representation”. In call-
ing this a “representation”, does Kant wish to point to what might be an
empirical-phenomenal aspect of the proposition I think? There has been
a great deal of debate in the literature about this very singular application
of the concept of representation to the I think.8 For in conceptual terms
6 The difference between the original synthetic unity of apperception and the
identity of self-consciousness is not always made sufficiently clear in the Kantian
terminology. For a more detailed examination of this see Sturma, 1985, p. 70 f.
7 On the identity function of apperception see Rohs, 1988, p. 62 ff.
8 For Rohs, the representation of the I think, in contrast to empirical represen-
tations, has to be credited with intertemporal identity, which is not possible in
the case of empirical representation: Rohs, 1988, p. 62 f. Against this Malte Hos-
senfelder has argued that the I think, as a representation, could have consis-
tently been called I represent. He justifies this with a quotation from the
CPR where Kant argues that without the I think there would be “representa-
tions” in me that were not mine (Hossenfelder, 1978, p. 100). However, as Cram-
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it seems natural, prima facie, to read the concept of representation anal-
ogously to Kants use of the concept in the context of empirical con-
sciousness, in the sense of an object-oriented representation, intuition
or appearance.9 However, it speaks strongly against such an interpreta-
tion that that which accompanies cognitions “as their vehicle”10 (B406)
cannot itself be a conscious representation and thus cannot be intentional
in nature. Kant makes this unmistakably clear when he writes that the I
think is that representation that “must be able to accompany all others
and which in all consciousness is one and the same, cannot be accompa-
nied by any further representation.” (CPR B132)
If we look at the specific relation implied by the multiple-place pred-
icate “accompany”, it expresses a very characteristic function of the I
think in the theory of consciousness. “[A]ll manifold of intuition has a
necessary relation to the I think in the same subject in which this mani-
fold is to be encountered.”11 The I think corresponds to the postulate
of a thoroughly identical self and is thus to be understood as a moment
of formal self-reference that immanently structures concrete predicative
thought. For this reason the I think has to underlie intentional cognitions
whose objects are determined by means of concepts, and thus predicative-
ly, and this relation is a logical relation due to its “necessity”. But how are
we to understand this from the perspective of the I that thinks and pro-
duces mental acts?
Since a formal self-ascription occurs in all of my mental acts, they are
acts that are for me, that I see as mine and that I can relate to as mine. In
terms of the theory of consciousness, the I think refers to the thought of
the mineness of concrete acts of thought and representation, which means
that I have a consciousness of performing mental acts.12
er rightly objects, it cannot be derived from the judgment I represent that a rep-
resentation is not just in me but something for me. Cramer, p. 62 f.
9 This reading is plausible at least in the context of Kants systematic development
of object-oriented thought in the transcendental analytic. A more in-depth anal-
ysis of the concept of representation, aimed at distinguishing it from the concept
of idea, is found in the first book of the transcendental dialectic, where Kant de-
fines representation as the general category for (empirical) cognitions of various




12 Cramer offers a pertinent interpretation of the function of the mineness of a
mental event: “A representation in me is something for me precisely when I
do not just have it but have a consciousness that I have it.” Cramer, 1987, p. 171.
Katja Crone136
Now, Kant does make it clear that the I emphasized in the subject
role of the proposition I think has no descriptive or empirical content
of its own apart from the empirical acts of thought that I call mine by
means of this judgment. This is very clear from the often-quoted footnote
in the paralogisms chapter: “For it is to be noted that if I have called the
proposition “I think” an empirical proposition, I would not say by this
that the I in this proposition is an empirical representation; for it is rather
purely intellectual, because it belongs to thinking in general.” (B 423)
In contrast to empirical consciousness, which makes an object deter-
minable by predicates and which is characterized differently depending
on what objects it turns to, no further characteristics can be predicated
of the I think, i. e. of the thought of the mineness of representations.
However, it also follows from the fact that it is not an empirical and in-
dependent representation that the “representation” of the I can not
be the sort of consciousness that is based on sensible data. The “represen-
tation” I involved in concrete and direct self-ascriptions such as “I know
that I v” does not, in and of itself, refer to any sensory data. As Kant says,
the I is “the simple and in content for itself wholly empty representation
[…] of which one cannot even say that it is a concept, but a mere con-
sciousness that accompanies every concept.”13 The representation descri-
bed here has no sensible content and is therefore entirely without con-
tent; thus it lacks a decisive requirement of concrete consciousness, the
content of which could be analyzed and described by means of predicates.
According to the basic underlying assumption of Kants theory of knowl-
edge, this would only be the case when a mental state is based on data
given to sensibility that can be considered under categorical aspects,
which is clearly not true in the case of the I.14 Thus the I cannot be
seen as a single mental act, which is why Kant famously refers to the
I as a simple representation.15 This means that the self-ascription of rep-
resentations occurs in formal and invariant fashion—in a process that is
not bound to any data given to sensibility. In the B edition Kant makes
13 CPR, B404.
14 “For the I is, to be sure, in all thoughts; but not the least intuition is bound up
with this representation, which would distinguish it from other objects of intu-
ition.” (CPR, A350) The subject as transcendental apperception and manifold
representations are in a relation of mutual dependence. Rolf-Peter Horstmann
has brought out this point very well by comparing the I with an (immaterial) cen-
ter of gravity that relies on bodies subject to gravity in order to exist (Horst-
mann, 2007).
15 CPR, B135.
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it clear that the mere thought of the I by itself is to be seen as an act of
spontaneity and that it explicitly has no content that could be presented in
a sensible representation.16 It only describes a purely logical conscious-
ness, not a consciousness of something or even of itself in a phenomeno-
logical sense. The majority consensus in Kant research has been to adhere
to this passage, and to consider apperception as an exclusively logical self-
consciousness and leave it at that.17
However, authors such as Konrad Cramer, Dieter Sturma and
Manfred Frank have noted that although the I in the subject role of
the judgment I think is empty of content, Kant does attribute it with a
sort of content that eludes the epistemological framework of the critique
of knowledge, both terminologically and theoretically. Such a “content”,
under the conditions described above, could only be such that presents a
phenomenon that resists any further analysis.
2. The Relation between the Judgments I think and I exist
The textual basis for this thesis consists essentially of Kants formulations
in the paralogisms chapter of the B edition, which culminate in the state-
ment that the proposition I think implies the sentence I exist : “The “I
think” […] contains within itself the proposition “I exist.”” (CPR B422
note) Here Kant speaks of an entirely distinct type of consciousness
that evidently goes beyond the formal characteristic of the attributability
of acts of thought (“mineness”). Whenever I execute any act of thought
or representation, I am also thereby conscious or can be conscious of
the fact that I exist; hence this fact presents itself somehow in conscious-
ness. But how can we get a more precise handle on the possible content of
this “phenomenon”, the “representation” of the I?
The first question that arises concerns the peculiar relation Kant has
in mind in speaking of the proposition I exist being “contained” in the
proposition I think. Konrad Cramer has offered a practicable interpre-
tation that explains the relation between I think and I exist in terms
of the feature of simplicity that characterizes the “representation” I
for Kant. Cramer draws on three relevant citations from the A edition
of the paralogisms chapter that claim this simplicity.18 Tellingly Kant
16 Cramer emphasizes this central point in Cramer, 1987, p. 200.
17 Rohs puts a very fine point on this: Rohs, 1988, p. 76 ff.
18 Cramer, 2003, p. 66 f.
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only offers negative determinations in this context. The concept of sim-
plicity means, firstly, that the representation I cannot be given in intu-
ition so long as we accept Kants thesis that that which is given in intuition
always contains a manifold of sensible data.19 Secondly it means that the
representation I cannot be conceived as an act of the understanding, the
content of which would be describable by means of attributes; the repre-
sentation I is not a concept of something given in intuition, since it
“never contains a synthesis of the manifold.”20 And thirdly it cannot be
a form of intuition or representation, i. e. something within which intu-
itions could be given and that would be immutable due to its status of
being form.21
But speaking positively, what does correspond to the mental state that
expresses the I? Cramer begins by concluding from the various negative
specifications of simplicity that the mental state, in formal terms, has to
have the status of a thought—a thought that is not directed either at
something given or capable of being given in intuition, or at a rule-
bound synthesis of sensible data.22 Thus the use of the indexical I, in
the context of the self-ascription of mental acts, refers to something
“that can only be thought and not intuited.”23 That which can be thought
must have a form of intentionality and hence must have a content of some
sort, even if, as in the case of the I, it cannot be any predicatively spec-
ifiable empirical content, since this latter would require a sensible intu-
ition, which, however, as we have seen, Kant definitively rules out for
the “representation” I.
More precisely, in determining the (non-sensible) content of this cog-
nition Cramer introduces two aspects: the first aspect, which essentially
corresponds to the argumentation in the B edition of the paralogisms
chapter, is that Kant ascribes to the I think the status of an “act of spon-




22 Cramer, 2003, p. 67.
23 Ibid. It should be clear that this “thought” should not be seen in terms of the
Fregean concept of the thought as an objective (common) content of proposi-
tions and representations.
24 CPR, B132. Rolf-Peter Horstmann has noted, quite rightly, that the B edition of
the paralogisms chapter is particularly dominated by Kants thesis that the sub-
ject can only be conceived as an act or action; from which it follows that the
question of the knowability of the soul is made senseless from the very begin-
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arise from an act of spontaneity, as in the case of predicatively determina-
ble contents of representation, but rather is such an act. For Cramer this
very decisive circumstance, along with the previously mentioned thesis
that the content of the “representation” I can only be thought and not
intuited, suggests that I attribute acts of thought to myself and thereby
make reference to myself as subject because “I possess a concept of my-
self that can be spontaneously generated in every self-ascription” [my em-
phasis].25
It is at first glance rather surprising that Cramer speaks here of a
“concept” that I (allegedly) must have of myself when in my self-ascrip-
tion I make reference to myself as the subject of a propositional attitude.
However, a closer consideration shows that the phrase “concept of my-
self” refers to the epistemic status of the consciousness I have when I at-
tribute concrete representations to myself and consider them to be
mine.26 Yet despite our fuller characterization of the I think as an act
of spontaneity, it remains unexplained what this “representation” of the
I is directed at, if we assume, as Cramer does, that the representation
is (or must be) “about” something.
Here Cramer returns to Kants central claim that the I think is a
proposition that contains within itself the proposition I exist. I am the
content of the thought of the I, insofar as I am aware of myself as the
subject of acts of thought. This means, for Cramer, that the thought of
the I is directly related to the consciousness of my own existence. This
consciousness of existence inevitably sets in as soon as I ascribe cognitive
acts to myself and express (or am able to express) my consciousness of
this ascription in propositional form. Hence we can say that, for Kant,
the “representation” I think corresponds to the consciousness “that
can accompany all thinking”, and thus it is “that which immediately in-
ning. However, he does not mention the parallels that can be seen between the
act-structure of the subject and both Fichtes concept of the I as Tathandlung and
the structure of intellectual intuition. Horstmann, 1993, p. 416.
25 Cramer, 2003, p. 68.
26 Hence we should take into account Cramers systematic emphasis: he is con-
cerned with the analysis of a specific function of the consciousness of appercep-
tion, of the judgment I think, insofar as it accompanies concrete and substantial
representations, and specifically with the explication of the thought of the mine-
ness of representations. The question of what phenomenon of consciousness
could correspond to the I as the grammatical subject of the judgment I
think is not at the center of Cramers analysis.
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cludes the existence of a subject in itself”.27 “In the transcendental synthe-
sis of the manifold of representations in general […] hence in the synthet-
ic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself not as I appear
to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am.”28 It is important to
note that in executing a mental act one is only conscious of ones factual
existence as the unconcrete subject of mental states and acts. In other
words: whenever I think or represent to myself anything, I am present
to myself, but I lack any representation of myself as a spatio-temporally
existing concrete individual.
Peter Strawson has also mentioned this form of (possible) immediate
self-reference in executing concrete acts of thought, and emphasized that
this corresponds to the peculiarity of our use of I that we do not need to
specify who is meant by it.29 This is exactly what Kant means when he says
about the relation of the proposition I think and the spontaneous judg-
ment I exist, i. e. the judgment of my factually experienced existence,
that they are ultimately identical.30 Thus Dieter Sturma is right to insist
on seeing the relation of identity as identity of the act of consciousness
involved, and to emphasize “that the experiential evidence of self-con-
sciousness includes, uno actu, the explicit consciousness of ones own ex-
istence, which is evidently empirically determined.”31
All in all Kants argument does in fact represent a substantial expan-
sion, in terms of the perspective of first-personal experience, compared to
the purely functional description of apperception in the transcendental
analytic.
However, does the discovery that the I think represents immediate
self-certainty entitle us to speak of a form of pre-theoretical self-con-
sciousness in Kant? For the moment, at least, we can note that the mental
mode of immediacy that is characteristic of experiential evidence repre-
sents a conceptual contrast to mental acts that are reflective and thus the-
27 CPR, B277.
28 CPR, B157. We should also note that existence does not represent a real pred-
icate, but rather something that can be added to a representation qua sensible
perception (according to the premise of Kants refutation of the ontological
proof of God in the transcendental dialectic, CPR, B620 ff.)
29 Strawson, 1987, p. 211.
30 “Hence my existence also cannot be regarded as inferred from the proposition “I
think,” as Descartes held (for otherwise the major premise, “Everything that
thinks, exists” would have to precede it), but rather it is identical with it.”
CPR, B422 note.
31 Sturma, 1997, p. 121.
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oretically anchored; and thus we can take the characteristic of immediacy
to be an important indication in favor of the thesis. However, a satisfac-
tory answer to the question requires a closer look at the type of cognition
that Kant associates with the I think in the sense of I exist.
3. The I think as “Indeterminate Perception”
The decisive textual reference for this is found in the above-mentioned
note to the paralogisms chapter in the B edition. Here Kant describes
the form of cognition underlying the judgment I think as an “indetermi-
nate perception”.32 The comment immediately following is supposed to
explain how this is meant, but we cannot deny that Kant finds himself
in very difficult conceptual straits here: “An indeterminate perception
here signifies only something real, which was given, and indeed only to
thinking in general, thus not as appearance, and also not as a thing in it-
self (a noumenon), but rather as something that in fact exists and is indi-
cated as an existing thing in the proposition “I think.”“33 These vague for-
mulations suggest that Kant has evidently left the firm foundation of his
clear, systematically anchored epistemological terminology, and is con-
fronted by phenomena that elude his sharp analytical gaze. After all,
an “indeterminate perception” is not a concept, and it is only “indetermi-
nate” in contrast to a determinate perception, a sensible intuition organ-
ized by the activity of the understanding; this follows unmistakeably from
the quotation above, according to which the indeterminate perception is
not an appearance. But this contrast is by no means trivial: for an inde-
terminate perception is not nothing just because it is epistemologically
underdetermined; rather, it has to be seen as a pre-reflexive mental
state in which the subject is aware of itself, or rather present to itself,
in a minimal sense. Although Kant does not offer any more detailed state-
ments, we can interpret this as a basal consciousness, an experience of the
self immediately given with the first-personal perspective. That this is
very much a phenomenon of consciousness is made clear by further state-
ments that are quite problematic for the Kantian theory of knowledge.
For example, in summarizing the paralogisms in the Prolegomena, Kant
emphasizes: “The representation of apperception, the I, […] is nothing
32 CPR, B422 ff.
33 CPR, B424.
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more than a feeling”.34 We see the same tendency in the statement that a
“sensation, which consequently belongs to sensibility, grounds this exis-
tential proposition”, i. e. the I think in the sense of I exist.35 However,
Kant immediately notes that this sensation is not logically situated at the
level of structured thought, of experience, since the sensation of I think
precedes experience. This brief hint of a return to the logical significance
of apperception also makes it clear, however, that the I think as a phe-
nomenon of consciousness cannot be understood in purely empirical and
psychological terms. And it seems quite appropriate to speak here of a
pre-theoretical self-consciousness which at the same time forms the foun-
dation of object-oriented thinking.
However, it is important to note that for Kant nothing follows, sys-
tematically, from this finding—unlike for Fichte. Fichtes writings on
the Wissenschaftslehre around 1798, in particular, show a systematic con-
sideration and integration of the immediate, pre-conceptual conscious-
ness. Unlike for Kant, in Fichtes theory of consciousness the justification
of subjectivity can and must be realized from the first-person perspective.
This thesis goes hand-in-hand with the claim that the content of transcen-
dental principles can be demonstrated in consciousness itself.36 In other
words: the “original self-consciousness”, the self-positing I, is a transcen-
dental principle that one can summon to consciousness. In the Wissen-
schaftslehre nova methodo Fichte says quite unambiguously: “We have
to know something about this final ground, since we talk about it.”37
For this reason, for Fichte the structural conditions of self-consciousness
cannot only be functional in the transcendental sense; and consistency
then requires that the phenomenal content of self-consciousness in an
original sense, as an immediate awareness of intuition, has to also be
bound to the justificatory conception of subjectivity.38
The Kantian text, in contrast, does not offer any more precise speci-
fication concerning pre-theoretical self-consciousness, which, however, is
not surprising given his theoretical strategy. Quite the contrary: that Kant
34 “[D]ie Vorstellung der Apperzeption, das Ich, […] ist nicht mehr als ein Ge-
fhl”. AA 4:334 note; English translation by Karsten Schçllner.
35 CPR, B423
36 For more on this point see Crone, 2005, p. 47 ff.
37 “Wir mssen etwas von diesem letzten Grund wissen, denn wir sprechen davon.”
WLnm 31; English translation by Karsten Schçllner.
38 Whether such an approach can, in fact, live up to the claim of a priori justifica-
tion is definitely more than doubtful from the viewpoint of Kantian transcenden-
tal philosophy; however, I cannot pursue this problem here.
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keeps the pre-theoretical self-consciousness so well under wraps should
be taken as an indication that he knew he was leaving the clearly delim-
ited framework of the critique of knowledge, which is the central concern
of Kants theoretical philosophy.
4. Conclusion
The foregoing considerations can be summarized as follows: alongside
the purely functional characteristics of logical self-consciousness, Kants
theory of apperception also implies a form of immediate consciousness
that can be called a phenomenal, pre-conceptual self-consciousness.
This thesis is founded on several points of textual evidence. For one
thing, the relation of the judgments I think and I exist refers to the
mental state of experiential evidence, more precisely to the spontaneous-
ly generated, immediate consciousness of ones own existence. For anoth-
er, the cognition associated with the I is characterized as an “indetermi-
nate perception”, hence as a consciousness that cannot be interpreted ei-
ther as a conceptually structured experience or as an a priori form or
structural condition. However, it needs to be emphasized that we cannot
speak of a fully developed Kantian concept of phenomenal self-conscious-
ness. Rather, what we have our several remarks that can be taken as in-
dications that Kant was fully aware of the issue as well as of the fact that
the realm of consciousness located between non-sensible structural condi-
tions and (empirical) propositional attitudes is conceptually very hard to
get a handle on. Unlike in Fichtes conception of subjectivity, the phe-
nomenal character of the I think does not have any significance within
the theory, since Kant, in his critique of knowledge, is essentially interest-
ed in the functional significance of apperception, particularly with a view
to the structural conditions of contentful, predicatively determinable
mental acts. Thus it is entirely irrelevant to Kants aim whether the “in-
determinate perception” could be somehow described more precisely
and put to theoretical use: “Now it does not matter here whether this rep-
resentation be clear (empirical consciousness) or obscure, even whether it
be actual; but the possibility of the logical form of all cognition necessa-
rily rests on the relationship to this apperception as a faculty.”39
Finally we can say that the consciousness of apperception—within the
framework of the critique of knowledge—is to be exclusively understood
39 CPR, A117 note.
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as an epistemological principle of formal self-reference that grounds the
circumstance that I attribute representations to myself and call them
mine. Within this framework the I think expresses the mere logical
unity of the subject—a unity that is not a product of experience but
given prior to all experience. The phenomenal I as “indeterminate per-
ception” lies beyond this framework.
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Kant, Blows of Tears*
Tommaso Tuppini
1. Crying as a Sign
Kant lists in his writings different feelings that are able to induce men to
tears. Quite possibly, the most significant phenomenology of crying and
tears is to be found in the chapter On Affects by Which Nature Promotes
Health Mechanically from Anthropology:
There are some affects by which nature promotes health in a mechanical
way, and these include, in particular, laughing and weeping. Anger [Zorn]
is also a fairly reliable aid to digestion, if one can scold freely (without
fear of resistance), and many a housewife has no other emotional exercise
than the scolding of her children and servants. Now if the children and serv-
ants only submit patiently to it, an agreeable tiredness of the vital force
[Mdigkeit der Lebenskraft] spreads itself uniformly through her body.
[…] Weeping—inhaling with sobs (convulsively) [convulsivisches Einath-
men], when it is combined with a gush of tears—is likewise one of natures
provisions for health, because of the soothing effect it has; and a widow
who, as we say, refuses to be comforted—that is, will not hear of stopping
the flow of tears—is taking care of her health without knowing it or really
wanting it.1
Crying and shedding tears of laughter are basically mechanical means,
with which nature provides human beings in order to regain a healthy
vital force. This vital force, Lebenskraft, is the feeling of life, and life is
mind: “the mind [Gemt] for itself is entirely life (the principle of life it-
self), and hindrances or promotions must be sought outside it, though in
the human being himself, hence in combination with his body.”2 Vital
force is the concept that links inner life of mind with external occurrences,
events of nature. Regarded as vital force, the whole of mind is considered
* I would like to thank my friend Gregory Roman K. Skibiski for his assitance ed-
iting.
1 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, translated by
Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), 129–30.
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, translated by Paul Guyer
and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 159.
in itself, as complexity, but linked to the outer world that surrounds it. En-
vironment is never neutral, it always assumes the value of hindrance or
facilitation of vital force. Mind considered as vital force is therefore struc-
turally bounded to what is external, to what has a natural, not mental,
consistency and to which belongs the power to strengthen or weaken
the mind.
Vital force finds itself in a healthy state when it is not stuck in the
same condition, but swings back and forth, proceeds through “slight in-
hibitions” and “slight advancements.”3 Dynamism, ascending and de-
scending the scale of intensity, is synonymous with a healthy state of
the vital force. On the other hand, mind left to itself is trapped in an un-
healthy condition of steady balance among its constitutive forces. This
balance represents a dangerous cramp for the normal, healthy dynamism
of mind. The young Kant saw the mind constituted by “real grounds [Re-
algrnde]”4, that is, forces, drives opposing one another. The vital force is
a clutter of forces; the inner forum of mind consists of tensions between
these forces. Illness, bodily and mental, represents in itself a spastic con-
dition of such forces, a Krampf of their reciprocal tension: “all patholog-
ical attacks in which mans mind can master […] feelings by sheer stead-
fast will, as the superior power of a rational animal, are convulsive
(cramplike) in nature.”5 In order to modify the unhealthy state of mind,
nature provides us with such affects, which have the function to bring
the previously cramped vital force into motion again, to put the forces
of mind, that is, the Realgrnde, in a healthy state of conflict. Crying
with tears is for Kant a typical example of those remedies that nature in-
vented to restore health. A weeping widow is the most suitable figure of
the human comedy with which it is easy to represent the situation of a suf-
fering human being. The function of weeping is for Kant twofold, it has
indeed an inner effect, but it works also as an exterior sign. Already in
this twofold effect tears show an ambiguous character, suspended be-
tween inner and outer nature, freedom and nature. Both effects of tears
(tears as having an immediate inner effect as well as mediation as an ex-
terior sign) tend to free the mind of the weeper from its cramped com-
3 Kant, 1974: 100.
4 Immanuel Kant, Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into
Philosophy, in Theorethical Philosophy 1755–1770, translated by David Waldorf
and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992a), 232.
5 Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, translated by Mary J. Gregor (New
York: Abaris, 1979), 205.
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plexion, from such situation, which is both, morally unfree and bodily un-
healthy. Lets begin our analysis from tears regarded as exterior sign.
In weeping, human beings make show of their weakness, that is, of
their dependence on the external world or other human beings for the
preservation of their own freedom. The crying human being is a weak
being. Tears show the fact that somebody is in need of help. In Kantian
understanding such a weak being is generally portrayed as a woman. In
the brief description above this woman is specifically a widow. The
widow is a human being whose social weakness is due to the fact that
she lost the (male) counterpart who used to protect her and guarantee
her freedom. Weakness and anger are the two essential emotional states
that induce human (female) beings to tears. Weakness and anger form an
almost indissoluble conceptual pair in understanding the mediating func-
tion of tears. The tearful anger Kant is talking about, mostly in Anthro-
pology, is always an anger arising from impotence. It is rage deriving
from consciousness about lack of power. Tears are originated by the feel-
ing of impotence, and anger appears more or less as an immediate conse-
quence of such feeling:
Weeping accompanies the melting [schmelzende] sensation of impotent
anger [ohnmchtigen Zrnens] with fate or with other men, when we
have suffered an affront from them, and this sensation is chagrin [Wehmut].6
The sensation of impotence is described as “melting” by Kant. Such melt-
ing sensation is indicative of a soul, whose tension of forces is about to
lower, whose vital force is hindered. As we previously read, for Kant,
“hindrance or furtherance has to be sought outside.” In the case of impo-
tent anger the hindrance factors are fate or other men. Both (fate in its
dull imponderability, other men in their free unpredictability) are sign
of a possible hindrance of my vital force, for the pragmatic exercise of
my spontaneity.
From Kant, only women being aware of their impotence are allowed
to cry. Men must not shed tears. “Der Mann schhmet sich der Thrnen.
Sie fließen aus dem Bewustseyn seiner Ohnmacht.”7 Men are allowed to
let tears come to their eyes, but not to let them fall. Masculine tears
exist, but they have to remain invisible. Sobbing and letting tears fall,
weeping in a recognizable and visible way, is a matter for women.
6 Kant, 1974: 123.
7 Immanuel Kant, Reflexionen zu Anthropolgie. Kants handschriftlichen Nachlaß,
in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XV (Berlin, Leipzig: De Gruyter, 1928), 854.
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Why? Because tears are basically a sign of impotence and in Kants an-
thropologic frame the characteristic figure of impotence is the woman
(“we call feminine ways weakness [die Weiblichkeiten heißen Schw-
chen]”8, “Vom Nahmen Weib, Frauenzimmer. Sie muß schwach sein.”9).
But, as we already noticed, it is not a mere passive state of Wehmut (sad-
ness, wistfulness or weakness) that induces tears. Wehmut in itself is the
feeling of ones own impotence in front of something, which is beyond
our capability to master (such as fate, bad luck, or offences suffered be-
cause of someone who is clearly stronger than us). But Wehmut can
also be the preliminary state of anger, that is, the desire to overcome
the present state of distress: “it is not always sadness [Wehmut] that
makes women and children weep: anger [Zorn] can also reduce them
to tears”10. Ohnmchtiges Zrnen, impotent anger, is the most precise ex-
pression that explains the state of mind that induces human beings to
tears. Kant repeatedly emphasizes the link between tears and impotence
and the fact that impotence evokes the emotion of being overcome, which
is anger. Therefore, who sheds tears is not just powerless. While weeping,
he or, better said, she is in a state of anger and anger in itself represents
the regret to not be able to overcome ones own impotence.
Female tears are therefore a sign of awareness regarding ones impo-
tence that can not be overcome without external help. Awareness of im-
potence to overcome ones impotence, to bring vital force in healthy mo-
tion again, doesnt exclude, rather, it requires the ability of someone else
to perform it. Thats the reason why crying with tears is never a mere pas-
sive behavior, but shows an attitude of reaction in dealing with ones own
impotence. Thus tears are not just a sign of self-awareness, they also be-
come a sign able to awake awareness (about my own impotence) in my
neighbor. Tears communicate ones state of impotence to others. Flowing
tears make others aware of the impotence I was previously aware of.
Tears have a sign-value, a communicative skill. They represent a call
for help addressed to others:
For their feeling of impotence against some evil that arouses a strong affect
(whether of anger or of sadness) summons to its aid the external natural
signs of it which (by the right of the weaker) then at least disarm a mascu-
line soul. But this expression of frailty [Zrtlichkeit], as a feminine weak-
ness, should not move a compassionate man to weeping, though it may
8 Kant, 1974: 167.
9 Kant, 1928: 567.
10 Kant, 1974: 130.
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well bring tears to his eyes. […] But if he were not moved at all, he would
not show the compassion toward the other sex that his masculinity makes
his duty.11
Tears are shed mainly by women in order to call other people to their aid.
A widow who lost her man sheds tears to have other men help her. Tears
are natural signs of womens real or pretended impotence. Tears and the
convulsive breathing that accompanies them are contagious. The commu-
nicative, mediating value of tears expresses itself in the first place by so-
liciting tears from a neighbor: “The sight of a man in a convulsive or epi-
leptic seizure induces similar convulsive moments in the spectator.”12 It is
the duty of men to help weaker human beings, that is, women, and to be
sensitive to the communicative skills of tears. Women know that very
well, therefore they often simulate an impotence that doesnt really
exist: “der Mann hilft aus Großmuth gern den weiblichen Schwchen ab,
dies wissen die Weiber auch mehr als zu gut; daher affektieren sie bisweilen
Schwchen, wo gar keine sind.”13 In such cases, what we might call theat-
rical, tears are solicited from inside, they originate solely from the subject,
not from an external situation that occurred, and are provoked arbitrarily.
In front of real or simulated impotence, tears glisten in a generous mans
eyes: tears are a sign of his tact, his sensitivity, his potential helpfulness.
But tears must only glisten in a mans eye. Shedding tears would be ex-
tremely inappropriate for a man, because it would put him on the side
of those who can not be helpful, because they need help themselves,
also betraying an authentic duty to be active for other peoples sake:
“for Kants own version of the Stoic sage has as its enemy not emotion
but passive sentimentality. The latter, Kant holds, is a way of being emo-
tional that makes no contribution to outward benefaction or altruistic re-
gard. It is to take part in the suffering of others […] merely sentimentally
or passively. Thus, certain shows of sentiment are more acts of self-indul-
gence than active interventions on behalf of others.”14
11 Kant, 1974: 130.
12 Kant, 1974: 54.
13 Kant, 1928: 581–82.
14 Nancy Sherman, “Concrete Kantian Respect”, in Social Philosophy and Policy,
vol. 15 no. 1 (1998), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 129.
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2. Crying For a Miracle
Tears are basically tears from angry grief—they are shed mainly by those
(women and, as we will see, children or newborns) who make experience
of their own impotence in front of a problem they can not face, an obsta-
cle that occludes the space of their freedom. Tears are the visible signs
that help is needed. “Ohnmachtiger Zorn preßt Thrnen aus. In Traurigket
stellen sie uns als einen Gegenstand der Theilnehmung anderer Vor und
zertheilen den Schmerz.” They represent a call for compassion and sym-
pathy. Tears are communicative and contagious. Therefore they represent
an implicit double statement: 1. that I cannot overcome an event con-
trasting my freedom, and, 2. that someone must exist who can, and I
cry for him. By shedding tears the one who is powerless shares the feeling
of impotence with another being who is supposed to be able to face the
upcoming event. In Kants sexist reconstruction: the woman sheds tears
in order to obtain help from a grown up man. Thats the reason why
the man is not supposed to weep: he should be able to help himself
and others. The masculine human being is properly autonomous: he
knows the nomos, the moral or intellectual rule that masters the matter
of the upcoming event. His authentic autonomy prevents him from look-
ing for solidarity outside the range of his own freedom. Nevertheless, he
can not be deaf to the call for help from others who are not (yet?) auton-
omous and free. Tears that glisten without being shed in a mans eyes are
the sign of his sensitivity to the impotence of others (there are tears) and
of his own power (tears are not shed, they only glisten).
Being hindered in ones own freedom means not to experience coin-
cidence between inner and outer freedom. It means the impossibility of
being not just practical (i. e. being free, moral, self-determined, which
has to be always possible), but pragmatic, that is: acting in a world that
often resists against the expressions of our self-determination: “The
man whose happiness depends on another mans choice (no matter how
benevolent the other might be) rightly considers himself unfortunate.”15
Unfortunate is by definition the weeping human being, who solicits by
tears the intervention of other beings in order to gain outer freedom:
“if ones options are not at ones disposal a person can lack sensuous
15 Kant, 1974: 135.
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outer freedom. If others determine what our options are, we are not free
to go and do as our inclinations propose.”16
The being that female tears are calling for is nevertheless a being
whose inner and outer freedoms have to coincide. The only being able
to save, properly said, has to be a being who doesnt know unhappiness
and dependence. If this is the state of things, no human being can expect
to be saved by another human being. It belongs to all human beings to
suffer from the lack of coincidence between inner and outer freedom,
that is, to be hindered in the expression of their freedom by fate or
other human beings. Impotence is structurally a part of the human finite
condition. The call for help that comes from human impotence is a call for
power. But only an absolute power, that is, a being whose inner freedom
coincides with his outer freedom, can be properly called for help in dis-
tress and unhappiness. “Now the idea of a being commanding according
to moral-practical laws contains the idea of a person having all power [in]
relation to nature as a sense object”17, but “a being, which has unrestrict-
ed power over nature and freedom under laws of reason, is God.”18 God,
the quintessence of personality, therefore of freedom as self-determina-
tion after the fulfillment of the moral law, is the one whom we properly
ask for help when we cry.
“The concept of God is that of a person—hence, that of a being who
has rights, but against whom no other possess a right.”19 It is exactly this
lack of symmetry that justifies the fact that tears can be shed in front of
God much more than in front of another human being, that is, a finite
being. A human being can call another human being for help when he/
she suffers. But another human being might himself need help, therefore
being unable to offer help to others. There is only one being who never
suffers injustice and that is God. God is freedom and absolute expression
of this freedom in front of the natural world, which often contradicts our
expression of freedom. Crying because of ones impotence is crying for
more freedom, for experiencing the coincidence of inner and outer free-
dom, that is, crying in this world for the advent of God as absolute power.
God cannot be impotent in front of nature, or fate, or human beings,
16 Holly L. Wilson, Kant	s Pragmatic Anhtropology. Its Origin, Meaning, and Crit-
ical Significance (Albany: SUNY, 2006), 63.
17 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, translated by Michael Rosen (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 213.
18 Kant, 1993: 200.
19 Kant, 1993: 218.
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therefore he is the only being who can properly help or at least can be
evoked apriori for help. The person who sheds tears is basically always
asking for a divine intervention, that is, for a miracle. A miracle happens
when the outer world seems to be arranged in an order that supports my
inner freedom and offers to it an adequate expression.
An event in the world that does not happen according the order of nature is a
miracle. The word miracle is supposed to mean an event which does not
happen in conformity with recognized nature, although it could be in con-
formity with a higher order. We are amazed [wir wundern uns] only when
something is contrary to the cognized order of nature.20
Miracles point at the presence of “Gods hands”21 within nature. Human
beings ask for miracles when they are hindered in the pragmatic exercise
of their freedom. We may define such entity as the God of religion and
prayer. Obstacles represented by hostility from other human beings or
nature are removed by the God of religion and prayer: “The overthrow
of Sennacherib by means of an angel”, or “the passage of the children
of Israel through the Red Sea” are the best examples of miracles. To
the people of Jerusalem under siege or Jews fleeing from the Egyptian
army, nature or other human beings posed obstacles that God removed
through mediation of nature. The same outer world, which functions
via mechanical criteria and doesnt have anything to do with human free-
dom, suddenly seems to support human projects.
One likewise endeavors to explain the passage of the children of Israel
through the Red Sea, in that one says: the wind so divested a part of the
Red Sea of water that the children of Israel were able to go through.
Here the cause lies indeed in nature, but it does not occur according to
the order of nature that a wind had to blow then, when a people was op-
pressed and persecuted by a foreign king; thus a special direction is required
here.22
That makes the miracle, in spite of the rarity of its occurrence (miracles
“must be only seldom”23), an essential modus of being helped, in order to
restore the previously menaced outer freedom. Nature and outer world
miraculously assume a direction, the same direction of the steps of the
fleeing Jews, who are seeking to preserve their freedom from the Egyp-
20 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, translated by Karl Ameriks and Steve
Naragon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 38.
21 Kant, 1997: 39.
22 Kant, 1997: 39.
23 Kant, 1997: 41.
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tian menace. If I call for help I am basically calling for a miracle, that is,
for the removal of the hindrance that nature or human beings might rep-
resent, towards my free action. In the greatest distress I might call for an
intervention from the outside over something which I have no control or
authority: nur noch ein Gott kann uns helfen! This is the same God, for
whom there is no difference between inner and outer freedom.
3. Being Moved and Being Unconscious
But if shedding tears and asking God for a miracle is a female business,
waiting for miracles is not worthy of a free, autonomous man. Experienc-
ing miracles means to abdicate ones own freedom. We encounter more
miracles in life than we might think we do. Or at least, we react in
front of worldly events as if they were miracles, yet they are not. In a re-
markable passage from his precritical essay The Only Possible Argument
in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God, Kant mentions the
case of a scholar who is put in front of a demonstration of a theorem of
mechanics, in which bodies sliding on chords drawn with different inclina-
tions from the highest point of a circle take the same time in order to
cover their distances. What to the man of knowledge appears as a theo-
rem doesnt make the same impression on a smart, yet untrained, student.
I once explained this theorem, along with its proof, to an intelligent student.
I recall that once he had thoroughly understood all the details, he was as im-
pressed by it as he would have been by a miracle of nature [Naturwunder].
One is, indeed, amazed and rightly astonished to find, in such a seemingly
straightforward and simple thing as a circle, such wondrous unity of the
manifold subject to such fruitful rules. Nor is there a miracle of nature
[Wunder der Natur] which could, by its beauty and order, give more cause
to amazement, unless it did so in virtue of its cause being less apparent,
for wonder is a daughter of ignorance [die Bewunderung eine Tochter der
Unwissenheit ist].24
What is understood in English as “impressed” is in German gerhrt. Now,
gerhrt means rather “touched” or “moved”. Kant doesnt mention tears
here, yet surely an emotional situation is involved. What actually touches
the sensitivity of the student? The amazing thing is that “order and har-
24 Immanuel Kant, The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of
the Existence of God, in Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770, translated by David
Waldorf and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992b),
138.
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mony, along with such necessary determinations, prevail throughout
space, and that concord and unity prevail throughout its immense mani-
fold [in einem ungeheuren Mannigfaltigen, Zusammenpassung und Ein-
heit herrsche].”25 The scholar is touched by the uniformity of events occur-
ring in the previously prepared circular space, that is, by the presence of a
rule that unifies and frames the manifold of the given space. Or, as Kant
says, its monstrous manifold. Ungeheuer is actually something that pro-
vokes fear and puts into desperation the one who has to face it. The
fact that the monstrous manifold of space is dominated (herrscht) by a
certain unity amazes (berrascht, litteraly: being overrun) and astonishes
(in Bewunderung gesetzt) the scholar. This intensity of surprise is prerog-
ative of a sensitive, but not well-trained mind. The feeling of a dazzling
surprise in front of the development of a theorem of mechanics is only
possible for a scholar who doesnt perceive the events occurring as conse-
quences of a theorem, but as natural events, having an order in them-
selves, fulfilling the expectations of our rationality, but without any active
intervention of our knowledge. An intelligent scholar, indeed. But still
just a scholar. In the couple old/young, Kant/scholar only the second
party feels emotion in front of the rebirth of a mechanical truth. The rea-
son is that the untrained scholars mind is not aware of itself and takes the
theorem with its accompanying proof as an event of nature fulfilling our
expectations, that is, more or less for a miracle.
If the widow is moved by her own incapacity to overcome practical
difficulties, because of lack of spontaneity and strength, and therefore
cries, in the case of the student it is surprise that arouses emotion. Exter-
nal obstacles induce the woman who expects something like a miracle, to
tears. Tears are shed in front of an obstacle, and its overcoming is imag-
ined as a miracle. In the case of the scholar, the event of being surprised
happens in front of a miracle that has not been requested, yet occurs any-
way. Miracles—as we already saw—happen when the subject and the
world walk in the same direction, when the needs of human spontaneity
find fulfillment in the conditions of outer world without having actively
taken part in the determination of such conditions. The regularity imme-
diately perceived from bodies sliding on chords drawn within a circular
space appears as a natural event that seconds our rational striving for
unity, therefore as a miracle.
The student mistakes the theorem for a miracle of nature only be-
cause he is not aware his own mind has projected the rational frame of
25 Kant, 1992b: 137.
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knowledge on the plan of outer nature, which is in itself meaningless.
Such lack of awareness induces the student to take the result of his under-
standing as an unexplainable givenness. The scholar is touched because
he mistakes a product of his mind for nature, inside for outside, rule
for miracle. The woman asks for masculine, that is, potentially divine
help in order to be delivered from external nature that hinders, she is ask-
ing for Gods hand. The scholar is surprised and touched by having re-
ceived such help without even having asked for it. Amazement, das
sich Wundern, is the emotional sign that points to a miracle. Now, the
scholar, in Bewunderung gesetzt, is surprised and amazed in front of the
dominating uniformity of how bodies slide with regularity within a circu-
lar space. Nature in itself, its monstrous manifold, seems able to provide
the systematic unity of experience that confers regularity to phenomena,
as the waters of the Red Sea were parted by the wind exactly at the mo-
ment when the fleeing Jews needed it.
If something is felt as a miracle it means that a danger has to be faced.
In fact, a significant danger has been averted from the scholar. What
poses a threat to the scholars freedom? We already named it: the unge-
heueres Mannigfaltige of space, the monstrous manifold, something that
contradicts our rational striving for unity. This character of monstrosity
rests on the fact that the multiplicity of space is opposed to the discipline
of conceptuality. We are put in front of a panorama of spacial disjecta
membra. Such dismembered datum is the material reality the intelligent
scholar has to face, manifold without unity. The theorem of sliding bodies
puts us in front of something like a systematic, logical truth: that the mon-
strous manifold of nature might appear as unified, coherent wholeness.
The material manifold is inhabited by the possibility of ideal and of rela-
tion, but one doesnt coincide with the other, even if our first tendency is
to do like the scholar, that is, to attribute the unity to the spacial manifold
itself, to make nature out of mind.
For the young Kant we have to postulate an ultimate position, that is,
a God as personality or free being, as the condition of relation, as ground
that makes possible those systematic truths, the uniformity of experience
which is fully separated from the material content of such experience.
“The more unity one finds, the more one uncovers economical laws
that govern several different phenomena according to one simple, perfect
principle, the more one can be convinced of the necessity of a God.”26 The
26 Diane Morgan, Kant Trouble: The Obscurities of the Enlightened (London:
Routledge, 2000), 126.
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presence of God means the necessity of a unifying, systematic principle
that makes possible the single regulated experience we perform from
time to time. This is not the God of religion and prayer, who miraculously
suspends the order of things, the supernatural being whose intervention is
“contrary to the cognized order of nature”, as we read before. Now God
stands for a figure that summarizes in himself all human spontaneity, the
order that our mind puts in the manifold of nature, that in itself doesnt
follow any intellectual regularity: “God and the world. Freedom and na-
ture. […] There is a God, not a world-soul in nature, but a personal prin-
ciple of human reason.”27 This is rather the God of philosophy, in front of
which it is no use to cry and shed tears. But the student is not aware of the
existence of such a God, in the first place because he is not aware of the
power of his own mind. Him being touched and amazed is the proof of his
ignorance about himself, therefore of the God of philosophy as principle
of human reason. The student is basically moved by unconsciousness of
intellectual rules that give a structure to reality. Kant doesnt say if the
students amazement is accompanied by tears or not, but we might imag-
ine that the student gets emotional without shedding tears and without
even letting them glisten in his eyes. Tears belong to a conscious experi-
ence. Unconsciousness of ones own power and faculties rather produces
emotion without tears. In Kant, one always knows why he or she is crying,
there is nothing like unconscious weeping. Tears are about the awareness
of ones need for help (or readiness to give it, as for the tears just glisten-
ing in somebodys eye). The student doesnt need to shed tears, because
he doesnt even know he needs to be helped (the help his Kant teacher
might give him in order to become fully aware of his determining intellec-
tual power). From his perspective, the manifold of bodies presents itself
as already uniform and organized. The being touched of the student
has a significantly different meaning than the impotence of crying
women, and from sensitivity of the helpful man. Different, yet not totally
unrelated. The crying woman is a being hindered in the expression of her
inner spontaneity. The helpful man with tears only glistening in his eyes is
a being partly affected by unhappiness of the woman, but potentially able
to remove the hindrance and to return to the weaker being her negated
freedom. The tearless being touched of the student means a radical un-
consciousness about ones own intellectual life, the ignorance of the
unity, the regularity that gives shape to the given space: the unity is ignor-
ed in his constructive powers and therefore deprived of itself. The student
27 Kant, 1993: 225.
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(like the widow) is deprived of his freedom, but not from the outside,
rather from inside, from himself, from his unconsciousness of it.
The regularity of how bodies fall on the chords drawn within a circu-
lar space is essentially a proof of existing spontaneity as the determining
power of the mind. Freedom already corresponds, for the young Kant, to
the spontaneity, activity, and personality which are bases for the lawful-
ness of (moral or intellectual) experience: “spontaneity is action which is-
sues from inner principle.”28 But also for the Kant of the critical period,
beyond any distinction between knowledge and morality, “personality
as the unified exercise of freedom is analogous to the unity of appercep-
tion itself as the product of the exercise of our cognitive spontaneity, and
is maximally pleasing as answering what is our most fundamental need of
all, our need for unity itself.”29 The reason why the scholar is touched in
front of the sliding bodies is the lack of awareness, that is of apperception,
perception of himself and his own power to build concepts. What Kant
defines as the ignorance of the student is therefore an ignorance about
himself, unconsciousness. The student doesnt lack understanding skills,
because Kant tells us that he is intelligent and apparently gets the
whole path of the proof. The scholar does make use of his own under-
standing. But he doesnt know he makes use of it. His being touched
comes from undergoing an unconscious intellectual experience. The
scholar doesnt know he knows, he doesnt know what he knows, nor
what he can make with his knowledge. Following development of the
proof the scholar understands the unifying function of the law, which is
necessary to give coherence to the manifold of events, but he doesnt un-
derstand from where the theorem originates; he is not able to compre-
hend a difference between the existing manifold and the unifying law.
The student puts together what is supposed to stay separated. He thinks
of the regularity of natures events as something that rests on them, and it
is such erroneous thought that touches him deeply. Such fantastic, surpris-
ing unity rests on the fact that the function of the unifying law remains
unanalyzed and therefore unconscious. The student is still convinced
that is possible to ground his own knowledge in outer nature and there-
fore remains unfree. To the contrary, the free, autonomous being, who
28 Immanuel Kant, A new Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cog-
nition, in Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770, translated by David Waldorf and
Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992c), 25.
29 Paul Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 115.
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makes proper use of his knowledge, institutes himself as a separate being,
independent from the occurrences that surround him in the external
world: “in Kant […] autonomy is what makes an independent, separate
individual; autonomous, that is, made individual and therefore true is
the one who has separated himself and purified his I from the residue
of dependence, urges, and conflicts, in order to be able to think and act
independently: truth, neutrality and freedom are bound together.”30
The knowledge act, as intentionally directed on the outer world, the ac-
tion turned toward outside, presupposes the institution of difference, pre-
supposes distance, therefore skepticism toward the fantastic unity of reg-
ularity and matter the young student shows still to believe in. Such belief
in unity is the naf empiricism of those who think to receive everything as
it is from the outside, without an active intervention of their own. It rep-
resents the condition of those who have not yet conquered themselves as
free and intelligent beings. The free and intelligent subject institutes itself
in the previous separation from outer reality: “discernment addressed to
objects implies, as its first and minimal requirement, to draw a distinction
between the object and the one who knows, therefore self-consciousness.
Intentionality as direction toward something arises through the act of dis-
tinguishing oneself from things, and this overlaps with the possibility to
represent something as external. […] Self-consciousness […] arises from
an original partition between what is in the subject and what is outside
it, and this character of externality is instituted by such difference.”31
The singularization of the intellectual subject, its institution as spontane-
ity and separated entity, is provoked by such difference that breaks a
never existing or mythological unity between inside and outside, knowl-
edge and thing, subject and object, inner and outer freedom.
30 Massimo Bracalenti, “Lascolto e la neutralit terapeutica” in Raffaele Braca-
lenti (ed.), Da inconscio a inconscio. Considerazioni sul problema dell	attenzione
ugualmente fluttuante in psicoanalisi (Napoli: Guida, 1994), 113.
31 Claudio La Rocca, “Lintelletto oscuro. Inconscio e autocoscienza in Kant” in
Claudio La Rocca (ed.), Leggere Kant. Dimensioni della filosofia critica (Pisa:
ETS, 2007), 71.
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4. Tears of Freedom
Such singularization, the original separation of freedom and nature, the
drowning of their false unity, is linked to the very early discoveries of
life, to birth, and once again to tears:
The inclination to freedom seems to be the reason why even a child who has
just emerged from his mothers womb enters the world with loud cries, un-
like any other animal; for he regards his inability to make use of his limbs as
constraint and so immediately announces his claim to freedom (an idea that
no other animal has). […] The tears that accompany his screaming a few
months after birth reveal that his feeling of uneasiness comes, not from
physical pain, but from an obscure Idea (or representation analogous to
it) of freedom and hindrance, injustice ; they express a kind of exasperation
when he tries to approach certain objects or merely to change his general
position, and feels himself hindered in it.32
Self-awareness, the perception of inner freedom, represents an act of sin-
gularization, putting a distance from the world, in which it becomes now
problematic to express ones own power and also be pragmatic (that is, to
tend to bring inner and outer freedom to coincidence.) This is the same
reason why women cry. But the cry of the newborn, even if it possesses
the same origin, has a different meaning. It is not a call for help. The new-
born suffers the same injustice the weak suffers and that grown up men
are sensitive to (injustice is the Kantian name for a lack of coincidence
between inner and outer freedom, it is the objective concept for what is
subjectively felt as impotence). But unlike women, the newborn (whom
at this point we can easily imagine having a masculine sex) doesnt
want to be helped. He cries not because he wants somebody to help
him, but because he wants to be alone, to be delivered from everybody
and everything, even his own body, except his own freedom. He sheds
tears due to the fact that his birth has broken the unity between freedom
and nature: “this image of mankind leads Kant to a strange interpretation
of the first cry of the newborn child […]. If the newborn child cries, it is
not to demand what is necessary for life and existence, it is to protest
against his dependence in regard to others.”33
The claim to singularization, to loneliness, as the last proof of power
and independency, is demonstrated in the soul of the newborn and by his
32 Kant, 1974: 136.
33 Tvetan Todorov, Life in Common: An Essay in General Anthropology, translat-
ed by Katherine Golsan and Lucy Golsan (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2001), 6.
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desire to restore the lost unity of inner and outer freedom from which he
came. He cannot stand injustice, a structural condition of finite existence
like the human one.
Mans self-will is always ready to break forth in hostility toward his neigh-
bors, and always presses him to claim unconditional freedom, not merely in-
dependence of others but even mastery of other beings that are his equal by
nature—something we can see in even the smallest child. (Footnote: The cry
of a newborn child is not a note of distress but one of indignation and raging
anger; he is screaming not from pain but from vexation, presumably be-
cause he wants to move about and his impotence feels to him like fetters
restricting his freedom.)34
The sense of injustice arises at the same time as consciousness. Being con-
scious, trespassing the threshold that parts unconsciousness from con-
sciousness, means to have a sense of injustice, that is, the gap between
inner and outer freedom. The newborn cries as soon as his sense of free-
dom is hindered by the givenness of his body, from the moment of his
birth. The presence of a hindrance produces the rebound of the previous-
ly unconscious freedom to itself, therefore making it conscious. It is par-
ticularly useful at this point to compare the figure of the newborn with the
one of the student previously considered. We must conclude that the
scholar is active, he makes use of his determining power, but in an uncon-
scious way: he misunderstands his own understanding as a product of na-
ture, as aNaturwunder. The scholar is in a certain way deprived of his own
activity, because he is not aware of the difference between freedom and
nature. He guiltily deprives himself of his own activity, because he lets
such activity persist in an unconscious state. To the contrary, the newborn
cries because of his lack of activity. He can not make use of the freedom
he possesses. The newborn is conscious of his freedom and of the bodily
conditions that deprive him of such activity and it is this awareness that
makes him cry. The scholar is touched by the presence of an activity he
doesnt know he already possesses. This activity is radically absent within
him, because it is present in front of him as a miraculous externality. He
mistakes the possession of a power of his mind for the surprising chance
of a miracle, and this surprise makes him emotional35. The newborn is hin-
34 Kant, 1974: 188.
35 The link between tears and miracle, almost 150 years later, will particularly draw
to itself the attention of Georges Bataille. Tears are induced by the surprising
character of an event which is impossible to foresee, as remarked in his unpub-
lished essay, On Sovereignty: “for many years I was struck by the ambiguous as-
pect of tears, which a happy event provokes as readily as misfortune […]. I had
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dered in taking advantage of the same spontaneity the scholar doesnt
even know to possess. The difference between the two situations lies in
the different degrees of consciousness both exemplary figures possess
of their own spontaneity. The fact that the newborn cries and the scholar
does not, forces us to conclude – a bit paradoxically – that the newborn
has a higher degree of consciousness about own freedom than the scholar.
5. Building Concepts
The conceptual figures of tears and crying are therefore strictly bounded
to questions about awareness and consciousness. The problem of con-
sciousness has been present to Kant since the two great essays of 1763,
The Only Possible Argument and Attempt to Introduce the Concept of
Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy. The path that leads to the critical
figure of apperception is clearly drawn from those precritical essays.
If you ask a man of even the greatest learning at a moment when he is re-
laxing and at rest to recount something to you or to share part of his knowl-
edge of things with you, you will find that he knows nothing in this state,
that he is empty and that he has no definite thoughts or judgments. But
stimulate him [Gebt ihm nur Anlaß] by asking him a question or by express-
ing a view of your own, and his learning will reveal itself in a series of ac-
tivities. And the tendency of that succession of activities will be to make
both him and you aware of his understanding of things.36
Such man of greatest learning finds himself in a situation which is not
very different from the one of the young scholar. Both of them ignore
what they are supposed to know: they dont know that they know, and
observed that on occasion these tears would well up in my eyes in circumstances
that left me disconcerted. […] Then it dawned on me […] that a miracle, that
only a miracle, caused those happy tears to arise. A miracle, or, if not, something
that seemed that, since in such circumstances we cannot expect a repetion of the
same fact. In any case, we cannot expect it from our efforts… This miraculous
quality is conveyed rather exctly by the expression: impossible and yet there it
is […]. From the beginning, this content, the miraculous, that I unltimately rec-
ognized wher one would least expect it, in the object of tears, seemed to me to be
in basic agreement with himanitys expectation.” in Fred Botting—Scott Wilson,
The Bataille Reader, (Malden: Blackwell, 1997), 306. Batailles miracle in front
of which tears are shed is hard to assign to the God of religion and prayer, rather
to the evenemential God as Uninvited Guest which we will briefly considered at
the end of this essay.
36 Kant, 1992a: 236.
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they are deprived of their own knowledge which is of a form of freedom.
The amazement and the emotion of the scholar is echoed by the relaxed
indifference of the man. Scholar and man are both potentially able to
form concepts in order to understand and master outer reality, that is
to become active, to be spontaneous, but they dont do it. The scholar as-
cribes the conceptual consistency of experience to nature itself (he makes
a miracle of nature out of spontaneity). The man of greatest learning is in
the present unable to construct conceptuality, because nature or other be-
ings havent yet stimulated him to such performance.
Apperception, or awareness, is not merely becoming aware of what is
already present but not previously perceived. Becoming aware of the real
forces of the soul has in itself a constructive meaning that needs to be em-
phasized. Becoming aware of the conflict among forces taking place in
the inner forum of the soul means, already for the pre-critical Kant,
being able to build concepts that can be applied to external reality. Be-
coming conscious has an explicit constructive value. When the soul suc-
ceeds in being clear about itself, the conflicting encounter of its forces
might build concepts:
The soul embraces the whole universe with its faculty of representation,
though only an infinitesimally tiny part of these representations is clear.
It is, indeed, the case that concepts of every kind must have as the founda-
tion on which alone they are based the inner activity of our minds [der in-
neren Thtigkeit des Geistes]. External things may well contain the condi-
tion under which concepts present themselves in one way or another; but
external things do not have the power actually to produce those concepts.
The power of the soul [Denkungskraft der Seele] must contain the real
grounds of all concepts, in so far as they are supposed to arise in a natural
fashion within the soul.37
The soul has a power to think, Denkungskraft, and it can build concepts
with the real grounds already present within it. Those concepts built in
the soul prefigure the synthetic a priori judgments of the forthcoming Cri-
tique of Pure Reason. “The question how synthetic a priori judgments are
possible can be regarded as further development of the question that
Kant posed in his work from 1763: how is knowledge about the relation
between real grounds regarded from the perspective of their consequen-
ces, as well as, in the state of their opposition possible, even if those real
grounds are not founded in external things, but in the inner activity of our
37 Kant, 1992a: 237.
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mind, in so far as it contains the real grounds for any kind of concept?”38
The form of the concept (or we might say: conceptuality in itself) is the
form that opposition among real grounds acquires within the soul,
when the same opposition becomes conscious. Real grounds within the
soul, mere potential forces, become concepts only if they cross the thresh-
old of consciousness. It is not to deny that for Kant is very possible to
make an unconscious use of already disposable concepts. But in order
to build concepts and judgments (Denkungskraft is a creative power), it
is necessary to be conscious, to let the real grounds of the soul cross
the threshold of consciousness, which produces, starting from the material
of their unconscious reciprocal opposition, an aggregation into a coherent
construct. Consciousness transforms forces and is in itself constructive
power. It gives the form of conceptuality to opposition among real
grounds of mind. Real grounds provide the matter for those concepts
that are elaborated by consciousness. But—Kant says it clearly—the so-
licitation to consciousness, and to elaboration of concepts, doesnt come
from consciousness itself. It doesnt come from the forces taken as matter
for concepts either. Consciousness, in order to build concepts, needs a so-
licitation that is external to the soul both in its energetic and rational con-
sistency.
6. Blows of Reality
The situations of the young scholar and the man of the greatest learning
are similar, but at the same time, not identical. They both presently live in
a state of unconsciousness. The first is unable to build a concept of the
surrounding events, even if stimulated by external occurrences (he is
put in front of a theorem of mechanics somebody else is developing).
The latter isnt giving shape to concepts, because nothing in the environ-
ment stimulates him sufficiently. In both cases the Denkungskraft, the
power to build concept, is sleeping, and stays undeveloped. Being
touched, being amazed, in front of a concept taken as an occurrence of
nature, is the clearest sign of the scholars unconsciousness of his own
spontaneity. Inactivity and indifference are the signs of the same uncon-
sciousness for the man of greatest learning. If the newborn of Anthropol-
ogy cries because an external matter resists the use he wants to make of
38 Heinz Eidam, Dasein und Bestimmung. Kants Grund-Problem (Berlin, New
York: De Gruyter, 2000), 121.
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his spontaneity, the young scholar of The Only Possible Argument does
make use of such spontaneity (he develops the proof of the theorem,
he unifies the manifold of the space after certain rules), but he is not
aware of his spontaneity as such; he is not aware of the fact that this ac-
tivity belongs to him as inner power. The man of greatest knowledge, on
the other hand, doesnt make use of his spontaneity, because he is not suf-
ficiently stimulated to do it. We are put in front of three different ways of
being hindered in the exercise of spontaneity. The external world might
hinder the expression of inner freedom just with its presence. But also
its absence can represent a problem to spontaneity. The man of greatest
learning cannot adequately form concepts, that is, be spontaneous, be-
cause the external world does not solicit him sufficiently. An excess of
presence hinders the expression of spontaneity and confines freedom in
its inner circle of pure self-referentiality, but lack of pressure on the
soul prevents freedom from instituting itself. If an excess of external pres-
sure from the outer world can endanger the expression of freedom, total
lack of it might be deadly for the existence of freedom itself.
The newborn cries for help and is ready to shed tears. The scholar is
touched, but apparently without shedding tears. The balance within the
soul of the man of greatest knowledge results in a tensional state that
is too weak and apparently destines him to everlasting unconsciousness,
until something from the outside pops up to disarrange the inertial bal-
ance of his forces. All three figures are presently deprived just of their
own freedom. But the newborn is deprived of the faculty to express his
freedom. He is potentially, practically free, not pragmatically, and is
aware of such limitation. The scholar and the man of greatest learning,
on the other hand, are not aware of their lack of pragmatic freedom. In
order to become active and spontaneous again these latter two need to
be put in the same situation as the newborn, which is to newly feel the
pressure of the outer world. The newborn is trying to make use of his
freedom, but he feels the resistance his body opposes to this performance,
becomes aware of his potential freedom, and cries. The obstacle his body
presents to the use of freedom is to the same extent the reason why free-
dom becomes conscious for him and might be performed in the external
world, when the present distress is overcome. The external body works as
a rude awakening that reveals the activity of the subject (spontaneity,
freedom) to the subject itself. The inner forces of the newborn, the bal-
ance among the real grounds of his soul, are put in motion by the resist-
ance that the body opposes to submit to those forces. Bumping into his
body as an external matter induces the newborn to the painful conscious-
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ness of his spontaneity that is therefore awakened and hindered by the
same worldly factor. The man of greatest learning needs a similar occa-
sion that he cannot give to himself but he might expect from something
or someone else (for instance: the questions people might ask him). In
order just to be there, to exist, spontaneity needs to encounter some re-
sistance, some Anlaß, some blow that causes external pressure. The iner-
tial equilibrium of inner forces needs to be shaken, so that the soul be-
comes spontaneous, forces awaken and become active, and produce con-
cepts able to unify worldly reality.
Such vision of external pressure as something that puts forces in a
condition of imbalance is clearly presented by Kant in order to explain
how the man of greatest knowledge can become spontaneous again.
The casual, unforeseeable event from outside is what brings the equilibri-
um of forces into unbalance and produces the activity of the soul:
Without any doubt, the real grounds of this occurrence had long been pres-
ent in him, but since the consequence, as far as consciousness was con-
cerned, was zero, those real grounds must have been opposed to each
other. Thus it is with the thunder which, invented by art for our destruction
and carefully preserved in the arsenal of a prince ready for a future war, lies
in menacing silence until, touched by a treacherous spark, it explodes in
lightning and lays waste to everything around it. Tensions constantly
ready to explode lay dormant within it, the prisoners of powerful forces
of attraction, waiting for the stimulus [Reiz] of a spark of fire, to be re-
leased.39
The relaxed man of greatest learning, in order to become active and free,
needs to be stimulated,40 exactly like a certain amount of gunpowder
needs a tinder, so that its hidden forces, previously kept in a inertial
39 Kant, 1992a: 236–37.
40 The stimulus that the man of greatest knowledge needs in order to develop his
conceptuality recalls the story of stimulating elderly Kant, from the biography of
Thomas de Quincey: “And I remember, in particular, that upon the very last
Monday of his life, when the extremity of his weakness moved a circle of his
friends to tears, and he sat amongst us insensible to all we could say to him, cow-
ering down, or rather, I might say, collapsing into a shapeless heap upon his
chair, deaf, blind, torpid, motionless—even then I whispered to the others,
that I would engage that Kant should take his part in conversation with propriety
and animation. This they found it difficult to believe. Upon which I drew close to
his ear, and put a question to him about the Moors of Barbary. To the surprise of
everybody but myself, he immediately gave us, by the way, that in the word Al-
giers the g ought to be pronounced hard (as in the English word gear).” Thomas
de Quincey, Last Days of Immanuel Kant, and Other Writings, (Edinburgh:
Black, 1862), 155.
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state of balance, get unleashed until final destruction, go from zero up to
a certain level. The menacing quiet of the gunpowder is the analogon
physicum of the relaxation of the man of greatest learning. Both the gun-
powder and the man are waiting for stimulus to express their sleeping
forces, to become active, to transform their premises into consequences,
that is (in case of humanity) to transform the real grounds that are in a
state of inertial balance into concepts.
The Reiz, stimulus, for the gunpowder to unleash its destructive
power echoes the Anlaß, occasion, that the man of greatest learning
needs in order to build concepts. Before the encounter with the stimulus
or the occasion, before being hit by something external, the forces within
the soul find themselves in a condition of balance that doesnt allow them
to cross the threshold of consciousness. Such state hinders the construc-
tion of concepts: conceptuality is so far wrongly regarded as a miraculous
fact that belongs to external nature. The perfect balance of real grounds,
the rest of the forces, means that the soul is unconscious of its own activ-
ity. Kant found a notion in 1763 to signify unconscious representation, the
lack of any apperception: this is the concept of nothing, or “nihil privati-
vum”, that is, “zero, the lack of a clear representation.”41 To be pulled out
of such a null and void unconscious state and become spontaneous again,
both the scholar and the man of greatest learning need a stimulus or an
occasion from outside. The same occasion the newborn finds in the resist-
ance of bodily givenness. The minimum we have to presume in order to
produce awareness about spontaneity and freedom is therefore a certain
“sensitivity of the soul [Reizbarkeit der Seele],”42 the excitability of mind.
Excitability of mind means availability to random encounters and readi-
ness to meet unforeseeable, external reality. Freedom and spontaneity
can not build concepts or judgments, in which they frame and make real-
ity foreseeable, until they are activated by the unframed and, at this ex-
tent, unforeseeable reality of things. The soliciting reality is clearly con-
noted by Kant as a reality without shape. An occurrence in which the un-
determined part prevails over the determined features: an already devel-
oped theorem of mechanics is not able to solicit adequately the attention
of the student; the words able to awake the man of greatest learning from
41 Kant, 1992a: 228.
42 Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, trans-
lated by John T. Goldthwait (Berkeley—Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1991), 46.
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his intellectual slumber possess the form of a question. They are not cat-
egorical statements, but a crystallization of doubtfulness.
What duty does this excitement or natures stimulus actually per-
form? It brings the inertial-balanced forces of the soul into motion, so
that they become able to create concepts, so that soul can become spon-
taneous and productive again. The unproductive balance of vital force
finds its only possible occasion of vivification in encounters with dead
matter or in intervention from the outside. The creation of concepts,
spontaneity, is made possible through the mediation of some dull materia.
This is the conclusion that drives Kant to his paradoxical assertion in An-
thropology that “the inclination to freedom is the most vehement of all
inclinations.”43 Freedom, i. e. spontaneity, is designated as a natural incli-
nation of human beings. How can freedom possibly be an inclination?
How can freedom, in its ideal and anti-natural consistency, be mistaken
for an entity depending on nature? Spontaneity and freedom are both
paradoxically designated by Kant as Neigung, or, inclination: “a sensuous
appetite that serves the subject as a rule (habit) is called an inclination.”44
The paradox is that freedom is designated as an inclination, therefore
having a sensuous derivation: the centripetal movement of self-constitu-
tion, to gain consciousness of oneself, autonomy, seems to overlap with a
movement toward the outside, dependency. “Although animals dont
share the idea of freedom, Kant still calls this a natural inclination to free-
dom because it occurs as soon as a baby is born. Culture, or socialization,
has no chance to have an input before the inclination to freedom arises.”45
And this is correct. But the fact that freedom for Kant is not a product of
culture or history doesnt mean it is therefore an Anlage, anything innate
or something like a specific human instinct. Neigung doesnt mean in-
stinct or predisposition, but inclination, eccentric movement, radical
heteronomy, sensitivity: “every inclination turns outward, it leans out of
the self in the direction of whatever may affect me from the outside
world. It is precisely through inclination, through leaning out of myself
as I may lean out of the window to look into the street, that I establish
contact with the world. Under no circumstances can my inclination be de-
termined by my intercourse with myself.”46 Therefore, even more remark-
43 Kant, 1974: 135.
44 Kant, 1974: 133.
45 Wilson, 2006: 63.
46 Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment (New York: Shocken, 2003), 81. I
thank for this reference Prof. Adriana Cavarero.
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able is the paradox if freedom itself, autonomy, intercourse with oneself,
is designated as inclination and heteronomy. But, even if it might sound
surprising for a traditional interpretation of Kants philosophy, such state-
ment is very coherent with the specific figure of freedom regarded in its
genealogical features. Freedom is designated by Kant as the specific an-
swer to the blows of nature. It co-exists and co-forms itself with the
first assault of reality as its inner fold. Intercourse with oneself, autonomy,
independence, is the verso of a recto, which is the experience of inclina-
tion, heteronomy, dependence. Neither the one, nor the other, taken
alone, are original experiences. Original, rather, is their reciprocal part-
ing. Such parting destroys the mythological unity of freedom and sensitiv-
ity, the fantasy of nature being rational in and of itself and allowing free-
dom. A newborns tears are the most reliable witness of the nonexistence
of such nature.
7. Crying as Immediate Affect
We have considered until now the affect of crying as mediative-commu-
nicative sign. Nevertheless, as we already saw, Kant also assigns to crying
with tears an immediate affect on the vital force. Tears are not just a sign
addressed to others. They also communicate an effect to the mind without
any mediation. Tears share this immediate effect with laughter. What cry-
ing shares with laughter is that “both […] cheer us up, for they release
[sind Befreiungen] us from hindrance to the vital force by the effusions
they involve.”47 Also, in this case, as having an immediate effect on the
mind, tears are directly connected with the concept of freedom. Tears
in themselves work as Befreiungen, they set us free from cramplike con-
stitution of our mind. The capability of shedding tears represents in itself,
irrespective of the effect it might have on other human beings, a kind of
regained freedom from previous hindrance. Lets read again the second
part of the first Kantian quote of this essay, taken from Anthropology:
Weeping—inhaling with sobs (convulsively) [convulsivisches Einathmen],
when it is combined with a gush of tears—is likewise one of natures provi-
sions for health, because of the soothing effect it has; and a widow who, as
we say, refuses to be comforted—that is, will not hear of stopping the flow of
tears—is taking care of her health without knowing it or really wanting it.
47 Kant, 1974: 123.
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Tears allow a blocked vital force to flow into the paths of health again.
The convulsions of crying, convulsivisches Einathmen, shake the cramped
balance of a mind and put it in motion again, set it free from the cramps
that block it. Weeping and laughter both have to do with breath, as each
of them emphasizes one phase of the rhythm: inhalation/exhalation.
Laughter (like sneezing) is associated by Kant mostly with exhalation,48
while weeping—as we can see from last quote—is linked to inhalation.49
Such difference in the phases of breathing is emphasized by their gender
connotation, as we find again in the pages of Anthropology:
Laughter is masculine ; weeping, on the other hand is feminine [weiblich] (in
men it is effeminate [weibisch]). And when tears glisten in a mans eyes [die
Thrne im Auge glnzt], it is only if it comes from generous but helpless
[ohnmchtiger] sympathy with anothers suffering—but not if he lets tear-
drops fall, and still less if he sobs along with them and so makes disgusting
music.50
While laughter is masculine-exhaling, weeping is feminine-inhaling. An-
other significant difference between the two related but opposite affects
is that even if laughter is also characterized as a convulsive phenomenon,
it is nevertheless regarded by Kant as “continuous […] exhalation,”51
something like a calm, single, large convulsion. Its character of continuity
lessens the syncopatic value. A properly convulsive, discontinuous charac-
ter is specific to crying. Such connotation associates crying to the syncope
of surprise, the suspension of the previously present state (that is not nec-
essarily involved in the phenomenon of laughter). The syncopatic out-
burst of tears means that the subject is determined to break the inertial
balance of forces that previously weakened its mind. And at the same
time it makes us think of a kind of homeopathic cure, because crying is
designated to cure the cramp of mind through convulsions. But the
cramp of the mind we have to be cured of is a state, meaning an inertial
balance of the forces, while the convulsions of sobbing aggress discontin-
uously this inertia in order to bring it to a healthy condition of imbalance.
The affect of crying possesses the peculiarity of making the cramped bal-
ance of mind unstable and alive again through such discontinuous blows.
The multiplicity of convulsions of sobbing is supposed to bring into
48 “In laughter, the exhaling of air by fits and starts […] strenghtens our feeling of
vital force by its salutary movement of the diaphragm.” Ibid. 129.
49 “Weinen ist ein Schluchzen und einathmen, Lachen Ausathmen.” Kant, 1928: 853.
50 Kant, 1974: 123.
51 Kant, 1979: 207.
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healthy motion a vital force blocked in a singular cramp. Health obtained
from tears is the mirror in which regained freedom, restored spontaneity,
recognized itself: “health is the visible plane of an existence where the or-
ganic totality is dominated, without remainder and without opposition, by
a form of rationality that, beyond any division, is at once ethical and or-
ganic; it is the playground of freedom – the space in which freedom can
play.”52 The Kantian parallelism between mental and bodily inertia, as
well as the occurrence able to overcome it, is emphasized by Foucaults
essay: “the master of his own thought process is also the master of this
vital movement which is its organic and indispensable complement. If
the mind were immobile, then life would go to sleep – which is to say
that it would die […]; and if the movement of life risks being thrown
off balance, or getting jammed up in a spasm, then the mind must be
able to restore its proper mobility.”53 Through convulsive blows of sob-
bing the mind again becomes master of itself. The peculiar fact that
such mastery is gained through pretense of receiving a stimulus from out-
side. Crying as convulsivisches Einathmung, inhalation and convulsion,
being shaken from a state of previous unconsciousness and laziness, mim-
ics the situation of being besieged by a world (the newborns body, the
questions put to the man, etc.) against which the I is able to institute itself
as (hindered) spontaneity.
Inhaling (the phase of breathing emphasized by weeping) means in-
deed an absorption from the world, openness to what comes across. Cry-
ing induces in the soul the same effect as hazardous blows from external
matter: the vivification of unconscious spontaneity. The multiple convul-
sions of crying reproduce the blows with which external reality awakens
the soul. There is nevertheless a significant distinction that makes the
phenomenon of crying more problematic: in this case the convulsive
blows are called from inside. In the act of crying and shedding tears
there is a structural reference to the external world, inhaling as intention
directed toward the outer world. But at the same time crying is an affect,
therefore inner occurrence, motion of the mind.54 The blows that tears
turn against the unconscious soul in order to awake it come from the
soul itself: by crying the soul solicits itself in order to produce an outer
excitation. The soul is not just passively hit, but also behaves actively to-
52 Michel Foucault, Introduction to Kant	s Anthropology, translated by Robert
Nigro and Kate Briggs (Cambridge: MIT Press 2008), 46.
53 Foucault, 2008: 49.
54 “Affekt ist Gemthsbewegung”, Kant, 1928: 736.
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ward the blows. The activity of the soul consists in this particular case of
provoking its own excitability. Therefore, there is something deeply au-
tonomous in crying, which is not to be found in the simple solicitation
Kant hypothesizes for the spiritual awakening through blows of reality.
Such autonomy has the peculiarity of emphasizing the passivity of the
mind: it solicits the blows of reality; it solicits the soul to be more excit-
able. The mind asks to be solicited in order to become spontaneous, asks
actively to be hit by blows of reality.
We can portray the crying personality of someone as a movement in
and out from himself: one violently inhales and at the same time tears
gush out from the eyes, because of an “affect” that “works like water
breaking through a dam.”55 Crying is absorption and excretion at the
same time. Tears of human free being flow from the inside on cheeks
as an exhibited and desired evidence of dependency on the outer world
(the blows) in order to gain independency. Tears are the phenomenal an-
alogon of the pure self-affection of the first Critique, on which Heidegger
built his interpretation of Kantian criticism. But crying and its convulsive
breathing represent the phenomenon of self-affection upside down. In
pure self-affection of time mind affects itself as another, je est un autre.
On the contrary, in the affect of crying, an effect that has the physiogno-
my of the external world is provoked spontaneously from inside, un autre
est moi. I dont encounter myself as a part of reality; rather blows of re-
ality are provoked by me. Such occurrence, doesnt mean that provoked
otherness is assimilated and digested by the mind: convulsions stay exter-
nal convulsions, and the blows of tears solicit the mind without becoming
a part of mind, they are just Anlaß to the health of Lebenskraft. But the
solicitation of tears and sobs is solicited by the mind. The affect of crying
represents in itself—so to speak—the inner solicitation of outer solicita-
tion, the autonomy of heteronomy. Through violent inhaling of crying
the soul provides itself the necessary shocks that sometimes outer
world is ungenerous with, but the human beings that we are need in
order to be free and spontaneous. Men and women know too well the in-
stants of dead calm, in which the world doesnt solicit them anymore, and
they are urged to escape such dead calm through lighting up a cigarette,
just for the sake of feeling the stinging of tobacco, taking toxic substances
(affect is in itself a “drunken fit”56), or cutting ones own arms with a
blade. They aggress themselves to put their vital force in motion again.
55 Kant, 1974: 120.
56 Kant, 1974: 120.
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The affect of crying is the basic gesture of aggression called from inside,
an inner surprise, a gift from ourselves to ourselves. The autonomy of cry-
ing sketches out a paradoxical autonomy of excitability and counts on the
intimacy of hazard.
If we might be allowed to follow the theological metaphoric we have
been using until now, we could say that if there is a God involved also in
such seductive tears, it is neither the God of religion and prayer, nor the
God of philosophy and knowledge. The God of self-provoked tears is
rather an evenemential God, God as event and uninvited guest.57 For
the same reason such tears of self-solicitation introduce ambiguity in
sex distinction. Tears are in themselves feminine. But a man who sheds
tears is weibisch, says Kant, effeminate. Man is, as we know, the figure
of autonomy, woman of heteronomy. The inclination the two sexes
have for freedom is not strictly equivalent. Through the self-solicitation
of tears man becomes ambiguously free. He becomes free while paying
the price of involving mechanism and while tempting nature, nature as
something that convulsively addresses the soul. He who sheds tears ob-
tains a sexually ambiguous state. He is basically a man, because its aim
is to restore health, that is vital force, freedom and spontaneity with it.
But the way he strives for vital force is extremely doubtful: excreting con-
vulsions will help him to restore vital force. It resembles too closely the
57 Tears having an immediate effect also evoke their own God, whose physiognomy
does not overlap with the previous two. Beside the omnipotent God of miracle
and the systematic God of knowledge, the will of solicitation is longing for a gift
from the outside, but not in the recognizable shape of the Saviour or a metaphys-
ical Idea. Rather, as a stranger met without any forewarn, yet still evoked. John
Climacus, the Desert Father, abbot of Mount Sinai, who lived in the 7th century
and whose meditations on tears are fundamental to Christian East and Orthodox
faith, said: “when the soul grows tearful, weeps, and is filled with tenderness, and
all this without having striven for it, then let us run, for the Lord has arrived
uninvited and is holding out to us the sponge of loving sorrow and the cool wa-
ters of blessed sadness.” (John Climacus, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, translat-
ed by Colm Luibheid and Norman Victor Russell [Mahwah: Paulis Press, 1982],
139). John Chryssavgis commented: “as a gift, tears testify to a visitation […]
from the Holy Spirit. This is preceded by an earlier visitation from that Unin-
vited Guest who arrives, but later leaves us to mourn […] the divine absence.”
(John Chryssavgis, John Climacus: From the Egyptian Desert to the Sinaite
Mountain [Burlington: Ashgate, 2004], 153). Inviting the uninvited God as a
stranger is the temptation of tears, what ratifies “le caractre prophtiques de
ces pleurs, provoqus par un vnement  venir” (Piroska Nagy, “Les larmes
du Christ dans lexgse mdivale,” Mdivales 27 [Fall 1994]: 38), an event
yet to come, and already present, different from us, but evoked by ourselves.
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behavior of women, who call other human beings to their help. The dif-
ference is that by crying regarded as an immediate effect, no other free
and independent being is properly called for help. I call for help blows
of reality, as belonging to me. I solicit the otherness of convulsions as
obeying my solicitation. And thats why a man who cries doesnt become
a woman, hes just effeminate. Crying as immediate affect represents the
femininity of masculinity. The distinction becomes less marked between
honest, sincere tears as call for help, and theatrical tears sometimes
women shed without any necessity. The effeminate character of blows
of tears is a product of sincere distress and at the same time, a self-pro-
voked gesture, exactly as theatrical female tears are. The blows of tears
have the gratuity of a pathetic, unnecessary gesture, and—in spite of
that—they arise from an authentic and inescapable sorrow.
Pure self-affection represents the being outward of the inside (the pe-
culiar way of being outward, that belongs to inside). On the contrary, the
awakening tears represent the inwardness of externality. As the title of
the quotedAnthropology chapter says: through tears “nature mechanical-
ly promotes health”. Tears put bodily mechanisms in motion for the sake
of the soul, they solicit the intelligent character of bodily mechanisms.
Tears say that autonomy is rooted in heteronomy, freedom is a rebound
from nature originating in inclination (tears of newborns). Tears also
say that freedom is occasioned by encounters with external matter as
an effort to negate this origin, and to extend its inner power over the out-
side with the help of others (tears of anger, female tears). Tears speak a
resolution to bring together inner and outer freedom, the overcoming of
difficulties of the external world (tears that glisten only, tearless crying,
miraculous tears, tears of men). But, more radically, tears tell of the desire
to tempt reality, the desire to become free and spontaneous by an assault
from the world that we ourselves have provoked (tears of excitability, ef-
feminate tears).
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A Linneaus of Human Nature:
The Pragmatic Deduction of Unconscious Thought
in Kants Lectures on Anthropology*
Nuria Snchez Madrid
I. Introduction
Probably the most important feature in Kants approach to the issue of
obscure representations is his calmness and firmness when he establishes
that they are the most numerous, since their field, unlike that of clear rep-
resentations, is enormous1. In fact, it is enough to apply the synthetic
unity of apperception—the highest point of understanding—on materials
of pragmatic origin, to uncover some regions in this field. Thus, the best
procedure is to head from the cognitive operations which we are con-
scious of towards those which still remain covered with mist. Nothing
in the Kantian deduction of the existence of this kind of representations,
deduction which starts from their effects, announces an inversion or a dis-
* This text was achieved while I belonged to the research team of the Project
“Naturaleza humana y comunidad. Una investigacin, a partir de Kant, sobre
los principios antropolgicos del cosmopolitismo” (HUM2006–04909), finan-
cially supported by the MICINN of Spanish Government. I would like also to
acknowledge the academic mobility grant for teachers of the Complutense Uni-
versity of Madrid, which I received in 2008 for a short-term research stay at the
University of Pisa. In the references to Kants writings I have made use of the
original German text according to the Akademie edition. In the case of the An-
thropology from a pragmatic point of view I have made use in the main text as
well as in the footnotes of the translation by R. B. Louden, Cambridge U.P.,
2006. Quotes of the Critique of pure reason follow in the main text the transla-
tion by N. Kemp Smith, Palgrave Mcmillan, 2003. Citations of Kants scholarship
appear in the original language. I would like to thank Aurora Santamara, Jesffls
Gonzlez Fisac, Eduardo CaÇas and Guillermo Villaverde, whose comments
have helped me to put the final touches to the text and to improve different
drafts of this study.
1 ApH, § 5, AA 07: 135; V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 868; V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:
1221–1222; V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25: 1440 and V-Log/Philippi, ad §10, AA 24:
341.
turbance either in the realm of objectivity or in the arts which discipline
and cultivate human sociability2. The discovery of the predominance of
obscure regions of the mind does not supply an instrument to reveal
the most concealed human thoughts either, since it cannot break the re-
sistance which human beings can oppose, in order to keep their thoughts
hidden3. One could say that, avant la lettre, Kant makes the same re-
proach against the theories about the unconsciousness of the 20th century
that he levelled to the naive gentleman De Luc. This gentleman only
dared to conclude, after completing a long journey with a philanthropic
purpose, that “[a]s regards benevolence the human being is good enough
[…] provided that no bad propensity to subtle deception dwells in him”,4
even though he had the essential elements to deliver such a judgment in
his own heart, without ever leaving his country. Similarly, those who find
in the thoughts which we start without being conscious of them a kind of
secret bottom of the mind—as Baumgartens fundus animae5—, do not
pay enough attention to the fact that only a “certain pragmatic freedom”6
offers the occasion to identify in a mediated way the regions of the mind
2 Kants interpretation of unconscious thought is far from the progresses of psy-
chology which Schiller imagines in the tale “Der Verbrecher aus verlorener
Ehre”: “Es ist etwas so Einfçrmiges und doch wieder so Zusammengesetztes,
das menschliche Herz. Eine und eben dieselbe Fertigkeit oder Begierde kann
in tausenderlei Formen und Richtungen spielen, kann tausend widersprechende
Ph
nomene bewirken, kann in tausend Charakteren anders gemischt erscheinen,
und tausend ungleiche Charaktere und Handlungen kçnnen wieder aus einerlei
Neigung gesponnen sein, wenn auch der Mensch, von welchem die Rede ist,
nichts weniger denn eine solche Verwandtschaft ahndet. Stnde einmal, wie
fr die brigen Reiche der Natur, auch fr das Menschengeschlecht ein Linn
us,
der das nach ihm benannte Pflanzensystem aufstellte auf, welcher nach Trieben
und Neigungen klassifizierte, wie sehr wrde man erstaunen, wenn man so man-
chen, dessen Laster in einer engen brgerlichen Sph
re und in der schmalen
Umz
unung der Gesetze jetzt ersticken muß, mit dem Ungeheuer Borgia, ber-
chtigt durch seine Verbrechen in einer Ordnung beisammen f
nde”, in: F.
Schiller, Erz
hlungen und theoretische Schriften (S
mtliche Werke in 5 Bd.),
W. Riedel (Hrsg.), Mnchen, Carl Hanser Verlag, 2008: 13.
3 G. Bçhme (2002: 217 ff.) tells a funny anecdote, according to which in 1962
Christian Thomasius conveyed to the Prince curator of Branderburg the discov-
ery of a new science, Anthropology, where “the things hidden in the heart of
other men would be known, even against their will, through everyday conversa-
tions”.
4 MpVT, AA 08: 271, transl. by G. de Giovanni
5 Baumgarten, Met. , § 511.
6 Foucault (2008: 27).
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where obscure representations lie7. These representations do not remain
foreign at all to the study of what man “makes of himself, or can and
should make of himself”8, in spite of the tendency to reduce them to a
mere play of sensations, which is only suitable to a physiological analyse.
Kant considers that, in the space covered by the arts of human treatment,
the alleged object of empirical psychology meets something “unthought”,
which has been traditionally concealed by metaphysics, and which, as an
“always open dimension, never permanently defined”9, accompanies con-
science as its reverse.
Thus, just as one can glimpse from the island of truth the wide and
stormy ocean of illusion10, the darkness of the mind ought to be located,
as indistinctly as it could happen, on an ideal map of the mind, which will
never find its customized Linnaeus11. In order to accomplish this task, the
question about the unconscious order of our thought must satisfy first the
conditions of every quaestio domestica12, that is to say, the question ought
to be resolved by resorting to the sources which it stems from: the cogni-
tive faculty of understanding. Therefore, obscurity of mind does not fore-
cast a crisis for this faculty, but understanding confirms that this matter is
7 See Manganaro (1983: 102–103 and 117).
8 Anth, Vor. , AA 07: 119.
9 The purpose of Foucault (1966: 333–339) to accomplish, beyond the Kantian
transcendental analytic and against the modern cogito, a transcendental reflec-
tion which would give account of “the unthought” which is contented in the epis-
temic configuration of man, such a purpose, we say, might be well considered as
a repetition of the research that the Kantian Anthropology carries out. Cf. Fou-
cault (2008: 57), where he focuses the function that Kunst performs in order to
unfold the anthropological order in Kant. Actually, this order regulates the pro-
duction of a fictive reality (taste, protocol, courtesy, seduction…) and establishes
both its meaning and its means of communication.
10 KrV, A 235/B 294 s.
11 The fact that a Linnaeus of the human mind never could arise obeys to the same
reason why it is impossible that some day a Newton able to give account about
the origin of a blade should be born (KU, § 75, AA 05: 400). Whilst the Critique
of Judgment asserts that the systematic unity of an organism could not be ex-
plained by mere mechanical means, the Lectures on Anthropology distrust
that social intercourse would be tackled in terms of an empirical psychology. In-
stead of this, the last matter should be submitted rather to a Critique of sociabil-
ity, that is to say, to a Critique of the semblances that the developed human com-
munity produces. M. Horkheimer offers suggestive remarks about the seeds of a
“sozialen Schematismus” in Kant; see “Eine Kantische Soziologie”, in: ID., Ge-
sammelte Schriften, vol. VI, Frankfurt a.M., Fischer, 1991, pp. 191–192.
12 KrV, A 476/B 504 s.
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a metaphysical and anthropological object of study. After its plunge into
this terra incognita, logic will see increased its archive of rules, once it
identifies the principles and the transcendental instances which are al-
ready working, increased in the common experience without the subjects
knowledge. One of the most evident signs of Kantian interest for the un-
conscious thought can be recognized in the discovery of a transcendental
principle, which, even if it does not concern the objectivity of experience,
works as a subjective guiding thread for the research and classification of
nature. At first glance, such principle seems to be merely tautological and
to belong to a general logic. But, actually, we are faced with the wretched
entanglement of a transcendental assumption of the faculty of judgment,
the roots of which settle so deep in the domain of reason that the inquiry
of its legitimacy as a maxim cannot spare a certain obscurity13. Since the
condition of possibility of every logical classification has eventually be-
come outshone by the most humble knowledge14, theory vindicates the
existence of an original pleasure which is already absent from the factum
of logical subsumption. Unlike Aby Warburgs dictum, the descent of
Kant to the “first ground” [die erste Grundlage] of the faculty of reason
does not confirm that “Der liebe Gott steckt im Detail”, but rather
that the mud, the dirt and the hair of Platos Parmenides have been con-
veniently detheologized15. Thus, it is not the promise of a total release
from the conditions of possibility of experience, as the light dove of the
KrV 16 dreams, what moves Kant to problematise the hidden forces of
judgments of which we only know the results. It is rather the “conscious-
ness of ignorance”, which does not block further philosophical inquiries.
On the contrary, this consciousness actually initiates them, and begins
with the examination of the first sources of our knowledge17.
13 EEKU, AA 20: 211–212 and KU, Einl. , AA 05: 168 and 170. Cf. G. Lebrun
(1970: 272).
14 KU, Einl. § VI, AA 05: 187–188.
15 See Foucault (2008: 75–76).
16 KrV, Einl. , § III, B 8. As the pathological self-observation reveals, accomplishing
such a wish would entail to submit the region which holds the “supposed discov-
eries” made by self-observation (Anth, § 4, AA 07: 133) to an influence even
more tyrannical that that of the understanding, that is to say, to the control of
a consciousness higher than the human one, which allegedly would inspire to
some privileged people visions stemming from suprasensory realms (WDo,
AA 08: 145).
17 KrV, A 758/B 786.
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II. The Dialectic Path to the Obscure Representations:
The Pathological Self-observation
The main caution that needs to be applied before displaying the field of
obscure representations is to consider the representation “I” as the
unique point of departure of every cognitive biography. A different be-
ginning is not allowed, at least to us men, if our purpose is to classify
the representations in our mind18. Given the tempting Leibnizian propos-
al to consider consciousness as a threshold too rough to catch the petites
perceptions, which however leave their subtle and continuous traces on
our mind19, the representation “I”, which “raises us infinitely above all
other living beings on earth”20, definitely expels man from animal
realm21. Even though the endeavour to pay attention and to turn away
18 PhilEnz. , AA 29: 44: “Das erste, was ich bey mir gewahr werde, ist das Bewußt-
seyn. Dies ist kein besonderes Denken, sondern dasjenige worunter ich die
brige Vorstellungen etc. bringen kann, es ist die Bedingung und die Form
unter der wir denkende Wesen oder intelligentzen sind”.
19 See Manganaro (1983: 105): “Il problema del medium, dello strumento che ci
permette di esplicitare ci che gi risiede nella nostra coscienza, ci che ci appa-
rtiene come territorio di nostra propriet, questo , in un certo senso, la chiave
della distanza che Kant prende da Leibniz. […] La “modernit” di Kant su ques-
to aspetto che a prima vista appare del tutto marginale rispetto ai grandi temi
gnoseologici sta in questo: al modo delle rappresentazioni oscure non pervenia-
mo, come avviene con le petites perceptions, come al sostrato della nostra indi-
vidualit e della nostra potenza. […] Ci che io come soggetto chiarifico nella
cosa  un evento che implica una chiarificazione stessa delluniverso. La solu-
zione Kantiana passa attraverso la distinzione di sensibilit e intelletto” and
M. Oberhausen (2002: 133–134): “Kant is kein Leibnizianer. Fr ihm sind alle
Erkenntnisse erworben, und zwar entweder a posteriori aus den Sinnen oder a
priori aus den Erkenntnisvermçgen selbst. Die dunklen Vorstellungen sind fr
ihn kein ursprnglich gegebener Vorrat, der in seiner Gesamheit die Welt voll-
st
ndig widerspiegelt. Kant hat die dunklen Vorstellungen von diesem metaphy-
sischen Hintergrund abgeschnitten—wenn eigentmlicherweise auch eine Spur
davon bei ihm erhalten geblieben ist”.
20 Anth, § 1, AA 07: 27; cf. Fortschr., AA 20: 270: “Wie es mçglich sey, daß ich, der
ich denke, mir selber ein Gegenstand (der Anschauung) seyn, und so mich von
mir selbst unterscheiden kçnne, ist schlechterdings unmçglich zu erkl
ren, ob-
wohl es ein unbezweifeltes Factum ist; es zeigt aber ein ber alle Sinnenan-
schauung so weit erhabenes Vermçgen an, daß es, als der Grund der Mçglichkeit
eines Verstandes, die g
nzliche Absonderung von allem Vieh, dem wir das
Vermçgen, zu sich selbst Ich zu sagen, j nicht Ursache haben beyzulegen, zur
Folge hat”.
21 V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 854: “Wenn ein Thier ich sagen kçnnte, so w
re es
mein Camerad”. Regarding the Kantian difference between the procedure
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from an idea reflects the freedom of the faculty of thought and the au-
thority which the mind has over itself 22, there is no situation more miser-
able for man than the one caused by the involuntary course of both oper-
ations23, where, as the main character of the E. A. Poes tale Berenice de-
clares, visions and ghosts stand for appearances24. The reader of the An-
thropology from a pragmatic point of view is surprised to find the unex-
pected note which Kant adds to § 7, where he distinguishes between log-
ical and psychological consciousness. This note does not really belong to
the subject of this work. Its purpose is rather to prevent the speculative
extravagances of the illuminati being detrimental to the operation of
the “I think”25. The pretention to compose an inner story with the invol-
that men and animals follow in order to make a distinction see N. Snchez Ma-
drid, “Si un caballo pudiera captar el pensamiento “yo”…” (AA 25: 854). Con-
sideraciones sobre la presencia del animal en la biologa gris de Kant”, Pro-
ceedings of the VIII Philosophical Anthropology International Congress, Madrid,
UNED (in print), accessible as e-print UCM (2009), http://eprints.ucm.es/8031/ .
22 Anth, § 3, AA 07: 131.
23 V-Parow, AA 25: 263–264. See Pirillo (2003: 387): “La sana autoosservazione
pragmatica termina l dove comincia quella patologica, cos come la coscienza
empirica termina l dove la realt dellautoosservazione  scambiata con la
sua possibilit trascendentale”; cf. Desideri (1999–2000: 35–36). Freuds text
Formulierungen ber die zwei Principien des psychischen Geschehens (1911) sur-
prises for its closeness to the Kantian assessment about the aporetical back-
ground of the self-observation.
24 Poe, Berenice: “The realities of the world affected me as visions, and as visions
only, while the wild ideas of the land of dreams became, in turn, not the material
of my every-day existence, but in very deed that existence utterly and solely in
itself […]. This monomania, if I must so term it, consisted in a morbid irritability
of those properties of the mind in metaphysical science termed the attentive. It is
more than probable that I am not understood; but I fear, indeed, that it is in no
manner possible to convey to the mind of the merely general reader, an ade-
quate idea of that nervous intensity of interest with which, in my case, the pow-
ers of meditation (not to speak technically) busied and buried themselves, in the
contemplation of even the most ordinary objects of the universe”. We owe this
reference to Manganaro (1983: 95). See F.-X. Chenet, Lassise de lontologie cri-
tique, Lille, PUL, 1994, p. 44: “Kant nenseigne pas seulement que lobjet est
donn, mais quil ne peut Þtre donn que comme effet dune affection. Le con-
cept daffection ne se rduit pas  laffirmation que la sensation est donne,
quelle est inconstruible et quelle est a posteriori, il est indispensable  la pense
de la rceptivit comme telle, cest--dire comme passivit”; cf. Lebrun (1982:
208).
25 Anth, § 7, AA 07: 143: “But it was nevertheless necessary to go back so far sim-
ply in order to stop the offenses of the speculative mind in regard to this ques-
tion”. The question concerns the possibility of a priori knowledge.
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untary course of ones own thoughts and feelings is, according to Kant,
the direct path to alleged inspirations received from the sky and, in gen-
eral, the direct path to a chimerical community with spirits which we real-
ly ignore, a community which substitutes for our real community with
other human beings, known to us as world26. The main illusion entangled
with these practices is the discovery of contents which we have actually
carried into our inner self. This happens when we do not consider as ob-
jects of our observation the very representations which ourselves have
summoned, and which we are the legitimate owners of, but rather the
acts of representation which allegedly come on their own into the
mind, without anybody having appealed to them. The visionary, whose in-
ternal journeys only announce to him a subsequent arrival at the coast of
Anticyra, chooses Nietzsches statement that thought comes when “it”
wants, not when “I” want27 as his motto. However, the visionary receives
as a reply the Kantian firm “decision”28 to make the logical consciousness
26 Anth, § 2, AA 07: 130. Cf. Longuenesse (2006: 302): “[A]ccording to Kant, one is
conscious of oneself in this empirical sense not when one directs ones “mental
gaze” to ones inner states. But rather when, in directing ones mental gaze to
outside objects, one becomes also aware of the distinction between the temporal
determinations of those objects and the temporal determinations of ones per-
ceptions and experience of them”; cf. KrV, “Refutation of Idealism”, B 275:
“even our inner experience, which for Descartes is indubitable, is possible
only on the assumption of outer experience” and R 3826, AA 17: 304: “Gott er-
kennt alles, indem er sich selbst erkennt. Der Mensch erkennt sich selbst, indem
er andere Dinge erkennt”; see Goldmann (1948).
27 Jenseits von Gut und Bçse, § 17. The following passage from Iliad, chant XV,
vv. 80–83, might be a Greek counterpoint, closer to Kants position than to
Nietzsches one, regarding the hidden machinery of our thoughts: “Swift as
the thought of one whose fancy carries him over vast continents, and he says
to himself, Now I will be here, or there, and he would have all manner of things
– even so swiftly did Juno wing her way till she came to high Olympus and went
in among the gods who were gathered in the house of Jove” (S. Butlers trans-
lation).
28 We believe that Kant would not reject this “charge”, rather he would plea for its
opportunity; see op. cit. , § 16: “Mag das Volk glauben, dass Erkennen ein zu
Ende-Kennen sei, der Philosoph muss sich sagen: ,wenn ich den Vorgang zer-
lege, der in dem Satz, “ich denke” ausgedrckt ist, so bekomme ich eine
Reihe von verwegenen Behauptungen, deren Begrndung schwer, vielleicht un-
mçglich ist,—zum Beispiel, dass ich es bin, der denkt, dass berhaupt ein Etwas
es sein muss, das denkt, dass Denken eine Th
tigkeit und Wirkung seitens eines
Wesens ist, welches als Ursache gedacht wird, dass es ein “Ich” giebt, endlich,
dass es bereits fest steht, was mit Denken zu bezeichnen ist,—dass ich weiss,
was Denken ist. Denn wenn ich nicht darber mich schon bei mir entschieden
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a principle that precedes all the experience amassed in the inner sense29.
This decision establishes “the natural order in the faculty of knowl-
edge”30, according to which the spontaneity of imagination is always
kept under control by the spontaneity of understanding. The inner
sense alone cannot yield any fruitful observation, because it is an uninter-
rupted flow of representations. Only if we represent to ourselves the inner
changes of the soul as representations which belong to one and the same
subject, we will gain consciousness of them or, if one prefers, we will not
find any appearance within ourselves, within our own self unless the log-
ical consciousness sets up beforehand the “stage” of objectivity against
the blackboard of nothingness, as it was called by the Machadian philos-
opher Abel Martn.
The reason that definitely destroys the expectations of psychology to
become a science—whose situation regarding this point is even more
needy than that of the chemistry, which at least can become a systematic
art—is that mathematics cannot be applied to the appearances of the
inner sense, which flow only in the temporal dimension. Indeed, we can
separate these appearances only in our mind, but it is not in our hands
to keep them in this state long enough to combine them and, finally, to
leave them as they were at the beginning. In fact, the observation already
“modifies and dissimulates”31 the state of the observed object, so that we
are only allowed to carry out a natural description of the soul, not even an
experimental psychological doctrine, which probably, even if Kant does
not pronounce a word about it, will be feasible with animals. Actually,
there will be an experiment suited to human nature, but one so connected
with the exercise of freedom that, as we will see later, it is better to aban-
don the term “experiment” for that of “rules of game”32. Albeit the rep-
h
tte, wonach sollte ich abmessen, dass, was eben geschieht, nicht vielleicht
“Wollen” oder “Fhlen” sei? Genug, jenes “ich denke” setzt voraus, dass ich
meinen augenblicklichen Zustand mit anderen Zust
nden, die ich an mir
kenne, vergleiche, um so festzusetzen, was es ist: wegen dieser Rckbeziehung
auf anderweitiges “Wissen” hat er fr mich jedenfalls keine unmittelbare “Ge-
wissheit”.
29 Anth, § 7, AA 07: 143: “So it is advisable and even necessary to begin with ob-
served appearances in oneself, and then to progress above all to the assertion of
certain propositions that concern human nature; that is, to inner experience”.
30 Anth, § 4, AA 07: 134.
31 MAN, AA 04: 471.
32 Cohen-Halimi (1994: 324) has highlighted the figure of the “experimental mor-
alist” (expression which is used in a remark of an anonimous annotation to the
Essay about the mental illnesses of 1764), which Kant, who breaks up clearly with
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resentation “I” is the narrow path which leads us to the world we form
part of when we are awake33, we can turn it into the narrow pass of ego-
ism, an abuse of reason and freedom, which strangle the use of all the
higher cognitive faculties. An especial mention deserves the logical trap
which leads to the “physical egoism”34—a Kantian hapax—, a pathology
where the mind refuses the reality of the world and considers itself as the
unique object of reflection.
The § 4 of the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, devoted
to the observation of ourselves, ends with a note35 that reminds to us that,
due to our finitude, we cannot spare the “consistent inconsistence”36 of
the “I” to appear double to us—where this duplicity concerns the manner
of representation, not the represented content—, that is, as pure apper-
ception of reflection and as empirical apperception of apprehension.
The pure apperception is not an object of psychology, but rather the
ground of the “whole of logic”37, that is, the “formal element of con-
sciousness” [Fçrmliche des Bewußtsein]”38, that “can be clear (empirical
consciousness) or obscure”39. The important point is that without it we
will only find a chaotical amalgam of states in our mind, which remain un-
tied to any representation. Both dimensions of the “I” are neither coori-
ginal—one displays the stage where the other appears—, nor evolutive
phases that a look at childhood could ever distinguish40. Since the empir-
the method followed by the empirical psychologists, from Plattner to Hamann,
turns into an anthropologist in nuce: “[L]a connaissance de la nature humaine
ne peut proceder que dune experimentation. Lexprimentateur suppute et in-
duit la o	 le moraliste dcrit et dduit. Le premier dfait lvidence  laquelle le
second adhre navement,  savoir lexistence dun homme naturel perceptible
par del les dnaturations auxquelles le soumet la civilisation”.
33 TG, AA 02: 342.
34 V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25: 1438: “Der Phisische Egoist ist der der sich immer an die
Stelle eines Objects Hat”; cf. V-Parow, AA 25: 251–252.
35 Anth, § 4, AA 07: 134; cf. op. cit. § 7, AA 07: 141–142.
36 We quote this expression which F. Martnez Marzoa (1995) uses in his consider-
ation of the Paralogisms of the pure reason and, more concretely, of the Kantian
analysis of the structure “I think”.
37 KrV, § 16, footnote, B 134.
38 Anth, § 7, AA 07: 141. See The commentary of M. Foucault (2008: 23–24 and
35) about the attention that the H manuscript of the Anthropology from a prag-
matic point of view pays to the self- knowledge.
39 KrV, A 117, footnote.
40 M. Capozzi (2007) argues an interpretation of the § 1 of Anth which heads from
this assumption; cf. M. Baum (2002: 109). See Anth, § 1, AA 07: 128: “However,
the memory of the teachers childhood does not reach back to that time; for it
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ical consciousness is always necessarily “changing” [wandelbar], it cannot
provide itself a “fixing and abiding self” [stehendes oder bleibendes
Selbst]41. Therefore, when the subject is conscious of the succession of
the apprehensions which integrate the series of inner experiences, that
consciousness will be the sign that he always represents “himself as one
and the same subject in the different states”42, to the extent that he rarely
notices it. There are two manners of misinterpreting the function of tran-
scendental consciousness in Kant. One of them declares that the empiri-
cal consciousness causes a doubt about our own phaenomenical existence.
In fact, this is a malicious twist of Kantian terms, because nothing in his
description of the manner we represent us to ourselves could equal the
following statement: “it only seems to me (mihi videri) that I have certain
ideas and sensations, indeed it only seems that I exist at all”43. Instead of
spreading a doubt which the factual feature of our finitude could easily
vanish, it would be better to refuse every intuitive approach, that is, with-
out mediation of time—“which is not a concept of understanding”44—to
the content of the “I think”. For example, when we execute a basic calcu-
lation45 the logical consciousness leads the entire process, and, even if we
can allude to that highest point of our judgments with expressions as little
subjective as “I or he or it (the thing) which thinks”46, we do not gain ac-
was not the time of experiences, but merely of scattered perceptions not yet unit-
ed under the concept of an object”; cf. the interesting commentary of this § by
Cohen-Halimi (2008).
41 KrV, A 107.
42 Anth, § 4, AA 07: 134.
43 Anth, § 7, AA 07: 142.
44 Anth, Ibid See F. Desideri (2005: 531): “[P]erch vi sia coscienza della propria
esistenza come determinata temporalmente, il tempo va pensato nella sua arti-
colazione con lo spazio. Solo alla luce di questa articolazione strutturale, di ques-
to coappartenersi di tempo e spazio, diviene infatti possibile affermare “Io esis-
to” con il valore di una proposizione empirica ovvero di un giudizio di esperien-
za”.
45 KrV, A 103.
46 KrV, B 404. We consider suggestive the next hermeneutical proposal of Longue-
nesse (2006: 304): “”I” in Kants “I think” is not a selfreferring expression in the
modern sense of theories of reference. Rather, it is a term, or a thought, playing
a role in our activity of binding representations in a way that makes them both,
and inseparably, related to objects “in the weighty sense” ascribed to the agent
that is accountable for the act of binding, whoever or whatever that agent might
be. Considered in this way, if we want to find a modern descendent to Kants
“formal” or “logical” I, perhaps it could be found more in the direction—horri-
bile dictu?—of Freuds ego as opposed to id (both of which, rather than refer-
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cess to that consciousness in the same manner we face any other object. If
we insist to move us forward onto the logical consciousness in such a man-
ner, having renounced to recognize its real identity, that is, the identity of
a transcendental function, we could only—Kant tinges—“revolve in a
perpetual circle” [in einem bestndigen Cirkel herumdrehen]47. The
other misleading understanding of the transcendental consciousness
finds in the pure apperception a kind of “universal mind”, not provided
with personality48, which does not concern us as empirical subjects. But,
although we deal with a logical function and not with the empirical qual-
ity of a person, it should not be neglected that each subject knows that
he—and not a foreign understanding, even a higher understanding—af-
fects himself when he observes himself 49. This fact entails a great risk, be-
cause, even if everyone is able to think for himself, he may do it in an ob-
scure manner, in such a way that he can accomplish an outstanding dis-
covery without being conscious of the principle which has guided his
thought. Moreover, it is noteworthy that those who never think for them-
selves “have the sharpness to discover everything”50, so that they believe
they already know beforehand all the things which other people could
convey to them. This last kind of man, not the first one, would ruin
every inquiry, as well as the exercise of philosophy itself.
ring to a particular entity, define a specific logic of the mind)—than in the direc-
tion of contemporary theories of self-reference”.
47 Ibid
48 As W. H. Walsh (1966: 190) and Ph. W. Rosenmann (1999: 185–230) suggest.
49 J.-L. Marion (1997: 349) has replied to this kind of lecture of the transcendental
apperception in Kant; see the analysis of H. Heimsoeth (1971), which is more
concentrated on the practical use of reason, about the averroist echo which is
allegedly sent out from the Kantian “I think”; cf. also P. Merlan (1969) and S.
C. Tornay (1943). See T. de Aquino, In 1 ad Corinthios, 15, 19, lect. 2, n8 924:
“Anima autem cum sit pars corporis hominis, non est totus homo, et anima
mea non est ego”.
50 This is the reproach that Kant directs against the academic reception of the dis-
tinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, see Prol, § 3, AA 04: 270. Re-
garding the legitimate phenomenon of employing a method in science without
actually being conscious of it see KrV, A 834/B 862: “Niemand versucht es,
eine Wissenschaft zu Stande zu bringen, ohne daß ihm eine Idee zum Grunde
liege. Allein in der Ausarbeitung derselben entspricht das Schema, ja sogar
die Definition, die er gleich zu Anfange von seiner Wissenschaft giebt, sehr sel-
ten seiner Idee; denn diese liegt wie ein Keim in der Vernunft, in welchem alle
Theile noch sehr eingewickelt und kaum der mikroskopischen Beobachtung
kennbar verborgen liegen”.
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Far away from the Kantian warning for preserving the mental health,
“illuminists” as Madame de Bourignon, Pascal or Haller51 share the ten-
dency to “eavesdrop [belauschen] on oneself” through thoughts which
were catched in a, so to speak, virgin state, since they expect that these
thoughts appear “unbidden”52, that is, before they become acts of con-
sciousness. Therefore, “the principles of thought do not lead the way
(as they should), but rather follow behind”53. This would not be possible
were not the imagination, instead of the understanding, the faculty that
leads the observation to a pathology associated with “melancholia”
[Grillenkrankheit], which grants more soundness to fantasy than to real-
ity54. However, an intense discipline is required to shape this realm of
shadows. Actually, everyone is able to notice how the understanding de-
termines the inner sense while producing the effect called attention:
Ich sehe nicht, wie man so viel Schwierigkeit darin finden kçnne, daß der
innere Sinn von uns selbst afficirt werde. Jeder Actus der Aufmerksamkeit
kann uns ein Beispiel davon geben. Der Verstand bestimmt darin jederzeit
den inneren Sinn der Verbindung, die er denkt, gem
ß zur inneren An-
schauung, die dem Mannigfaltigen in der Synthesis des Verstandes corre-
spondirt. Wie sehr das Gemth gemeiniglich hiedurch afficirt werde, wird
ein jeder in sich wahrnehmen kçnnen55.
The disturbance derived from the prolongation of this state is to be ascri-
bed, to a large extent, to a subreption, stemmed from the will, consisting
in conferring a position in space to the soul, so that the soul comes into
contradiction with its main function, which Thomas of Aquinas calls tran-
scendentia and Aristotle formulates as the capacity to be, in some man-
51 N. Pirillo (2003: 393–394) has collected some annotations from the Lectures on
Anthropology where Kant praises Montaignes self-observation, which takes
place im singulari and only regards the empirical I. Kant seems to discover in
this method a powerful medicine against the inner illumination which all the au-
thors of diaries allege.
52 Anth, § 4, AA 07: 133.
53 Anth, § 4, AA 07: 134.
54 See the description of the awaked dreamer [wachender Trumer] in TG, AA 02:
343–344. Cf. op. cit. , AA 02 317: “Das Schattenreich ist das Paradies der Phan-
tasten. Hier finden sie ein unbegr
nztes Land, wo sie sich nach Belieben an-
bauen kçnnen. Hypochondrische Dnste, Ammenm
rchen und Klosterwunder
lassen es ihnen an Bauzeug nicht ermangeln”.
55 KrV, § 24, B 156–157. In the Fortschritte (AA 20: 270) Kant stresses the fact that
every act of attention affects the inner sense and that, if it goes on for a large
time, it could become bothering [beschwerlich]. “Attentio prolongata faticat”,
we read in a reflexion of the 60 (AA 15: 59).
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ner, all the things56. The pre-critical text Dreams of a Spirit-Seer estab-
lishes that an endeavouring meditation, an anxious or happy state are oc-
casions which make possible to downplay the demand of an accurate
place for the “organ of the soul”, because sometimes one thinks it lays
on the brain, and some other times on the heart or on the diaphragm.
This fluctuation shows that mind, by suffering the semblance that
thoughts factually lie in one of those organs, shakes a different organ
each time. Kant holds responsible for such subreption the physiological
theory of the ideae materiales, which was of wide use among the support-
ers of the Cartesian metaphysics:
Die Ursache, die da macht, daß man die nachdenkende Seele vornehmlich
im Gehirne zu empfinden glaubt, ist vielleicht diese. Alles Nachsinnen er-
fordert die Vermittelung der Zeichen fr die zu erweckende Ideen, um in
deren Begleitung und Untersttzung diesen den erforderlichen Grad Klar-
heit zu geben. Die Zeichen unserer Vorstellungen aber sind vornehmlich
solche, die entweder durchs Gehçr oder das Gesicht empfangen sind, wel-
che beide Sinne durch die Eindrcke im Gehirne bewegt werden, indem
ihre Organen auch diesem Theile am n
chsten liegen. Wenn nun die Er-
weckung dieser Zeichen, welche Cartesius ideas materiales nennt, eigentlich
eine Reizung der Nerven zu einer 
hnlichen Bewegung mit derjenigen ist,
welche die Empfindung ehedem hervorbrachte, so wird das Gewebe des
Gehirns im Nachdenken vornehmlich gençthigt werden mit vormaligen
Eindrcken harmonisch zu beben und dadurch ermdet werden57.
Kant does not support this explanation, but he acknowledges that at least
it does not mixture the reasons of the physiologist with those of the met-
56 TG, AA 02: 325 and V-MP-K2/Heinze, AA 28: 756–757. Euler rejected all the
essays to place human soul in the space in Letters to a German Princess, XII,
Charpentier, 1843, pp. 235–236: “mon me nexiste pas dans un certain lieu,
mais elle agit dans un certain lieu”.
57 TG, AA 02: 324; cf. op. cit. : 345. For the Kantian attribution of the ideae mate-
riales to Descartes we refer to the erudite footnote that G. Chamayou (2007:
250–251) prepared for his edition of the French translation of the Epilogue to
the “On the souls organ”. The footnote collects interesting remarks about
this elusive Kantian term from scholars as J. Ferrari and R. Brandt. The last
one points out that the ideae materiales appear, as far as we could check, in dif-
ferent passages (§§ 23, 33, 35 and 42) of the Latin but not of the french edition of
the Passiones animae. Descartes refers in the Treatise of Man to “the ideas that
take form on the surface” of the pineal gland (AT XI, 184). Max Dessoir (1924:
226) says that during the XVIII Century the formation of figures which are
claimed to be the effect of mouvements produced in the brain was an extended
method used among doctors and metaphysicians in order to find the place which
thought occupies.
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aphysicist. The alleged organic traces, which ideas leave behind, repeat, as
a kind of pathological reverse of our receptivity, the manner in which the
wordly things affect us, so that, whereas in the case of ideas, the guidelines
of the thought movement “meet in the brain,”58 producing futile ghosts—
velut aegri somnia, vanae finguntur species—, in the case of things, the
same guidelines meet outside the brain, conveying us the existence of
an external world.
Nonetheless, if one hopes to inquire what thinking actually means, it
is necessary to dispense with the Cartesian support of the organic traces
which the thought is supposed to leave on the brain. Inner experience
confirms that the only non pathological approach to the soul [Seele]
stems from its activity and force—virtus—, that is, from the use of the
cognitive faculties, whose effects we perceive in the mind [Gemth]:
[T]he soul is an object of the inner sense and, therefore, it does not occupy
any place. But, if I ascribe a place to it, I make of it an object of external
sense and I turn it into matter. For this reason, its presence in the body can-
not be determined localiter, but virtualiter, deriving from the influence that
it has over the body59.
As we read in Kants Epilogue to the text About the Organ of Soul of the
anatomist Sçmmerring, “although most people believe to feel the thought
in the brain, however it is only a mistake of subreption”60, because they
confuse the judgment about the cause which could have produced this sen-
sation with the sensation of the real locality of the cause. The presence vir-
tualiter of the soul requires accomplishing a hermeneutics of its effects,
58 TG, AA 02: 345.
59 V-MP/Mron, AA 29: 909 and V-MS/Vigil, AA 29: 1028–1030. It is advisable to
read the introductory study of G. Chamayou (2007: 16–19) to the french edition
of Kants writings about the link between body and soul, because it offers a prof-
itable outcome about the Kantian critique of those projects which intend to lo-
cate the human soul. Cf. V-MP/Dohna, AA 28: 680: “anima, kçnnte man Seele,
das Subjekt der Empfindung, animus, Gemth das Subjekt der Gedanken, und
spiritus Geist—als Subject der Spontaneitaet—nennen”. Cf. Lucretius, De
rerum naturae, III, vv. 136–161, where is called anima the vital principle scat-
tered through the body and animus the faculty to think and desire, placed into
the breast.
60 Aus Sçmmerring: 
ber das Organ der Seele, AA 12: 32–35. Regarding the reach
that this short writing has on the Kantian position about the opening of the mind
to the world, we refer to the paper of J. Gonzlez Fisac, “El mundo como mbito
intencional: vida y virtualidad. La (di)solucin hermenutico-metafsica del
problema de la comunidad alma-cuerpo en Kant”, Proceedings of the VIII Phil-
osophical Anthropology International Congress, Madrid, UNED (in print).
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which will dissolve any claim to the assignment of a place in space to it.
This last remark is important to a large extent for the Kantian analyse of
unconscious thought61. Once abandoned the criterion of the anatomist,
we will search the soul assessing the interest62 of our forces or faculties,
so that mind [Gemth] , that is, “the faculty that combines the given rep-
resentations and produces the empirical consciousness”63, will supersede
the place of soul [Seele] . This remark is of great importance for the “lo-
calization” of the obscure representations in the mind, because they also
need the virtual presence of the transcendental consciousness or apper-
ception, in absence of which the representations neither would be object
of thought, nor would become something for us. In the virtualiter pres-
ence of the soul is to be found the Kantian formulation of the classical
Aristotelian sentence, which claims that “the soul is, in a certain manner,
all things”, so that “where the body is, there is also the soul”64. According
to this statement, every meditation which has been made according to the
Cartesian proposal to speculate “back and forth over the traces of impres-
sions remaining in the brain”65 is destined to turn into a theoretical help-
lessness, since this procedure reduces us to mere spectators of the opera-
tions that nature executes on us. But as essential as the act that makes us
an intelligence is the existence of some material to determine:
The proposition I think or I exist thinking is not a mere logical function
[…] and cannot take place without the inner sense66.
61 Starobinski has analysed the link between body and soul, indissoluble while we
are alive (1981: 273) and his conclusions are to a large extent valid for Kants
reflection on the unconscious: “Cessant davoir pour source exclusive la vie
du corps, linconscient chappe  la comptence exclusive dune approche md-
icale et relve dune hermneutique”.
62 KpV, AA 05: 119, where the principle which contains the condition which enhan-
ces the exercise of a faculty is called “interest”.
63 Aus Sçmmerring…, AA 12: 32, footnote; cf. the valuable comment of Krger
(1967: 43 ff.) about the distinction of Seele and Gemth and its meaning for
the Kantian question concerning the human nature.
64 V-MP-K2/Heinze, AA XXVIII: 757.
65 Anth, Pref., AA 07: 119. The letter adressed to Marcus Herz to the end of 1773
expresses Kants distrust towards a physiological approach, as the one of Platt-
ner, to the origin of our thoughts, see Br, AA 10: 145–146.
66 KrV, B 429 s. In a letter to Tiefrunk of 5th April 1798 (Br, AA 12: 241), Kant ad-
mits to be puzzled by the Fichtean idea of the subject, since a mere form of
thought without any matter [Stoff] to determine would produce astonishment
in the reader, who has not “anything in front of him to apply it to”; see observa-
tions about the letter and its bearing for understanding the Logic of Kant in Ca-
pozzi (2002: 141). Cf. Opus postumum (AA 21: 76).
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Far from its application, the highest act of the faculty of understanding is
an “undetermined empirical intuition”, an “undetermined perception”
and “something real”67, which still does not produce any experience.
We will say, then, as a provisional conclusion that the healthiest state
for a cognitive faculty depends on its use, so that we will lack psycholog-
ical consciousness if we do not refer it to the logical consciousness68. This
is equivalent to claim that the most harmful thing to the mind is getting
obsessed by self-observation. It should not be a surprise that the first
progress a doctor has to make with a hypochondriac patient is to succeed
in leading him to forget himself 69. Turning to oneself and becoming the
object of the own thoughts must be practised from time to time [Zwi-
schenrume], but it must be carefully prevented that this endeavour be-
comes a habitual propensity, because it would exhaust the faculty of
thought70. The vital force gets stronger with the observation of external
objects, whereas it weakens itself when the subject dives into the fearful
images that he produces in his own mind. For this reason, it is better not
to think about anything, to empty oneself of thoughts, instead of fixing
the attention on oneself following that physical egoism discussed appro-
priately in the “Lectures on Anthropology”. The tree of life may be
green and golden, but we have no other option left than to observe it
through the unbiased and grey lens of theory71. And, since we speak
about our life, theory first of all must withdraw the privileged approach
which we allege to have over it, in order to clear what makes our life a
common life, which takes place in the community with others. To fill
this theoretical locus vacans a pragmatic episteme rises, which offers to
the blind alley of speculation about oneself an exit called game, that is,
a pluralist stage, which we will return to in the third epigraph. Proceeding
in this way, Kant indeed follows a remark which Descartes conveyed to
Princess Elisabeth in a famous letter of 1643, where the French philoso-
67 KrV, B 423, footnote. Cf. Ameriks (2002: 81) and Mathieu (1994: 80).
68 V-MP-L1/Pçlitz, AA 28: 227 and KrV, A 108 and A 118.
69 V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 862: “Je mehr wir aber außer uns sind, und uns mit
andern Gegenst
nden besch
ftigen, desto mehr schonen wir unsre Seelenkraft”;
cf. V-Parow, AA 25: 251–252.
70 V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 862–863.
71 Goethe, Faust, part I, vv. 2038–2039. The following passage of Log, AA 09: 33,
displays in an excellent manner the priority of the trascendental apperception to
every empirical act of representation. Actually this order is condition of possibil-
ity of our experience: “Eigentlich ist das Bewußtsein eine Vorstellung, daß eine
andre Vorstellung in mir ist”; cf. T. de Aquino, STh, I, qu. 14, a. 1, sol.
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pher referred to common social intercourses as the best means to compre-
hend the union between body and soul72. Before that, we will look into
Kants disapproval towards the psychological discovery of obscure repre-
sentations which the German followers of Leibnizian metaphysics had
made.
III. The Only Possible Argument for the Deduction of Unconsciousness:
The Transcendental Consciousness as Thread to Discover
the Obscure Operations of the Mind
The majority of the research dedicated to inquire about the emergence of
the unconscious in occidental philosophy usually considers the Leibnizian
theory of the petites perceptions73 as the first appearance of this matter74.
Leibniz leads the consciousness to submerge in a dream which will yield a
positive result, if only the consciousness renounces to interpose its spon-
taneity in the reception of the qualitative variety of the world. This exhor-
tation fits to the comparison of the mind with a marble stone with subtle
veins, not totally compact, on which different events have left their trace.
The cause of our subtle and ephemeral contact with those particles of the
universe is our incapacity to comprehend with distinctness the infinity, as
72 Letters to Princess Elisabeth, 28th june 1643, AT, III, pp. 691–695: “Les choses
qui appartiennent  lunion de lme et du corps ne se connaissent quobscur-
ment par lentendement seul, ni mÞme par lentendement aid de limagination;
mais elles se connaissent trs clairement par les sens. […] Cest en usant seule-
ment de la vie et des conversations ordinaires, et en sabstenant de mditer et
dtudier aux choses qui exercent limagination, quon apprend  concevoir lu-
nion de lme et du corps”.
73 New Essays on Human Understanding, Preface, in Philos. Schr., ed. C. J., Ger-
hardt, vol. V, Berlin, 1882 (reprint. : Hildesheim/New York, G. Olms, 1965),
pp. 46–48. See also Deleuze (1991: 31 and 37): “Linclusion, linhrence, est la
cause finale du pli, si bien quon passe insensiblement de celui-ci  celle-l.
[…] lme est lexpression du monde (actualit), mais parce que le monde est
lexprim de lme (virtualit)”. Cf. Deutl., AA 02: 277: “Leibniz dachte sich
eine einfache Substanz, die nichts als dunkle Vorstellungen h
tte, und nannte
sie eine schlummernde Monade”. In Nova Dilucidatio, AA 01: 408, is considered
out of doubt the existence of an “infinita, quae semper animae interne praesto
est, quanquam obscura admodum totius universi perceptio”.
74 I agree with La Rocca (2007: 63–64) in pointing out the disregard that has suf-
fered the Kantian reflection about this subject. Several of his writings, but spe-
cially L	intelletto oscuro. Coscienza e autocoscienza in Kant (2007), have been
crucial for laying out my own text.
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God75 is able to do. So we gain a clear idea only after gathering enough
quantity of them. The Leibnizian monad lies on the antipodes of the
Lockian conception of the mind76, which refuses diametrically the exis-
tence of a latent activity in it, composed by microscopical perceptions,
since there cannot be any shadowy side within the consciousness.
The thought of the Baroque revitalized the gigantomachia of being
and not being thanks to a classification of human representations. In a
text dated in 1684 Leibniz propounds a division of the representations
in four levels—obscure and clear; confusing and distinct; adequate or in-
adequate and symbolic or intuitive—, so that human understanding will
only reach the cognitive summit of intuition in the case of primitive no-
tions, extremely simple. According to the precedent scheme an obscure
notion is, unlike what it happens with clear knowledge, insufficient to
know the represented thing—quae non sufficit ad rem repraesentatam ag-
noscendam—, opposed to the feature of clear knowledge:
An obscure notion is one that is not sufficient for recognizing the thing that
it represents. Example: I once saw a certain flower but whenever I remem-
ber it I cannot bring it to mind well enough to recognize it, distinguishing it
from other nearby flowers, when I see it again. Another kind of example: I
have obscure notions when I think about some term for which there is no
settled definition—such as Aristotles entelechy, or his notion of cause
when offered as something that is common to material, formal, efficient
and final causes. And a proposition is obscure if it contains an obscure no-
tion as an ingredient. Accordingly, knowledge is clear if it gives me the
means for recognizing the thing that is represented. Clear knowledge is ei-
ther confused or distinct. It is confused when I cannot list, one by one, the
marks that enable me to differentiate the represented thing from other
things, even though the thing has such marks into which its notion can be
resolved. And so we recognize colours, smells, tastes, and other particular
objects of the senses clearly enough to be able to distinguish them from
one another, but only through the simple testimony of the senses, not by
way of marks that we could list77.
75 “Dieu seul a lavantage de navoir que des connoissances intuitives” (New Es-
says…, l. IV, chap. 17, ed. de Gerhardt, vol. V, p. 472); cf. H. Adler (1988: 201).
76 In New Essays Leibniz, with the voice of Teophilus, charges Locke-Philathetes
that he has identified, first, the confusion with the obscurity of representations
and, second, the idea of something with its image, which can have faults originat-
ing in the senses and the imagination (book II, cap. XXIX). For Leibniz, our
body is not on a par with our mind. For Locke, the body does not suppose
any obstacle for the operations of understanding.
77 Leibniz (1765: 422–423).
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Chr. Wolff informed Leibniz that the lecture of this text, which is from the
Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis, threw him “an unexpected
light about the differences between notions”78. In the German Logic,
loyal to the Leibnizian approach, a notio obscura79 is a notion whose
marks are insufficient to make it known. Wolff mentions different reasons
which make clear why some concepts become obscure, that is, a) the
vagueness of certain objects, due to the distance which we contemplate
them from; b) the difficulty to get to the proprieties of abstract concepts
such as cause, end or essence, which would also explain the obscurity of
philosophical vocabulary throughout the centuries and c) the distraction
with which we perceive an object, which “just as when we pass through a
garden and do not pay attention to the noun of an ignored plant that the
gardener convey us, because our thoughts are more directed to the lady
we intend to visit than the plant”80. The examples mentioned above con-
cern both the objective insufficiency of representations, which can be
caused by the limitation of human cognitive faculties and the consequen-
ces of a deficit of attention. Either the thing itself does not let to be per-
ceived with clarity, or we provoke that it is not perceived at all. On the
contrary, if we had to spell out to a handicapped person what the red col-
our, the whistle of wind, the sound of the sea or the bang of waves81 are,
we would meet other kind of thoughts. This time the thoughts would be
necessarily confuse in logical terms, because we only could clarify them
by leading that person to a place where he could observe the object of
these clear but confuse representations82. Thereby, if his physical faculties
allow it, we would offer him a direct experience of those things which we
cannot put analytically in front of him. The Leibnizian nomenclature de-
pends strongly upon the sense of sight, which actually guides the classifi-
cation, so that we “judge, from the constitution of our thoughts, about the
78 Letter of Wolff to Leibniz, 21th february 1705, in Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz
und Chr. Wolff: 18. In German metaphysics we read, according strictely to the
Leibnizian classification, that “the difference of notions is the same that the
one of perceptions: they are indeed clear and obscure notions, and the clear
ones, distinct or confused” (§ 50) and theGerman Logic (chap. I, § 9) reproduces
the Leibnizian division.
79 Wolff, DL, chap. I, § 13.
80 Op. cit. , § 23.
81 Ibid
82 op. cit. , § 14.
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distinctness of vision”83. For this reason, we use to say that when our
thoughts are clear the light comes into our mind84. From a cognitive
point of view this means, regarding clear representations, an increase of
the manifold of marks which are under the control of subject85.
If for Leibniz the subject was no conscious of the perceptions which in
an imperceptible manner left their trace on the marble surface of the
mind as if they were veins, Wolff, as Baumgarten afterwards, declares
that we actually have some consciousness of obscure representations in
the mind. It is not the representation which is removed from the con-
sciousness, but the object which the representation refers to. We only
identify totally obscure perceptions86 by inference from other perceptions
that we observe with some clarity, but it must be admitted that, as we sup-
pose an unconscious thought in them87, it seems that we deal with a lack
of thought. But obscure concepts “do not leave us without thoughts”88, in
spite of the mistakes they provoke, due to the fact that such representa-
tions entail a wide margin of error for our judgments. The obscurity of the
mind entails, then, according to Wolff, a kind of inner mist, which belongs
to the remains of our sensory contact with the world that the conscious-
ness did not absorbed89, what is very fruitful for the field of aesthetical
knowledge. So Wolff goes beyond Leibniz by considering a sort of unde-
83 DM, § 200. In § 33 of Anfangsgrnde aller schçnen Wissenschaften, Halle, Hem-
merde, 1754 (Hildesheim/New York, G. Olms, 1976 reprint) of Meier, whose
work serves as textual basis of Kants Lectures on Logic, we read that a repre-
sentation is “clear […] when we are conscious of it, or we know its difference
with regard to others”. Obscurity, on the contrary, is defined by the impossibility
to reach that state of clearness, absolutely (cognitio absolute obscura) o relative-
ly (cognitio relative obscura) (§ 125); however, “none true knowledge is abso-
lutely obscure”, so that there is nothing which should be considered absolutely
obscure in cognitive terms. Every obscure knowledge is obscure only relatively,
that is, “the forces of this or that one thinking being are not enough to clarify it”
(Ibid). An absolutely obscure knowledge would be a “chimere” (op. cit. , § 156),
which, although it should not be identified with a complete ignorance (op. cit. ,
§ 157), would hidden so much its content to the extent to hamper its clearing
with examples.
84 Wolff, DM. , §§ 203–204.
85 Op. cit. , §§ 207–209.
86 Op. cit. , §§ 193 and 213.
87 Op. cit. , § 731; cf. PE, § 200 and Meier, Vernunftlehre, § 156. La Rocca (2007: 75,
n. 41).
88 Wolff, DL, § 10.
89 See La Rocca (2007: 74–76).
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termined objectivity90, defective but positive in its indetermination, as ref-
erence of the obscure representations. Baumgarten will link these repre-
sentations with the fundus animae91 and the aesthetical impetus.
This classification of representations moves from a hypothesis aban-
doned definitively by Kant, that is, the psychological genesis of conscious-
ness from an original act of distinguishing [Unterscheidung] , which ena-
bles us to split the external things from our inner self. If this act was ab-
sent we would not be able to recognize ourselves as subject of our
thoughts either. In the Leibnizian-Wolffian school to observe [bemerken]
a mark [Merkmal] that distinguishes something from something else is a
general act, in contrast with the consciousness of our selves; even more,
that psychological operation generates the latter, which amounts to mak-
ing empirical psychology the key piece to build a rational or logical psy-
chology. It is worth mentioning that the latter will consider all judgments
of an analytical kind. To observe [bemerken] grants to the consciousness
the possibility to notice the difference between what is external and itself,
that is, the possibility to direct its attention to its own acts92. It should not
surprise Kants temporary admission of empirical psychology in the
household of metaphysics, according to the scholar use, as a foreigner
who receives a provisional asylum, “until it is in a position to set up an
establishment of its own in a complete Anthropology, the pendant to
the empirical doctrine of nature”93. It is a piece too important to be expel-
led outright from metaphysics, but it should radically modify its approach
to the question about the origin of human knowledge, if it intends to de-
serve something more than a provisional settlement. In fact, the first de-
cision Kant makes in order to abandon the analysis of the obscure carried
out by Wolff, Baumgarten and Meier is to abolish the link between mark
90 Baumgarten, Met. , §§ 511 and 522; cf. the Kantian use of the term vagum in the
context of the claim of a systematic unity of reason in KrV, A 680/B 708. Cf. La
Rocca (2006: 41, n. 64; 44–48; 52–53); Agamben (2005: 8–11 and 18–19).
91 About the relationship between the Grund der Seele [fundus animae] (Aesth,
§ 80) with the “notre propre fonds” of Leibniz (Phil. Schr. , vol. V, 46, 373)
and the German mystic tradition from Eckhart, see La Rocca (2006: 44, n. 79).
92 Cf. La Rocca (2007: 71–72): “[L]atto del differenziare  appunto pi	 originario
della autocoscienza in quanto tale, perch questultima sorge da una divisione
originaria tra ci che  nel soggetto e ci che si trova fuori di esso, il cui carattere
di essere “esterno”  istituito dalla sua differenza. La sfera della coscienza, per
quanto comprenda una implicita componente riflessiva (distinguere s da altro),
 costituita tuttavia dallatto di Bemerken, del notare distinguendo”; cf. Wolff,
DM, §§ 45 and 201 and PR, § 21.
93 KrV, A 848/B 876-A849/B 877.
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and consciousness94. Rationalist philosophers remained within the boun-
daries of empirical psychology, which deals with the chaotic and rough
matter deposited in the fundus animae. Afterwards, the soul elaborates
this matter until achieving the level of clarity and distinctness95. Meier,
whose Vernunftlehre Kant uses as basic manual in his Lectures on
Logic, can be used to consolidate the fixed correspondence between dis-
tinction and consciousness, which makes the first the source of the second
and ascribes obscurity to those representations lacking this origin96. Since
“from nothing, nothing comes out” [aus Nichts wird Nichts]97, the obscure
representations will be the origin of the rest.
The Kantian separation, mentioned above, entails two important con-
sequences. First of all, the way rationalism inquired about the origin of
the representative force suffers from a fundamental flaw, for this kind
of inquiry leaves aside the question of the logical right a representation
has, restraining itself to describe the psychological content of that force.
The discovery of unconscious marks reveals that the distinction cannot
be either the unique or the first cause of objectivity of representations,
the “stage” for which has not been ascribed yet to a concrete instance,
which could only be transcendental. To display the structure of objectivity
is, indeed, the function that transcendental apperception accomplishes,
which, far from being a live-experience of our psyche, is the best antidote
against every spirit-seer, since it distinguishes the subjective validity of
representations from the objective and universal. Thus, the empirical psy-
chology leaves the little and less oxygenated place [Pltzchen] it occupies
in the ancient shelves of scholar metaphysics, which are already at the risk
of collapsing, to move to the stage [Schauplatz] of the world98. This depar-
ture will entail a really transfiguration for a discipline which aspires to be
a science, whose corollary shall be the discovering of a pragmatic use of
94 R 2275, AA 16: 296: “Beym Bewustseyn sind Merkmale. aber wo Merkmale [se]
vorgestellt werden, da ist nicht immer Bewustseyn”.
95 Meier, Auszug, § 161.
96 Meier,Auszug, § 115 and Vernunftlehre, §§ 146, 155 and 158. Cf. La Rocca (2007:
77).
97 Meier, Vernunftlehre, § 159.
98 PG, Einl. § 2, AA 09: 158: “Die Welt ist das Substrat und der Schauplatz, auf
dem das Spiel unserer Geschicklichkeit vor sich geht. Sie ist der Boden, auf
dem unsere Erkenntnisse erworben und angewendet werden. Damit aber das
in Ausbung kçnne gebracht werden, wovon der Verstand sagt, daß es gesche-
hen soll: so muß man die Beschaffenheit des Subjectes kennen, ohne welches
das erstere unmçglich wird”; see also the use of the term “Weltbhne” in
IAG, AA 08: 17, 32.
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reason. At first, it will be necessary to distinguish between the issue about
consciousness and its unity, on the one hand, and the issue regarding sour-
ces of representation, on the other, to stop ascribing to sensibility the mis-
takes stemmed from the obscurity and confusion of representative
marks99. Understanding, as occurs with imagination, thinks also in the ob-
scurity, although in these circumstances we just obtain consciousness of
their effects. So the unconsciousness is no longer a mere default or priva-
tion, usual in the data given by the senses, nor the lowest level of the life
of the mind. Only overcoming the opposition between obscurity and clari-
ty, corresponding to sensibility and understanding, the field of uncon-
sciousness will be opened in Kants thought. It is not enough to distin-
guish the structure of an analytical judgment from that of a synthetic
one to go forward. Thus, the opportunity100—the use of rules in concre-
to—ought to appear in order to recognize the traces that obscure judg-
ments of the mind have left in us. This recognition cannot employ the
same means provided by the material ideas of the Cartesianism, but
should rather adopt a pragmatic modulation, which will bound the huge
field of the obscure in the mind without appealing to a concealed meta-
physical order. Actually, the notion of game has finally made the charm
of the petites perceptions101 disappear. If the pure logic tiptoed around
the “applied logic”102, now the information that the senses, the games
of imagination, the laws of memory and the power of habits convey
about our concepts and judgments is especially interesting. It should
not be forgotten that general logic had not qualms to draw the heuristic
principles which guide the thought from the common understanding, be-
99 V-MP-L1/Pçlitz, AA 28: 229–230 and V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 31–32; cf. Anth,
§§ 6–7 and Log, Einl. , § V, AA 09: 34–35.
100 This term, which entails an objective indetermination and, consequently, a claim
of reflection, is really important to elaborate a theory of prudence, at least from
the work of B. Gracin. S. Vaquero (2009) is a valuable work regarding the sub-
ject, since S. Vaquero connects the project of a “Reason of State neither political
nor economical, but of yourself”, announced in The Hero of Gracin with the
foucaultian notion of “gouvernementalit”, understood as “rencontre entre les
techniques de domination excerces sur les autres et les techniques de soi”
(1994: 785). Cf. Janklvitch (1980: 124 and 126) and the erudite contribution
of N. Elias to this subject (1997: 90 s).
101 Satura (1971: 55–64) offers a list, which pretends to be more exhaustive than
systematic, of the Kantian examples of obscure representations; cf. Manganaro
(1983: 105–109) and Tortolone (1994: 258–263). Kant displays the three first
classes of Saturas division in the R 177, AA 15: 65.
102 KrV, A 52/B 77; cf. Logik Hechsel (Kant, Logik-Vorlesung: 546).
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cause a large stock of abstract laws awaited there to be disclosed103. As a
matter of fact, without the hunter who senses the trace of the prey the
academical logic would have never emerged, as without the land surveyor
Geometry would have never appeared.
We must not forget the second consequence mentioned above. It
seems paradoxical that the feature of understanding as a faculty would
be associated to the disclosure of the field of representations we are
not conscious of. But that is what actually occurs. The ground to tear
apart judgments the predicate of which lies retreated and concealed [ver-
steckter Weise]104 in the concept of the subject from those which express
what happens in the world is the unique thread to locate logical decisions
we made unconsciously. Without the opening to the worldly syntax pro-
vided by the structure called synthetic judgment a priori it would not
be possible to clarify anything from the analytical bottom of obscure rep-
resentations, whose reality depends on the transcendental apperception,
as occurs with any other appearance of the world. Even more, if we do
not enter into the world, the obscure representations will have serious dif-
ficulties to be conveniently identified. As soon as we feel ourselves affect-
ed by something, reflection begins to work105, albeit we are not conscious
of this activity, which is often hectic. We forget too early that any content
we are conscious of is owed to the understanding, to the extent that the
best argument against the fear to death is that “the thought I am not sim-
ply cannot exist”106. The following extract from the KrV makes the syn-
thetic unity of apperception the sole possible source for the clarity of rep-
resentations:
Der Gedanke: diese in der Anschauung gegebene Vorstellungen gehçren
mir insgesammt zu, heißt demnach so viel, als ich vereinige sie in einem
Selbstbewußtsein, oder kann sie wenigstens darin vereinigen; und ob er
103 WDO, AA 08: 133; cf. KU, § 20, AA 05: 238: the common understanding or sen-
sus communis logicus works with concepts according with “dunkel vorgestellten
Principien”, unlike the aestheticus works according to principles which are usu-
ally overlapped in the common language; Log, AA 09: 11; Anth, § 6, AA 07:
139–140 and Prol, AA 04: 369.
104 KrV, Einl. , § IV, B 10; cf. FM, AA 20: 322: “Urtheile sind n
mlich analytisch,
wenn ihr Pr
dicat nur dasjenige klar (explicite) vorstellt, was in dem Begriffe
des Subjects, obzwar dunkel (implicite), gedacht war; z.B. ein jeder Kçrper ist
ausgedehnt”.
105 V-MP-L1/Pçlitz, AA 28: 233–234.
106 Anth, § 27, AA 07: 167. Cf. R 1482, AA 15: 666: “Bewustseyn der Vorstellungen
und Bewustseyn seines Zustandes der Vorstellung; der letzte kann klar seyn
[ohn] und doch dunckele Vorstellungen enthalten”.
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gleich selbst noch nicht das Bewußtsein der Synthesis der Vorstellungen ist,
so setzt er doch die Mçglichkeit der letzteren voraus, d.i. nur dadurch, daß
ich das Mannigfaltige derselben in einem Bewußtsein begreifen kann,
nenne ich dieselbe insgesammt meine Vorstellungen; denn sonst wrde
ich ein so vielf
rbiges, verschiedenes Selbst haben, als ich Vorstellungen
habe, deren ich mir bewußt bin [my emphasis]107.
The empirical unity of apperception cannot generate any experience
alone, because it is not able to unify the different representations accord-
ing to any objectivity108. The original synthetic unity of apperception is
the transcendental-logical structure entrusted to open the realm of objec-
tivity. For this reason it grants to our judgments of perception a necessary
combination that transforms them into judgments of experience109. Kant
does not deny that the obscure representations prevail in our mind, but
what he rather denies is that we could not notice them without submitting
them at a given moment to the principles of objectivity, whose highest
point is the original synthetic unity of apperception. If obscure represen-
tations can be mine, to declare both that they are possible representations
and that they could become representations for me will be enough110. We
107 KrV, § 16, B 134; cf. op. cit. , A 117. Cf. La Rocca (2007: 99): “la coscienza della
sintesi “scopre” lidentit, non la costituisce”.
108 Kants following remark stresses this default of the empirical consciousness: R
5923, AA 18, 386: “Allein das Bewustseyn der Wahrnehmungen bezieht alle
Vorstellung nur auf uns selbst als Modificationen unseres Zustandes; sie sind als-
denn unter sich getrennt, und vornehmlich sind sie nicht Erkentnisse von irgend
einem Dinge und beziehen sich auf kein Obiect. Sie sind also noch nicht Erfah-
rung, welche zwar empirische Vorstellung, aber zugleich als Erkentnis der Ge-
genstande der Sinne enthalten muß”.
109 KrV, § 15, B 130: “[S]o ist alle Verbindung, wir mçgen uns ihrer bewußt werden
oder nicht, es mag eine Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung oder
mancherlei Begriffe, und an der ersteren der sinnlichen oder nichtsinnlichen An-
schauung sein, eine Verstandeshandlung, die wir mit der allgemeinen Benennung
Synthesis belegen wrden, um dadurch zugleich bemerklich zu machen, daß wir
uns nichts als im Object verbunden vorstellen kçnnen, ohne es vorher selbst ver-
bunden zu haben” [my italics].
110 KrV, § 16, B 131–132: “Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten
kçnnen; denn sonst wrde etwas in mir vorgestellt werden, was gar nicht gedacht
werden kçnnte, welches eben so viel heißt als: die Vorstellung wrde entweder
unmçglich, oder wenigstens fr mich nichts sein” [my italics]. Cf. La Rocca
(2007: 106): “La autoconscienza psicologica ha come sua condizione (che aiuta
a manifestare) la possibilit di una coscienza intenzionale, la quale— la scoper-
ta di Kant pi	 decisiva—non  un atto puntuale di relazione di un singolo stato ad
un singolo oggetto, ma  originariamente complessa, ossia presuppone la costitu-
Unconscious Thought in Kants Lectures on Anthropology 201
perceive this potentiality as a suspicion that obscure representations hang
around or that a latent judgment has moved us to perform some action.
This is the Kantian correction to the rationalist question about what de-
cides if a representation is something or rather nothing111, which the fol-
lowing excerpt of the KrV shows with eloquence:
Klarheit ist nicht, wie die Logiker sagen, das Bewußtsein einer Vorstellung;
denn ein gewisser Grad des Bewußtseins, der aber zur Erinnerung nicht zur-
eicht, muß selbst in manchen dunkelen Vorstellungen anzutreffen sein, weil
ohne alles Bewußtsein wir in der Verbindung dunkeler Vorstellungen kei-
nen Unterschied machen wrden, welches wir doch bei den Merkmalen
mancher Begriffe (wie der von Recht und Billigkeit und des Tonknstlers,
wenn er viele Noten im Phantasiren zugleich greift) zu thun vermçgen. Son-
dern eine Vorstellung ist klar, in der das Bewußtsein zum Bewußtsein des
Unterschiedes derselben von andern zureicht. Reicht dieses zwar zur Unter-
scheidung, aber nicht zum Bewußtsein des Unterschiedes zu, so mßte die
Vorstellung noch dunkel genannt werden. Also giebt es unendlich viele
Grade des Bewußtseins bis zum Verschwinden112.
Kant makes the transcendental apperception the necessary threshold for
any representation referred to objects, but it is not indispensable to this
threshold to be noticed with distinctness, not even with what is usually
called clarity. Often the transcendental apperception remains in a floating
state, more obscure than clear113, as the normative system of their mother
language can be obscure to numerous speakers, but they do not stop to
communicate with each other. As what happens to the rest of acts
which understanding structurally sustains, we are only rarely conscious
of the “blind function of mind” which synthesis is. The task of the under-
zione di un intero mondo conoscibile da una coscienza: presuppone la dimen-
sione che Kant chiama dell “esperienza possibile””; cf. R 5923, AA 18: 386.
111 KrV, A 103–104: “Denn dieses eine Bewußtsein ist es, was das Mannigfaltige,
nach und nach Angeschaute und dann auch Reproducirte in eine Vorstellung
vereinigt. Dieses Bewußtsein kann oft nur schwach sein, so daß wir es nur in
der Wirkung, nicht aber in dem Actus selbst, d.i. unmittelbar, mit der Erzeugung
der Vorstellung verknpfen: aber unerachtet dieser Unterschiede muß doch
immer ein Bewußtsein angetroffen werden, wenn ihm gleich die hervorste-
chende Klarheit mangelt, und ohne dasselbe sind Begriffe und mit ihnen
Erkenntniß von Gegenst
nden ganz unmçglich” [my italics].
112 KrV, B 414–415; cf. op. cit. A 731/B 759; cf. Prol, § 24, AA 04: 306. Cf. La Rocca
(2007: 109): “Questo livello minimo non  un livello minimo di autoconsapevo-
lezza, ma un livello minimo di ordine strutturale—regolarit—che possa tradursi
in possibilit (solo possibilit) di autoscoscienza completa, ossia di coscienza
degli oggetti e insieme delle regole della loro unificazione”.
113 KrV, A 104, A 106, A 116 and 123.
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standing is to bring this synthesis “to concepts” and this task turns it into a
specific faculty114. If some obscure representations can belong to the inter-
connected context of experience, it will hold them as the legitimate bot-
tom of it, kept latent in the empirical consciousness115. The obscure rep-
resentations are not effectively submitted to the original synthetic unity of
apperception. The proof of that is that we do not remember them nor
their acquisition has been registered in the treasury of consciousness.
But it would be enough to be virtually submitted to that unity. This is
the only shelter that understanding offers the obscure representations.
This explains a remark of great importance for the Anthropology of
Kant, since, although man could pretend to regard his obscure represen-
tations as an animal would do it, that is, without being conscious of them,
nevertheless, man is determined to see them—even to recognize that he is
not able to clarify them—with the aid of light which self-consciousness
delivers, what the animal is not able to do. Thus, the Leibnizian-Wolffian
approach to the unconscious thought is turned over. Not to mention the
romantic sympathy for the unconscious, for the obscure has already no
lessons to give to the transcendental apperception. Rather, it is the
unique means to notice the presence of the unconscious in the mind.
Therefore, the best explorer of obscure representations would not be
the visionary, but one who not only knows enough the conditions of pos-
sible experience, but is also a man of world [Weltmann] , that is, somebody
who knows when to interrupt the periods devoted to speculation to have
leisure with other human beings in society116. The fact that we are able to
give reason of the sequence of steps which guided our unconscious judg-
ments (in case we decide to compose its hypothetical genesis as far as we
can), proves that the operations executed in the obscurity of the mind are
not mere organic events. One more time, the power to say “I” raises us
infinitely above the animal, which certainly distinguishes, but has no con-
sciousness of the distinctions it makes117:
114 KrV, § 10, A 78/B 103; cf. op. cit, § 15, B 130.
115 Cf. La Rocca (2007: 115–116 and 2008: 61 and 66).
116 Kants Anthropology closes the gap that Humes scepticism established between
the speculation and the philosophical delire, on the one hand, and the effects of
leisure and distraction, on the other; see Treatise of Human Nature, I, IV, vii, SB
269, where that gap appears as methodic condition of the “unique science of
man” (op. cit. , 273), that is, of the science of human nature.
117 Spitzfindigkeit, AA 02: 59–60. C. Ginzburg finds in this “physical distinction”
the intuition claimed by the “indiciary paradigm”, which he proposes to apply
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Alles in der Natur, sowohl in der leblosen als auch in der belebten Welt, ge-
schieht nach Regeln, ob wir gleich diese Regeln nicht immer kennen. […]
Auch die Ausbung unsrer Kr
fte geschieht nach gewissen Regeln, die
wir befolgen, zuerst derselben unbewußt, bis wir zu ihrer Erkenntniß all-
m
hlig durch Versuche und einen l
ngern Gebrauch unsrer Kr
fte gelan-
gen, ja uns am Ende dieselben so gel
ufig machen, daß es uns viele Mhe
kostet, sie in abstracto zu denken. So ist z.B. die allgemeine Grammatik
die Form einer Sprache berhaupt. Man spricht aber auch, ohne Gramma-
tik zu kennen; und der, welcher, ohne sie zu kennen, spricht, hat wirklich
eine Grammatik und spricht nach Regeln, deren er sich aber nicht bewußt
ist118.
The general logic is a matter of surface, whose task is to rule the most visi-
ble and illuminated zone of our judgments and reasoning. Even a logic
attentive to the contents, as transcendental logic, which recognizes the ex-
istence of a “blind function of the mind” as synthesis is, does not inquire
the reflective activities retreated in the shadowy side of the mind. This
task is eminently metaphysical and, to be precise, belongs to the matter
Kant considers the heiress of the needy empirical psychology of rational-
ism, namely, the anthropology as a pragmatic knowledge.
IV. From the petites perceptions to the Concept of Game:
The Pragmatic Map of the Representations in the Mind
The appearances bearing on the obscure activity of the cognitive faculties
of the mind show also the connection between these faculties. The fact
that reason prepares the field to understanding119, by ordering the collec-
tion of its concepts in accordance with a systematic unity, remembers—
mutatis mutandis—what happens to someone who decodes the characters
to the field of historiography and which “closely connects man as an animal with
others animal especies”. Cf. Ginzburg (2000: 193); Mathieu (1994: 82).
118 Log, AA 09: 11. cf. V-Lo/Blomberg, § 125, AA 24: 119: “Die Logic schreibt uns
die Regeln vor, welche wir anwenden sollen, um zu wißen, wie wir verfahren sol-
len mit Erkenntnißen deren wir uns bewust sind, daß wir sie wircklich besitzen”
and § 131, AA 24: 123: “Die Lehre von den dunckelen Erkenntnißen ist gar
nicht logisch, sonderen nur Metaphysisch. Die logica ist nicht eine Wißenschaft
ber die Natur des Subjects, der Menschlichen Seele, um zu erkennen, was da-
rinnen eigentlich verborgen liege. sonderen sie sezet schon klare Begriffe zum
voraus, und handelet von dem Gebrauche unseres Verstandes, und unserer Ver-
nunft”; V-Lo/Philippi, ad § 10, AA 24: 340.
119 KrV, B 685.
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of a text: he suspects to have been performing unconscious calculations120.
The reader, as well as his understanding, only notices the authentic point
of departure afterwards, namely, after having finished reading either a lit-
erary text or the experience as an interconnected space of appearances.
This is a restraint, regarding the knowledge about the human nature,
that Anthropology has to take seriously into account, for when the
springs of a mental operation are active, we cannot observe them, whilst
when we observe them, they stop working or they radically modify its ac-
tivity121. Just then the crucial question emerges: Have I been conscious of
the whole cognitive operations required to do what I have been doing?
The question does not undertake an exhaustive inquiry of what kind
and how many operations and assumptions were required promptly for
the activity of spelling and after for the one of reading. The question is
settled when noticing the existence of an “unconscious cognitive”122,
what often occurs in a so ephemeral manner that merely to spell out be-
comes a really thorny task123. A different description of this phenomenon,
120 NG, AA 02, 191: “Allein welche bewunderungswrdige Gesch
ftigkeit ist nicht
in den Tiefen unsres Geistes verborgen, die wir mitten in der Ausbung nicht be-
merken, darum weil der Handlungen sehr viel sind, jede einzelne aber nur sehr
dunkel vorgestellt wird. Die Beweisthmer davon sind jedermann bekannt; man
mag unter diesen nur die Handlungen in Erw
gung ziehen, die unbemerkt in uns
vorgehen, wenn wir lesen, so muß man darber erstaunen. Man kann unter an-
dern hierber die Logik des Reimarus nachsehen, welcher hierber Betrachtung
anstellt”; cf. KrV, A 314/B 370–371, Prol, § 30, AA 04: 312 and V-Anth/Fried,
AA 25: 479; see Kitcher (1999: 381) and Volkelt (1876).
121 Anth, Vor. , AA 07: 121.
122 The relevance that Kant recognizes to these operations that the mind carries out
should be enough to consider its analysis of intellectual obscurity close to the
studies of Piaget about the cognitive unconsciousness. See “Inconscient affectif
et insconcient cognitif”, in: Id., Problmes de psychologie gentique, Paris, De-
nol, 1972, p. 11: “le sujet […] a conscience des rsultats quils obtiennent, mais
nullement des mcanismes intimes qui ont transform sa pense, les structures
de celle-ci demeurent inconscientes en tant que structures. Ce sont ces mca-
nismes en tant que structures et que fonctionnement que nous appellerons glob-
alement linconscient cognitif”. Cassirer (1956: 203–204) has appealed to an
analogous argument against the reduction of a linguistic form to a sound matter.
123 Manganaro has highlighted that Kant discovery of the existence of obscure rep-
resentations does not intend a complete illumination of the mind (1983: 105):
“[I]l processo Kantiano di Aufklrung, la quale ha tante affinit con la Erklr-
ung di Wolff, non va semplicemente dalloscuro al chiaro, bens dal chiaro allo-
scuro, ossia da ci che  dato come un chiaro “indizio” alla ricostruzione del
campo delloscuro. In questo processo, che  un processo memorativo, pi	 che
cognitivo in senso freudiano, lassoluta completezza del mondo oscuro  postu-
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where a faculty overcomes the boundaries of another one for its own
sake, is the connection between thinking and knowledge. So that, in oppo-
sition to the conditions of possibility of knowledge, the only thing de-
manded of me to think something is not to contradict myself 124. Kant as-
serts that we never stop thinking while we are alive, what does the same
as affirming that understanding is not the unique faculty which takes part
in knowledge. We cannot try to forecast in the most diligent manner the
conclusions that our judgments will finally draw. This is a requirement
[Bedrfnis] which urges on our faculty of judgment, whose performances
we are not allowed to interrupt in an arbitrary manner125. Even more, the
whole judging activity assumes that things, natural or not, will let them-
selves be classified in accordance with the conditions of a logical system.
Occasionally, due to a habit, we do not notice this appeal [Geheiß] orig-
inally rooted in the faculty of judgment126, but without it the complete ac-
tivity of this faculty would sink. On the other hand, according a particular
interpretation of the sumpnoia panta that Leibniz borrowed from the sto-
ics, none of our judgments remains isolated. In fact, each judgment de-
pends on an amazing activity enacted by the faculty of judgment. In
this perpetual exercise of anticipation the shadow of the unconscious per-
ceptions of Rationalism should not be noticed, but the influence that the
systematic order searched by reason on the works of understanding
should. Actually, reason displays like a stage the field of understanding,
as emerges from the investigation of the natural purposiveness [N.B. pur-
posiveness is the translation of Zweckm
ssigkeit according to the Cam-
bridge edition] which confirms the rational tendency to produce transcen-
dent concepts127. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the existence of purpo-
lata, ma mai data”. Foucault (2008: 38–39) emphatically remarked the relation-
ship between the mind regions that we control and those that in the best case we
play with, in an active or passive sense, taking as thread the relatioship between
Gemt and Geist.
124 KrV, B XXVIII.
125 WDO, AA 08: 139.
126 KU, Einl. , § VI, AA 05: 87–188.
127 Prol, AA 04: 362 ff. To the extent to say that “auch Erfahrung mittelbar unter
der Gesetzgebung der Vernunft stehe” (364), assertion to which could be
added that the connection, the most direct, between both orders is generally a
regulative sign which remains obscure for the researcher, who only achieve to
continue with difficulties. Cf. KrV, A 737/B 765 s., where Kant, regarding the im-
possibility to use a dogmatic method in philosophy, asserts that our reason is, in a
subjective sense, a system, but that, when its use proceeds with concepts, reason
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siveness concerns specially the use of a faculty128, so who denies or con-
ceals its existence would ground a peculiar “tyranny of values”, which
perhaps would turn the mind as Gemth into the proper object of study
of a philosophy of mind. In this sense, sciences as arithmetic and geome-
try would never have arisen if their founders would have been guided by
the stingy question: what is this for?129 Nothing great has been done in
science without granting a horizon which must be maintained in half-
light. On the contrary, regarding the practical use of reason, the half-light-
ed horizon where passions and their obscure misinterpretation of the
practical tenets move generates actually a cancer for the practical reason.
Now I suggest focusing on the rich content that Kants lectures on
logic and anthropology offer about obscure representations. First, we
have to tackle what discipline is incumbent to determine “the reflections
that understanding has done in obscurity”130. Metaphysics, and not logic,
should be chosen to carry out this task, since, as seen above, if such goal
were attempted from a logical point of view, it would be severely ham-
pered. The discovery of the darkness of the mind is so indissolubly asso-
ciated to the history of this sought-after science131 and, indeed, to the en-
tire philosophy, that cannot leave in the hands of the mathematical calcu-
lation the results derived from concepts that have been exhaustively re-
fined. For this reason, the latter makes progress insofar as the analysis
of its concepts also progresses. Taking into account that “most part of
the activity of understanding occurs in the darkness”132, the scholar of
metaphysics cannot get rid of the responsibility of research; as far as pos-
sible, the sources where “the hidden springs of what takes place at
light”133 lie. Indeed, such a study is no trifle134 :
should be considered as a “system of research according to unity principles”,
which the experience provides the necessarely material with.
128 KrV, A 817/B 845.
129 Log, AA 09: 42. The article of Pozzo (2005: 198–202) contains valuable infor-
mation about the influence of the doctrine of the logical horizon in Kant.
130 V-Lo/Pçlitz, AA 24: 536.
131 V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 123: “Die Lehre von den dunckelen Erkenntnißen ist
gar nicht logisch, sonderen nur metaphysisch” and V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 410.
132 R 177, AA 15: 65; cf. R 2342, AA 16: 324: “Die dunkele wahre Erkenntniß ist
dasmateriale zu klahren Wahren Begriffen, e.g. des Christen in der Religion”. In
a letter adressed to Reinhold, dated on the 20th september 1791, AA 11: 288,
Kant declares that the analysis promotes the elaboration of a Critique of pure
reason, since it allows that “what still appears obscure becomes distinct”.
133 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 479.
134 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 481; cf. V-Parow, AA 25: 252
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Diese duncklen Grnde zu entwicklen ist das Gesch
ft des Philosophen,
wobei wir oft die Vortrefflichkeit der enfalteten Einrichtung des Menschen
bewundern. Die Keime unserer Gedanken liegen nur in uns selbst, und dies
ist der wahre Schatz der menschlichen Seele; das, was man bis jetzt entwick-
elt hat, ist unendlich wenig gegen das, was man noch entwickeln kçnnte.
Alle Metaphysiker, Moralisten, mssen demnach zur Aufkl
rung der dun-
klen Vorstellungen in dem Menschen beitragen, weil es darin auf die Be-
griffe der Menschen ankommt, die sie bei sich haben135.
In this overall context of the research the judgments in advance [vorlu-
fige Urteile]136 deserve a special mention, as pieces of a heuristic logic
spread along Kants writings. The natural procedure is to notice the pres-
ence of this hidden ground of the faculty of judgment once a determined
judgment has been given out, in order to reconstruct from it the content
and the aim of the one which has fortunately guided the search137. It
would help to bear in mind that the logic resulting of the previous attempt
must remain always in a sketchy state, as the desire of getting a complete
control of the judgments, which take place secretly in the mind, would en-
tail the dispossession of our finitude, which therefore would ruin the pri-
macy of the game as the most profitable experience to recognize the ac-
tion of concealed cognitive operations138. In this case, the facticity of the
obscure side of the mind would stop to surprise us, as the audience which
attends a puppetry spectacle, once it is conscious of the principles of its
activity. Likewise, scientists like Linnaeus would neither boast uncon-
sciously of the fact that the manifold of natural beings would let them-
selves be classified in accordance with a logical system, nor would they
make reference to worry and hope as suitable terms for the severe tone
135 V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 871.
136 La Rocca (2003: 119) is author of a profitable study of this kind of judgments in
Kant: “Se Kant avesse sviluppato in modo pi	 compiuto la sua “logica dei giu-
dizi provvisori”, avrebbe delineato un sistema di autoanalisi, in base allintersog-
gettivit di principio, della rete di anticipazioni che rendono possibile, guidando-
la, la conoscenza empirica”.
137 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 481.
138 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 502; the satisfaction of this desire would shatter the bal-
ance among the faculties of the human mind, see KpV, AA 05: 147–148. Peirce
threw other glance about the materials offered by these judgments, which turns
the obscure genesis of our judgments in the effective motor of all synthesis a pri-
ori. It is not at stake to value that provisional judgments have guided our under-
standing to achieve an objectively valid judgment, but that “the whole cognitive
process is put under the sign of the hypothetic inference” (Eco, 1997: 79).
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of the logic necessarily used by scientific research139. The fact that apply-
ing the sceptical method140, regarding metaphysical problems, or that tak-
ing part in a game141—between scholars or social mates—which only an
adult would be able to appraise, is a phenomenon compatible with the
purposes of Enlightenment is not a negligible finding associated to the dis-
covery of the obscure representations. If this is true, this topic would in-
terest both metaphysics and Pedagogy, since it brings out a discipline for
the use of reason and the exercise of freedom. Indeed, in the game that
understanding undertakes with itself in the realm of the obscure represen-
tations, where it is not always the leading element, a powerful obstacle
must be recognized. This obstacle does not let this faculty get too enthu-
siastic on account of its spontaneity; a faculty that draws consciousness of
itself from an “obscure distinction of Judgment”142, no matter how coarse
or rough it could be, between the sensible world and the intellectual one.
Thus, the reflective operations which cover as a concealed thread the
darkness of the mind become a burden for the understanding, when
this cognitive faculty is victim of the illusion which would wish to see it
free of such faults. They shall be, however, of an odd benefit if employed
to draw the critical geography of this faculty143. So, the reflection about
the judgments in advance may “give rules regarding the way we should
judge in advance about an object”144, but it should be more careful with
the uncontrolled aim to turn all the judgments in advance into determin-
ing judgments. If this could be possible, the transcendental logic would
stop being a mere canon for the pure understanding, as the general
logic is with a formal reach for understanding and reason, in order to be-
come the always yearned organon of philosophy. But “we do not possess
139 EEKU, § V, AA 05: 215, Kants footnote; cf. Lebrun (1970: 263 ff.). see Aristo-
tle, Met. , IX 8, 1050 b21–23. see the accurate article devoted to the “Kantian
logic of scientific research” of M.. Santos Gracia (2004).
140 KrV, A 424/B 451–452.
141 My lecture of the unconscious in Kants writing is deeply indebted to the follow-
ing study of J.L. Pardo (2004: 49 and 463–488) and the respective notions of
game 1 and game 2, of Wittgensteinian origin, that he uses there; cf. R. Ronchi
(1996) and A. Cohen (2008a and b).
142 GMS, AA 04: 450–452.
143 Cassirers theory of the symbolic forms is considered heir of the Kantian meth-
od, even though it does not consider in its real sense the originality of the Kant-
ian thought about the unconscious, dispersed in its work, see specially Die Logik
des Symbolbegriffs.
144 Log, AA 09: 75; cf. Logik Hechsel, in: Logik-Vorlesung. Unverçffentlichte
Nachschriften (1988, 359).
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it yet”145 and there are more than enough reasons, as it has been said be-
fore, to state that the Critique never had the purpose of grounding some-
thing similar.
Kant seems to have read Wittgenstein when he highlights—in a sec-
ond context of entries stemmed from the obscure representations—that
we will be appraised in society first from our appearance, gestures, cloth-
ing, although upright men shall retroactively judge us from our intelli-
gence or character. Likewise, we must acknowledge that we cannot
avoid judging a stranger from his face or that a book arouses our interest
from its title. Or perhaps can we avoid behaving this way? Kant chooses
an intermediate solution, which would gradually lead the judgments in
advance to the state of conscious judgments. He also tags that the rhythm
we deliver judgments never tallies with the rhythm of the worldly things,
that is to say, that our finitude prevents us to react immediately and in a
complete right manner to the phenomena we have to face. Maybe this un-
avoidable upheaval is the framework of human life146. A total right an-
swer seldom occurs and when it happens we notice, no matter how ob-
scure it could be, that an unconscious appraisal guided us unintendedly
to success. Otherwise, if we could become those perfect speakers, how
would we be conscious of the difference between sensibility and under-
standing, that notwithstanding we ascribe to a “common, but to us un-
known, root”147? So, all the judgments necessarely shelter a history
that, first and foremost, is unknown to us. We are only allowed to
dream that we can exercise instantaneously the determining faculty of
judgment148, because we would be able to do it only if we could dispense
with the synthesis of apprehension and, therefore, with the combination
between the functions of understanding and the manifold material sup-
plied by sensation. What does not suprise us is the fact that the para-
graphs of the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view devoted to
the obscure representations and its distinctness or indistinctness are fol-
lowed by a long reminder about the heterogeneity of sources of represen-
tation, that is to say, the basis of the knowledge possible to us. An intui-
145 V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 861; cf. KrVA 60/B 85-A 61/B 86 and A 796/B 824.
146 KU, § 29, All. Anm. , AA 05: 277–278; cf. V-Mo/Mron, AA 27: 1502–1503.
147 KrV, Einl, § II, A 15.
148 PhilEnz, AA 29: 24–25. Kants reluctance to a logical absorption of the set of
provisional judgments may give the chance to assess the closeness of his inter-
pretation to the freudanian definition of unconsciousness. The reading of Freuds
work as Das Unbewusste (1915) and Einige Bemerkungen ber den Begriff des
Unbewussten in der Psychoanalyse (1912) could clarify this point.
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tive understanding would abruptly interrupt the game that the obscure
representations set in motion in the mind, so that it is well-grounded to
assert that judgments in advance are a point of an odd depth in the build-
ing of human reason. Indeed, this type of judgments contents an uncon-
scious subtract, which no logic could turn into the state of an abstract
rule. In fact, every research “must always first presuppose something
here”149, that is to say, it must begin with a hypothesis which was not pre-
viously taught and which, in either case, stems from a decision so impos-
sible to prove directly as the Aristotelian principle of non-contradic-
tion150. Due to this, this faculty must be considered a natural gift, what ex-
plains that the logic of the scientific research sets out a hermeneutical cir-
cle which prevents the transcendental logic to become one day a produc-
tive organon of knowledge not falling into the dialectic. This fact displays
also the defences that a game, generated in the obscurity of the mind, pro-
vides to conserve the human health, contrary to that other game, very
dangerous and normally neglected, performed by those minds bewitched
by their power to cover, it does not matter the topic, all thoughts with the
logical form of thinking.
It must be emphasized that the analysis of the obscure representa-
tions has a certain argumental homogeneity in the lectures that Kant de-
voted to Anthropology. If we attempt to display this framework, it would
be advisable to take into account that the obscurity of the mind should be
considered, first and foremost, a paradox. Indeed, in accordance with the
famous objection of J. Locke151, which Leibniz argues against, how could
we know if we are in possession of representations without being con-
149 Anth, § 56, AA 07: 223; cf. the phenomenon of the premonition of something fu-
ture, which covers “judgments arising from obscure concepts of such a causal re-
lation”, AA 07: 187 and the general efficacy of obscure judgments in op. cit. , AA
07: 140 and 144. The rest which provisional judgments entail, and which is non-
objectivable in logical terms, remembers to what a linguist as K. Bhler, in re-
sponse to certain anlytical and structuralist excesses, called “experience of mean-
ing” (1934, § 4: 58). Freuds text Triebe und Triebschicksale (1915) may be the
counterpoint of Kantian theory about the natural giveness of the cognitive fac-
ulties.
150 It would be of interest to assess the closeness between what we consider here
“pragmatic deduction” of the unconscious thought and the validity of the refu-
tation in the Metaphysics of Aristotle as an indirect proof of the truth of a prin-
ciple.
151 Anth, § 5, AA 07: 135. See Essay, l. II, 1, §§ 15–19. Freud and Breuer suggest the
very expression “representative substrate” in order to scape from this obiection,
see Studien ber die Hysterie (1895).
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scious of them? Nevertheless, a better beginning than this one could not
be found in order to deal with the representations which cover most part
of the map of mind152, since the absence of a directly consciousness of the
obscure representations allows us precisely to be indirectly seized in ac-
cordance with the influence they have on our conscious life153. Once we
accept the possibility of an indirect consciousness of this kind of represen-
tations, the Kantian analysis uses a distinction which is not specifically
stated, but which powerfully reminds us the one Freud established be-
tween the preconscious and the unconscious154. Next we will focus on
both terms. First, the perceptions whose faulty character we are not con-
cious of, the use of devices which broaden the feature and details of the
things we observe and thereby allow us to recognize an unsuspected
depth also in the sounds we hear, all these phenomena prove that the
most part of the operations of the faculties of mind occur in the obscurity.
Anyway, we are enabled to recover those operations, either hypothetical-
ly or with the contribution of technical devices.
For the purpose of enlightening this first aspect of the obscure repre-
sentations Kant delivers various examples, some of them recurrent in the
Lectures on Anthropology. The example of the confuse perception of a
meadow or of a man we see in the distance is paradigmatic of the man-
ner—which is as progressive as impatient—how we perceive155. In fact,
152 V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 868. In Studien ber die Hysterie Freud and Breuer
also use the image of light to underscore the quantitative decompensation be-
tween conscious and unconscious life.
153 See Tortolone (1994: 258–260).
154 It puzzles that a recognized specialist in Kants Anthropology as R. Brandt, re-
garding the treatment of the question in Anth, § 5 (1991: 96), supports: “In a nut-
shell, […] Kant is not interested on a broader specification of the unconscious-
ness” [my translation]. See Freud, Einige Bemerkungen… (1912): “Wir waren
gewohnt zu denken, daß jeder latente Gedanke dies infolge seiner Schw
che
war, und daß er bewußt wurde, sowie er Kraft erhielt. Wir haben nun die ber-
zeugung gewonnen, daß es gewisse latente Gedanken gibt, die nicht ins Bewußt-
sein eindringen, wie stark sie auch sein mçgen. Wir wollen daher die latenten
Gedanken der ersten Gruppe vorbewußt nennen, w
hrend wir den Ausdruck un-
bewußt (im eigentlichen Sinne) fr die zweite Gruppe reservieren, die wir bei
den Neurosen betrachtet haben. Der Ausdruck unbewußt, den wir bisher bloß
im beschreibenden Sinne bentzt haben, erh
lt jetzt eine erweiterte Bedeutung.
Er bezeichnet nicht bloß latente Gedanken im allgemeinen, sondern besonders
solche mit einem bestimmten dynamischen Charakter, n
mlich diejenigen, die
sich trotz ihrer Intensit
t und Wirksamkeit dem Bewußtsein ferne halten”.
155 V-Lo/Pçlitz, AA 24: 510–511, V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25: 1441 and V-Anth/Fried,
AA 25: 479. Brandt (1999: 142–143) is precisely based on this peculiarity of
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our perception does not wait to utter a judgment about an object which
faces it until it has gained a complete vision of such object. And in this
judgment reflection will bring forward the complete shape of what has
not been clearly seen yet—the place that eyes, nose and mouth, which
are still not noticed in detail, have in the whole—, “[drawing the conclu-
sion] that that thing was a man”156. It is not clear if in this perception is
still working a rational instance, which would determine the provisionally
fittest conceptual scheme for the sensory data which are still meager.
However, it would not be difficult to connect this appraisal of the meth-
odological assumptions which inhabit our perception with the observa-
tions about the transcendental principle of purposiveness which is con-
tained in the First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. It makes no
sense to charge the sensibility with the defaults of the judgments uttered
in such circumstances, since the faculty of judgment is the unique respon-
sible for those assessments which will be afterwards thrown away. The ob-
scure perception of what is far-off from us also conveys the power which
adjacent representations can have over main representations, albeit the
first ones do not provide such a relevant information, in objective
terms, as the last ones. We ignore actually why these countervailing rep-
resentations enthrall our attention with such intensity157.
A second group of examples concentrates in the manner how devices
as the telescope and the microscope modify our perception, whereas they
uncover data, which already existed in it, after enlarging and enhancing
the sharpness of the images which are pictured on the retina158. This mod-
ification tears up the association that the ancient Greeks established be-
tween the Milky Way and the imaginary milk jet of a godness, but, at the
human perception in order to face this passage of Kants Anthropology with the
distinction between the kathlou and the kat	hkaston in the search of principles
at the beginning of Aristotles Physics.
156 Anth, § 5, AA 07: 135. Kants analysis seems near to the phenomenon of the “re-
quest image”, which K. Bhler has studied in his Sprachtheorie.
157 V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 266 and V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 946: “Es ist merk-
wrdig, daß wir erst auf willkrliche Weise uniere Einbildungskraft auf einen
Gegenstand lenken kçnnen, dann verfolgt dieselbe ihr Spiel von selbst, und
wir folgen nicht mehr willkhrlich, sondern eine innere Kraft der Seele leitet
uns, die Bilder nehmen ihren Gang und wir selbst wissen nicht, wie wir darauf
kommen”. The remark is as interesting for the dynamics of the Pathosformel
in A. Warburg as for appreciating the implications of the Kantian heritage of
the logic of symbol which was analysed by Cassirer in Der Begriffsform im myth-
ischen Denken and in Zur Logik des Symbolbegriffs (1959).
158 Locke, Essay, II 23; see Log, AA 09: 35; cf. Satura (1971: 57).
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same time, they confirm that the white patch was only, in objective terms,
the obscure representation of a group of stars159. Therefore, the fault
needs not to be charged to the sensibility, but rather to the faculty of judg-
ment and its impatient subjective tenets. The active cognitive life appears
associated to this kind of examples, a life which underlays a musical fan-
tasy which is plaid on the organ, whose freedom in the improvisation
moves blindly on without leaving any trace on the conciousness of the
musician, who “perhaps otherwise with all diligence and care could
never hope to bring off so well”160. Unlike the previous examples, the
field of artistic creation, which from Baumgarten is a common and pro-
ductive region where obscure representations show specially their activi-
ty, has not, as happens with the natural gift of inquiry, a suitable micro-
scope. Quite on the contrary, the one who listens to a musical piece, start-
ing with the author himself, notices the presence, although the perception
could be confused, of a reflective and unconscious depth161, which sup-
ports the final result as a kind of structural bottom which the subject sus-
pects, without being able to define it in a more precise manner. A last
group of obscure representations, which have their root in metaphysics
and moral162, remind the philosopher that he ought to bring them to
the clarity, for the purpose of uncovering the hidden forces which move
them, as the physician, observing the bodies, discovers the forces of mat-
ter. Moreover, it is a duty of the philosopher163 to research, as far as pos-
sible, in the obscurity of the mind.
These examples set out a first pattern of the unconscious in Kant,
which gathers pre-conscious reflections and latent perceptions that, ac-
cording to a Leibnizian-Wolffian hypothesis, would be possible no em-
phasis to be utterly clarified164. Such an achievement would turn our
mind in a motive of perpetual admiration, basically because we would be-
come a kind of divinity. It would not be possible to distinguish between
159 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 479 and V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 868–869.
160 Anth, § 5, AA 07: 136, V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 249 and V-Anth/Mrongrovius, AA
25: 1221. See Giordanetti (2005: 67–77, 104 and 176–177); cf. Locke, Essay, II
33 and Brandt (1999: 156).
161 V. Rohden (2009: 5–6) finds this Kantian description close to some observations
about the mechanism of musical reception, collected by D. Barenboim in Klang
ist Leben. Die Macht der Musik, Mnchen, Siedler, 2008.
162 GMS, AA 04: 450–451, cf. MS, TL, AA 06: 376, V-Log/Philippi, § 130, AA 24:
410 and V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 869.
163 V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 250.
164 See Wolff, PE, § 35 and Baumgarten, Aesth. , § 300.
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the genial and the third rate performances, either between the called
“logical tact” and the science, without the high cost of ruining the
order among soul [Seele], mind [Gemt] and spirit [Geist]165. Yet this de-
sire stems from a preconceived idea of the unconcious thought, the idea
of taking the conscious representation as the only valid criterion, namely,
the clear and, if possible, distinct representation, instead of appreciating
the heuristic support of the reflection which has worked in the obscurity.
It is beyond all doubt that the examples assessed up to now belong more
to an Anthropology from a physiological view than to a pragmatic one,
since the “play of sensations” they bring about is uncovered only in a pas-
sive manner, a play whose consequences concern the private sphere more
than the sociability. Kants writing called Menschenkunde may make eas-
ier for us to transit to the authentic use of the obscure representations.
This lecture, which is devoted to Anthropology, invites to analyse the
case of a cultivated man, whom someone asks for to argue about a
topic, which the man believes not to have licence to pronounce a word
about. Yet this man is not a reliable source of the contents which his
mind conceales. Thereby, Kant asserts that if the guest does not accept
the pleas of this man, but on the contrary, the first one continues to en-
courage the last one to speak, this behaviour would unconsciously set
in motion the capacity of reflection of the speaker, as confirms the fact
that ocasionaly it is enough “to begin with a subject and, suddenly
after, to be able to narrate this story or that other”166. It is worth noticing
the presence of the term “occasion” [Veranlassung] in the text, which re-
places the magnifying optic glasses mentioned above. Everyone can use a
telescope in the loneliness of a lab, yet nothing would give a better per-
formance as the pragmatic publicity and the “refined humanity” of a din-
ner party [Tischgesellschaft]167—“this little dinner party”168—in order to
find, without the risk of falling into the Schwrmerei, the bottom of
thoughts which are awating to be discovered in the self. In spite of the ob-
jection of Locke, the human understanding generally does not know what
it actually knows. Therefore, the society, not the private space, must carry
165 V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 16; cf. Foucault (2008). Cf. the suggestions of A. Cohen
about the counterpart that a sincere alien would mean for mans nature and
praxis (2008b).
166 V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 868 and V-Anth/Mron, AA 25: 1221.
167 See Foucault (2008: 64). See also Anth, § 88, AA 07: 277–278 and the remarks of
M. Ruffing about this § (2009: 50 s.).
168 Anth, § 88, AA 07: 278.
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out the Socratic role of the midwife169. Moreover, in a common meal a
companion of table supplies to another “with alternative ideas […] stim-
ulation through new material which he himself had not been able to track
down”170. The proposal to make of social game, of the laws and conversa-
tions of social intercourse the most suitable occasion to unload, in a
healthy and reasonable manner, entire files of information, which we ig-
nore to be in possess of, seems to be the best antidote of the pathologies
related to self-observation and, borrowing a term of Michel Foucault, it
also seems to be the access to a fruitful “gouvernement de soi et par
soi dans son articulation avec les rapports  autrui”171. The obscure rep-
resentations are the intimate realm of the mind, but we will never
come to know anything about them without getting out of ourselves
and entering into the world, where we shall take part in a common life.
This entails a new paradox, which is specially important for the subject
at stake. The first paradox that we met was focused on the possibility
to have representations without being conscious of them. Now we notice
that we must rely on the others in order to extract fragments of our un-
conscious thought. Precisely this unexpected request of exteriority,
which is arisen from the most hidden regions of the mind, leads to the
other side of the obscure representations, namely, to the specifically un-
conscious one. We would argue that its role should be accurately assessed
in the light of the artifice172, that is to say, beyond the existence of a suit-
169 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 479, V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 871 and V-Anth/Mron,
AA 25: 1221. On the “Socrates Genius”, actually a litterary mode in Kants
times, as a claim of the “Fundgrube in den Tiefen des Gemths verborgen liege-
nder Sch
tze” that human understanding (bon sens) is supposed to be, see Anth,
AA 07: 140; cf. letter from Hamann to Kant, the 27th july 1759, AA 10: 8; cf.
Brandt (1999: 171–173).
170 Anth, § 88, AA 07: 280.
171 Foucault, “Subjectivit et vrit”, 1994: 214. Cf. the helpful article of A. Cohen
(2009: 133): “[F]or Kant, from the pragmatic perspective of human action, there
is no doubt that we do have access to an experience of freedom and that our ra-
tional and moral capacities are empirically exercised rather than happening in
some timeless inaccessible world”.
172 Foucaults following citation has been specially helpful for us, in order to identify
the function that unconscious thought has in Kant (2008: 56–57): “Alors que le
temps de la Critique assurait lunit de loriginaire (depuis loriginairement
donn jusqu la synthse originaire), se dployant ainsi dans la dimension du
Ur… celui de lAnthropologie reste vou au domaine du Ver…, parce quil main-
tient la dispersin des synthses et la possibilit toujours renouvele de les voir
schapper les unes aux autres. […] Dans la Critique, le temps se faisait transpar-
ent  une activit synthtique qui ntait pas elle-mÞme temporelle, puisquelle
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able occasion to experience the presence of the obscure reflection. This
new experience encompasses both the game which we undergo, where
our nature is too near to the conditions of finitude, and the one which
we voluntary generated in order to protect us from those objects which
would put at risk the space of social intercourse.
The connection between the obscure representations and the concept
of game is essential to break away from the traditional Leibnizian-Wolf-
fian interpretation. It is necessary to distinguish two modalities of game.
On the one hand, game appears as an effect which we cannot control, that
is to say, so that we become “a toy of the oscure representations”173 ; for
instance, when our understanding runs into the idea of death and there-
fore falls into logical absurdities, which only express our fear of the mor-
tal condition. On the other hand, less frequently, we intentionally play
with these representations, with the aim of covering some concrete sub-
jects with civilisation. Even if it is not approved to mention them, because
they are unpolite, in the social intercourse, it would be possible not to re-
nounce to the pleasure of seeing them flow from one conversation to an-
other under the sheltering veil of irony and metaphor. We will tackle the
three examples which appear in the § 5 of the Anthropology from a prag-
matic view and we will focus on death, prejudices and sex. Regarding the
first two ones we behave in a more passive than active manner, since the
person who meditates about the place where he prefers to be buried cer-
tainly knows that this reflection will not achieve anything. Yet he shall not
find a most efficacious issue than this tub-thought174 to move the phantom
of death away. The concern to secure a good lot or a beautiful view in the
cemetery, which affects even the wisest men175, lacks sense, even if this
thought undertakes its course without our consent and is reluctant to van-
ish. We feel, thus, under the control of reflections which we do not con-
sider rational to start with. Likewise, it is socially extended that somebody
has pity for a recently dead young man, as marks the eloquent utterance
of sorrow “after seeing such young blood buried”176, albeit everybody
knows that death is the end of all suffering and that after it there is noth-
tait constituante; Dans lAnthropologie, le temps, impitoyablemente dispers
obscurcit, rend impntrable les actes synthtiques, et substitue  la souverainet
de la Bestimmung, lincertitude patiente, friable, compromise dun exorcice qui
sappelle le Kunst”.
173 Anth, § 5, AA 07: 136.
174 Anth, § 14, AA 07: 152.
175 V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 250.
176 V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 870.
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ing neither good nor bad for man. In a less radical way, somebody placed
in the highest point of a tower and endeavoring to see downwards might
be assaulted by the vertigo. In this case obscure representations may
make this person totter, although he is well conscious that a rail solid
enough protects him, to the extent that the power of these representa-
tions could lead him to fall without other cause than autosuggestion177.
In such a case, the unconsciousness of these representations generates
the belief that we have sensations which actually did not take place.
It is also necessary to investigate the first grounds of the prejudices,
before which the understanding seems to be helpless. Kant suggests as
paradigmatic a case as the following. The sighs that the bourgeois of
the XVIII Century breathed before the inexperience [Unerfahrenheit]
in the art of pretence [Kunst zu scheinen]178, noticed in an adolescent
peasant girl, and felt as an ephemeral ray of light in an horizont which
is darkened by the egoism, pay tribute to the fact that experience [Erfah-
renheit]179, a pregnant term of Kants reflection on pragmatics, is lacking
here. Anyway, as Rousseau already acknowledged, man cannot dream
with a non political, and consequently a non social, sphere180. The only ef-
fective medicine against the nefarious effects of the art of pretence, far
from slacking the springs of such an art, will tighten and strengthen
them, albeit in an unusual direction. This is a feature of the Kantian An-
thropology that Foucault has insistently highlighted, since no other work
of Kant confronts more decidedly the animal rationale with his destina-
tion, not as a pure rational being or as a member of the visible Church
or of an aesthetic community, but properly as an animal rationabile181,
who ought to take control of his own reason and, furthermore, within a
177 V-Ant/Parow, AA 25: 251; cf. Anth, § 29, footnote, AA 07: 169 and § 79, Allg.
Anm. , AA 07: 264; cf. V-Anth/Mron, AA 25: 1222 and V-Menschenkunde, AA
25: 870: “[D]ie Besch
ftigung der Einbildungskraft ist durch die Vernunft
nicht ganz widerlegt, und so sind wir immer in der Furcht und in der Widerle-
gung derselben”; see V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 480 and V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 250.
178 Anth, § 4, AA 07: 132–133.
179 MAM, AA 08: 117; cf. GSE, AA 02: 231, Nachricht, AA 02: 312 and R 705, AA
15: 312: “Die allgemeinen Grunds
tze entspringen hier per inductionem und gel-
ten auf die F
lle des Lebens (Klugheit durch Erfahrenheit) (logisches Vermç-
gen)”.
180 Discours sur l	origine et les fondements de l	ingalit parmi les hommes, n. 9:
“Quoi donc? Faut-il dtruire les socits, anantir le tien et le mien, et retourner
vivre dans les forÞts avec les ours? Consquence  la manire de mes advers-
aires, que jaime autant prvenir que de leur laisser la honte de la tirer”.
181 Anth, AA 07: 321–322 and KU, § 5, AA 05: 210.
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civil community among other men, enhanced by the “brgerlichen Um-
gang”182. This civilising scope calls for developing a “technique of the
self”, which a pragmatic knowledge, basically an “art of prudence”183,
must devise. On this basis, I submit that the subject of a pragmatic An-
thropology, like a galilean experiment which would endeavor to calculate
a kind of civilising inertia, stems from the result of listening, not the
noise—the phone—, but more precisely the subtract of logos, which the
city gives out every time it has been voided of politic life. This work prob-
lematizes the sole origin of man which we are enable to discover, an ori-
gin which is necessarily borne on language and appearance, hence, on
rhetoric184. In this context, the habits that dwell in us as a “second na-
ture”185, making thornier self-observation, explain the general validity
that the Russian proverb “clothes make the man”186 has in all countries,
even those where the civilizatory process has most intensively progressed.
At the most, we will achieve to expel prejudices a posteriori, after having
corrected our judgment in advance. Kant suggests that we should answer
the following question: why do we endure more a man who squanders his
fortune than a miser man in the social intercourse, even if we have actual-
ly nothing objective against the behaviour of the last one? Again, the phi-
losopher ought to search for the origin of this prejudice, which the logi-
cian disregards. According to Kant, the explanation lies on the fact that
human mind draws quickly the conclusion that the miser person depends
on his own properties more than he respects the humanity in himself and
in others187. Such a judgment does not stem from things that the subject
has actually seen, but rather from a “presumptive objectivity”188, which
he holds legitimate enough to be applied to the present case.
182 V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25: 734.
183 Aubenque (1963) is one of the rare scholars which have underscored the pres-
ence, even if through many mediations, of the work of B. Gracin in the Kantian
notion of prudence—private and mundane—; cf. GMS, AA 04: 416 and 417,
footnote.
184 V-Anth/Mron, AA 25: 1223: “So ist ieder Tropus und iede Figur ein Umweg
indem man eine dunkle Vorstellung plotzlich zur klaren macht und darin besteht
das angenehme derselben”. To define this term in Kant are indispensable the fol-
lowing textes: KU, §51, AA 05: 321 and § 53, AA 05: 327. We commend the lec-
ture of Cohen-Halimi (2004: 147–164).
185 Anth, Vorwort, AA 07: 121.
186 Anth, § 5, AA 07: 137.
187 V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 250.
188 Levi-Strauss (1962) and Lebrun (1970: 272).
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Regarding the manifold games that we produce employing the ob-
scure representations, the phenomenon which promotes such an inversion
of wit is the fact that the civilised man occasionally perceives far too much
his relationship with animals189. Especially his yearn for sexual satisfac-
tion, together with the habits and the utterances which are too mechani-
cal190, show his relationship with animals, which embarrasses him. This
runaway of man from himself makes the human faculties work in order
to shelter what one really desires both in the conversation and in the so-
cial intercourse. Furthermore, society promotes this process, an authentic
“art to darken”191, which, although sparing us “crude expressions”192,
keeps them unharmed in our social intercourses, transparent enough to
bring out a smile. The smile is a mark of the aesthetic self-restraint and
the beginning of a moral self-mastery, based on pretence, through
which the homo civilis overcomes the wild and rough man. In fact,
Kant acknowledges that the audiovisual archive of such an art shall
give the more pleasure the stronger the contrast is. A contrast that one
notices between the original obscurity—in ornament, in utterance—and
the clarity which finally emerges once the speaker understands what it ac-
tually veiled. Here the mind moves in a delicate intermediate zone be-
tween the cynicism of those who preach the radical deliverance of the an-
imal features of man, and the purism193 of those who plea for a complete
submission of human drives under the chains of culture and education.
Besides the spring to the gentleness, one of the most habitual issues
which men use as a protective screen to disguise their relationship with
189 V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 871; cf. V-Anth/Mron, AA 25: 1223.
190 Anth, § 12, AA 07: 149. The “physical coaction”, which stems from the assuetu-
do provokes disgust when we perceive it in others, because “here one is led in-
stinctively by the rule of habituation, exactly like another (non-human) nature,
and so runs the risk of falling into one and the same class with the beast”. Cf.
MAM, AA 08: 114, where Kant highlights that human being, in the fourth
level of his evolution, conceives “wiewohl nur dunkel” that he is an end of na-
ture, so that nothing on Earth may seize him his title. This enclosed as counter-
part the claim, which can also emerge only obscurely in mind, that the same dig-
nity which makes him think he is the owner of nature must be supposed to any
other man.
191 V-Anth/Mron, AA 25: 1223.
192 V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 871. In this passage Kant comments an amusing let-
ter from Cicero (Fam. , IX 22), where the latin author lists the absurds which the
cynical philosophers failed in when they tried to naturalize the organic functions
that man shares with other animals.
193 Anth, § 5, AA 07: 136; cf. V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 480.
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animals is to borrow a foreign term to cover the one he would prefer not
to pronounce in their mother language. The explanation that Kant offers
of this behaviour is the following. This decision, unconscious at first
glance, forces us, every time we meet the term at stake, to take time in
order to translate it in our mind. This translation also takes place when
one decodes an enigmatic message. Such a detour brings down the inten-
sity of the aggression that the mind notices in the term, without actually
being conscious of this fact, as if we had found the most suitable screen to
refract a ray of light as powerful as fearsome. Kant delivers valuable psy-
chological recommendations regarding this point: when one fears some-
thing, the most advisable behaviour is not to be reluctant to face it, but
rather to face repeatedly with an often exposure to the focus that moti-
vates the distrust, after having chosen the convenient angle of refrac-
tion194. So, “through obscure representations we endeavour to weaken
or to strengthen the power of the impression”195, which is normally relat-
ed to corporal functions or which belongs to the field of sex. This analysis
displays the human mind as a complex logical and optical machinery,
where understanding and imagination are doomed not only to understand
each other, but to do it through a common game. As Kant, who takes the
biblical tale of the Genesis as a travel map, interprets the fig leaf as the
result of mans discovery of his rational control over inclinations such
as the sexual instinct196, the anthropological remark about the attachment
that mothers have more to their sons than to their daughters has a prob-
ably explanation in the rooted inclination to the other sex, which is a nat-
ural disposition of the human being. Therefore, the sexual instinct tallies
with the game it provokes in its circular feature: the force of the instinct
will soon catch unaware the stakes of the civilisation. The decency that an
urban woman exhibits as external appearance finds fullfillment in the
tribute that the other sex tributes her and the modesty [pudicitia]197 en-
larges the distance between sexes which prevents that both shall reduce
each other to a mere mean of enjoyment. Moreover, instead of expelling
passion, decency and modesty search to administrate it in an optimal
manner. Both practical and empirical phenomena illustrate the “un-dia-
194 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 481.
195 V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25: 1439–1440; cf. V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 250.
196 MAM, AA 08: 113. We cannot focus here on the interesting effects that the ob-
scure idea of freedom, or an analogous representation of it, has on the practical
philosophie of Reason of Kant. Regarding to this question, we refer to La Rocca
(2003: 267–285).
197 Anth, AA 07: 306–307.
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lectized dialectic”198, which Foucault remarked in the Kantian Anthropol-
ogy. Yet the most outstanding fact of this case is that the polite language
endeavours to find the suitable formulae for the contents that society
does not approve to be pronounced in public and that the art of pre-
tence199 appears as a pragmatic, hence intelligent, use of pleasures. In
short, the outstanding point in the human animal is to employ the logos
to deal with the function that instinct carries out in the other animal spe-
cies, that is to say, as the voice of God, which the human creature drive
away, as a mist, as soon as it begins to behave in accordance with its
own tenets.
Finally, the obscurity entails a rhetoric interest, for it works as an epis-
temological obstacle which, when it is conveniently dosed, the reader, the
speaker and the listener shall be thankful, since the obscurity gives them
the chance to use their understanding in a ludic manner and, hence, to ex-
perience the strength of their faculties200, as they have to fight against the
obstacle. Notwithstanding, when this tendency goes to the excess, it is in
accordance with the decree of all mystics201, who identify the imperative
skotison!—opposed to the sapere aude!—with an organon of alleged
knowledge, since there will be no way to sieve the will under an apparent
solemnity, attractive for the neophyts, to hide their own ignorance from
the legitimate aim to exercise and tune the faculty of judgment.
V. Conclusion
Finally I suggest breaking down the topic of the obscure representations
at least into three aspects in order to determine the output that it provides
to the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. First, Kant releases
this evasive subject from the monopoly which was demanded by its al-
198 Foucault (2008: 39).
199 Anth, § 14, AA 07: 152: “In order to save virtue, or at least lead the human being
to it, nature has wisely implanted in him the tendency to allow himself willingly
to be deceived”.
200 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 479–480: “Iede Dunckelheit die sich plçtzlich aufkl
rt,
macht Annemlichkeit, und ergçtzt sehr, und darinn besteht die Kunst eines Au-
tors seine Gedancken so zu verstecken, daß der Leser sie gleich von selbst
auflçsen kann, hiezu gehçren die Schertze und Einf
lle. Das klare aber ermdet
bald” and 482: “So wie in der D
mmerung alles grçßer erscheint, als im Lichten,
so macht auch die Dunckelheit grçßere Erwartungen”. See Brandt (1999: 164).
201 Anth, § 5, AA 07: 137.
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leged scholars, namely, the visionaries, to the extent that the study of ob-
scure representations could be considered as a supplement for the paral-
ogisms of pure reason which seizes the last framework of empirical psy-
chology. To support this claim, it could be added that the critical lecture
of the obscurity of the mind denounces the fact that philosophy, more
often than expected, has fallen into the dialectic when regarding this
topic. Against this misconception of the unconscious thought, Kant un-
dertakes an anthropological “didactic”, according to the table which
the cognitive faculty, the faculty of desire and the feeling of pleasure
and displeasure set out, since the obscurity of thought concerns all
these faculties202. Thereby, Kant prevents that the mentioned illuminated
gang could allege a privileged experience of the phenomenon. Second,
the pragmatic assessment of the referred topic, which stems from the cri-
tique of the empirical psychology, analyses the domain that human Erfah-
renheit identifies in an intuitive manner, therefore transcendental apper-
ception obtain a plea for its rights also over the fragments of the uncon-
scious thoughts which we could be enabled to track down. Moreover, in
spite of the astonishment aroused by the discovery of the great amount
of our unconscious thoughts, an even more intense and lasting astonish-
ment should be engendered by the principle which the entire logic de-
pends on and which the very understanding consists of, namely, the objec-
tive unity of apperception. Transcendental consciousness is the only tenet
which is able to avoid the probable shipwreck when we dare to raid the
Cocitus Lake of unconscious thought. Yet the submission of the obscure
representations to the unity of the logical consciousness reveals also that
the game and social techniques provide the occasion for discovering these
representations. In fact, the internal logic and the experience of time
which those devices entail are essential to the rightful comprehension
of human life. Third, an internally consistent pragmatic discours stems
from the study of the obscurity of mind, which tackles the human nature
from the point of view of the worldly and popular activity of man. It leads
us to an order where the problematic nature of man emerges amidst
games, conversations, jokes and riddles. The fact that Anthropology
from a pragmatic point of view should be considered as a possible and
necessary work proves that those arts, with all their glittery bright, have
been analysed up to now under the grey glass of the theory. Perhaps
there is no other possible achievement when the subject of study is
202 According to Oberhausen (2002: 125), the § 5 ofApH is, in relation to the matter
of unconscious representations, only the “summit of the iceberg”.
Unconscious Thought in Kants Lectures on Anthropology 223
human nature. The following excerpt of M. Foucault, surely one of the
finest scholars which have interpreted the Kantian Anthropology, will
allow us to infer what we consider the conclusion of this contribution:
Le Geist ce serait ce fait originaire qui, dans sa version transcendentale, im-
plique que linfini nest jamais l, mais toujours dans un essential retrait—et,
dans sa version empirique, que linfini anime pourtant le movement vers la
vrit et linpuisable succession de ses formes. Le Geist est  la racine de la
possibilit li du savoir. Et, par l-mÞme, indissociablemente present et ab-
sent des figures de la connaissance: il est ce retrait, cette invisible et “visible
rserve” dans linaccesible distance de laquelle le connatre prend place et
positivit. Son Þtre est de nÞtre pas l, dessinant, en ceci meme, le lieu de la
vrit203.
The text refers to the spirit [Geist], the “faculty to exhibit aesthetic
Ideas”204, which Foucault tracks in the Anthropology in the light of the
link between this “principle that vivifies man” and the mind [Gemt] ,
which in fact consists only in life. But the principle that vivifies the
mind is also strongly connected with the aesthetic potency of genius,
whose roots lead to the obscure representations which we have to deal
with. The fact that the genius and the artistic production belong to the
realm of the potency prevents both their exam from a genetical method
and their acceptation in the circuit of cultural and artistic progress. It
should be admitted that none artist has denied the participation, no mat-
ters how minimal it could be, in genius, as the Kantian exam of the mu-
sical fantasy shows. Furthermore, the aesthetic attributes that the creative
spirit uses to vivify rhetoric and poetical works cannot be exhibited. Nev-
ertheless, this failure of exhibition, both in a direct and indirect manner,
traces the existence of imaginary representations that, when they go with
a determined concept, supply something like an air or an ambiance where
everything makes us remember to reason. The relation of counterpart or
pendant between the aesthetic Idea and the Idea of reason is justified by
the fact that both refer, although each one in a different manner, to the
supersensory ground of the phenomenal world. The distinctiveness of
the genius is that it borders this ground with the virtuosity which is nec-
essary for its products not to be decoded some day205. The gathering of
phenomena at first glance so distant from each other, as the genial artistic
creation, the judgments in advance, the wit, the gift of inquiry, the preju-
203 Foucault (2008: 40–41).
204 KU, § 49, AA 05: 313–314.
205 Lebrun (1970: 403 ff.).
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dices or the galateo, and other ones which could be added to these—then
we face an open series206—pushes us to think that the obscure represen-
tations lay out a real archipelago in Kants writings, which is impossible to
constraint to a single work. Esprit, genius, bon sens, are brittle terms,
more suitable for the writing of a visionary than for the author of the Cri-
tiques. Nevertheless, Kant did not dismiss, quite on the contrary, facing all
of them, in order to discipline their claims and cut up the wings207 of the
predominant perceptive field in mind. It could be submitted that the sus-
pected presence of obscure representations is a kind of balancing pole for
the transcendental consciousness, which allows this one to feel that some-
thing will always remain to be known and to be discovered, that is to say,
to be brought to the objective unity of apperception. Furthermore, finite
understanding can neither be completely correct nor completely wrong.
The default of this feeling should be enough for the one who exists
when thinking to become another person208, while assuming maybe Fich-
tean marks. Again, nobody has noticed this with such a great lucidity as
M. Foucault, whose remarks about the Anthropology from a pragmatic
point of view, as brief as weighty, have guided without any doubt the pres-
ent work:
De la Critique  lAnthropologie, il y aurait comme un rapport de finalit
obscure et obstine. Mais il se peut aussi que lAnthropologie ait t mod-
ifie dans ses elements majeurs  mesure que se dveloppait la tentative cri-
tique: larchologie du texte, si elle tait possible, ne permettrait-elle pas de
voir natre un “homo criticus”, dont la structure diffrerait pour lessentiel
de lhomme qui la prcd? Cest--dire que la Critique,  son caractre
propre de “propdeutique”  la philosophie, ajouterait un role constitutive
dans la naissance et le devenir de formes concretes de lexistence humaine.
Il y aurait une certaine vrit critique de lhomme, fille de la critique des
conditions de vrit209.
206 The sense of the Kantian critique to the rhapsody of Aristotles categories must
be tinged since there is the same figure of a rhapsody in the pragmatic Anthro-
pology, not only because the methodic difficulties for the research, but also the
very dress of the object of study; cf. Foucault (2008: 33: “LAnthropologie se d-
ploie donc selon cette dimension de lexercise humain qui va de lambigut du
Spiel (jeu=jouet)  lindcision du Kunst (art=artifice)”).
207 KU, § 50, AA 05: 319.
208 Prol, § 46, footnote, AA 04: “[die Vorstellung der Apperception] ist nichts mehr
als Gefhl eines Daseins ohne den mindesten Begriff und nur Vorstellung des-
jenigen, worauf alles Denken in Beziehung (relatione accidentis) steht”.
209 Foucault (2008: 12–13).
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However, as we argued specially in the third section, after noticing the ex-
istence of the unconsciousness, the obscure balancing pole of the logical
consciousness will not be examinated within the boundaries of a transcen-
dental doctrin of the faculty of judgment, either using a physiological
method, which could only increase the data of an empirical Anthropolo-
gy210. The only path that remains open is, thus, the one which chooses the
intercourse [Umgang] as the context of discovering, not of explanation, of
the unconscious representations. The main part of what we shall find in-
sofar as we track down the pieces of the layer of prejudices underlying in
the mind will not please us. Yet this is not at stake here. As Aristotle
would say, no one calls us good or evil taking in account the passions
which get us rough, but only after having assessed the habits that actually
have grafted onto a morally good character, that is to say, onto a “second
nature” for us. Hence, the space of the social game is the best both em-
pirical and pragmatic spectrum of human nature, which the rules of ele-
gance and the norms of taste211 reflect, once that nature has been neces-
sarily framed to ease its entrance in society. This notwithstanding requires
selecting foremost that part of the obscurity of mind that our finitude can
endure. And this is a worldly glass that the empirical psychology could
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Logical Forms, Indeterminacy, and the Subjective Unity
of Consciousness in Kant1
Seung-Kee Lee
The nature of the relation between logic and psychology is recognized to
be an important albeit difficult topic for understanding Kants aims and
argumentation in his theoretical philosophy, particularly, in the Critique
of Pure Reason. The recent commentators who have tried to understand
and to defend Kants views have warned readers not to confuse our, post-
Fregean understanding with Kants own understanding of the terms like
“logic”, “mind”, “psychology”, and “cognition”. One such view that the
commentators have noted is that in Kants philosophy logic and psychol-
ogy are intertwined in a way that is perhaps difficult for us today to fully
appreciate or even sympathize with. It is noted, for example, that for Kant
the talk about “the rules of logic” is inseparable from the talk about
“mental activities” or “cognitive faculties”.2 In this connection, some
have suggested that Kants view is more in line with the view of the rela-
tion between logic and the mind that is elaborated in the Port-Royal
logic.3
Even among these commentators, however, there seems to be no con-
sensus on precisely how the relation between logic and psychology is to
1 A shorter version of the paper was presented at the 85th Annual Meeting of the
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, April 2011, in San Diego,
California.
2 For a discussion of the relation between logic, epistemology, and “faculty psy-
chology” in the early modern period, see Hatfield, Gary: “The Workings of
the Intellect: Mind and Psychology”. In: Logic and the Workings of the Mind.
Ed. Patricia A. Easton. Atascadero, CA 1997, 21–45. For an interesting paper
on the relation between logic and consciousness in Kant, see Kitcher, Patricia:
“Kant on Logic and Self-Consciousness” in the same volume, 175–90.
3 Arnauld, Antoine and Pierre Nicole: La Logique, ou l	Art de penser. Paris 1662,
translated Logic or the Art of Thinking. Ed. Jill Vance Buroker. Cambridge
1996. See Kitcher, Patricia: Kant	s Transcendental Psychology. Oxford 1990,
11–13, 234, note 57; Longuenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge.
Princeton 1998, 5, 74; Allison, Henry: Kant	s Transcendental Idealism. New
Haven 2004, 146.
be understood in Kants philosophy. For example, even among those who
are keenly aware that in Kants philosophy logic and psychology cannot
neatly be divorced from each other, some have been criticized for over-
psychologizing, while others have been criticized for over-logicizing
Kants account or for offering “anti-psychological” interpretations there-
of.4 My aim in this paper is not to focus on, let alone, to resolve this con-
flict, but to explore a particular theme that falls under the broader topic
of the relation between logic and psychology.5
One aspect of this relation is represented by Kants famous claim in
the Transcendental Deduction sections of the Critique of Pure Reason
that consciousness or self-consciousness6 is a condition for the possibility
of cognition of an object. This claim has been interpreted in various ways.
Among the interpreters,7 however, what has not received much attention,
4 For example, Patricia Kitcher (Kant	s Transcendental Psychology, 94) includes
Henry Allison among those who “depsychologize” Kants doctrine of appercep-
tion. Beatrice Longuenesse (Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 6), while crediting
Kitcher for providing an analysis of “mental activities”, at the same time criticiz-
es her for not taking into consideration the logical forms of judgment. In his re-
view of Longuenesses book, Graham Bird (“Kant and the Capacity to Judge:
Sensibility and Discursivity.” In: European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1), 1999,
105), on the other hand, says there is “surprisingly little on Kants account of
the self […]”
5 Here I use the word “psychology” broadly. Kant distinguishes between “empiri-
cal”, “rational”, and (some argue) “transcendental” psychology. See Hatfield,
Gary: “Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psychology: Psychology as Sci-
ence and as Philosophy.” In: The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Ed. Paul
Guyer. Cambridge 1992, 200–227. On the relation of Kants views to Leibnizs
and Humes views on self-consciousness, see Kitcher, Patricia: Kant	s Transcen-
dental Psychology, 105–107.
6 I follow the view of Karl Ameriks, Patricia Kitcher, and Robert Pippin, among
others, that Kants notion of apperception does not entail that consciousness re-
quires self-consciousness. As Pippin (“Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind.” In:
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17, 1987, 459–60), notes, Kants apperceptive
thesis (represented by Kants claim at KrV: B 131 that “it must be possible
for the I think to accompany all my representations”) “does not mean that
the fact that I am perceiving rather than imagining is itself directly attended
to, but that such an awareness is an inseparable component of what it is con-
sciously to perceive, imagine, remember, etc”. See also Kitcher, Patricia:
Kant	s Transcendental Psychology, 92–94, and Ameriks, Karl: “Kant and
Guyer on Apperception.” In: Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie 15 (2),
1983, 183–84.
7 In this paper, I examine in detail the views of three scholars: Allison, Henry:
Kant	s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven 1983 (1st ed.), 2004 (2nd ed.); Freu-
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and what I would like to explore in this paper, is the fact that Kant links
what he terms the “subjective unity” of consciousness, or the way in
which representations are combined merely “empirically”, arbitrarily,
and contingently in consciousness, with an indeterminate (as opposed
to a determinate) way in which the logical forms of judgment are em-
ployed. Although the view that the categories are nothing other than
the logical forms of judgment as applied to intuitions has been empha-
sized and elaborated by many commentators,8 few have focused on the
fact that for Kant the logical forms can be employed determinately or in-
determinately.9 By exploring the theme of the relation between the sub-
jective unity of consciousness and the indeterminate use of the logical
forms of judgment, I hope to make clear this one, fascinating aspect of
the relation between logic and psychology in Kants theoretical philoso-
phy. By doing so, moreover, I hope to help make better sense of some
of Kants notorious distinctions, such as that between judgments of per-
ception and judgments of experience, subjective and objective unity of
consciousness, and empirical and pure apperception, distinctions which
are elaborated in the passages in which Kant relates his theory of judg-
ment with his views on consciousness.
The key idea that will emerge from my analysis is that what Kant calls
“the subjective unity” of (or “empirical”) consciousness involves that
state of mind in which the understanding leaves undetermined, that is,
fails to specify, fix, or determine, the manner in which the concepts in a
judgment are to relate to one another. Differently put, it is when the log-
ical forms are employed merely indeterminately that a “relation” of rep-
resentations that is merely “subjectively valid” or what Kant calls in the
Prolegomena a relation of representations that is valid for “a conscious-
diger, Jrg: “Zum Problem der Wahrnehmungsurteile in Kants theoretischer
Philosophie.” In: Kant-Studien 82, 1992, 414–435; and Longuenesse, Beatrice:
Kant and the Capacity to Judge.
8 For example, Young, J. Michael: “Functions of Thought and the Synthesis of In-
tuitions.” In: The Cambridge Companion to Kant, 116, and Allison, Henry:
Kant	s Transcendental Idealism, New Haven 2004, 155.
9 In my “The Determinate-Indeterminate Distinction and Kants Theory of Judg-
ment” (In: Kant-Studien 95, 2004, 204–25), I explain the function of the concept
of determination in the Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason,
and Critique of the Power of Judgment. In the present paper, I focus on the pas-
sages in the so-called “B-Deduction” or the Transcendental Deduction in the
second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in order to provide an account
of the relation between Kants theory of judgment and his views on conscious-
ness in his theoretical philosophy.
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ness in one subject only” (as opposed to “a consciousness in general”) re-
sults.10 Although Kant himself leaves it unexplained why such indetermi-
nacy with regard to the act of judging should result in what he calls the
“subjective unity of consciousness”, understanding this key idea will
help us find ways to resolve some thorny problems and difficulties that
have arisen in interpreting the relevant passages in Kants writings.
In the first part of the paper, I explain what Kant means by “the log-
ical use of the understanding”, why this use involves an indeterminate
employment of the logical forms of judgment, and what this employment
consists in. In the second part, I explain what role this use of the under-
standing plays in those passages in the Transcendental Deduction sections
in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in which Kant relates
judgment with consciousness. In the third part, I show that the act of judg-
ing objectively involves the consciousness that a representation is a spe-
cific or determinate instance of a more general representation. Thus, I
will argue that what Kant calls “the subjective unity of consciousness” re-
fers to that form of consciousness in which the subject is aware of an in-
determinate relation of representations, that is to say, a relation in which
a representation is not a specific or a determinate instance of a more gen-
eral one.
I. Indeterminacy and the Logical Use of the Understanding
What Kant calls the “act of the understanding”11 or judging by means of
which cognition is attained is governed by rules. These rules determine
the ways in which the understanding judges. The “Table of Judgments”
in the Critique of Pure Reason lists the ways.12 Kant claims that the
Table is taken from “general” or formal logic. For Kant, however, the
rules taken from general logic are only the necessary but not sufficient
conditions for cognition of an object. For such cognition to be possible,
the understanding must judge in accordance with rules that are taken
from not merely a general but a “transcendental” logic. The two kinds
of logic differ because one is more “general” than the other. In the Cri-
10 Prol AA 04: 304. Translations from the Prol are by Lewis White Beck (Indian-
apolis 1950).
11 “Die Handlung des Verstandes”. KrV, A 69/B 94. Translations from KrV are by
Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge 1997).
12 KrV, A 70/B 95.
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tique of Pure Reason, Kant explains that general logic is “general” be-
cause it abstracts from all content of cognition, that is to say, it is indiffer-
ent to the question of whether the object has an empirical or a priori ori-
gin. As Kant puts it, general logic “concerns the use of the understanding
without regard to the difference of objects”.13 Transcendental logic, on
the other hand, is less general or more specific than general logic because
it does “not abstract from all content of cognition”: “it concerns the laws
of the understanding and reason, but only insofar as they are related to
objects a priori”.14 This implies that the “act of the understanding” as it
operates merely in accordance with the rules of a general logic differs
from the act of the understanding as it operates in accordance with the
rules of a transcendental logic. But in what precisely does the difference
consist?
For Kant, the two kinds of logic provide rules for two different ways
in which the logical forms of judgment can be employed. He provides an
example to clarify the difference. Take the judgment, “all bodies are di-
visible”. This judgment has the categorical form, such that its function
is “that of the relationship of the subject [“bodies”] to the predicate [“di-
visibility]”. But when the understanding follows the rules of a mere gen-
eral logic, or in Kants words, “in regard to the merely logical use of the
understanding”, it is left “undetermined which of these two concepts will
be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the
predicate. For one can also say: Something divisible is a body.”15 Thus,
what Kant calls the “logical use of the understanding”16 leaves it undeter-
mined which of the two concepts will be given which function.17 Else-
where, instead of “the logical use of the understanding” Kant uses the
phrase “the formal act of the understanding”18 to refer to that act of
the understanding through which the logical forms are employed indeter-
minately, that is, in such a way that the subject and the predicate concepts
may, in Kants words, “interchange their logical functions”.19 So, for ex-
ample, the two concepts in the judgment “the stone is hard” may inter-
13 KrV, A 50 f./B 74 f., A 53/ B77
14 KrV, A 55/B 80, A 57/B 82
15 KrV, B 128 f.
16 KrV, B 128: “der logische Gebrauch des Verstandes”.
17 See also KrV, B 419.
18 “die formale Verstandeshandlung”
19 MAN, AA 04: 475. Translations from MAN are by J. W. Ellington (Indianapolis
1985). See also Prol, AA 04: 301, 304, 311 f.
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change their function so that one can also say “something hard is a
stone”.20
It is important to note here that although one might be tempted to
take the phrase “logical use” or “formal act” to signify that act of the un-
derstanding that is merely “formal”, in the sense of “without content”,
such an interpretation would be incorrect. Kant makes it clear that
“the logical use” or “the formal act” of the understanding is that which
is operative even when representations derived from the senses, including
empirical concepts, are combined in a consciousness.21 Thus I agree with
Longuenesse when she says that “by [logical use of the understanding]
Kant meant, not the use of the understanding in logic, but the use of
the understanding for empirical knowledge, […]”22 This is confirmed by
the example given in the quoted passage, “the stone is hard”, which is
an empirical judgment and in which the logical forms are said by Kant
to be employed indeterminately. As we shall see, in the Prolegomena,
Kant uses the phrase “a logical connection of perceptions”23 to refer to
that kind of relation of representations that is merely “subjectively
valid”, i. e., “empirical” and “contingent”.
When, on the other hand, the categorical form of judgment is em-
ployed in such a way that it is determined which of the two concepts is
to function as the subject and which is to function as the predicate, the
understanding follows the rules of a transcendental logic, in which the
logical form (the relation between the subject and predicate) becomes
the category of substance and accident. Thus, when the category is em-
ployed, the two concepts in the judgment “bodies are divisible” may
not “interchange their logical functions”; as Kant explains, “Through
the category of substance, […] if I bring the concept of a body under it,
it is determined that its empirical intuition in experience must always
20 MAN, AA 04: 475.
21 This view appears to agree with Longuenesses interpretation, according to
which, the logical forms of judgment are “the forms of analysis of what is
given in sensibility (Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 11). In fact, she also speaks
of “the empirical use of logical functions of judgment” (Ibid., 194, and also 27).
However, for Longuenesse, there are different stages at which the logical forms
function for different purposes, whereas the account given in the present paper
focuses merely on the role of the logical forms in combining concepts into a
judgment (or the role they play in the first part [or sections 15 to 20] of the
B-Deduction). I discuss Longuenesses interpretation below.
22 Longuenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 71.
23 Prol AA 04: 298. My emphasis.
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be considered as subject, never as mere predicate; and likewise with all
the other categories.”24 Moreover, it is only when the logical forms are
employed determinately, that is, as categories, that cognition of an object
results; the two concepts in the judgment “the stone is hard”, for exam-
ple, are connected not merely in thought but also “in the object”: “I rep-
resent to myself in the object as determined that the stone in every pos-
sible determination of an object, and not of the mere concept, must be
thought only as subject and the hardness only as predicate, […]”25 It fol-
lows that when the logical forms are employed merely indeterminately,
the concepts are connected only in thought but not “in the object”.
Kant contrasts “the logical use of the understanding”26, in which the
logical forms of judgment are employed indeterminately, with “the tran-
scendental use of the power of judgment”27, which involves “the sensible
condition under which alone pure concepts of the understanding can be
employed, i. e., the schematism of the pure understanding”.28 In Reflec-
tion 593329 Kant also says that “the Schematism shows the condition
under which an appearance is determined in respect to a logical function
and, therefore, stands under a category”.30 In other words, it is the provi-
sion of the schema (or “the transcendental time-determination”) that
makes possible the determinate as opposed to the indeterminate employ-
ment of the logical forms of judgment.31
For Kant, “the act of the understanding” or judging, as it is consid-
ered by transcendental logic, is nothing other than the act of determining,
that is to say, of delimiting, restricting, or specifying that which general
24 KrV, B 129. See also KrV, A 245 f.
25 MAN, AA 04: 475.
26 KrV, B 128: “der logische Gebrauch des Verstandes”.
27 KrV, B 167: “der transzendentale Gebrauche der Urteilskraft”.
28 KrV, A 136/B 175
29 Dated 1776 to 1789
30 Refl. AA 18: 392. Quoted in Allison, Henry: Kant	s Transcendental Idealism.
New Haven 1983, 176.
31 See also KrV, A 139/B 178 and A 664/B 692. Allison (Kant	s Transcendental Ide-
alism. New Haven 2004, 152) contrasts “the logical use” with “the real use” of
the understanding. But, as he admits, Kant mentions this distinction only in
the Inaugural Dissertation (MSI AA 2: 394, 386). In the Transcendental Analytic
of the Critique of Pure Reason, however, whereas Kant does use the expression
the logical use”, “he does not use the expression [the real use]” (474, note 46).
In fact, in the Critique of Pure Reason the expression with which Kant contrasts
“the logical use of the understanding” is “the transcendental use of the power of
judgment”.
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logic leaves indeterminate, namely, the manner in which the concepts in a
judgment are to relate to one another, or more specifically, with regard to
the categorical form of judgment32, which concept is to function as the
subject and which concept as the predicate.
II. Logical Forms and Consciousness in the Transcendental Deduction
Before delving into the passages in which the significance of understand-
ing the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate employ-
ment of the logical forms of judgment becomes clear, I would like to clar-
ify the status of the categories that the foregoing interpretation supports. I
have argued that the logical forms of judgment can be employed either
indeterminately or determinately, and that it is only in the latter case
that they are employed as categories. This implies that whether the logical
forms will be employed as categories or not depends on what Kant calls
“the act of the understanding”, that is to say, the act of judging. This in-
terpretation differs from the received view regarding the categories. Ac-
cording to this view, the categories exist even before the activity of judg-
ing is carried out, so that “the categories are just concepts that make the
logically distinct forms and components of judgment applicable to our in-
tuitions”, or that “categories are supposed to describe twelve different
ways of conceiving of objects that are necessary in order to make the
twelve different logical functions of judgment applicable to them”.33
Such a view is questioned, however, by Beatrice Longuenesse, whose in-
terpretation seems to agree with the one I am supporting. She notes that:
the categories, as full-fledged concepts, […] are in no way prior to the activ-
ity of judging. On the contrary, they result from this activity of generating
and combining concepts according to the logical forms of judgment. […]
one should not be misled into supposing that the categories are concepts
ready to be applied prior to the activity of judgment. Such an interpreta-
tion is incompatible with Kants consistent opposition to innatism of repre-
sentations.34
32 As we shall see, Kant also explains how the hypothetical form of judgment (If p
then q) can be employed determinately and indeterminately. Prol, AA 04: 311 f.
and KrV, B 233 f.
33 Guyer, Paul: Kant and the Claims of knowledge. Cambridge 1987, 132, 134.
34 Longuenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 199.
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Although Loguenesses interpretation differs from mine in some details
(which I note below),35 both interpretations emphasize the necessity of
the activity of judging for the generation of the categories. This idea
will be operative in my analysis below of the distinction between subjec-
tive and objective unity of consciousness, and the distinction between
judgments of perception and judgments of experience.
One of the most intriguing and at the same time controversial views
that Kant tries to defend in the Transcendental Deduction sections of the
Critique of Pure Reason is that cognition of an object or an objective
judgment is impossible without the unity of apperception or of self-con-
sciousness.36 Since it is in these sections that Kant brings together his
theory of judgment and his views on consciousness,37 it is these sections
that I shall focus on in this paper. The sections in question are those in
the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that lead to the conclu-
sion which Kant himself identified (at B 159) as the goal of “the transcen-
dental deduction of the categories”, that is, section 15 to section 20. These
are the sections that many, though not all, commentators (following Diet-
er Henrichs suggestion) refer to as “step one” of the deduction.38 What I
shall focus on in these passages is the role the difference between the de-
terminate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judg-
35 In fact, Longuenesses view is complex. She notes that the categories are the log-
ical forms before “synthesis of what is given in sensibility” is carried out, but the
logical forms themselves “govern the synthesis” (Kant and the Capacity to Judge,
12).
36 KrV, B 130–143. I restrict my examination to Kants views elaborated in the B-
deduction, for, as I am mainly concerned with the relation between judgment
and consciousness, it is in the B-Deduction (but not in the A-Deduction) that
Kant makes explicit the mediating role that judgment plays between the catego-
ries and the unity of apperception. There are in fact also passages in the A-De-
duction that lend support to my interpretation. For example, at A 106–107, even
though he does not explicitly mention the act of judging, Kant says that “empir-
ical apperception” (as opposed to “transcendental apperception”) is only “the
determination of our state in internal perception … forever variable”. I thank
Bryan Hall for pointing this out.
37 Allison (Kant	s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven 2004, 176) notes that the
incorporation of the account of judgment in section 19 of the B-Deduction “con-
stitutes a major improvement over the A-Deduction, which attempted to relate
apperception to the categories and the latter to experience without explicitly re-
ferring to judgment”.
38 “Step two” consists of section 21 to section 26. For a discussion of Henrichs view
and of this issue, see Allison, Henry: Kant	s Transcendental Idealism. New
Haven 2004, 160–62.
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ments plays in Kants account of the relation between consciousness and
the act of judging.
Few recent commentators have discussed this role. This is surprising
given that the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate em-
ployment of the logical forms of judgment is noted and alluded to by
Kant himself throughout the sections that make up the first step of the
B-Deduction. In fact, the paragraph that immediately precedes section
15,39 which is the section that begins the whole of the B-Deduction, is
the paragraph that we examined above, namely, the one in which Kant
explains the distinction.40 The significance of this passage, with which
Kant prefaces the whole of the B-Deduction, becomes evident once we
realize that this explanation is reiterated in section 20, in which the con-
clusion of the entire first step of the deduction is stated:
That act of the understanding […] through which the manifold of given rep-
resentations (whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an
apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments (§ 19). There-
fore all manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical intuition, is deter-
mined in regard to one of the logical functions for judgment, by means of
which, namely, it is brought to a consciousness in general. But now the cat-
egories are nothing other than these very functions for judging, insofar as
the manifold of a given intuition is determined with regard to them (§ 13).41
What Kant emphasizes in this passage is that it is through the act of judg-
ing that the manifold of representations is brought to “an apperception in
general”, and the ways in which this act is carried out are the categories,
which are nothing other than the determinate ways in which the logical
39 This paragraph is contained in the section titled “Transition to the transcenden-
tal deduction of the categories”, to which Kant apparently forgot to assign a sec-
tion number. Most editors insert “Section 14” into the text. The paragraph was
added in the second edition.
40 KrV, B 128 f.
41 In his text of the Critique (Berlin 1911), Benno Erdmann, following Hans Vai-
hinger, most likely realizing that Kant says nothing about the logical functions
determining the manifold of intuition in §13, emends the text by replacing
“§13” with “§10”. But Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Critique of Pure Reason.
Cambridge 1997, 727, note 41), perhaps noticing that Kant says nothing of the
kind in §10 either, and finding justification for Kants reference to §13, defend
their decision to leave it as it is in their text. In my view, it seems obvious,
and I think the readers will see clearly, that Kant should have referred to §14
(not §13 or §10), since the statement in the passage in section 20 is practically
repeated in section 14. But as we know that Kant forgot to assign a section num-
ber to this section, it makes sense that Kant could only have referred to “§13”.
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forms of judgment are employed. But, as we already know from section
14, the same logical forms can also be employed indeterminately, in
which case the manifold of representations will be brought, not to “the
pure apperception” but to “the empirical apperception” (B 132).42 This
means that, although in the quoted passage from section 20 all that
Kant points out is the fact that the categories are nothing other than
the logical forms of judgment as they are employed determinately, as
we proceed to examine those sections that precede and lead up to section
20 (namely, sections 15 to 19), it is crucial to keep in mind what he also
points out in the quoted passage from section 14, namely, that the same
logical forms of judgments, through “the logical use of the understand-
ing”, can be employed indeterminately, and that when they are so em-
ployed, the representations are connected only “subjectively” or “empir-
ically”, i. e., not “in the object” (B 142).
The point that there needs to be a determinate use of the logical
forms or a “determinate relation” of representations in order for there
to be a cognition of an object is emphasized by Kant throughout the B-
Deduction sections. To show this, I would now like to run through briefly
each of the six sections that make up “step one” of the B-Deduction,
namely, sections 15 to 20.
Kant begins the deduction in section 15 by identifying what he calls
“combination” as “the action of the understanding”, which, in turn, is
equated with “synthesis” (B 130). As we find out later in section 19,
this act of combining or unifying, or of synthesis, is nothing other than
the act of judgment (B 142). And, as we also find out in sections 19
and 20, this act involves the employment of the logical forms of judgment,
which, as Kant has already made clear in section 14, can be employed de-
terminately or indeterminately.
In section 16, this act of synthesis is tied to the unity of apperception
or of self-consciousness (B 133–136). In order for a manifold of represen-
tations to be a manifold at all, it must be combined in one consciousness.
But in order for a subject to be conscious of its own identity, it must
(somehow) be aware of its own act of combining the manifold of repre-
sentations into a unity (hence, “the synthetic unity of apperception”).
Thus, the unity of consciousness is impossible apart from the synthesis
42 Or so I shall argue below, following Jrg Freudigers suggestion. In the Prolego-
mena Kant distinguishes between “consciousness in general” and “a conscious-
ness of my state” or “a consciousness in one subject only” (Prol AA 04: 304). Cf.
KrV, A 106–107.
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of the manifold of representations, and the synthesis of the manifold of
representations is impossible apart from the unity of consciousness.
Then, in section 17, Kant argues that the synthetic unity of appercep-
tion is required for the representation of objects; for, “an object” is pos-
sible only when the manifold of intuitions are unified or synthesized
under a concept. But since representations can be unified only if they
are combined in one consciousness, the unity of apperception is necessary
for the representation of objects. Kant then notes that “cognitions” con-
sist in “the determinate relation of given representations to an object”
(B137), or that “a determinate combination of the given manifold” is
what gives rise to a “cognition of an object” (B 138). Thus a cognition
arises not from a mere combination or relation but from a determinate
combination or relation of representations; and when we remember
what Kant says in section 14 (namely, that the logical forms of judgment
can be employed determinately or indeterminately), representations can
also be combined indeterminately, the result of which is explained in the
next section.
In section 18, Kant distinguishes between a “combination of repre-
sentations” that is merely “subjective”, “empirical”, and “contingent,
and a combination of representations that is “necessarily and universally
valid”. This distinction is also linked to the distinction between what Kant
calls “subjective” and “objective unity of consciousness”, and between
“the empirical unity of apperception” and “the objective unity of self-
consciousness” (B139–140). Kant notes that the empirical unity of apper-
ception “has merely subjective validity” because its unity “depends on the
circumstances, or empirical conditions”; and under such conditions “one
person combines the representations […] with one thing, another [person]
with something else”, that is to say, they are not combined determinately.
Its unity, therefore, is “not […] necessarily and universally valid” (B
140).43 Thus, from Kants claim in section 14 that the categories are noth-
ing other than the determinate ways in which the logical forms are em-
ployed, it may be inferred that what Kant calls a merely “subjective”
and “empirical” connection of representations can be equated with a con-
nection that is not “a determinate relation of representations to an ob-
ject”, that is, a merely indeterminate relation of representations.44
43 Cf. KrV, A 106–107.
44 In this section, Kant also says that “the empirical unity of apperception […] is
derived only from the [transcendental unity of apperception], under given con-
ditions in concreto, […]” This claim would seem to challenge my thesis, accord-
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In section 19, we learn that the act of synthesis by means of which the
manifold of representations is united in one consciousness is nothing
other than the act of judging. In other words, apart from the activity of
judging, no manifold would be unified, and thus no representations
would represent anything “for me”, and I could not become conscious
of my own identity. A “judgment” is defined as “the way to bring given
cognitions to the objective unity of apperception” (B 141). As Kant
tells us, this means that in a judgment (so conceived) the representations
are combined “in accordance with principles of the objective determina-
tion of all representations insofar as cognition can come from them,
[…] [my emphasis]” (B142). A judgment, in other words, “is a relation
that is objectively valid”, which, as Kant emphasizes, is a relation through
which “two representations are combined in the object” and not merely
in the “subject” (B 142).
And finally in section 20, Kant says that “the act of the understand-
ing” is nothing other than “the logical function of judgments”, and that
it is through this act that “the manifold of given representations” is
ing to which the two kinds of apperception, empirical and pure, underlie two
kinds of judgments or two ways of relating representations, one subjective and
the other objective; for, Kant seems to be saying that the empirical unity is
somehow dependent on or made possible by the transcendental unity of apper-
ception. I make two points in response. First, this claim has been regarded by
many commentators as obscure; Kant does not make clear how the one apper-
ception can be “derived from” the other. Allison, for example, in dealing with
this difficulty, suggests that the notion of empirical apperception and its subjec-
tive unity is not clarified until sections 24 and 26, that is, in “step two” of the B-
Deduction. However, Allison concludes his discussion of the latter sections by
noting that Kants statements therein lead us to an “interpretative dilemma”
that “cannot be avoided”. Indeed, Allison suggests as one horn of the dilemma
that “Kant himself was unclear about both the nature and scope of the argu-
ment” (Allison, Kant	s Transcendental Idealism, New Haven 2004, 183–185,
198–201). The second point is that in spite of its obscurity Kants claim has
prompted many commentators to adopt what some have called the “top-
down” approach to interpreting Kant, in which one moves from the categories
and pure apperception to sensible representations and empirical apperception,
an approach that often downplays or even ignores completely those passages
in Kants writings that would seem more comprehensible and meaningful
when the “bottom-up” approach is adopted instead, such as those passages in
sections 18 to 21 of the Prolegomena, which I discuss in detail below. Although
some of the difficulties will remain unresolved, by analyzing and examining
some of the crucial terms that Kant uses consistently in his writings, I hope to
make connections that will shed some light on Kants view of the relation be-
tween logical forms and consciousness.
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“brought under an apperception in general” (B143). The categories are
nothing other than these logical forms of judgment as they are employed
in such a way that intuitions are “determined” with respect to them (B
143). Since the categories are nothing other than the ways in which I per-
form the act of judging, it follows that every manifold of intuition is sub-
ject to the categories.45
Considering the views that are implicit in the arguments of the B-De-
duction summarized above, however, a problem arises. Kant appears to
be saying that whenever a manifold of representations is unified in one
consciousness, there is a relation of representations to an object, or in
other words, a cognition of an object. But this cannot be right, since
Kant also speaks of a combination of representations that is merely “sub-
jectively valid” and “contingent”. Indeed, as we saw above, Kant makes it
clear in sections 16, 18, and 19, that there is a distinction between “pure”
and “empirical” apperception, between “subjective” and “objective unity
of apperception”, and between a “subjectively” and an “objectively
valid” relation of representations respectively. As Allison points out,
however, although Kant makes clear what “a subjective unity” is not,
namely, a unity brought about by the act of objective judging, he does
not clarify what “a subjective unity” is. This prompts Allison to bring
up what he calls “the problem of subjective unity”.46 I will return to
this problem in the next part of the paper where I will also propose a sol-
ution. There is another problem, however.
The account of judgment given in the B-Deduction, particularly in
section 19, seems to contradict the account of judgment given in the Pro-
legomena. In section 19, as we recall, a judgment, by definition, is a rela-
tion that is “objectively valid”. In other words, a relation that is merely
subjectively valid cannot be regarded as a judgment at all. In the Prole-
gomena, however, Kant distinguishes between two kinds of judgment,
“a judgment of perception”, which is said to be “subjectively valid” be-
cause the representations combined in it hold only “for me” but “not
for everyone else”, and “a judgment of experience”, which is said to be
“objectively valid” because in it the representations are combined not
only “in the subject” but also “in the object” (or they hold not only
45 For a fuller and more detailed exposition, see Allison, Henry: Kant	s Transcen-
dental Idealism. New Haven 2004, 163–178. I have relied on Allisons interpre-
tation for many of the points mentioned in the summary.
46 Ibid., 178 f.
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“for me” but also “for everyone else”).47 Moreover, Kant says that a judg-
ment of experience is “objectively valid”, while a judgment of perception
is merely “subjectively valid” because, he maintains, whereas the catego-
ries are involved in a judgment of experience, they are not involved in a
judgment of perception.48 Since the sections in the Prolegomena in which
the distinction between the two kinds of judgment is elaborated (namely,
section 18 to section 21) is supposed to correspond to (and indeed, to rep-
resent for Kant a more accessible version of) the transcendental deduc-
tion sections in the Critique of Pure Reason (section 15 to section 20),
it is natural for the reader to assume that the distinction between the
two kinds of judgment introduced in the Prolegomena corresponds to
the distinction Kant introduces in the Critique between “subjective”
and “objective unity of apperception”. But this assumption is called
into question by the discrepancy that seems to exist between the two ac-
counts. This apparent discrepancy along with Kants statement that a
judgment of perception does not require the categories has led many
commentators to question the validity of Kants notion of a judgment
of perception.49
Most commentators have dealt with this problem by suggesting that
Kant abandoned the account that he gives in the Prolegomena (1783)
in favor of the account that he gives in the B-Deduction sections in the
Critique of Pure Reason (1787), which, they argue, he introduced to re-
47 Prol AA 04: 298 f.
48 Prol AA 04: 297 f.
49 Lewis White Beck (“Did the Sage of Kçnigsberg Have No Dreams?” In: Essays
on Kant and Hume. New Haven 1978, 50–1) argues that judgments of percep-
tion, no less than judgments of experience, require the categories inasmuch as
they succeed in “telling a connected story, even if it is false”; Henry Allison
(Kant	s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven 1983, 151), says that “the denial
of any role for the categories in judgments of perception is […] problematic”;
Paul Guyer (Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge 1987, 100, remarks,
“It is often asked how the initial distinction [between judgments of perception
and of experience] is to be reconciled with Kants view that the unity of apper-
ception, thus apparently any form of self-consciousness itself, entails the use of
the categories. How can judgments of perception express any form of self-con-
sciousness, yet not use the categories?” Jrg Freudiger (“Zum Problem der
Wahrnehmungsurteile in Kants theoretischer Philosophie.” Kant-Studien 82,
1992, 420 f.) puts the problem thus: “Nun droht der Einwand, daß Wahrneh-
mungsurteile qua urteile auch dann gem
ß der Urteilstafel verknpft werden
mssen, wenn sie nicht objektiv sind, und daß sie daher die Kategorien voraus-
setzten. Widerlegt dies die Mçglichkeit der Wahrnehmungsurteile?”
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place the Prolegomena account.50 The problem with this suggestion, how-
ever, is that it would be plausible only if the distinction between judg-
ments of perception and judgments of experience was never to be
found in texts written after 1783. But this is not the case.51 What is
more, a number of recent commentators such as Allison and Longuenesse
have tried to show that the two accounts do not contradict one another,
that the account in the B-Deduction is consistent with that in the Prole-
gomena, and that therefore it was not Kants intention to replace the lat-
ter account with the former account.
Very few of the commentators, however, have focused on the role the
logical forms of judgments play in these works, particularly with respect
to the manner in which they are employed in the act of judgment. I
shall argue that when Kants distinction between determinate and inde-
terminate employment of the logical forms of judgment is taken into con-
sideration, a possible way to show the consistency between the two ac-
counts of judgment can be found.
My aim is to show that the distinction between these two ways in
which the logical forms of judgment can be employed in the act of judging
is connected to the distinction between what Kant describes as a relation
of representations that is “subjectively valid” and a relation of represen-
tations that is “objectively valid”, and between what he calls “subjective”
and “objective unity of consciousness” or between “empirical” and “pure
apperception”. Moreover, textual evidence exists in the Prolegomena that
supports the interpretation, according to which, the distinction between a
judgment of perception, which is “subjectively valid”, and a judgment of
experience, which is “objectively valid”, is meant to be understood in con-
nection to the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate
employment of the logical forms of judgment. If this interpretation can
be shown to be correct, we draw closer to understanding how the account
of judgment in the Prolegomena and the account of judgment in the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason can be seen to be consistent with one another.
In section 18 of the Prolegomena, Kant says that there are two kinds
of empirical or synthetic a posteriori judgments: judgments of perception
and judgments of experience. As we have already seen, Kant says that
50 For example, see Beck, Lewis White: “Did the Sage of Kçnigsberg Have No
Dreams?”, 50 f., and Kitcher, Patricia: Transcendental Psychology, 158–60.
51 For example, Log AA 09: 113, 608, and Reflection 3145 (1790s). See Allison,
Henry: Kant	s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven 2004, 481, n. 46, and Lon-
guenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 188–192.
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judgments of perception are “subjectively valid”, while judgments of ex-
perience are “objectively valid”. In section 20, Kant explains that “a judg-
ment of experience” requires a connection of representations that is
based on the “subsumption” of an intuition “under a pure concept of
the understanding”: “it is requisite that the perception should be sub-
sumed under [a “pure”] concept of the understanding.”52 Kant explains
the function of such a concept: it “serves to determine the representation
subsumed under it, with respect to judging in general” or it “determines
the form of judging in general relatively to the intuition”.53 In section 21a,
Kant says that a pure concept of the understanding “can be nothing else
than that concept which represents the intuition as determined in itself
with regard to one form of judgment rather than another”; it is “a concept
of that synthetical unity of intuitions which can only be represented by a
given logical function of judgments”.54 In a judgment of experience,
therefore, a pure concept of the understanding determines an intuition
subsumed under it with regard to one of the logical forms of judgment.
In other words, the logical forms of judgment in all judgments of experi-
ence are employed determinately, that is to say, so as to refer to an object
of intuition.55
A judgment of perception, on the other hand, requires “only the log-
ical connection [der logischen Verknpfung] of perception in a thinking
subject”56. In section 21a, Kant says again that a judgment of perception
requires, not a pure concept of the understanding, but a mere “sensuous
intuition and its logical connection [die logische Verknpfung] in a judg-
ment”57. Kant does not explain what he means by a “logical connection”
here. Various interpretations of this phrase have been proposed. Patricia
Kitcher modifies the word “logical” to “[psycho]logical”, so that it reads,
“the [psycho]logical connection of perception”.58 This is understandable
given that what Kant seems to be referring to in the passage is a connec-
tion that is more than merely “logical” (in the sense of “without con-
tent”), and yet at the same time merely subjective and empirical. Howev-
er, the word “logical” may mean something different here. Jrg Freudiger
says, “Kant scheint also davon auszugehen, dass wir beliebige Vorstellun-
52 Prol AA 04: 301.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 304.
55 See also §39, Ibid., 324.
56 Ibid., 298.
57 Ibid., 304.
58 Kitcher, Patricia: Kant	s Transcendental Psychology, 159.
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gen sozusagen mechanisch gem
ss der Urteilstafel miteinander verknp-
fen kçnnen”59. I think this is closer to Kants meaning. Henry Allison
seems to agree. He says that judgments of perception “do not make
use of the categories, though, […] they involve the logical functions”60.
If, however, Freudiger and Allisons interpretation is correct, that is
to say, if all that Kant means to say in using the phrase a “logical connec-
tion of perception” in describing the nature of a judgment of perception is
that all such judgments involve the logical forms of judgment, then we are
faced with a puzzle. Kants categories are commonly defined as “the log-
ical forms of judgment as applied to intuitions”.61 Indeed, in some passag-
es Kant himself describes the categories in this way.62 But if this is how we
are to understand the nature of the categories and nothing further is said
about it, then we are forced to conclude that a judgment of perception, no
less than a judgment of experience, involves the categories, since, if a
judgment of perception involves the logical forms, then, since such a judg-
ment is synthetic and a posteriori (or empirical), the logical forms in-
volved would have to be applied to intuitions, which is just to say, on
the view of the nature of the categories just mentioned, that they are
used as categories. But this directly contradicts Kants claim that judg-
ments of perception do not require the categories.
Faced with such difficulties, commentators have responded in a num-
ber of ways. Allison, for example, suggests that Kants real position is that
the categories do, in fact, govern judgments of perception as well as judg-
ments of experience. For example, after stating that judgments of percep-
tion involve the logical forms of judgment, Allison remarks that “the
change from a judgment of perception to a judgment of experience
does not involve a change in logical form”63. But, as has just been
noted, if Allison is right, then we are forced to conclude that the catego-
ries are involved not only in judgments of experience but also in judg-
ments of perception. But why, then, does Kant say in the Prolegomena
that judgments of perception do not involve the categories?
In response to this question, Allison suggests that in the Prolegomena
Kant neglected to point out the fact that judgments of perception, no less
than judgments of experience, are governed by the categories, because of
59 Freudiger, Jrg: “Zum Problem der Wahrnehmungsurteile”, 420.
60 Allison, Henry: Kant	s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven 2004, 179.
61 See note 8.
62 For example, KrV, B 128–29, and Prol AA 04: 311, 54.
63 Allison, Henry: Kant	s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven 2004, 480, no. 39.
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the different method of presentation used by Kant in the Prolegomena
(namely, the analytic method) from that used in the Critique of Pure Rea-
son (namely, the synthetic method) as well as of their respective goals.
The neglect, says Allison, “is attributed to [the Prolegomenas] particular
goal and method rather than to any philosophical confusion or doctrinal
change on Kants part”.64 This is not, however, in my view, entirely con-
vincing, since it fails to explain why, then, Kant apparently goes out of his
way in the Prolegomena to point out that judgments of perception do not
involve the categories, and that they are “subjectively valid” and not “ob-
jectively valid” because the representations combined in them are not
“subsumed under” the pure concepts of the understanding. If Kant inten-
tionally wanted to shy away from mentioning (for reasons methodologi-
cal65 or otherwise) that the categories are also involved in judgments of
perception, then he probably would have refrained from stating, as he
does so bluntly and more than a few times, that such judgments do not
require the categories.
Jrg Freudiger offers another interpretation. He maintains as Allison
does that the logical forms of judgment are involved in both judgments of
perception and judgments of experience. As was noted above, however,
this brings up the difficulty that both kinds of judgments must then be
considered as involving the categories, which Kant explicitly denies. As
Freudiger explains the difficulty, “Nun droht der Einwand, dass Wahrneh-
mungsurteile qua urteile auch dann gem
ss der Urteilstafel verknpft
werden mssen, wenn sie nicht objektiv sind, und dass sie daher die Ka-
tegorien voraussetzten. Widerlegt dies die Mçglichkeit der Wahrneh-
mungsurteile?”66 To solve this difficulty, Freudiger argues that whereas
judgments of experience involve the “schematized” categories, judgments
of perception involve only the “unschematized” categories. So, according
to Freudiger, when Kant says that only a “logical connection of percep-
tion” is required for a judgment of perception, or that a pure concept
of the understanding is not required for a judgment of perception, Kant
means that “das Wahrnehmungsurteil setzt keinen schematisierten Ver-
64 Ibid., 182.
65 Moreover, Kants statement that the Prolegomena employs the analytic method
while the Critique of Pure Reason employs the synthetic method, while common-
ly accepted, has been questioned and even challenged by some commentators.
See my “analytische/synthetische Methode”: In Kant-Lexikon. Eds. Georg
Mohr, Jrgen Stolzenberg, and Marcus Willaschek. Berlin (forthcoming).
66 Freudiger, Jrg: “Zum Problem der Wahrnehmungsurteile,” 420 f.
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standesbegriff voraus”.67 In order to support his interpretation, Freudiger
argues that there are no fewer than three ways in which the categories can
be applied in judging, and that while all three ways are involved in judg-
ments of experience, only two are involved in judgments of perception.
The first way is as “Urteil berhaupt”, the second way consists in “die ei-
gentliche Anwendung der schematisierten Kategorie”, and the third way
is as the condition of the “Synthesis der Apprehension”, which “Wahr-
nehmung […] voraussetzt”68. The third way, according to Freudiger, is
elaborated by Kant only in the Analytic of Principles sections in the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason. While Freudigers interpretation is interesting, his
claim that the categories can be applied in three different ways in judging
would raise some questions and perhaps even doubts. His view, however,
that judgments of perception involve unschematized categories is sugges-
tive (and it also enables him to come up with a solution to the difficulty in
question), and I would like to return to it later on.
Beatrice Longuenesse proposes an interpretation that is not dissimi-
lar to Freudigers. According to Longuenesse, the logical forms of judg-
ment are operative in both a judgment of experience and a judgment
of perception, but because the latter involves what she calls “the empiri-
cal use of the logical functions of judgment”, such a judgment does not
“entitle us to consider” the representations connected therein as “sub-
sumable under the corresponding categories”69. Thus, Longuenesse main-
tains that Kant “distinguishes the logical connection [of perception]”
which is involved in a judgment of perception, from “the full-fledged ap-
plication of the category”, which is involved in a judgment of experi-
ence.70 In fact, Longuenesse proposes an interpretation of Kants account
of judgment that is similar to the one that I have given above. She notes
that, for Kant, not every judgment requires the use or the “application” of
the categories, “even when judgments […] apply to objects of a sensible
intuition”71. To illustrate her point, she refers to the paragraph in section
14 of the Critique of Pure Reason (B 128) that I discussed above, the para-
graph in which Kant distinguishes between the determinate and indeter-
minate employment of the logical forms of judgment. Having quoted the
passage, Longuenesse comments, “To be sure, this text is not easy to in-
67 Ibid., 420.
68 Ibid., 421.




terpret. But at least it unambiguously shows that the relation of subject
and predicate in a judgment does not always express one of substance
and accident. The same holds for all other categories. I will develop
this point in detail in part III.”72 Longuenesse discusses the passage in
the context of defending Kants metaphysical deduction of the categories
against the criticisms raised against it by such authors as Jonathan Ben-
nett and Paul Guyer. But she discusses the passage mainly in connection
to the second part or “step two of the B-deduction, particularly section
26, as well as the Schematism chapters, and the Analytic of Principles.
She thus misses the opportunity to discuss the passage in connection to
the first part of the B-deduction, namely, sections 15 to 20, in which
Kant explains the role of judgment and how it relates to the unity of con-
sciousness.
Thus, although she does speak of “a merely logical standpoint” in
addressing Kants reference in B 128 to “the merely logical use of the un-
derstanding”, the distinction between the two ways of employing the log-
ical forms of judgment is not thematized by Longuenesse. In fact, even
though she devotes the whole first chapter of her book to elaborating
what Kant calls “the logical use of the understanding” in the Inaugural
Dissertation (1770), she does not provide as detailed an account of the
same term “the logical use of the understanding” as it is used by Kant
in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787). So, for exam-
ple, Longuenesse says that “the logical use of the understanding” in the
Inaugural Dissertation signifies that use of the understanding by virtue
of which mere “appearances” (apparentia) are turned into “experience”
or “phenomena” (phaenomena). Longuenesse then argues that this dis-
tinction between mere “appearances” and “experience” corresponds to
the distinction that Kant later makes in section 14 of the Critique of
Pure Reason between object as “appearance” (or as “the indeterminate
object of an empirical intuition”) and object “as an object”, i. e., object
as “corresponding to intuition”. Thus, according to Longuenesse, the
term “the logical use of the understanding” as it is used by Kant in the
Inaugural Dissertation denotes the understandings use “in the empirical
generalization of our sensible representations” or “the subordination of
sensible representations under common concepts”.73 What Longuenesse
does not emphasize, however, is the fact that in the second edition of the
Critique of Pure Reason, and in the very section that Longuenesses men-
72 Ibid., 79, n. 13.
73 Ibid., 26
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tions, namely, section 14, Kant says, “in regard to the merely logical use of
the understanding, it would remain undetermined which of these two con-
cepts will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that
of the predicate [my emphasis]” (B 128). In other words, in this passage,
Kant defines “the logical use of the understanding” as that use of the un-
derstanding in which the logical forms of judgment are employed indeter-
minately.74
In sum, Allison, Freudiger, and Longuenesse all construe (correctly, I
believe) Kants statement that a judgment of perception requires only
“the logical connection of perception” as the claim that the logical
forms of judgment are involved in all judgments of perception. What
they do not seem to recognize, however, is that the phrase “logical con-
nection” can best be comprehended if it is understood in connection to
what Kant calls in section 14 of the Critique of Pure Reason “the logical
use of the understanding”, which Kant takes to involve the indeterminate
employment of the logical forms of judgment, that is to say, the logical
forms of judgment as they are employed in such a way that “it would re-
main undetermined which of [the] two concepts [in a judgment] will be
given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the pred-
icate”.75
This interpretation avoids the difficulty mentioned above. It is true
that the logical forms of judgments are involved in both judgments of per-
ception and judgments of experience. On this interpretation, however,
this fact does not give rise to the difficulty in question, namely, that the
categories would then be involved in both kinds of judgments (which
Kant denies) because the way in which the logical forms of judgments
are employed in the two kinds of judgment are not the same: in judg-
ments of perception, the logical forms are employed indeterminately (in-
volving a mere “logical connection of perception”), while in a judgment
of experience they are employed determinately, i. e., as categories. In
other words, in judgments of perception the logical forms of judgment
are employed but indeterminately. This also means that what makes a
judgment of perception “subjectively valid”, or in other words, what
makes “the connection of perception” in such a judgment to be valid
only “in a consciousness of my state, without reference to the object”76,
74 See also KrV, A 245 f.
75 KrV, B 128
76 See Prol 04: 299 f., and also KrV, B 142.
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is the indeterminate (as opposed to the determinate) manner in which the
logical forms of judgment are employed.
That a judgment of perception involves an indeterminate employ-
ment, while a judgment of experience involves a determinate employ-
ment of the logical forms of judgment is confirmed in two passages,
one in the Prolegomena and the other in the second edition of the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason. In these passages, Kant uses the hypothetical
form of judgment as an example, while in the passages we examined
above he uses the categorical form of judgment as an example. In his dis-
cussion of the concept of cause in section 29 of the Prolegomena, Kant
writes:
We are first given a priori, by means of logic, the form of a conditional judg-
ment in general; that is, we have one cognition given as antecedent and an-
other as consequent. But it is possible that in perception we may meet with
a rule of relation which runs thus: that a certain appearance is constantly
followed by another (though not conversely); and this is a case for me to
use the hypothetical judgment and, for instance, to say if the sun shines
long enough upon a body it grows warm. Here there is indeed as yet no ne-
cessity of connection or concept of cause. But I proceed and say that, if this
proposition, which is merely a subjective connection of perceptions, is to be
a proposition of experience, it must be seen as necessary and universally
valid. Such a proposition would be that the sun by its light is the cause of
heat.77
Kant makes it clear in this passage that the logical form of judgment –
here, the hypothetical form – is involved in a judgment of perception as
well as in a judgment of experience. The way in which it functions in
each of the two kinds of judgment, however, is different; in judgments
of perception, the hypothetical form is employed so as to make possible
a “subjective connection of perceptions,” whereas in judgments of expe-
rience, it is employed so as to make this connection “necessary and uni-
versally valid.” In the Second Analogy of the Analytic of Principles of the
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant specifies more precisely in what this differ-
ence consists. In the following passage, Kant explains that the hypothetic
form of judgment can be employed either indeterminately or determi-
nately:
Now connection is not the work of mere sense and intuition, but is here
rather the product of a synthetic faculty of the imagination, which deter-
mines inner sense with regard to temporal relations. This, however, can
combine the two states in question in two different ways, so that either
77 Prol 04: 311 f.
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one or the other precedes in time; for time cannot be perceived in itself, nor
can what precedes and what follows in objects be as it were empirically de-
termined in relation to it. I am therefore only conscious that my imagination
places one state before and the other after, not that the one state precedes
the other in the object; or, in other words, through the mere perception the
objective relation of the appearances that are succeeding one another re-
mains undetermined [my emphasis]. Now in order for this to be cognized
as determined [my emphasis] the relation between the two states must be
thought in such a way that it is thereby necessarily determined which of
them must be placed before and which after rather than vice versa [my em-
phasis]. The concept, however, that carries a necessity of synthetic unity
with it can only be a pure concept of the understanding, which does not
lie in the perception, and that is here the concept of the relation of cause
and effect, […]78
In this passage we learn that the hypothetical as well as the categorical
form of judgment can be employed in two ways: in a judgment of percep-
tion the hypothetical form is employed so as to leave “undetermined”
which of the two states is to “precede” and which is to “follow” the
other; while in a judgment of experience the hypothetical form is em-
ployed so as to determine “which [state] must be placed before and
which after rather than vice versa,” or which “state preceded the other
in the object” (B 233–34). And this is why a judgment of perception
merely “expresses a relation of two sensations to the same subject, that
is, myself, and that only in my present state of perception”79. A judgment
of experience, on the other hand, in which the hypothetical form is em-
ployed determinately, i. e., as the category of cause, expresses this relation
objectively or as determined “in the object.”
When the quoted passage from the Critique of Pure Reason is read
side by side with the quoted passage from the Prolegomena, it becomes
clear that the distinction Kant makes in the latter between “a subjective
connection of perceptions” and a connection that is “objectively valid” or
“necessarily and universally valid”80 is meant to be understood in connec-
tion with the distinction Kant makes in the former between “indetermi-
nate” and “determinate” employment of the logical forms of judgment.
In other words, we now have textual support for the crucial link that
we assumed above that Kant makes. For Kant, the distinction between
the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of
judgment underlies the distinction between a judgment of perception
78 KrV, B 233–34.
79 Prol 04: 299.
80 Prol 04: 312.
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and a judgment of experience. But we also know that for Kant a judgment
of perception is “subjectively valid” because in such a judgment the con-
nection of representations, as merely “empirical” and “contingent”, is
valid for “a consciousness in one subject only”,81 while a judgment of ex-
perience is “objectively valid” because in such a judgment the connection
of representations, as “necessary and universal”, is valid for “a conscious-
ness in general”.82 Thus, from these connections it can now safely be in-
ferred that the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate
employment of the logical forms of judgment is also meant to be under-
stood in connection to the distinction between what Kant refers to as “a
connection” of representations that is “subjectively valid” and a connec-
tion of representations that is “objectively valid”. Indeed, these distinc-
tions help us to comprehend the distinction between a judgment of per-
ception and a judgment of experience in a way that makes it possible
to show the consistency between the account of judgment given in the
Prolegomena and the account of judgment given in section 19 of the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, to which I now turn.
In this section, Kant defines a judgment as “a relation that is objec-
tively valid”.83 While one might so construe this definition as to rule
out any possibility that there could be such a thing as “a judgment of per-
ception”, which, Kant says, is “subjectively valid”, once we take into con-
sideration the distinctions we established above and the fact that these
distinctions are elaborated by Kant and play a significant role not only
in section 19 but throughout the sections that make up the first part of
the B-Deduction (sections 15 to 20), it no longer becomes implausible
to hold the two accounts of judgment to be consistent with one another.
For example, in section 19, Kant also defines a judgment as “the way to
bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception”.84 But Kant
contrasts what he calls here “the objective unity of apperception” with
what he calls “a subjective unity of apperception” in section 18.85 “The
subjective unity of apperception”, in turn, corresponds to what Kant
calls “the empirical unity of apperception”, which is said to “have only
subjective validity”.86
81 Prol 04: 304.
82 Prol 04: 300.
83 KrV, B 142
84 KrV, B 141.
85 KrV, B 139.
86 KrV, B 140.
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Given all this, and given also that in section 19 Kant provides an ex-
ample of both a relation of representations that is merely “subjective
valid”—“If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight”—and a relation
of representations that is “objectively valid”—“It, the body, is heavy”—
and given that these two judgments are strikingly similar to the examples
of the two kinds of judgment that Kant gives in the Prolegomena—“if the
sun shines on the stone, it grows warm” is the example of a judgment of
perception, and “the sun warms the stone” is the example of a judgment
of experience—the fact that Kant does not actually use the phrase “a
judgment of perception” in section 19 may not be as significant as the
fact that the kind of relation of representations that such a judgment is
said to represent in the Prolegomena, namely, a relation that is “subjec-
tively valid”, “empirical”, and “contingent”, is precisely what Kant de-
scribes in section 19 of the B-Deduction in order to distinguish it from
a relation that is “objectively valid”. Freudiger is, therefore, justified in
concluding that, if Kant wants to define a judgment that is “objectively
valid” as “nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the ob-
jective unity of apperception”, as he does in section 19,87 then “wir
koennten daher in Analogie zum […] zitierten Satz aus B 141 nun
sagen: ein Wahrnehmungsurteil ist nichts anderes als die Art, gegebene
Wahrnehmungen zur subjektiven Einheit der Apperzeption zu bringen.”88
Thus, the fact that Kant did not actually use the term “a judgment of per-
ception” in section 19 to describe the kind of relation involved therein
may not be as detrimental to Kants account as some commentators
have thought.
Now, we have already seen that, according to Freudigers interpreta-
tion, the difference between the two kinds of judgment that Kant distin-
guishes in both the Prolegomena and the B-Deduction in the Critique of
Pure Reason, namely, between a “subjectively valid” and an “objectively
valid” judgment, consists in the fact that whereas the “subjectively valid”
judgment (the judgment of perception in the Prolegomena) involves
unschematized categories, the “objectively valid” judgment (the judgment
of experience in the Prolegomena) involves the schematized categories.
On Freudigers interpretation, then, it is because the unschematized cat-
egories are not full-fledged categories that Kant says in the Prolegomena
that a judgment of perception “does not require a pure concept of the un-
derstanding”; in fact, “die Bemerkung, dass das Wahrnehmungsurteil nur
87 KrV, B 141.
88 Freudiger, Jrg: “Zum Problem der Wahrnehmungsurteile,” 427 f.
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subjektiv gltig (Prol. 298) sei, ist gleichbedeutend mit: die Wahrneh-
mungsurteile bedrfen keines reinen Verstandesbegriffs (ebd.).”89 As
we have already seen, Kant says that “the sensible condition under
which alone pure concepts of the understanding can be employed” is
the “schematism of the pure understanding”.90 This seems to confirm
Freudigers interpretation, according to which, a judgment in which the
pure concept of the understanding is not required is a judgment that in-
volves, not the schematized, but the “unschematized” categories.
What Freudiger does not seem to recognize, however, is that, for
Kant, the provision of the schema (or “the transcendental time-determi-
nation”) makes possible not merely the use of “a pure concept of the un-
derstanding” understood in the sense of “schematized categories”, but
more specifically, a determinate as opposed to merely indeterminate em-
ployment of the logical forms of judgment. In the Critique of Pure Rea-
son, for example, Kant says that “the actions of the understanding [i.e.,
judgments], […] apart from the schemata of sensibility, are undetermined
[…]”.91 Moreover, in Reflection 5933,92 Kant says, “the Schematism shows
the condition under which an appearance is determined in respect to a
logical function and, therefore, stands under a category”.93 Thus, for ex-
ample, Freudiger notes that there are three ways in which the categories
can be involved in a judgment, and that in a judgment of perception only
two of the three ways are involved (whereas all three ways are involved in
a judgment of experience), namely, their function as “judgment in gener-
al” and as “the condition of the synthesis of apprehension”, which is de-
scribed in the Analytic of Principles. The third function, namely, as the
schematized categories, is not involved in such judgments.
Apart from the difficulty of comprehending how there could be three
ways in which the categories can function in judging, what Freudiger
leaves out in his account is the fact that the logical forms of judgment,
which are involved in all judgments without exception, can be employed
either determinately or indeterminately, and that the application of the
categories, for Kant, is equivalent to the determinate employment of
the logical forms of judgment. As the quoted passages indicate, it is the
89 Ibid., 422.
90 KrV, A 136/B 175.
91 KrV, A 664/B 692.
92 Dated 1776 to 1789
93 Refl AA 18: 392, quoted in Allison, Henry:Kant	s Transcendental Idealism. New
Haven 1983, 176.
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difference between these two ways of employing the logical forms that
Kant is concerned with in his account of the schema, which, he says,
alone makes possible a determinate (as opposed to a merely indetermi-
nate) employment of the logical forms.
Beatrice Longuenesse proposes another way to reconcile the account
of judgment given in the Prolegomena with the account of judgment given
in section 19 of the Critique of Pure Reason. She argues that whereas in
the Prolegomena Kant opposes “two types of empirical judgments”, in
the Critique of Pure Reason he opposes “two origins of judgment”94.
Thus, “the Critique and the Prolegomena obey a different purpose”; she
explains:
In the Prolegomena, Kant distinguishes between two types of empirical
judgments. In the Critique, he shows what the combinations of our percep-
tions would be in the absence of a function of judging that we could consider
as original, what they would be if our judgments merely derived from em-
pirical associations. Then our representations would have no other connec-
tion than those derived from subjective associations, and the only adequate
formulation for these combinations would be such as if I carry a body, I feel
[a pressure of weight]. No combination would be adequately expressed by
it, the body, is heavy, since no combination would hold whatever the state
of the subject, that is, as a judgment of experience.95
In other words, as Longuenesse sees it, in section 19 of the Critique, Kant
is rejecting “Humean associationism”.96 In her view, Kant is not explain-
ing in this section the difference between two kinds of empirical judg-
ments, as he does in the Prolegomena, but rather, he is arguing that, if
the only way in which we could combine sensible representations were
through the associative (Humean) act of the imagination, no judgment,
in the Kantian sense, that is, in the sense of “expressing relation to an ob-
ject”97, could ever arise. Instead, all combinations would be “subjectively
valid”, resulting in skepticism.98 In the Prolegomena, on the other hand,
Kant is distinguishing between two kinds of judgments, both of which in-
volve the logical forms of judgments, and, therefore, both of which ex-
press “a relation to an object even if this form is filled in an empirical,
contingent, and (empirically) subjective manner [in a judgment of percep-
94 Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 188.





tion])”.99 On Longuenesses view, therefore, Kants “judgments of percep-
tion” are qualitatively different from Humes imaginative association of
perceptions, which could never be regarded as “a judgment” in Kants
sense.
Longuenesses interpretation hinges on her claim that, for Kant, “the
original”100 or “the normative”101 function of the logical forms of judg-
ment is “to express the relation of representations to an object”.102 This
definition, Longuenesse maintains, does not force us to reject Kants
“judgments of perception” which are “subjectively valid”, because even
if such judgments fail to “fulfill [this] function”,103 “our capacity to
judge carries within its very forms (the logical forms of judgment, speci-
fied according to quantity, quality, relation) the norms that drive us to
progress from judgments of perception to judgments of experience”.104
Thus, as “a potential judgment of experience”,105 a judgment of percep-
tion does require the logical forms of judgment, though it “adequately
fulfills its goal or immanent norm only in judgments of experience”.106
Whether or not such a characterization of the function of judgment
was what Kant had in mind when he distinguished between the two
kinds of judgment in the Prolegomena, Longuenesse is forced by her in-
terpretation to make a move that I believe is questionable. The examples
that Kant gives in section 19 of the Critique of Pure Reason of both a
“subjectively” and an “objectively valid” relation of representations—
viz., respectively, “if I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight” and “it,
the body, is heavy”107—appear to correspond exactly to the examples
that Kant gives in the Prolegomena of a judgment of perception, which
is “subjectively valid”, and a judgment experience, which is “objectively
valid”—viz., respectively, “when the sun shines on the stone, it grows
warm”, and “the sun warms the stone”.108 Given this, the most natural
way to construe these examples seems to be to regard them as formulat-
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valid” and an “objectively valid relation of representations” or judgments.
This natural reading, however, would have to be rejected on Longueness-
es interpretation, since, according to her interpretation, in section 19 of
the Critique Kant is using the examples to distinguish between “mere em-
pirical association”, which is not (and can never be) a judgment, and a
“judgment”, while in the Prolegomena, he is using the examples to distin-
guish between two kinds of judgments.109 She admits that “it is of course
tempting” to construe the examples in the two works as representing the
same distinction, “all the more so since Kant specifies that the meaning of
the objective form it, the body, is heavy, is that [the] two representations
are linked in the object, whatever the state of the subject, whereas the
formulation of empirical association, if I carry a body, I feel a pressure
of weight is said to hold only in my perception.”110 But she is forced
by her interpretation to resist this “temptation”.
The fact that Longuenesses interpretation forces us to reject this nat-
ural reading calls into question her interpretation. I believe that an inter-
pretation can be proposed that does not force us into such a conclusion
and that does not at the same time commit us to a far-fetched reading
of the passages in question. We can sustain the natural reading of the pas-
sages if we remember that in both accounts Kant speaks of “the logical
use of the understanding” (in the Critique) or “a logical connection of
perceptions” (in the Prolegomena), which he contrasts with “the tran-
scendental use of the power of judgment” (in the Critique) or with “a sub-
sumption of perceptions under the pure concepts of the understanding”
(in the Prolegomena) in order to elaborate the difference between the
two ways in which the logical forms of judgment can be employed, that
is, indeterminately and determinately respectively. On this interpretation,
the example that Kant gives of a relation of representations that is “sub-
jectively valid” in section 19 of the Critique, viz. , “if I carry a body, I feel a
pressure of weight”, will not have to be construed (as it would have to be
on Longuenesses interpretation) as a non-judgmental, merely “empirical
association” that is unrelated to the example that Kant gives of a judg-
ment of perception in the Prolegomena, viz. , “if the sun shines on the
stone, it grows warm”, of which Kant says not only that it is “subjectively
valid” but also that it is “merely a connection of perceptions within my
mental state, without reference to the object”.111 Compare the latter char-
109 Longuenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 187.
110 Ibid.
111 Prol 04: 300.
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acterization with the example of an “objectively valid” relation of repre-
sentations that Kant gives in section 19 of the Critique, viz. , “it, the body,
is heavy”, in which, he says, “the two representations are combined in the
object, i. e. , regardless of any difference in the conditions of the subject,
and are not merely found together in perception […]”112 On this interpre-
tation, we are not forced to deny what seems obvious since both exam-
ples, viz., “if I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight” (in the Critique)
and “if the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm” (in the Prolegomena),
can be regarded as instances of what Kant calls “subjectively valid” rela-
tions of representations that can, moreover, be regarded as judgments in-
sofar as they both involve the logical forms judgment as they are em-
ployed indeterminately, that is to say, as they are employed in such a
way that the representations are connected, as Kant notes, only in the
subject, though not “in the object”.
III. The Subjective Unity of Consciousness
If the foregoing interpretation is correct, we can conclude that what Kant
calls “the subjective unity” or “the empirical unity” of consciousness or
“empirical apperception” refers to that “unity” which results from the in-
determinate way in which representations have been combined, that is, in
such a way that the manner in which the concepts are to relate to one an-
other in the judgment has not been fixed or determined in ones con-
sciousness. In other words, for Kant, the representations being combined
or unified “subjectively”, “contingently”, and “empirically” is equivalent
to their being related to one another in accordance with the merely “log-
ical use of the understanding”, that is, in accordance with an indetermi-
nate employment of the logical forms. Unfortunately, Kant does not
make clear precisely how the kind of (self-) awareness that is involved
when the representations are combined merely subjectively or “only in
the consciousness of my state” differs from the kind of (self-) awareness
that is involved when the representations are combined not only in the
subject but also “in the object”. For example, Kant, as we saw, argues
in the Transcendental Deduction that self-consciousness is required for
cognition or objective judgment. Kant seems to be saying that we can
be conscious of our activity of combining or be conscious of the ways
in which the representations are being combined. But how are we to un-
112 KrV, B 143.
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derstand such a claim? Moreover, what is the nature of the state of our
consciousness when the representations are unified according to an inde-
terminate use of the logical forms, i. e., in such a way that “it is undeter-
mined which concept is to function as subject and which concept as pred-
icate”? As we have already seen, Kant does not explain how the “subjec-
tive unity” differs from the “objective unity” of consciousness, and, in
fact, his account seems to suggest (to our puzzlement) that any unification
of representations that is effected in one consciousness is an “objective
unity”. It can perhaps be suggested that, for Kant, even a relation of rep-
resentations brought about by, say, a mere associative (Humean) act of
the imagination constitutes a “unity”, since what he calls “the unity of
consciousness” or “the unity of apperception”, whether it be objective
or subjective, is impossible apart from the combining or synthetic activity
that is always carried out in accordance with the logical forms of judg-
ments. But such a suggestion still leaves us with some unanswered ques-
tions.
A few recent scholars have dealt with the question of the relation be-
tween apperception or self-consciousness and the act of judging in Kants
theoretical philosophy. Patricia Kitcher, for example, does discuss apper-
ception as it relates to judging,113 but she does not take into consideration
the role of the logical forms of judgment and the categories in her discus-
sion.114 Henry Allison also offers an account of the relation between con-
sciousness and the act of judging, but like Kitcher, he does not bring to
bear the role the logical forms and the categories play in this relation.
Nonetheless, I would like to examine Allisons account since it does
make reference to the notion of indeterminacy and since, if developed
further, it can help bring out another dimension in our comprehension
of this relation.
Allison says that Kants “conception of knowledge” commits him to
two views: one, “that judgment involves a synthesizing, unifying activity,
exercised upon the given by the understanding”, and two, “that it involves
113 Kitcher, Patricia: Kant	s Transcendental Psychology, 104–115.
114 Kitcher says, “[Kant] believes that the unity of apperception is brought about by
syntheses that are guided by rules associated with the categories. I omit this as-
pect, because it does not bear on the soundness of the reply to Hume [which is
her focus in the chapter] and because I do not believe that the arguments for cat-
egorically determined syntheses succeed” (Ibid., 105).
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a consciousness of this activity”.115 He suggests that judgment be con-
strued as “the activity of taking as”. He explains:
To judge is to take something as a such and such. In the simplest case, an
indeterminate something x is taken as an F. In more complex cases, Fx is
qualified by further “determinations”; for example, Fx is G (this cat is
black). […] in all these cases the mind must not only combine the items
(representations or judgments) in a single consciousness, it must also be
conscious of what it is doing. […] unless one is aware of taking x as an F
(recognizing it in a concept), one has not in fact taken it as such.116
Allison says that this “taking” is “a spontaneous, inherently self-conscious
activity of the subject”.117 He also characterizes this act of “taking as” as
“recognition”, that is, being “aware of taking x as an F” in a categorical
judgment or “the grasping of reasons as reasons” in reasoning or infer-
ence.118
Allisons account is highly suggestive. He specifies what it is that the
subject must be conscious of in the act of judging that leads to knowledge
and thus explains why Kant says that such judgments must involve self-
consciousness. What Allison does not incorporate in his discussion, how-
ever, is the role the logical forms of judgment plays in ones consciousness
of the act of judging. This is unfortunate given that Allison himself de-
scribes this act of judging, which he equates with the act of “taking as”,
as the act of determining, that is, in Allisons words, the act of taking
“an indeterminate something” as a such and such.119 In another essay,
for example, Allison says that “to judge is just to take some intuitively
given item or set thereof as a determinate something. [For example,] an
indeterminate something = x is taken as an F. Apart from or prior to
this conceptual determination, there is no content for thought.”120 I
have shown above that, for Kant, cognition of an object or objective judg-
ment (as opposed to a mere relation of representations that does not refer
to an object) requires the determinate employment of the logical forms.
In other words, nothing can be grasped as an object unless the logical
115 Allison, Henry: “Kants Refutation of Materialism.” In: Idealism and Freedom:






120 Allison, Henry: “On Naturalizing Kants Transcendental Psychology.” In: Ideal-
ism and Freedom, 61.
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forms are employed in such a way that the merely logical function that
orders the representations is fixed or specified in some way. The same
point can be made from the perspective of apperception. The possibility
of the unity of consciousness or apperception must be construed in terms
of the manner in which the logical forms are employed in the act of judg-
ing. Kant explains the state of consciousness in human cognition, whether
it is merely “subjective” or “objective” (that is, whether the representa-
tions are unified for one subject only or for all), in terms of whether or
not the subject succeeds, through the activity of judging, in fixing, delim-
iting, or determining, the content of thought. In other words, for Kant,
cognition and thus the objective unity of consciousness is impossible
apart from the act of making a particular or specific use of the general
forms of thinking that are available to human understanding.
Given all this, Allisons account seems to give rise to the following
problem. According to this account, the act of judging is equivalent to
the act of “taking as”, which he construes as the act of determining
that which was formerly “an indeterminate something”. Such an account,
however, will not be able to distinguish adequately the act of “taking as”
that represents a determinate, objective judgment from the act of “taking
as” that amounts to a merely indeterminate, subjective judgment. For ex-
ample, a judgment that results from a mere Humean, associative act of
the imagination may take the form of “taking” some item in experience
“as a such and such”. But this obviously would not count as an objective
judgment. So the problem is that as it stands it seems that Allisons ac-
count of judging as the act of “taking as” cannot explain how an indeter-
minate, subjective judgment differs from a determinate, objective judg-
ment. In other words, what Allisons account has to (but cannot) rule
out is the possibility that the act of “taking as”, understood as the act
of determining, be involved in subjective judgments.
Allison would reply that a Humean association is not a judgment at
all, and therefore, is not an instance of the act of “taking as”. But, as
we have already seen, for Kant, even a relation of representations that
does not refer to an object (including Humean associations as well as var-
ious species of what he calls “judgments of perception”) employs the log-
ical forms, though indeterminately and not determinately. In other words,
Kant allows for subjective judgments, in which (as we saw) the “unity” of
consciousness is said by Kant to be merely “subjective” or “empirical”
since, again, the logical forms employed therein are not fixed or deter-
mined for cognition of an object. In this connection, Longuenesse points
out, I believe correctly, that even those judgments that have the catego-
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rical form (S is P) can result from a mere associative act of the imagina-
tion:
The subjective unity [“of given representations”] emerges from the asso-
ciative combinations of imagination, which are dependent on the contingent
conjunctions of our representations. […] For example, a judgment such as
Bodies are heavy may be only the empirical generalization of a customary
association between impressions of weight and of carrying a body. If it ex-
presses nothing more than such a generalization, the correlation it expresses
is contingent.121
If my analysis is correct, one way in which Allisons account can be sup-
plemented is to provide an explanation as to how the kind of “taking as”
involved in a subjective judgment differs from the kind of “taking as” in-
volved in an objective judgment.
An account that includes such an explanation can be developed if Al-
lisons account is construed in the context of what I have shown above.
For Kant, there could simply be no act of “taking as”, if this act is con-
strued (as it is by Allison) as the act of determining, unless the logical
forms are employed determinately. The same point can be made in the
following way from the standpoint of apperception: Allison says that
the act of “taking as” involves at the same time a consciousness of this
activity. But if this activity is understood (as it is by Allison) as one of de-
termining that which was at first indeterminate, then the unity of con-
sciousness involved in such an activity is objective, not subjective; and
if so, this activity can take place only when the logical forms are employed
determinately. Kant makes it clear that what he calls “determinations”
(Bestimmungen) are not mere attributes, but “real predicates” (as op-
posed to merely “logical predicates”) or representations that refer to
an object.122 It is only in the Transcendental Deduction sections in the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason that the explanation is given of how such represen-
tations are possible at all. I have shown above that in these sections we
121 Longuenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 83. Of course, if this
judgment emerges from “the objective unity of given representations”, then it
is objectively valid, as Kant notes in section 19 of the Critique of Pure Reason.
Another example of an empirical judgment that could be either subjectively
valid or objectively valid is the one given in the passage from MAN discussed
above: “the stone is hard” (MAN AA 04: 475). Longuenesse discusses another
example of such judgments that Kant gives in the Prolegomena, “air is elastic”.
See Longuenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 84.
122 KrV, A 598/B 626
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learn that no representation can refer to an object unless the logical forms
are employed determinately.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, Allisons account can be devel-
oped further in an attempt to make clear Kants view of the relation be-
tween judgment and apperception. What the subject must be conscious of
in the act of judging, according to Allison, is the act of taking something x
as a such and such. But, since Allison himself describes this act as the act
of taking “an indeterminate something” as a such and such, that is to say,
as the act of determining, it would be more in line with Kants own views
if we say that what the subject is conscious of in the act of judging that
leads to cognition of an object is that a representation is grasped or under-
stood as a determinate or specific instance of a more general one. Kant
often explains the act of judging as involving such a relation of represen-
tations, namely, in terms of concepts or representations being brought
under or “subsumed under” more general or “higher” ones.123 The “high-
est” or the most general representations or concepts under which every-
thing that humans can cognize must be brought are, of course, the catego-
ries, which are nothing but the specific or particular ways in which the log-
ical forms can be employed. In other words, the only objects that can be
cognized by human beings are those that can be represented as specific or
determinate instances of ultimately what are the most general forms of
thinking available to us, namely, the logical forms of judgment.
Here one might object that, on my interpretation, the act of judging
would cover only analytic judgments in which the concepts are combined
in a genus/species relationship or in the manner of subordination or
super-ordination typical in the Aristotelian tradition. It would not (so
the objection would go) cover synthetic judgments in which not only con-
cepts but also intuitions (empirical or pure) are combined. In response to
this objection, we must recall that in section 20 of the B-Deduction, Kant
says that the logical forms of judgment are employed not only in combin-
ing concepts but also intuitions: Kant say that in applying “the category
of substance, […] if I bring the concept of a body under it, it is determined
that its empirical intuition [my emphasis] in experience must always be
considered as subject, never as mere predicate” (B 129). This means
that even when intuitions are combined or “subsumed under” the subject
concept, such combination is made possible by the logical forms (here,
the form S is P) being employed determinately. In other words, the in-
tuition is able to be brought under the concept of the subject at all be-
123 KrV, A 69/B 94
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cause it can be represented as a specific instance of a more general con-
cept (body), which in turn may be “brought under” a still more general
concept, and so on, though in the end the most general concept would be
the category. This interpretation is supported by a number of passages,
such as the following passage in the Critique of Pure Reason in which
Kant mentions the condition that must be met if objectively valid empir-
ical judgments are to be possible:
[Empirical laws] are only particular determinations of yet higher laws, the
highest of which (under which all others stand) come from the understand-
ing itself a priori, and […] must provide the appearances with their lawful-
ness and by that very means make experience possible.124
As Michael Friedman comments, “Only such […] [a] procedure, in which
empirical laws are successively determined by synthetic a priori principles
of the understanding, can explain how a judgment of perception can be
converted into a judgment of experience.”125 Every act of judging, then,
involves taking something as a determinate or specific representation of
a more general one. For Kant, cognition of an object is impossible
apart from such an act of determining. So what we must be conscious
of in the act of judging that leads to cognition of an object is the act of
determining, which should be understood not merely as the act of ascrib-
ing properties or “determinations” to “an indeterminate something”, but
more fundamentally, as the act of grasping or taking something as a spe-
cific instance of a more general representation, which, after all, is (as I
have shown) how Kant himself understands “the act of determining”,
and thus of the act of judging itself.
But what does it mean to say that the act of judging objectively is
equivalent to the act of determining in which I am conscious of the act
of grasping something as a specific instance of a more general represen-
tation? Wouldnt this mean that only logicians and philosophers can hope
to make objective judgments? To avoid this absurdity, it may be suggest-
ed that the awareness need not be explicit. Implicit awareness, recogni-
tion in retrospect (“after the fact”), or even awareness as a “second
order” act suffices. Thus, what is required is the capacity of the subject
to be conscious of the act of grasping such a relation.
124 KrV, A 126
125 Friedman, Michael: “Logical Form and the Order of Nature: Comments on Bea-
trice Longuenesses Kant and the Capacity to Judge.” In: Archiv fr Geschichte
der Philosophie 82, 2000, 202–215.
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We can now return to what Allison calls “the problem of the subjec-
tive unity of consciousness”, namely, the problem that while Kant does
make clear what “the subjective unity” is not, he does not clarify what
“the subjective unity” is. Taking into consideration the conclusions of
the analyses carried out above, we can say that “the subjective unity of
consciousness” is “subjective” because no object is cognized thereby. It
is a “unity” because in relating or unifying representations, the logical
forms are still employed (though only indeterminately). It is a “conscious-
ness” in the sense that what I am aware of is an indeterminate relation of
representations, that is to say, a relation in which a representation is not a
specific or determinate instance of a more general representation.126
126 I would like to thank Erik Anderson, Bryan Hall, and Marco Sgarbi for their




Determining the nature of transcendental apperception (hereafter TA) is
key to understanding Kants theory of consciousness. One of the intricate
problems with interpreting TA is the dual modal aspect of the famous
proposition that Kant puts forward at the beginning of the B-version of
the Transcendental Deduction of the categories (hereafter TD) in the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason.At §16, Kant writes that “the I thinkmust be able to
accompany all my representations”.1 Kant calls it a Grundsatz at B135.
* For their comments I should like to thank the audience at a seminar organized
by the Centre for Advanced Research on Logic and Sensibility in the Depart-
ment of Philosophy at Keio University, Tokyo, where a draft of this paper was
read in March 2010. Special thanks are due to Wolfgang Ertl who invited me
for the presentation. I also thank Christian Onof for his useful comments on
the penultimate draft. Parts of section 5 appeared earlier in an issue of South Af-
rican Journal of Philosophy (Schulting 2008). I thank the editor for his kind per-
mission to reuse this material here.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, translations from the Critique of Pure Reason are
from the Guyer/Wood edition (Cambridge University Press, 1998). The Critique
is cited in the standard way by means of the abbreviation A/B. The following ad-
ditional abbreviations for Kants texts are used:
AA = Kants Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Kçniglich Preußische (sp
ter: Deut-
sche) Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900- (Akademie Aus-
gabe).
Anthr. = Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (AA 7). Trans. V.L.
Dowdell. Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press,
1978, 1996.
Inquiry = Inquiry concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural The-
ology and Morality (AA 2). In Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770. Ed. and trans.
D. Walford. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 2003.
LM = Lectures on Metaphysics. Ed. and trans. K. Ameriks & S. Naragon.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 2001.
MAN = Metaphysische Anfangsgrnde der Naturwissenschaft (AA 4). Ed. K.
Pollok. Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1997.
Prol. = Prolegomena zu einer jeden knftigen Metaphysik (AA 4).
R = Reflexionen zur Metaphysik (AA 18)
E = 
ber eine Entdeckung nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft
durch eine ltere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll (AA 8).
The way the proposition is formulated is less straightforwardly analytic
than is usually thought by commentators. From the passage that follows
it seems that Kant thinks of this I think, or the cogito, as a kind of rep-
resentation. It is further identified by Kant as pure apperception or orig-
inal apperception (B132)2. As it appears, the I think is also closely linked
up with, if not identical to, what is called transcendental self-conscious-
ness or the unity thereof (B132 [AA 3: 109.3–4]). In fact, in the Transcen-
dental Aesthetic, at B68, Kant already identified “simple [einfache] rep-
resentation of the I” as “consciousness of self [Bewußtsein seiner Selbst]”
(trans. Kemp Smith). I think-consciousness, transcendental apperception
and self-consciousness are, for Kant, thus equivalent.
Trying to grasp the meaning of TA and the relation between the var-
ious designations for apperception is requisite in any serious analysis of
TD. However, despite numerous attempts at grappling with it no agree-
ment has yet been reached in the literature as to how we should under-
stand this proposition and how it bears on the general argument of TD.
In this article, I do not address the many complex issues involved in un-
derstanding TD, nor even all aspects of TA (see further Schulting 2008).
Due to space constraints, I also hardly talk about empirical apperception.
I will also not address the question how TA ties in with the derivation of
the categories from a principle, and so is part and parcel of the argument
concerning objective knowledge (see Schulting, 2012). I must also abstain
from talking about synthesis and its correlates (e.g., synthetic unity of
consciousness), although this is fundamentally important for fully under-
standing Kantian apperception.
Here, I am interested in answering two, relatively simple, but impor-
tant questions: (a) Does Kant allow first-order consciousness without sec-
ond-order consciousness, that is, does he allow for empirical conscious-
ness that is not transcendentally apperceived, and so not accompanied
by the I think, either in principle or de facto? In other words, is there
non-apperceptive consciousness for Kant? (b) If Kant allows for unac-
companied first-order consciousness, what is the status of this conscious-
ness? Is it in any way possible to be conscious of this consciousness? Or is
this first-order consciousness in some way a consciousness of which we
are and remain ex hypothesi unconscious? A related question, which is
independent of Kants arguments regarding the conditions for self-con-
2 Importantly, at A354 Kant identifies the I think as the formal proposition of
apperception, and at A400 he identifies the I and mere apperception [bloße
Apperzeption].
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sciousness, is whether Kant allows for unconsciousness strictius dicta, viz.
the total lack of consciousness, at all. I will touch on this in due course.
I approach these questions systematically rather than merely histori-
cally. I believe that TA itself provides sufficient ground for establishing
Kants position on unaccompanied or non-apperceptive consciousness.
An argument for the thesis that Kant either allows or doesnt allow for
non-apperceptive consciousness can be extracted from the positive argu-
ment for TA as an analytic principle. We need only look at the logical
ramifications of this principle to find such an argument. I do this in the
last section of the paper. Certain passages in the Critique and elsewhere,
e.g. a reference to Locke in the Anthropology, confirm this more oblique-
ly. Although I think that Kant is pretty consistent, it is clear that some text
passages, especially in the A-version of TD, might at first blush seem to
contradict the real possibility of non-apperceptive consciousness.3
1. Possible Construals of the I think-proposition
But before we get to the intricate bits, lets just start, innocently enough,
with trying out a few answers to the question how we should read the I
think-proposition at §16 (TA). At one extremity, one might want to
argue, as the great German Kant scholar Heinz Heimsoeth appears to
do4, that (1) TA concerns not merely cognitive acts or states, representa-
tions that have an epistemic value, but indeed comprises all possible rep-
resentations that I have or will have (or, more problematically, have had,
presumably implying that ones representational history is also involved).
In other words, all possible representations that a subject has must be re-
garded as primordially contained in the cogito ; presumably the unitary
self as “simple”, as Henrich has glossed it (Henrich 1976, 55 ff.), is eo
ipso formally implied in the manifold of all ones representations. Each
representation, being a mental state, uniquely exemplifies the cogito.
3 See esp. A108, A111–112, A116, A117n.
4 Heimsoeth 1966, 83n.115. Cf. Heimsoeth 1956, 235. For Heimsoeth the I think
does not concern “eigentliche Denkakte und Gedanken” only, but representa-
tions as such, in the sense of Cartesian cogitationes, indeed “alles was sich im Be-
wußtsein abspielt”. This latter equivocation poses problems. For Kant, the I
think would eo ipso accompany everything that can be thought by me (any cog-
itatio carries a cogito) but it would not accompany all types of representation.
Not all representations are cogitationes, for Kant. The pivotal question thus is
whether everything that occurs in consciousness is exhausted by thought acts.
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No representation an I effectively or possibly has (or indeed has had)
can fail to be accompanied by it. This is a notably strong reading of TA.
An importantly different approach could be (2) to emphasize that in
any case all representations must be able to be so accompanied, express-
ing the necessity of a possibility, whilst it is not the case that all of ones
representations need effectively be accompanied by such an I-thought.5
The emphasis is put on the difference between actual and possible reflec-
tive accompaniment. One could have representations that are not effec-
tively accompanied by, and thus not thereby explicitly contained in the
unity of, the I. This constitutes the major difference from view 1. How-
ever, according to view 2 representations must still have a real potential
for such accompaniment.6 In other words, representations have a disposi-
tion towards apperception. In this way, one believes to have attended to
the peculiar modal aspect that appears to be implied by Kants words
must be able.7
Or, slightly differently, (3) the proposition is taken to assert, analyti-
cally, that all my representations must stand under the condition under
which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations,
and thus can grasp them together as my own.8 Any representation that I
have I must be able, indeed cannot fail, to ascribe to myself as my own,
which shows up an analytic relation between the representation that I
have and the act that I ascribe it to myself. This view emphasizes the con-
ceptual truth of the relation between a representation and its necessary
subjective agent. The concept of representation is such that all represen-
tations are acts of representing that imply eo ipso an agent—the subject—
that does the representing.9 For this ability to be existentially possible
though, specific further material conditions should be met.
5 Cf. Allison 1996, 47. See also Allison 2001, 191, where Allison avers that the
principle of apperception implies that it must be possible that the I think ac-
companies all my representations, “not that it actually does so on every occasion.
It thus asserts the necessity of a possibility”.
6 This is suggested by Allison: “Thus, room is left in the Kantian scheme for intu-
itions that are not brought under the categories (though not for those that cannot
be brought).” (2001, 191; emphasis added) The phrase real potential is from
Ameriks 2000b, 243.
7 See also Heimsoeth 1966, 81 and 82n.112.
8 This is in fact, with omission of what turn out to be important appositions, Kants
definition of the analytic proposition (see B138). Cf. Guyers discussion of apper-
ception in Guyer 1980, 208–209.
9 Cf. Ameriks on the Act Theory of apperception in Ameriks 2000a, 250 ff.
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These three interpretations attend to different aspects of TA. View 1
implies that all representations that an I has (at any time and in any
sense) are primordially contained in the unity of consciousness—which
at §16 Kant calls the transcendental unity of self-consciousness—to be
at all ones representations. The transcendental unity is analytically im-
plied, as it were, in all of ones representations. This means that an exis-
tentially necessary unity of all of ones possible representational states
obtains, regardless whether it concerns past, actual or future states; it is
not clear whether subconscious representations are included as well. At
any rate, from the a priori unifiedness of representations in the unity of
consciousness one infers that all possible representations synthetically
constitute, as self-same representations, my self-consciousness. The aspect
of belonging, to which Kant alludes in this section, is emphasized.
Typically, some interpreters who take this interpretive path assume
that Kant believes that one necessarily has a priori knowledge of the iden-
tity of ones continual self, namely of ones identity through the transition
of ones representational states. This quasi-Cartesian interpretation of
identity has been attributed to Kant by, most prominently, Dieter Henrich
(1976; 1988; 1989), who also distinguishes between a construal of TD
starting from the unity of self as its premise as opposed to a construal
starting out from the identity of self as its premise. Furthermore, it re-
mains to be seen, apart from the apparent historical inexactitude of
straightforwardly aligning Kant with orthodox Cartesianism, whether
such a construal of the self indeed has its pedigree in Descartes notion
of the cogito itself rather than in some adulterated version of it. It doesnt
seem true to claim that Descartes, at least in theMeditations, believes that
I must be able to be continually aware of my identity as res cogitans. It is
in fact the lack of continuity between the instances of the cogito over time
which leads Descartes to postulate the need for a definite proof of Gods
existence as its eventual guarantor.
What I would like to emphasize here is, apart from the strong synthet-
ic reading, the patently conflationist view of consciousness and self-con-
sciousness, which differentiates this reading from other readings of TA.
It confuses the possessive and transcendental or epistemic unities of
consciousness.10 Note also that no effort is made to distinguish between
representing and thinking, surely not to be taken as identical modes of
mind; especially for Kant, sensibly representing is not the same as repre-
senting by means of conceptual thought. Most significantly, it appears
10 I owe these labels to Ameriks (see Ameriks 2000b: 281).
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that on this reading there could indeed be no episode of consciousness in
a subject that is not a representational state had by it as a selfsame subject
over time and who is self-aware of having this representational state
being his. By implication, on this reading any (possible) consciousness
is an instance of consciousness of ones unitary self-consciousness and
consciousness must thus be taken to be always already unified conscious-
ness. Crucially, then, this view simply confuses the conditions for psycho-
logical consciousness and the conditions for self-consciousness. Because
of this conspicuous feature, I will henceforth refer to view 1 as the Explic-
it Conflation Reading of apperception (ECR).
ECR: All possible instances of representation are existentially contained in
the unity of the self and, by implication, all episodes of consciousness are
eo ipso instances of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness.
Karl Ameriks has recently remarked with regard to this reading of apper-
ception that it reveals an ontological commitment to the extent that it is
“a claim not merely about how we are self-aware [but] already a claim
that we cannot exist except when self-aware in a certain way” (2000b:
250). ECR makes the intemperate claim that there is an existential entail-
ment between all possible representations that one has, and of which one
is ipso facto conscious, and the unity of self-consciousness. It is thus that
ECR assumes that there is a prior synthesis of all of ones possible repre-
sentations (past, present, and future) and that any occurring representa-
tion is just a manifestation of the self to which it synthetically belongs.
View 2 is less obviously committed to a strong synthetic argument
with respect to the existential unity of instances of ones consciousness
and would rather want to emphasize the conditionality of apperception.
That is, the accompanying of ones representations by the I think is
not an existential necessity but a logically necessary possibility for the
possibility of self-consciousness. This reading holds that some representa-
tions could in fact go unaccompanied by the I think, implying that as
such, as unaccompanied, representations are not contained in the tran-
scendental unity of consciousness. This means that these representations,
not being contained in the unity of consciousness, would effectively be
“impossible, or else at least […] nothing for me” (B132, emphasis
added), which should be interpreted as implying that those particular rep-
resentations are obscure, if not totally non-existent (contra Aschenberg
1988, 58). These obscure representations, which according to this view
do not amount to conscious representing, do have, in some sense, a causal
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influence on my behaviour.11 Unity of consciousness is nonetheless neces-
sarily entailed by all possible representations to the extent that all repre-
sentations must be regarded as at least capable of being unified by me as
the subject of those representations. This view is characterized by an em-
phasis on the necessary presupposition of apperception. In close connec-
tion with this claim it is claimed that apperception is a precondition or
supposition of all consciousness.
Representations cannot fail to possibly being accompanied. There is
thus a real potentiality for all my representations of being accompanied
by the I think; this potentiality is not a mere hypothesis but implies a
necessary entailment of apperception for all representations (it is not
clear what the conditions of satisfaction are for what is in the first in-
stance deemed a potentiality or possibility). Henceforth I call this view
the Necessary Entailment Reading of apperception (NER). NER is the
most widely accepted reading of TA.12
NER: All representations that I have have a real potential	 for transcen-
dental apperception, i. e. , a relation of necessary entailment obtains be-
tween all representations that I have and transcendental apperception to
the extent that representations must potentially, but need not effectively,
be accompanied by the I think.
This reading argues that for every instance of a representing A there is a
parallel instance of an I think-accompaniment B, and B is, as on ECR,
always already formally implied by, although not existentially instantiated
in, A (this constitutes a difference with ECR). This means that it isnt the
case that for any instance A there necessarily obtains an actual reflection
of the kind B, but it does mean that there can be no instance A that does
not already imply, formally, and so entail a possible instance of B.13 Un-
like ECR, NER holds that some representations that one has, and is in
the business of representing, could and sometimes do in fact go un-ac-
11 Cf. Allison 1983, 153 ff.
12 The idea behind of NER is captured by Pierre Kellers assertion that “any con-
nection that might hold between individual representations in a particular con-
sciousness must be such that it is consistent with the unifiability of those repre-
sentations in self-consciousness” (1998: 57), or, somewhat more ambiguously, by
his statement that “all representational content must have at least an indirect re-
lation to a possible self-consciousness in order to be a determinate representa-
tion at all” (1998: 19; emphasis added).
13 Cf. Henrich 1988, 58–59.
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companied by the I think. Some representations do exist without an I
think strictly speaking having been instantiated. Representations are
then not non-existent per se, but they are non-existent before the I
(cf. again B132). Logically, representations that do not instantiate the I
think do thereby not actualize the possibility of I think-accompaniment
and a fortiori do not exist as being so accompanied and are nothing for the
I.
A complication for NER arises: how does it account for the differ-
ence between unaccompanied and effectively accompanied representa-
tions if all representations must at least entail possible accompaniment?
What actualizes the effective accompaniment? That is, when is the I
think effectively instantiated and when not? Another complicating fac-
tor, and the most interesting for our purposes here, is that NER holds
that unaccompanied representations are eo ipso unconscious representa-
tions.14 NER regards apperception as a condition for consciousness tout
court, which thus must be fulfilled for representations to be conscious
representations. An amended version of NER, call it NER, allows con-
scious representing without any effective accompaniment by the I
think, that is, without any actual second-order consciousness of an I
or self reflecting on a first-order conscious mental state.15 However,
NER holds that no first-order conscious state can occur without at
least entailing the possibility of I think-accompaniment or self-con-
sciousness (this is the real potentiality or necessary entailment aspect
characteristic of NER).
NER: All representations that I have have a real potential	 for transcen-
dental apperception, i. e. , a relation of necessary entailment obtains be-
tween all representations that I have and transcendental apperception to
the extent that representations must potentially, but need not effectively,
be accompanied by the I think, and such representations as are not effec-
tively accompanied by the I think are not eo ipso unconscious.
View 3 is close to NER in the sense that it argues that a subject must be
capable of becoming conscious of his representations as his representa-
tions without always being self-consciously aware of his representations.
Alternatively put, apperception must be seen primarily as a subjects in-
14 See e.g. Allison 1983, 153; cf. Kitcher 1984, 117n.6 and 140; Pippin 1997, 41; Col-
lins 1999, 131.
15 This version of NER was suggested to me by Stephen Houlgate in discussion.
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fallible ability to self-ascribe representations as being part of the set of all
of his representations so self-ascribed. In Paul Guyers useful definition,
the apperception principle concerns the “conceptual truth that whatever
representations one ascribes to oneself must be ascribed to the same con-
tinuing set of representations to which belong all other representations
ascribed to oneself, in accordance with the rules for constructing such
sets” (1980: 208). This reading focuses on the analyticity of the principle
and rejects a priori synthesis out of hand. It is particularly in this sense
that view 3 differs from NER. It is also able to circumvent quasi-Cartesi-
an commitments to a priori knowledge of the self as a noumenal sub-
stance or to constancy claims regarding the self in terms of ECR.16 This
view of apperception is what has generally come to be known, mainly
through the achievements of P.F. Strawson,17 by the name of the theory
of self-ascription of representations. Hence, I refer to this interpretation
of apperception as the Self-Ascription Reading of apperception (SAR).
SAR: Any representation that one ascribes to oneself must be ascribable, in
conformity with certain a priori rules, to the same self to which one ascribes
all other representations.
These are three possible construals of TA, which emphasize different as-
pects of TA. Although two of the most prominent expositors of Kant,
Henrich and Guyer, have adopted it, ECR belongs to a minority view
and shall not be discussed further here.18 SAR is a view that is close to
NER, although it dismisses or neglects Kants argument for a priori syn-
thesis. It seems to me that for this reason alone SAR cannot be the right
interpretation of Kantian apperception. The received interpretation is
based on NER. Let me now expand on the implications of NER by look-
16 Guyer is peculiar in this respect. His interpretation of Kants apperception thesis
is a mix of ECR and the Self-Ascription Reading.
17 Strawson writes for example: “Unity of the consciousness to which a series of
experiences belong implies […] the possibility of self-ascription of experiences
on the part of a subject of those experiences; it implies the possibility of con-
sciousness, on the part of the subject, of the numerical identity of that to
which those different experiences are by him ascribed.” (1966: 98) See Schulting
2008 for my critique of Strawsons reading of Kantian apperception.
18 I discuss both Henrichs and Guyers philosophically illuminating positions on
the relation between apperception and the Deduction extensively in Schulting,
2012.
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ing at one of the best known latter-day accounts of apperception, namely
Henry Allisons, which I believe is a paradigmatic case of NER.19
2. Allison, NER and Representation
The important questions that NER must answer are: (1) In what does the
relation of a representation to TA consist? And (2) What is the relation
of consciousness to apperception? This second question is appropriate
given the fact that Kant has explicit recourse to the notion of self-con-
sciousness. With regard to the first question, one presumes, based on
the modality of the proposition, that it cannot be the case that, were
there no accompaniment of the I think, there would not even exist the
possibility of having representations. Rather, in the absence of an actual
accompaniment of the I think something could very well be represented,
albeit perhaps wholly indeterminately (at least in the cognitive or episte-
mic sense). Possibility works eo ipso both ways. If I think-accompani-
ment is a possibility, even if a necessary one, then logically it must also
be possible that it does not occur. However, although Kant stresses the
words be able in the dual modality of must be able, it should not be
ignored that the possibility of the principle appears to have a specific
quality: the proposition designates a necessary possibility. This might ap-
pear to contradict the possibility of the absence of I think accompani-
ment. Indeed, it suggests necessary entailment along the lines of NER.
On analysis, it will turn out that Kant means something altogether differ-
ent.
However, holding in abeyance an assessment of the implied necessity
of the I think-proposition (must be able), suppose that Kant indeed al-
lows that there is an actual occurrence of a mental state not being accom-
panied by the I think. As said, this does not eo ipso imply the absence of
representation tout court, which Kant appears to confirm in a subsequent
clause in §16 (AA 3: 108.21–22). This then appears to suggest that TA
must not be seen as designating a principle of representing tout court. Al-
lison, for one, seems to be saying the opposite. He writes: “We can infer
19 Other recent Kant expositors who, to a greater or lesser extent, espouse NER
are among others Kirkland 1989, 460, Klemme 1996, 192–194, Carl 1997, 154,
Keller 1998, 14 and, more recently, Beiser 2002, 145. See also the early Kitcher
in Kitcher 1984, 143–144. Cf. per contra Ameriks 2000a, 116; 244; 2000b, 247 et
passim and 1995, 221–223; and Brook 1994, 224.
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from the apperception principle that there can be no representation of
objects apart from the unity of consciousness, because without such a
unity there can be no representation of anything at all.”20 In defence of Al-
lison, one could rejoin (1) that, based on what Allison regards as the con-
ditions under which we can represent objects, Allison is merely saying
that no representation of an object is possible without the unity of con-
sciousness or apperception, for he means the “reflexivity of objective rep-
resentation” (Allison 1996, 60). And indeed this is what the passage fol-
lowing the above-quoted one appears to confirm. I have no quarrel with
such a view. Or one could rejoin (2) that what Allison means by the unity
of consciousness is merely the analytic unity of representations, without
which no representation (subjective or objective) could ever occur,
given that the I think must be able to accompany all of ones represen-
tations, whereas synthetic unity only pertains to representations taken to-
gether as having objective reference. I do not think Allison means the lat-
ter view, for he explicitly, and quite rightly, equates the unity of conscious-
ness with the transcendental unity of apperception, or the synthetic unity
of apperception, not just the analytic unity of consciousness.21
Crucially, Allison says, referring to Kants important qualification in
the same passage, that “the claim that a representation is nothing to
me means simply that I cannot represent to myself anything by it, not
that it is nonexistent” (Allison 1983, 137)22. I take the emphasis in the
subordinate clause to lie on “to myself”. A representation could certainly
be existent, even if the representation has no real epistemic value for me.
By implication, Allison appears to recognize that the relation between
representations and the I think cannot be an existential entailment rela-
tion. The latter clause in aforementioned quote from Allison (p. 146),
then, does not seem to imply that Allison has a general definition of rep-
resentation in mind, but rather a specific one. That what Allison under-
stands by a representation is to be taken as a representation in the
thick sense, a genuine representation of some object.
On this reading, Allison would have to agree with the claim that rep-
resenting as such, to wit, what he calls a “representation of anything at
all” short of a determinate object, is perfectly possible without presuppos-
20 Allison 1983, 146, emphasis added. Cf. Beiser 2002, 156. Also Kitcher 1984, 116–
117. Kitcher points to A116 for support. Cf. Kitcher 1982, 63–64, but compare
with ibid., 67. See also Pippin 1989, 45.
21 Allison 1996, 58.
22 Cf. de Vleeschauwer 1937, 98.
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ing TA. Indeed, at one point Allison rightly observes—in a note he refers
to Kants letter to Marcus Herz—that TA need not imply that I “cannot
have representations which are nothing to me cognitively speaking” (Al-
lison 1996, 47; emphasis mine). However, based on what he says in the
subordinate clause in the previously quoted text passage (1983: 146) I
am inclined to think that Allison believes that indeed having representa-
tions without explicit apperception is possible, but also that, if a represen-
tation is to have representational value (and not just remain hidden in the
inmost recesses of the mind), it must at least presuppose the possibility of
TA. That is, a genuine representation must at least have the potentiality
to be accompanied by a second-order act of reflexivity which gives it cog-
nitive value. Indeed, the implicit inference that Allison appears to draw
is: if any representation is impossible without at least presupposing apper-
ception, then a fortiori object-representation is impossible without it. Alli-
son, then, does appear to regard TA as the logical principle that governs
representation tout court after all, even if this does not mean that I must
always be explicitly aware of all my thoughts as mine.23 This view amounts
to NER.
23 See also Robert Pippins position in this. He writes: “Kant does indeed insist that
consciousness, construed as a representing activity, must be inherently reflexive
in order to be representative, genuinely to have objects. […] Or, stated in repre-
sentational terms, this means that there is no internal property of a mental states
occurring in me, and no property of that states real relation with other states,
that makes it a representation of X. For such a state to represent I must take
it up, unite it with other (or other possible) representations, and thereby self-
consciously represent X.” (1989: 45) Earlier (1982: 38) Pippin asserted, even
more explicitly, that “the senses do not represent at all, but only contain the re-
sults of the affection by objects on our senses […] and are constructed as repre-
senting only when so interpreted by the spontaneity Kant calls the understand-
ing.” Subjective representations are then actually not representations but “undif-
ferentiated subjective affects” (1982: 39). Note that, conversely, for Kant a rep-
resentation can be an object of other representations, as he argues in the Second
Analogy (B234–235=A189–190; see also A108–109); Kant says that “one can,
to be sure, call everything, and even every representation, insofar as one is con-
scious of it, an object”. This in itself does not settle the objective validity of rep-
resentations, for, as Kant says, “only what this word [i.e., object, D.S.] is to mean
in the case of appearances, not insofar as they are (as representations) objects,
but rather only insofar as they designate an object, requires a deeper investiga-
tion.” Pippins reasoning manifests a short argument with regard to the condi-
tions of object-representation. He confuses the empirical conditions of represen-
tational mental activity in a general sense and the transcendental constraints of
objectively valid representation. See Smit 2000, 239 ff. for an illuminating discus-
sion of B234–235=A189–190.
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It appears that Allison conflates not so much the difference between
the first-order activity of merely representing and the second-order activ-
ity of being reflexively aware of ones representations but two different
sets of conditions, i. e., the conditions for having representations and
the wholly different set of conditions for being aware of ones own repre-
sentations cognitively speaking, which he effectively conflates into one,
namely into the principle of transcendental apperception (TA) as that
which ostensibly governs representation tout court. Thus, although he
recognizes that one could be de facto representing without effectively ac-
companying ones representing (having explicit apperceptive awareness,
say), he also seems to think that the incontrovertible condition of the
very ability of representing as such is TA. This amounts to a confusion
of existential (or psychological) and transcendental conditions that is
characteristic of NER/NER. It also, I believe, contravenes the thrust of
Allisons own reciprocity thesis with respect to the intimate relation be-
tween the unity of consciousness and the constitution of objects (this is
a topic outside the scope of this article).
With regard to the second question: If I am not explicitly aware of my
representations as mine, but am merely having representations, in other
words, if apperception is not effectively instantiated, are the representa-
tions that I have conscious ones? In general, one would presume that rep-
resentational states that are not attended to by a second-order act of re-
flection are conscious states of mind regardless, based on the idea that
one must distinguish between first- and second-order consciousness.
The absence of second-order consciousness doesnt logically entail the ab-
sence of first-order consciousness. Allison disputes this (and I note that he
is not alone in this view), for he thinks that apperception is presupposed
for consciousness even of our subjective mental states (i. e. states that
have no cognitive, objective, value), hence for first-order consciousness.
Thus, one could not be conscious even of ones own mental states,
more precisely, be in a state of consciousness, unless TA is satisfied.24
24 Allison 1983, 153 ff. ; see also Allison 1996, 72–74. Cf. Kitcher 1984, 117n.6 and
140; Pippin 1997, 41. Collins is the most recent and clearest example of the idea
that for consciousness transcendental apperception is required. Collins dismisses
pre-synthetic consciousness on the grounds of the unintelligibility of the notion
of “conscious experience that precedes the emergence of consciousness” (Col-
lins 1999, 147). To apperceive means for Collins to be conscious, or indeed, “con-
scious experience is the ultimate product of this mental activity [viz. appercep-
tion, DS],” so that “we are not conscious of either the original representations”
(ibid., 108). Collins is right of course, if he means that one is not conscious of the
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Allison makes an ostensibly crucial distinction between representa-
tions and conscious representations. For consciousness of representations
to occur a further condition needs to be fulfilled, this condition being tan-
tamount to pure or transcendental apperception (TA). Apart from the
issue whether discriminating between representations and conscious rep-
resentations is germane to Kant, one might want to ask first: What are
representational or mental states, if not themselves episodes of conscious-
ness or states of awareness (of whatever magnitude), regardless of issues
that have to do with epistemic significance?25 Put negatively, does merely
subjectively valid experience consist of having representations of which
we are in no sense aware?26 Given that, according to Kant, it is not gov-
erned by pure apperception (B142), are we to believe that subjectively
valid experience consists in (necessarily) unconscious representation?
How, then, could representations still be accorded subjective value, as
modifications of the mind that have no objective significance, but which
may to a certain extent still be reckoned to amount to consciousness
(cf. B242=A197)?27
However, one might want to insist (and I take Allison to be insisting
on this line of thought) that representing as such, i. e., representing of
which I am not aware by virtue of a second-order act of apperception,
cannot be taken to be coextensive with consciousness. This is not as
odd as I may have made it appear, since presumably Leibniz thought
the same: perceptual states need not be conscious or apperceived states.28
Consciousness, then, is to be considered to be exclusively something of a
higher order, governed by the constraints of TA. Some conspicuous for-
mulations of Kants appear to imply that such a construal is justified.
already synthesized representations severally. Collins further emphasizes that
there is “no consciousness or experience at all apart from the functions of the
understanding” (ibid., 113; cf. ibid., 116). Or, even more clearly, Collins writes
that “[i]f we did not experience enduring, causally connected objects immediate-
ly, we would not have experience at all and could not even be conscious” (ibid.,
57; emphasis added).
25 I agree with Guyer here, who observes that the fact “that representations just are
impingements on consciousness, and thus cannot exist except as states of con-
sciousness, is incontestable” (1980: 209). Cf. Butts 1981, 266 and Brook 1994,
139.
26 Cf. Butts 1981, 260–261.
27 I should note that, properly speaking, one must differentiate between sentient
states such as feelings, representational states and sub-cognitive subjectively
valid experience respectively.
28 See Leibniz, Principes de la nature et de la grce, §4.
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Kant indeed appears frequently to equate consciousness and appercep-
tion (especially in the A-Deduction).29 Moreover, at times Kant appears
to suggest that for consciousness to occur, whether subjectively valid or
objectively real, a combination, more specifically, a synthetic act of the
imagination, should at least have taken place (see e.g. B233).
Now even if it were granted that, in general, first-order mental states
must ex hypothesi be empirically conscious states for them to be mental
states (existentially), someone reasoning in accordance with Allisons line
of thinking could still insist that for such states to be conscious states they
necessarily entail a second-order state (viz. , transcendental conscious-
ness).30 Proponents of NER (and I believe not Allison) might then fur-
ther qualify this requirement by maintaining that such representations
must be synthesized, in order to be conscious of them, but that they
29 Kant appears to identify empirical consciousness and the transcendental identity
of the self at A115–116. At A117n. he writes that it is “absolutely necessary that
in my cognition all consciousness belong to one consciousness (of myself)” (em-
phasis added). Also, at A350 Kant asserts that “consciousness is the one single
thing that makes all representations into thoughts, and in which, therefore, as
in the transcendental subject, our perceptions must be encountered”. See also
MAN 98 Anm. (AA 4: 542) and Metaphysik L2, AA 28: 584/LM 344. But see
R 5923 (AA 18: 386) and AA 28: 227/LM: 46, 47. For a less moderate concep-
tion of consciousness that might appear to give credence to NER, consider for
example a passage in Metaphysik Mrongovius, where Kant appears to hold
the view that the self of transcendental apperception is the condition of con-
sciousness: “Consciousness is the principle of the possibility of the understand-
ing, but not of sensibility. […] The self underlies consciousness and is what is pe-
culiar to spirit.” (AA 29: 878/ LM 247) Or, a few pages further on: “Inner sense
is the consciousness of our representations themselves. (Apperception is the
ground of inner sense).” (AA 29: 882/ LM 250–251) By this latter assertion
Kant seems to waver between granting inner sense some form of consciousness
independent of apperceptive consciousness (in conformity, it seems, with the
Critical doctrine of the distinction between inner sense and apperception
[B153]) and propounding the view that, if it is to amount to conscious represen-
tations, inner sense must have its ground in transcendental apperception, which
is the view of NER. Most probably following Baumgarten regarding inner sense,
the critical Kant however clearly distinguishes between inner sense and apper-
ception. Given that Baumgarten regards inner sense as “conscientia strictius
dicta” (Metaphysica §535), it seems justified to infer that Kant did not just con-
flate consciousness with apperception.
30 See Allison 1996, 76. Cf. Allison 1996, 72. Here, in a critique of Gurwitsch, Al-
lison appears to identify consciousness and the conditions for synthesis, for, as he
says, “the very act of bringing [a preconceptualized manifold] to consciousness
would necessarily subject it to determination by means of the categories.”
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may not effectively be accompanied by a reflective I think (they contra-
distinguish the synthetic and analytic unities of consciousness).31 In any
case, mental states that do not have a relation of entailment to transcen-
dental self-consciousness must be taken, it is argued, to remain hidden in
the dark recesses of the mind, indeed they would be, as Kant says at some
point, “but a blind play of representations, i. e., less than a dream”
(A112).32 A case can then be made for arguing, as we have seen Allison
do, that such states have no real representational quality (cognitively
speaking), to wit that they are without an object. Allison appears to in-
sist on this latter point, when he claims that by association nothing can be
represented, let alone represented consciously.33
However, apart from the question concerning consciousness, if that
latter claim is taken at face value, the following question crops up
again. What is it we do, in having representations which are not synthe-
sized in and by an act of apperception, other than associatively represent
somethings, “in a orderly fashion, as representations connected accord-
ing to empirical laws of association”, thus in the consecutive order in
which they are first prompted, that is, to be so disposed so as to pass
from one representation to another?34 We should be mindful that the no-
tion representation has a twofold meaning and can be differentiated into
representing and represented, so that every representing refers per def-
initionem to a represented. These can be further differentiated into rep-
resenting1 and representing2 and represented1 and represented2 re-
spectively. For sure, in the case of mere associative imagination the rela-
tion between a representation and a represented would remain epistemi-
cally opaque (being nothing to me) and could only be characterized in
terms of resemblance in the Humean sense (the one representation “im-
31 This has been suggested to me by Stephen Houlgate in discussion.
32 See L. W. Beck 1978.
33 Allison 1983, 154. See also his discussion of Gurwitschs interpretation of the
1789 letter to Herz, where Kant appears to suggest that atomistic consciousness
that accompanies associative successions of representations is possible; Allison
disputes this reading (Allison 1996, 72–74).
34 Kant in a letter to Herz (26 May 1789), AA 11: 52.10–15. Cf. Hume, Treatise, I,
Part I, section iv. Allison insists that by means of “a unity of representations pro-
duced by empirical causal factors (such as association) […] nothing is represent-
ed […] (or intended through) […], not even the subjects own psychological
state.” Further, in spite of Kants explicit words in the letter that I can be con-
scious of “each individual representation” when I merely associate, Allison
avers that “such a unity is […] not […] in any sense a mode of awareness.”
(1996: 74)
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mediately resembling, contiguous to, or the cause of the other”35). But a
representation would in this case still be a representation and be of some
significance to the representer (in some subepistemic sense).
As such, mere association would amount to representing representeds
without producing any referential content (R-Content) that does not col-
lapse into its presentational content (P-Content), hence without any in-
volvement of the unitary representation I think.36 To maintain, as Alli-
son appears to do, that in associatively representing nothing can be rep-
resented is effectively to divest the term representation of meaning.
Through association representeds are surely represented, namely repre-
senteds2 that are represented by representings2, in contrast to represen-
teds1 being the intentional objects of objectively valid representations,
representings1. Evidently, in the case of representeds2, representations
that draw forth other representations would lack, strictly speaking, genu-
ine R-Content. Instead, their representational quality (as representings)
or R-Content collapses into their P-Content and no objective reference
is made by these representations. But these associative representations
nonetheless represent. That is what representations do. The view that Al-
lison (and also Robert Pippin; see note 23 above) espouses on this score
is, I believe, not supported by the general thrust of Kants argument for a
distinction between subjective and objective significance (see again
A197=B242).
In the following section, I examine more closely the difference be-
tween having representations and being conscious of representations,
which presumably parallels the distinction between sheer representing
and consciousness tout court. This discussion bears directly on the issue
of the nature of the entailment relation between representations and
the I think, as well as on the parallel relation between consciousness
and transcendental self-consciousness.
35 Hume, Treatise, I, Part I, section iv.
36 I borrow this distinction from Kitcher 1999, 350–354. The referential content is,
as Kitcher writes, “what the mind is aware of through its representation” and
presentational content is “what it takes itself to be aware of through its represen-
tation”.
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3. Are Unaccompanied Representations Unconscious Representations?
I want to dwell on Allisons main point a little longer, viz., the claim that
a type difference must be made between having representations (being
properties of the mind or mental states) and being conscious of having
them, which presumably he understands to be the same as a second-
order reflexive or apperceptive awareness. Consider an ostensibly similar
position advanced by Georg Mohr (1991: 106 ff.), whose detailed view on
the matter appears to lend support to Allisons distinction. Mohr reflects
on the possible equivalence of representation and state of conscious-
ness (Bewußtseinszustand) or conscious content (Bewußtseinsinhalt).
He believes that these designations are not equivalent. If consciousness
were to be taken as equivalent to representation, Mohr reasons, having
a representation would indeed imply that one is eo ipso conscious of it.
It seems that, if representation were equivalent to consciousness this
would result in a surreptitious conflation of representing and apperceiv-
ing, which obviously cannot be true. It is then only appropriate to insist
that Kant, as Mohr puts it, “keine Bedeutungsgleichheit zwischen Vor-
stellung und Bewußtseinsinhalt angenommen [hat]” (107).37
Several reasons seem to corroborate Mohrs distinction and, hence, to
bear out Allisons position on this issue. First, Mohr refers to the Stufen-
leiter, which Kant provides at A320=B376–377, where it seems that Kant
holds that representation is not to be equated with consciousness. How-
ever, I believe reference to the Stufenleiter does not lend undeniable sup-
port to Mohrs view, for representation is to be taken as the genus of all
possible species of representation (perceptions etc.), and not itself an ac-
tual instantiation of it. The passage does not appear to imply the view that
a representation in general (that is, without being a representation with
consciousness, i. e., perception) actually exists as modification of the
mind—as Kant says, “a perception that refers to the subject as a modifi-
37 Also Ameriks (2000b: 109) stresses that representation must not be taken to be
equivalent to or coextensive with consciousness. I take it that Ameriks does so
because he wants to warn against an all too quick identification of consciousness
and pure apperception and specifically against Reinholdian speculations regard-
ing the principle of consciousness as a presumed basic ground of cognition (cf. de
Muralt 1958, 25, who appears to adopt the Reinholdian view). See further Amer-
iks 2000b, 238 ff. on what he calls the Strong Apperception Theory (SAT). In
many ways, Ameriks critique of SAT is similar to my critical account of NER.
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cation of its state is a sensation” (ibid.).38 This would appear to mean that
a perception is the minimally instantiatable form of representation for a
mind such as ours. Thus, since any perception is a representation with
consciousness, a sensation is eo ipso always conscious, and hence, any ac-
tual representation, regardless of whether it is objectively or merely sub-
jectively valid, is at least a minimally conscious representation. Given that
representations as modifications of the mind must always have a psycho-
logical content of some intensity for them to be mentally real (cf. A197), I
believe one cannot consistently argue on the basis of the Stufenleiter that
there are representations that have no consciousness attached to them.
The second, systematic, reason Mohr adduces is that, as Mohr writes,
“Aufnahme ins Bewußtsein [ist] eine Zusatzbedingung, unter der eine
Anschauung stehen muß, um allererst als bewußte Vorstellung, als Vor-
stellung vor uns gelten zu kçnnen”; and further: “Eine Anschauung
(sinnliche Vorstellung) erfllt also die Bedingung, bewußte Vorstellung
zu sein, nicht schon an sich.”39 Mohr thus asserts that consciousness is
the very condition under which a representation can count as a conscious
representation, a representation for us. Apparently, Mohr reasons that it
would be logically nonsensical to claim to be consciously representing
without the condition for consciousness having been fulfilled. Thus,
Mohr rejects the possibility that “A […] kein Bewußtsein davon [hat],
daß es Bewußtsein von X hat” on the grounds that it entails a contradic-
tion. He notes: “Wenn A sich nicht bewußt ist, daß in ihm X vorgestellt
wird, dann ist A sich X nicht bewußt.”40 Mohr appears to mean that hav-
ing no second-order consciousness that one has a representation implies
that there can be no first-order consciousness either.41 If this is what he
means, I believe Mohr commits a fallacy here, which consists in the as-
sumption that consciousness for me and consciousness per se are
equivalent. Presumably, he wants to emphasize that it is trivially true
that to be conscious of x is not not to be conscious of x. But it appears
that he understands the notion of consciousness as being already in itself
attentive consciousness, that is, consciousness before the subject or the
I, although elsewhere he carefully separates intransitive from appercep-
tive consciousness. One should pay heed that the fact that one does not
38 Notice that Mohr differentiates Bewußtseinsinhalt explicitly from Kants tech-
nical Modifikation unseres Gemts (Mohr 1991, 107; 107n.2).
39 Mohr 1991, 107; emphasis added.
40 Mohr 1991, 115.
41 Cf. Thçle 1991, 68.
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consciously attend to ones representations does not constitute in itself a
proof of the unconsciousness of representations which are not attended
to.42
There is an additional ambiguity in the way Mohr articulates the
problem. Mohr is careful not to conflate representing and apperception
and also inner sense and apperception. However, given that he argues
that consciousness is the “Zusatzbedingung” for an intuition to become
an intuition “vor uns” and given that according to B132 apperception is
precisely that condition which makes a representation be “something
for me”, apperception and consciousness apparently do coincide for
Mohr. On this account, NER would seem unavoidable, the interpretation
I take it Mohr works to avoid.
But if one heeds the distinction between mere consciousness and at-
tentive consciousness (only this latter consciousness being coextensive
with apperception) there is nothing problematic about the hypothesis
Mohr sets up at the beginning of his account and works to undermine,
namely the hypothesis that a representational state of mind would per-
force be a conscious state of mind (of a particular intensity). The differ-
ence, to which Mohr is careful to draw our attention in respect of the epis-
temically relevant additional condition of apperceptive consciousness,
would then not be a difference between representing (R) and conscious-
ness (C), but between consciousness1 (C1R) and consciousness2, a con-
sciousness that (C2[C1R]). This distinction would correspond with the dif-
ference between having a representation x (a representation being a mod-
ification of my mind, viz., a representing2) and representing that one is
having a representation x, i. e., having a complex representing1. What I
mean to say here is that differentiated modes of representing parallel dif-
ferentiated modes of consciousness. In general, when Kant, especially in
the A-Deduction, talks about consciousness he means a second-order
consciousness, a “consciousness that…”, which introduces an obligatory
clause (see A103), or “possible consciousness” (B131n.), not just any
first-order consciousness.
The transcendental or possible consciousness, which Kant argues is
requisite for representational manifolds to be synthesized, is merely for-
mal and not psychologically contentful. This is a point that has been fre-
quently emphasized by Allison. It is not controversial. However, what is
often not so clear is that this formal transcendental consciousness should
also not be conflated with the empirical conditions for psychological con-
42 Cf. Sturma 1985, 42.
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sciousness, which are not at issue in TD (see B152). What I am driving at
is that nothing in Kants reasoning with regard to second-order transcen-
dental self-consciousness indicates that unaccompanied or unsynthesized
representations (representings2) must ipso facto be unconscious, presum-
ably because transcendental consciousness is a condition of any con-
sciousness. More boldly, I believe that such representations cannot really
be unconscious, at least insofar as sensible representations (percepts of
empirical representeds) are concerned, especially if one heeds Kants the-
sis that the “proper material [den eigentlichen Stoff]” of inner sense con-
sists of the representations of outer sense (B67). Kant says that a sensa-
tion—the material of perception (immediately relating to the existence of
something=x as that which is not yet determined)—has an intensive mag-
nitude or a degree. In apprehending the sensation at a particular point in
time (in abstraction from the extensive magnitude of an appearance, of
which sensations constitute its reality or actuality), an empirical con-
sciousness with a certain degree of intensity is effectuated (Kant relates
it to “a degree of reality”). The degree of intensity can increase on a
scale from zero “until its given measure” or decrease until its magni-
tude=0, which effectively amounts to its negation.43
As I read this, regardless of the issue whether the matter it furnishes
pertains to a subjectively or an objectively valid representation, any sen-
sation is necessarily (empirically) consciously apprehended, as conscious-
ness is the measure of intensity. I should note that this does not alter the
fact that the intensity-principle itself, as part of the system of synthetic
principles, must be regarded as a categorial principle that is co-constitu-
tive of objective experience (cf. Prol. §24). This principle designates the
a priori form (the category of quality) under which one can synthesize
the reality of appearance, the quale of sensation, into an objective reality,
viz. , the existential content of a determinate object.44 The property of sen-
sations “of having a degree” is a priori determinable (A176=B218). How-
ever, as is generally the case in Kants theory of experience, a distinction
must be heeded between the transcendental character of the anticipation
of the intensity of sensations and the quid facti with respect to their real-
ity (as having been affected by the things-in-themselves).
This leads me to believe that sensations as such, that is, as the matter
of purely sensible apprehension, must be considered to have an existential
quality, a quale, before even what Anneliese Maier has called the Inten-
43 A167–168=B209–210 and B208. See also B414. Cf. Prol. §§24 (AA 4: 306, 307).
44 Cf. Maier 1930, 60–61.
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sittskategorie can be applied to it so as to constitute a qualitative formal
intuition which is subsequently eo ipso amenable to an intellectual syn-
thesis and hence to TA.45 It is thus that, contrary to Allison (1996: 73),
I believe that, by implication, we may ascribe to Kant the view that
sub-categorial consciousness, atomistic consciousness of qualitative
mental percepts, is a perfectly viable notion and even necessary for any
representation.46
4. Consciousness, Unconsciousness, and Obscurity
At this point we might want to consider a clearer definition of what one
understands by unconscious: does unconscious indeed mean not con-
scious at all in the most literal sense, or does it manifest an attempt to
express what is conveyed by not purely conscious (pure in Kants
sense)?
The former definition would seem to be out of keeping with what we
have just discussed as well as Kants enunciations at B414 regarding his
position on the possibility of a gradual diminishing of consciousness. It
would also conflict with the classification of types of representation in
the Stufenleiter (A320=B376 ff.), as we have seen above. True, in the An-
45 Maier 1930, 62. I note that my reading differs in some respects from Maiers.
Maier argues that the matter of experience is not identical to the quale, but is
“nur zun
chst im Quale gegeben” (63).
46 Kants position in the Anticipation-chapter, as I have construed it, is confirmed
by several passages in his Lectures on Metaphysics, for example in Metaphysik
Mrongovius, where it is reported: “All reality has degree. There are degrees
from sensation to thought, i. e., up to apperception, where I think myself with
respect to the understanding. Something can have so little degree that I can
scarcely notice it, but nonetheless I am still always conscious of it.” (Metaphysik
Mrongovius AA 29: 834/LM: 192; emphasis added) Consider further a passage
in the Metaphysik Vigilantius: “It follows now from this, that the real, since it
has its ground in sensation, therefore in the object of the senses, could not
have its abode in the merely intellectual, therefore the degree of the real can
thus be thought neither as greatest <maximum> nor as smallest <minimum>.
On the other hand, it is certain that the modification of the degree of the inten-
sive magnitude of the real quality must be infinite, even if it can also be unnotice-
able. Therefore between the determinate degree A until 0=zero there must be
found an infinite multitude of qualities of the real, even if in an unnoticeable de-
gree, e. g., knowledge, representations, yes even the consciousness of human beings
have many degrees, without one being able to determine the smallest.” (AA 29:
1000/LM: 468, emphasis added)
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thropology (§5) Kant talks about obscure representations, of which we
are “not directly conscious” (AA 7: 135ff).47 Kant does not specifically
use the expression unconscious representation there, although he
speaks, somewhat luridly, of “unconsciousness” as “a foretaste of
death” in another passage of the Anthropology (Anthr. §27)48. Obscure
does however not denote unconscious in the strict sense. I believe that
here in section 5 of the Anthropology Kant merely finds fault with
Lockes view that in any perceiving I simultaneously (ap)perceive that I
so perceive, which could be seen as a proto-adverbial view on conscious-
ness (anticipating Pippins thesis of ineliminable reflexivity49, which he
presents as an adverbial theory of Kantian apperception). Kant is not say-
ing that there could be actual representations with no intensity of con-
sciousness, nor does he say that there could not be conscious representa-
tions of which I cannot remember having them. The issue really is wheth-
er each or any perceiving is accompanied (individually) by a higher form
of consciousness, i. e. , transcendental consciousness. Kant negates this
question (I believe he follows Leibniz in this). Many perceptions that
we have remain unconscious in the sense of not being directly accompa-
nied by this higher consciousness.50 Importantly, this is not to say that un-
accompanied representations lack any intensity of awareness or are un-
conscious.
Such a reading is confirmed by what Kant asserts at B414n., to wit,
that consciousness does not settle the determination of clarity (as the op-
posite of obscurity), for which belief he in fact criticizes the logicians (he
presumably refers to Meier). Again, Kant here emphasizes that even in
obscure representations there must be a degree of consciousness (hence
the label obscure) to be able to make a minimal distinction but which
is short of conceptual recognition, or, second-order awareness. Mere con-
sciousness would not be sufficient to make a representation clear, just as
much as there must be possible consciousness, as an ability to make dis-
tinctions, that does not already belong to the higher cognitive faculty.
That amount of consciousness in a representation is concerned that ena-
bles a consciousness of the difference between it and other representa-
tions (cf. Anthr. §6). In other words, a difference must be made between
47 Cf. Metaphysik Mrongovius, AA 29: 879/LM 248.
48 Cf. Klemme 1996, 188, who quotes a passage in Kants lecture on Anthr.Men-
schenkunde, where Kant speaks of unconscious representation.
49 Pippin 1997, 39.
50 See also Kitcher 1999, 346 ff. esp. 348–349.
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mere consciousness and its various grades and clear consciousness, not
just between consciousness and unconsciousness—notice that the clarity
of apperceptive consciousness might equally not be great, psychologically
speaking (see e.g. A103–104).
Moreover, as we saw Kant observe earlier, unconsciousness in the lit-
eral sense would be close or perhaps identical to (the instant of) death.
Even a comatose person therefore cannot be said, on a purely physiolog-
ical level, to be completely unconscious, given the graded nature Kant ac-
cords to consciousness. Evidently, there is a difference between being in a
coma, i. e., being in a certain psychological or sensible or even vegetative
state that is utterly unreportable, and the instant when death, viz., abso-
lute unconsciousness (brain death), actually sets in. This suggests that ab-
solutely unconscious representations have no real purchase because the
corresponding sensations would perforce have no reality (since their in-
tensive magnitude would equal zero). Consciousness is thus strictly relat-
ed to existence (B414), whilst unconsciousness in the strict sense is equiv-
alent to non-existence.
Two correlated remarks are in order: (1) unconscious representations
would not have any physiologically registrable correlate in reality, wheth-
er in outer or inner sense, and more importantly, (2) it is impossible that
one could perceive the absence of the real, hence consciousness, in sensi-
ble intuition, and so prove that unconsciousness is something real. Kant
remarks at A172=B214: “[N]o perception, hence also no experience, is
possible that, whether immediately or mediately […], would prove an en-
tire absence of everything real in appearance, i. e., a proof of empty space
or of empty time can never be drawn from experience. For, first, the en-
tire absence of the real in sensible intuition cannot itself be perceived,
and, second, it cannot be deduced from any single appearance and the dif-
ference in the degree of its reality, nor may it ever be assumed for the ex-
planation of that.” Mutatis mutandis, given that for Kant consciousness is
coextensive with reality (B414), one could argue that neither proof of un-
consciousness nor a disproof of the consciousness of merely subjectively
valid representations, i. e., non-apperceptive states, is feasible.
Considering an insight offered by Strawsons critique of sense datum
experience could shed light on this.51 Strawson argued that in the case of a
pure sense datum experience (putatively a unitary consciousness of sep-
arate awarenesses at any singular time) the esse and percipi of a sense
datum would collapse into each other. There would be no distinction be-
51 See Strawson 1966, 100 ff.
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tween object of awareness and act of awareness in a single sense-datum-
experience. The accusative of awareness has no existence independent of
the awareness of it. In having the sense datum one would eo ipso be in-
stantly aware of it, without however recognizing that one is aware of it,
for there is no web of co-referentiality within which the single datum
could be contrasted with other such data. Only the relation to an identical
item over time (in a co-referential sequence of such awarenesses that
refer to this item) saves the recognitional component from being absor-
bed into its object. For Strawson, evidently, this gives rise to the belief
that a pure sense-datum experience is intrinsically contradictory: no
awareness of a separate impression (I perceive x, I perceive y, I perceive
z and so on) could occur without certain constraints that enable the rec-
ognition of the impression as that particular impression, these constraints
solely being provided by the connectedness of impressions, which in turn
rests on the connectedness of spatiotemporal objects. This then, presum-
ably, invalidates the cogency of the claim that one could be (intuitively)
aware of a single sense datum, given that by awareness one understands
a bona fide consciousness of the recognitional type and not mere animal
sentience.
Pace Strawson, however, I believe the opaqueness of the relation be-
tween act and object of awareness in an ostensible sense-datum experi-
ence does not ex hypothesi invalidate the concept of a sub-recognitional
relation between an act of empirical apperception and its object (I mean
recognition in the specific sense of conceptual recognition). Without the
capacity for recognition, one could not know that one was severally con-
scious of ones sense data (the multifarious representations that I have
consecutively), but—and this is in contrast to Strawson—even so one
could not know that one was not conscious of them severally (i. e. in a
sub-recognitional sense).
On Kants account subrecognitional consciousness is surely possible,
given that he elsewhere associates empirical apperception with the intui-
tive, i. e., non-discursive, consciousness of the I of apprehension, viz., an
accompaniment by empirical consciousness that has no relation to an
identical subject, which latter is the co-referential I of cognitive reflec-
tion (see also his account in the letter to Herz [26 May 1789], AA 11:
52.7). Wolfgang Carl has rightly observed, with reference to A107, that
empirical apperception, the type of accompaniment also meant by Kant
at B133 (AA 3: 109.16 ff.)52, is a type of empirical consciousness that is
52 Cf. B235 (AA 3: 168.15–19).
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“forever variable”. In other words, as Carl writes, “[d]as Bewußtsein der
Apprehension ist […] ein Bewußtsein, das sich mit der Ver
nderung der
Vorstellungen selber 
ndert”.53 He further notes that this kind of con-
sciousness “nur die Art und Weise charakterisiert, in der wir gegebene
Vorstellungen haben”.54 Because this kind of consciousness modulates
in accordance with the persistent flow or flux of representations as they
are prompted, the relation between such consciousness and representa-
tions remains opaque.
I thus maintain that Kant himself did not believe that TA is a condi-
tion even of such forever variable empirical self-consciousness as NER
holds. If we put the difference between the two types of conscious apper-
ception (empirical and transcendental) in terms of Kants terminology of
begleiten, I believe we must take begleiten in two ways: either (1) in
relation to a propositional I think-accompaniment of representations,
in which the accompanying relation between the accompanied represen-
tations and the I think is clear and distinct (at B131–2); this is the sense
of begleiten that is meant by the I think proposition that we started out
analyzing; or, (2) in relation to discrete representations, in which the re-
lation between the representations accompanied and empirical con-
sciousness remains obscure or opaque in Strawsons sense, that is, cogni-
tively indeterminate (B133). In the latter case, the accompaniment coa-
lesces with the representation so accompanied (as Strawson notes, the
esse and percipi collapse into one; no conceptual recognition occurs).
In other words, in such a case consciousness does not differentiate itself
from its representation.55
5. The Necessary Possibility of Non-Apperceptive Consciousness
But how now to read the apperception principle in a way that accommo-
dates non-apperceptive consciousness? If we look at the possible cases of
satisfaction of Kants apperception principle, then we can learn by anal-
ysis that NER, and by implication SAR and ECR, cannot be true. It is
53 At A169=B210 Kant speaks of “instantaneous [augenblickliche] apprehension”,
a “moment”.
54 Carl 1992, 64.
55 I expand on Kants distinction between the two kinds of accompanying [begleit-
en] (an accompanying of “all my representations”, as Kant writes at B131, and
an accompanying of “each representation” at B133; notice the important distinc-
tion of the determiner all and each) in Schulting 2012.
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not at all the case that all possible representations must be accompanied
by an I think, nor that all representations (sic) necessarily entail the
transcendental unity of apperception; nor do all of them (sic) effectively
belong to the thoroughgoing identity of my self-consciousness, in the pos-
sessive sense (as on ECR). This can be shown in a breakdown of the I
think proposition into its possible logical modalities P. Assume the neces-
sity of possibility P1:56
de facto, I think	 accompanies all my representations
If P1, then ex hypothesi it must also be possible that
P2: de facto, I think	 does not accompany all my representations
and/or:
P3: de facto, I think	 does not accompany any representations that happen
to occur and are so occurrent in the mind at any time t at which the I think	
is not instantiated
and/or:
P4: de facto, I think	 does not accompany any representations that happen
to occur and are so occurrent in the mind at any time t at which the I think	
is not instantiated, and that are also interminably barred from being able to
be so accompanied, i. e. , such representations that evanesce immediately
after having been prompted and leave no significant traces for possible re-
tention and taking up	 by an act of apperception (some representations
may simply not be able to be retained or retrieved)
P2 is obviously spurious, for it is logically inconsistent for me, as the sub-
ject of thought, to assert that I am thinking (effectively or de facto)—or
to assent, whilst thinking, to the proposition I am thinking—and yet not
56 Notice that here an analysis, ad oculos reflexionis, of the possible cases of satis-
faction of the I think-proposition in terms of its necessary logical purport is
concerned; it is not suggested that the existential necessity of the instantiation
of the I think or indeed the necessity of an actual occurrence of empirical con-
sciousness is at issue. What is my concern here is to extract the logically neces-
sary possibilities and impossibilities given that the I think either is or is not ex-
istentially instantiated.
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to accompany my representations that I am thereby thinking. In other
words, P2 amounts to a contradiction. As Kant says in his early work
the Inquiry, in accordance with the law of identity, “to no subject does
there belong a predicate which contradicts it” (AA 2: 294). The posses-
sive pronoun my in the predicate all my representations refers rigidly.
Those representations are my representations that I accompany as such
by effectively thinking them.57 This is shown by P1. P1 is analytically
true: the totality of my representations that are occurrent share the
same common mark I think, just in case I am accompanying them (as
my representations “all together [insgesamt]”, as Kant puts it at
B132)58, by means of the act of thinking, precisely when I am in the busi-
ness of thinking (representing in a particular way).
P3 reflects the case of a representer R representing any arbitrary oc-
current representation x,y,z. Whilst in this case P1 is not satisfied, R
would nonetheless be the representer of x,y,z, even if not aware of
being in the business of representing and a fortiori self-aware (stricto
sensu) of doing so.59 (R does not accompany his representations in the
transcendental way, but merely in the empirical way by just having
them in any arbitrary array peculiar to his actual physio-psychological
stance at a particular time. Strictly speaking, R does not think.) Further-
more, P3 leaves open whether representations are in future apperceived;
it might or might not happen.
57 NER and NER appear to argue that when P1 is satisfied P2 is still possible,
namely when the possibility of reflective consciousness (an I think reflecting
on her states) is at any rate necessarily presupposed (which accounts for the
must in the proposition) but not actually instantiated (which ostensibly ac-
counts for the be able). This would suggest that I think is indeed some psycho-
logical reflection on ones first-order states. But this construal shows a misunder-
standing of the modality of the proposition.
58 The predeterminer all in the predicate all my representations creates an am-
biguity, for Kants proposition could, at first sight, be construed such that it pos-
its that the I think does not effectively accompany all, but only some of my rep-
resentations, which could lead one to presume that P2 is not strictly speaking
false. This is indeed the route that NER takes. But this reading of all miscon-
strues the quantitative aspect of apperception. I deal with this aspect in Schulting
2012.
59 Take the example of Kants brute in the J
sche Logic (AA 9: 33) and in E, AA
8: 217n.
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P4 is a real Lockean possibility.60 Although Kant does not explicitly,
at least not in the Critique,61 venture an opinion on the possibilities P3
and P4, of which it is further open to question if they are anything
more than merely formally distinguishable, these are surely logically in-
ferable from the I think-proposition. This is confirmed by some of
Kants assertions in the text of the Deduction. P3/4-representations are
representations, which, as Kant puts it, are “nothing for me” (B132),
which is consistent with the rigid reference of the possessive determiner
my of P1-representations.62
If, in conformity with B132 (AA 3: 108.29–30), where Kant indicates
that I think designates transcendental self-consciousness63, we substitute
the predicate all my (episodes of) consciousness for all my representa-
tions, an analogous account can be given of the putative entailment rela-
tion between consciousness and self-consciousness (as NER and NER
suppose), so that the necessary possibility P1 reads as:
P1: de facto, the I think	 accompanies all my (episodes of) consciousness
If P1, then it must also be possible that:
P2: de facto, the I think	 does not accompany all my (episodes of) con-
sciousness
and/or:
60 See Locke, Essay, Book II, Ch. XXVII, §20, where he considers the following
objection: “Suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my Life, beyond
a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of
them again.” (cf. §14)
61 Cf. Metaphysik Mrongovius, AA 29: 908/LM: 274.
62 Notice that, significantly, at A116 Kant speaks of “all possible representations”
without the pronominal determiner my. See also A111, where Kant speaks of
“all possible appearances”, which stand in a relation to apperception; also at
A113 Kant says that “all possible appearances belong, as representations, to
the whole possible self-consciousness”. Kant might be taken to suggest ECR,
or at least NER, in these passages.
63 See also B68: “Das Bewußtsein seiner selbst (Apperzeption) ist die einfache
Vorstellung des Ich.” The English translation of Guyer/Wood is not precise
here; by translating das Bewusstsein seiner selbst as consciousness of itself
it is suggested that Kant speaks of consciousness tout court, rather than self-con-
sciousness. Moreover, the reflexive sense of the German is lost in translation.
Kemp Smith is more exact here.
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P3: de facto, the I think	 does not accompany any (episode of) conscious-
ness that happens to occur and is so occurrent in the mind at any time t at
which the I think	 is not instantiated
and/or:
P4: de facto, I think	 does not accompany any (episode of) consciousness
that happens to occur and is so occurrent in the mind at any time t at which
the I think	 is not instantiated, and that is also interminably barred from
being able to be so accompanied, i. e. because such an episode of con-
sciousness decreases until zero before it can even be retrieved for appercep-
tion
P3- and P4-consciousness signal the failure of satisfaction of P1.64 P3
allows of possible satisfaction of P1, but P4 does not. Again, since P1
indicates a necessary possibility, it seems that P4 is not allowed for.
But P4 is a real possibility, and P1 only concerns episodes of all my con-
sciousness, not just any consciousness; there is “complete identity” be-
tween the I think and my consciousness of all my representations,
but not between the I think and any arbitrary consciousness (cf. A362-
A363).
Notice that it is necessarily possible that P3. However, P2 is spuri-
ous, because it is contradictory for me to state that I am not self-aware
of all my consciousness, because I-consciousness is analytic to my con-
sciousness. The possibilities of P3 and P4, which are episodes of non-ap-
perceptive consciousness, are inferred necessary possibilities. As was the
case with P3 and P4, P3 and P4-episodes of consciousness are not report-
ably dissociable episodes of consciousness for they are psychologically
opaque, or, in language that Kant was familiar with, obscure.65
From this it follows that the I think does not indicate a capacity for
either representation (NER) or psychological consciousness as such. The
I think-proposition, or pure apperception, does not engender conscious-
64 Cf. Andr de Muralt 1958, 55–56 (“Le sujet peut bien avoir conscience de ses
reprsentations, mais lune lui chappe au moment de lapprehension de lautre.
Il se produit ainsi un flot continu dimpressions sensible qui apparaissent tour 
tour dans la conscience pour disparatre ensuite aussi vite quelles taient ven-
ues. […] le sujet nest pas capable de prendre conscience de son intgrit […]
le sujet nest pas capable par lui-mÞme de retenir ses diffrentes reprsentations
et de lutter contre lanantissement des diverses consciences empiriques dans le
temps fuyant.”)
65 Cf. Kants letter to Herz of May 26, 1789, in AA 11: 52.10–15.
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ness nor is it necessarily coextensive with empirical consciousness, even
though it is true that transcendental consciousness or self-consciousness
is contingent on psychological, first-order, consciousness.
P3- or P4-consciousness does not play any significant role in Kants
argument for synthesis and pure apperception. These types of conscious-
ness are not synthesized in the purely apperceptive sense; they are not a
subspecies of self-consciousness, nor do they necessarily entail transcen-
dental self-consciousness; this then disproves NER, NER, ECR but
also SAR, which I havent discussed. Also Pippins controversial thesis
that all consciousness is ineliminably reflexive (1997: 39) must be dis-
missed on these grounds. P3 or P4-consciousness is what could be called
non-apperceptive consciousness and the ground for it is, as I have argued,
provided by the apperception principle itself.
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Kant on Unconscious Mental Activity
Tom Rockmore
It is tempting but false to think that the unconscious was discovered at a
given point in time when we suddenly became conscious of it. It is more
accurate to say that long before that point, whenever it may be, it was not
absent but present. Though we were unconscious of the unconscious as it
were, it, however, understood in different ways, played a variable role in a
large number of theories. Long before Freud focused on the unconscious
in a way that has never ceased to capture the attention of the public, oth-
ers, including philosophers, were interested directly and indirectly in the
unconscious.1
Kant, who thinks of human beings as rational, emphasizes conscious
activity. He believes that the Enlightenment culminates in the challenge
to dare to know (sapere aude) in thinking independently of authority.
He further believes that a moral individual must act autonomously, that
is, according to principles that must without exception govern the actions
of all rational beings. These are forms of conscious activity. But what if
Kants theory of knowledge were based on unconscious activity? This
paper will examine Kants epistemology in arguing that at the heart of
the critical philosophy we find a conception of unconscious activity point-
ing to an anti-Cartesian theory of the subject as a conscious but also an
unconscious actor.
I. Kants Theory on Consciousness, Self-consciousness
and the Unconscious
We can begin to discuss the unconscious in the critical philosophy by ad-
dressing the triple distinction, familiar in the post-Freudian period, be-
tween consciousness, self-consciousness and the unconscious. It is well
1 It has been known for some time that the unconscious was not invented by Freud.
See L. L. Whyte, The Unconscious Before Freud, New York: Basic Books, 1960 and
Henri F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Tradition
of Dynamic Psychiatry, New York: Basic Books, 1970.
known that the Greeks were concerned with the problem of non-being (to
mei on). In the Sophist, Plato responds to Parmenides claim that non-
being is impossible in claiming that, since in a sense it is, hence it is pos-
sible. Non-being, which is not intelligible by itself, points toward and is
only intelligible on the basis of being. For this reason, Hegel begins
both his Logics with being and not with non-being. In the same way,
self-consciousness and consciousness point toward the unconscious.
Kant discusses consciousness and self-consciousness in the transcen-
dental deduction. He explicitly claims, against Humes bundle theory of
perception, that the unity of consciousness is a necessary condition for
cognition.2 He also mentions “self-consciousness” several times. Though
he has the term, it is unclear that he in fact has a theory of self-conscious-
ness,3 which arguably only comes into the German idealist tradition with
the self-described orthodox Kantian, Fichte. Kant famously claims to
know Plato better than he knows himself.4 To Kants dismay, while
Kant was still alive Fichte made the same claim about Kant. Though
Kant rejected Fichtes position as impossible, Fichte interpreted this
claim as meaning that he was even more Kantian than Kant.
In the deduction of the categories, Kant twice mentions in rapid suc-
cession that “a synthesis of the representations” is possible only “through
consciousness of this synthesis (“consciousness of their synthesis”).5 Yet
this point is dubious. Since consciousness is a condition of self-conscious-
ness, there must be consciousness of a perceptual object, which is the re-
sult of the synthesis of representations, prior to and as a condition of self-
consciousness. In that case, self-consciousness cannot be a condition of
synthesizing representations. Indeed, Kant seems ambivalent about this
claim. For he earlier indicates that combination of the manifold takes
place whether or not we are conscious of it.6
Some observers believe Kants theory of consciousness implies or
even entails a theory of self-consciousness.7 We detect what might be
2 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 133, p. 247.
3 According to Broad, “it is doubtful whether a single consistent doctrine [of self-con-
sciousness—T. R.] can be extracted from his various utterances.” C. D. Broad, Kant:
An Introduction, C. Lewy, ed., Cambridge: Cambride University Press, 1978, p. 234.
4 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 370, p. 396.
5 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason B 133, p. 247.
6 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 130, p. 245.
7 Stephen Priest, “Kant, Descartes and Self-consciousness,” in The Philosophical
Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 125 (Oct., 1981), pp. 348–351. He examines i. A. the view
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called a minimal theory of self-consciousness, with arguably Cartesian
resonances, in the “Refutation of idealism.” The aim of this argument
is to resolve the scandal of the existence of the external world, the
same problem, which G. E. Moore later raised against idealism in gener-
al.8 Kant seems to be claiming that, if we are aware of ourselves as having
ideas, there must be a mind-independent external world, which causes
this awareness, and which, hence, exists. The presupposition is that, as
Sartre later says, all consciousness is consciousness of something.
Hence, if there is consciousness, then it is caused by the world, which
must exist.
The view Kant outlines in the “Refutation of idealism” is consistent
with Kants generally anti-Cartesian conception of the subject. Descartes
argues that the existence of the subject, which cannot be denied, is the un-
shakeable basis for a theory of knowledge constructed on that founda-
tion. According to Descartes the subject is self-conscious, thus certain
of its existence, prior to and apart from knowing anything else. Descartes
claim for the cogito, namely, that if the subject thinks, it must exist, is
based on self-consciousness, not on consciousness of anything different
from the self. Since Descartes understands self-consciousness as immedi-
ate, not as mediated by consciousness of anything different from the self,
he does not argue that the subject is conscious of the world, hence con-
scious of itself as conscious of the world. Kants restatement of the Car-
tesian argument is intended to prove the existence of the external
world without claiming anything about the subject beyond self-conscious-
ness. Since he denies intellectual intuition, he further denies direct access
to oneself. Hence, he cannot argue from his own existence to the exis-
tence of the world. Rather, he presupposes his own existence in arguing
for a proof of the existence of the external world. This can be formulated
as the claim that I am not conscious of myself as I am but only that I am.9
In other words: Descartes argues from self-consciousness to knowledge of
the world, but Kant argues from self-consciousness to knowledge of the
existence of the world.
The Kantian argument from self-consciousness to the world is weaker
than the Cartesian model. On the one hand, the basic distinction between
that consciousness entails self-consciousness, which he attributes to Strawson and
Bennett.
8 See G. E. Moore, “The Refutation of Idealism,” in Mind, n. s. 12, no. 48, October
1903, pp. 433–453.
9 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 157, p. 259.
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appearance and reality, or phenomenon and noumenon, puts knowledge
of the mind-independent world as it is beyond appearance out of concep-
tual bounds. According to Kant, all knowledge begins with experience,
but there is and cannot be experience of the noumenon. Since the latter
can only be thought without contradiction,10 but cannot be given in expe-
rience, it is arguably inconsistent even to assert its existence. If that is cor-
rect, the effort to demonstrate the existence of the external world argua-
bly either fails or at least requires further argument to buttress its claims.
On the other hand, Kant, unlike Descartes, does not address the
problem of skepticism with respect to the contents of consciousness, or
ideas. It is unnecessary to invoke the fiction of an evil genius to imagine
that the subject is aware of nothing more than what it itself dreams up. In
this case as well, the proof of the external world would fail. Further, it is
arguably problematic in the critical philosophy even to speak of self-con-
sciousness, which implies an immediate grasp of oneself. Since Kant de-
nies intellectual intuition, he concedes no more than that we can repre-
sent ourselves but not that we can grasp ourselves as we are. Yet it
seems odd to attribute self-consciousness to a subject, which is a mere ap-
pearance, and which is conscious of no more than the appearance of the
external world.
II. On Kants Theory of the Unconscious
In studying Kants view of the unconscious, we will be testing the limits of
what, from a Kantian or indeed any other perspective, can be known. In
an obvious sense, what is unconscious cannot become unconscious with-
out in the process being destroyed.
A possible difficulty in attributing a theory of the unconscious to
Kant derives from his attitude toward psychology. In both the A and B
editions Kant analyzes four paralogisms, which derive from a rational
psychology, and which can only falsely be taken for a science of pure rea-
son.11 Kants attitude toward psychology is ambivalent. He is suspicious of
the possibility of a future science of empirical psychology on at least two
grounds: as concerns what later came at the time of the early Husserl to
be known as pyschologism, and with respect to the possibility, consistent
with his denial that the subject has privileged access to itself, for instance
10 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 566, p. 535.
11 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 404, p. 414.
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in a grasp of what we might call unconscious activity. His rejection of
what later, through the intervention of the early Husserl, came to be
called psychologism explains his repeated references to Lockes so-called
physiology12 as well as the assertion that the latter “sensitivized the con-
cepts of the understanding.”13 Today we would say that, from Kants per-
spective, Locke substitutes a psychological for a rational account of
knowledge. Yet Kants critical philosophy sketches a faculty psychology
on the transcendental plane. His transcendental theory of the mind in-
cludes at a minimum a view of the subject as the transcendental unity
of apperception, of categories or rules of synthesis, and of the synthetic
activity through which perceptions as well as objects of experience and
knowledge are constructed.
Kant further argues at several places that the unconscious activity of
the mind lies beyond the limits of what can be known. In a passage in the
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals that sounds as if it came from
later psychoanalytic discussion, Kant straightforwardly claims that our se-
cret motivations are beyond our knowledge. According to Kant, “we can
never, even by the most strenuous self-examination, get entirely behind
our covert incentives; for when moral worth is at issue, what counts is
not actions, which one sees, but those inner principles of actions that
one does not see…”14 This passage, which conflicts with Kants theory
of autonomy as the criterion of morality, suggests it is never possible to
determine if a given act is moral. In the schematism chapter in the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, he suggests in famously describing the activity
through which the schemata are produced as “a hidden art in the depth
of mans soul” that it is simply situated beyond the reach of human
knowledge.15 These and other passages suggest Kant has at least a mini-
mal theory of the unconscious, but not that he has a conception of the un-
conscious in the more extended modern sense.16
The modern science of empirical psychology did not yet exist when
Kant was writing and Kant was skeptical that it could even be formulated.
Kant, who thinks chemistry, which is empirical, is, for that reason, merely
12 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, e.g. A ix, p. 100.
13 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 327, p. 372.
14 See Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philos-
ophy, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1996, pp. 61–62.
15 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 181, p. 273.
16 See, e.g., Steven Sverdlik, “Unconscious Evil Principles,” in Philosophy, Psychiatry,
& Psychology , vol. 9, no. 1, March 2002, pp. 13–14.
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an art, further believes that psychology is even less scientific. In the Met-
aphysical Foundations of Natural Science he states that the “the empirical
doctrine of the soul … must remain even further removed than chemistry
from the rank of what may be called a natural science proper.”17 Paradox-
ically, though Kant contends we cannot have knowledge in the full sense
of the term of the unconscious, he also thinks, like Leibniz, that human
beings know themselves through pure apperception,18 that there are rep-
resentations of which I am not conscious.19
Kants view of the unconscious appears inconsistent. He seems to
hold that, since there cannot be a science of psychology, or at least not
a science in the full sense of the term, and there cannot be experience
of unconscious activity, we also cannot do without it as an explanatory
concept. This suggests that, if we cannot study the unconscious empirical-
ly, the correct way to study the unconscious activity of the mind is tran-
scendentally, that is indirectly through analysis of the so-called necessary
conditions of knowledge.
III. The Unconscious and Causal Theory of Explanation
Observers sometimes note Kants use of the unconscious. Heidegger fa-
mously emphasizes the role of the imagination in the first Critique.20 In
a study of the Critique of Judgment, following Heidegger, Makkreel
claims that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant left much of the work
of judgment to the unconscious imagination.21 Kants attitude toward
the unconscious is similar to his conception of the thing in itself. Kant,
who claims the thing in itself can neither be experienced nor known, ap-
peal to it constantly. He takes a similar attitude toward the unconscious.
Though he seems to be clear that it cannot be grasped, he appeals to ap-
peal to it in numerous contexts. His approach to the unconscious makes
17 Immanuel Kant,Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science, translated and edited by
Michael Friedman, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 7.
18 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 574, p. 540.
19 See letter of May 26, 1789 to Marcus Herz, in Immanuel Kant, Correspondence,
translated and edited by Arnulf Zweig, New York: Cambridge University Press,
1999, p. 314.
20 See Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, translated with an in-
troduction by James S. Churchill, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1962.
21 See Rudolf Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1990
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use of variations on the theme of a causal form of explanation. This
means that the unconscious functions in the critical philosophy in causal
situations, more precisely that in its causal role the unconscious is a nec-
essary condition of consciousness, which is its effect.
In the critical philosophy, Kant stresses the central function and limits
of our possible knowledge of the understanding. In a famous passage,
Kant further sets limits to the reach of the understanding itself:
We have now not only traveled through the land of pure understanding, and
carefully inspected each part of it, but we have also surveyed it, and deter-
mined the place for each thing in it. This land, however, is an island, and
enclosed in unalterable boundaries by nature itself. It is the land of truth
(a charming name), surrounded by a broad and stormy ocean, the seat of
illusion, where many a fog bank and rapidly melting iceberg pretend to
be new lands and, ceaselessly deceiving with empty hopes the voyager look-
ing around for new discoveries, entwine him in adventures from which he
can never escape and yet also never bring to an end.22
Two points follow immediately. First, Kant thinks that the understanding
has natural limits, which cannot be transgressed without falling into illu-
sions. In other words, there are limits to what we can legitimately claim to
know. This suggestion is consistent with a main thrust of the critical phi-
losophy, which consists in pointing to the limits of reason. Second, Kant
links the proper use of the understanding to thinking about its sources
since otherwise one cannot determine the boundaries of its legitimate
use.23 The link between the sources of the understanding and its so-called
legitimate use remains obscure, difficult to grasp. Kant reminds us that
one can only legitimately use principles empirically, that is, with respect
to appearances that are objects of possible experience. Yet there are dif-
ferent ways to explain possible experience, such as on the basis of con-
scious or unconscious activity.
Kants effort to grasp the function of the understanding can be grasp-
ed through his relation to Newton and Leibniz. Kant is a critical philos-
opher, and philosophy differs from natural science. Yet there is an anal-
ogy between his theory of knowledge, and the general scientific approach
to the explanation of phenomena through causal explanation. Kant, who
came to philosophy from natural science, was also interested in the histo-
ry and philosophy of science. Copernicus advances a descriptive approach
to astronomy, which is superseded in Newtons dynamic approach. New-
22 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 295, p. 354.
23 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 297, p. 355.
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ton relies on gravitation, the invisible force whose origin he cannot ex-
plain, and whose existence can only be inferred, to account for the mo-
tions of the heavenly bodies. The aims are clearly different since Newton
is concerned with knowledge of nature, and Kant is concerned with
knowledge of human nature. But, perhaps unsurprisingly, since Kant is
a Newtonian, the approach each employs is similar. Kant, like Newton,
appeals to the unconscious, whose origin he also cannot explain, and
whose existence he only infers, to explain the possibility of knowledge
in general.
Both appeal to the unconscious as an explanatory principle in a causal
framework. For Newton and for Kant, causal explanation, which employs
a kinetic approach, supersedes the merely descriptive approach of Coper-
nican astronomy. Kants claim that through the discovery of gravitation
Newton proved what Copernicus only conjectured24 supposes the validity
of causal explanation within the framework of Newtonian mechanics.
Causality is a historical variable, which goes back to the beginnings of
Western philosophy in ancient Greece. Ancient Greek cosmology records
early efforts to explain the origin or functioning of the cosmos by invok-
ing explanatory factors such as water (Thales), reason (Anaxagoras) and
so on. Aristotle thinks that causes are beginnings25 and that scientific
knowledge requires knowledge of causes.26
Kant rejects the familiar view that our knowledge must conform to
objects. In his Copernican revolution, he stresses that objects must con-
form to our cognition. In his approach to explanation of knowledge,
Kant works out a theory of unconscious activity based i. A. on his reading
of Descartes, Leibniz, Baumgarten and others as well. From Descartes, he
takes the general dualistic approach to mind and body while rejecting the
idea that a soul is a substance. It follows that the soul is not part of the
causal framework, and, since it is not causally determined, wholly free.
In our post-Freudian world and post-Marxian world, this view of the sub-
ject might now appear simplistic, but it is central to the critical philosphy.
In Kants account of knowledge from the perspective of the subject,
the subject is the source of spontaneous but unconscious activity, which
is a necessary condition for experience and knowledge of objects. There
24 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B xxii, p. 113.
25 See Metaphysics, V, ch. 1, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan
Barnes, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 2 vols., , vol. II, pp. 1599–1600.
26 See Posterior Analytics, II, chapter 11, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. I,
pp. 155–157.
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is a difference between activity, which is spontaneous and activity, which
is unconscious. All unconscious activity is presumably spontaneous, but
only some spontaneous activity is unconscious. Reflexes take place in
spontaneous but not necessarily unconscious ways. A cough or a sneeze
is spontaneous but neither is unconscious. Consciousness and uncon-
sciousness are antithetical. Activity that is a condition for consciousness
cannot itself be conscious.
Leibniz and Baumgarten both influence Kants view of the activity of
the understanding as spontaneous and unconscious. Kant criticizes Leib-
niz on a number of grounds, such as his relational view of space, his view
of pre-established harmony, for conflating phenomena and noumena, and
so on. Yet he is indebted to Leibniz for the conception of the subject as
the source of spontaneous but also unconscious activity.
Spontaneity or spontaneous activity is theoretical, not practical. The-
oretical activity is analogous to free practical activity, which is assumed as
the basis of the claim to determine oneself to act according to a moral
rule.27 Leibnizs influence on Kants conception of spontaneity is some-
times discussed.28 In the Monadologie, Leibniz claims, apparently for
the first time, that a monad, which has no windows, cannot be influenced,
hence cannot change because of an external causal influence. In denying
external causality, Leibniz opts for the so-called spontaneous activity of
simple substances. Baumgarten follows Leibniz on this point in his Meta-
physica, which Kant used in his lectures over many years. Baumgarten de-
fines spontaneity as the particular activity of the monad as “vis repraesen-
tativa pro positu corporis humani” in contending that cognition is based
on it.29
Moral autonomy, which is two-fold, includes freedom from external
causal determination and freedom to self-legislate, or so-called freedom
from and freedom to, the two kinds of freedom famously discussed by
27 See, for an account of Kants theory of spontaneity, Marco Sgarbi, “The Spontaneity
of Mind in Kants Transcendental Logic,” in Fenomenologia e Societ, no. 2, 2009,
XXXXII, pp. 19–28. Sgarbi argues very convincingly that the spontaneity of the un-
derstanding is Kants transcendental condition for all knowledge.
28 In his detailed study of the theme of spontaneity in Kant, Pippin, who does not de-
tect the Leibnizian connection, links Kants view to contemporary Wittgensteinian
themes. See Robert Pippin, “Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind,” in Canadian Journal
of Philosophy, vol. 17, no. 2, June 1987, pp. 449–476.
29 See A. G. Baumgarten,Metaphysica, Halle: Hemmerde, 1757, pp. 176–177. Cited in
Sgarbi, “The Spontaneity of Mind in Kants Transcendental Logic,” p. 21.
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Berlin.30 Theoretical autonomy is invoked to explain experience and
knowledge through “combination of the manifold in general” which is
“an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation” … that
takes place “as an action of the understanding, which we would designate
with the general title synthesis.”31 It is, however, difficult to get clear
about how Kant understands theoretical spontaneity, since he describes
it as both necessary but also as lying beyond the limits of human cogni-
tion. I will come back to this point below.
It is perhaps less well known that Leibniz also influences Kants view
of spontaneous theoretical activity as unconscious. Descartes advances a
theory of knowledge based on consciousness, which excludes the uncon-
scious. According to Descartes, all thought is conscious thought. There is
no unconscious thought.32 He depicts the human subject as a thing, which
thinks, understands thinking as including doubting, affirming, understand-
ing, denying, willing, imagining and feeling.33
In reacting against Descartes, Leibniz holds that there are some per-
ceptions–he calls them “petites perceptions”–of which we are not con-
scious. According to Leibniz, the mind contains perceptions, or represen-
tations, and appetitions, that is tendencies, inclinations or strivings. Appe-
tition, or the internal principle of activity and change, provide the transi-
tion between perceptions.34 He distinguishes between perception and ap-
perception, which is consciousness of the former, more precisely “con-
sciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this internal state,” which, as
he specifies, is “something not given to all souls, nor at all times to a
given soul.”35 Today we might describe such perceptions as subliminal.
Leibniz is clear that an appeal to unconscious perception is central to phi-
losophy of mind. “In short, insensible perceptions have as much use in phi-
losophy of mind [Pneumatique] as corpuscles do in physics; and it is
30 See “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Isaiah Berlin, edited by Henry Hardy, Liberty:
Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002,
pp. 166–217.
31 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 130, p. 245.
32 See Ren Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, principle IX, in The Philosophical
Works of Descartes, translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, New
York, Cambridge University Press, 1970, 2 vols., I, p. 222.
33 See Meditation II, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, I, p. 153.
34 See “Monadology,” in Leibniz,Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays, Indian-
apolis: LLA, 1965, translated by Paul Schrecker and Anne Martin Schrecker, p. 150.
35 See Principles of Nature and Grace, section 4, in G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays,
translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989, p. 208.
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equally unreasonable to reject the one as the other under the pretext that
they are beyond the reach of the senses.”36
Kant closely follows Leibniz in claiming that the mind (Gemt) acts
spontaneously and unconsciously. He depicts the subject as both passive
and active, and passivity and activity as both conscious and unconscious.
The subject is passive in that it is affected, or acted upon, by the mind in-
dependent external world, which lies beyond the possibility of cognition.
In Kants theory of knowledge the subject passively receives the contents
of the sensory manifold, or sensation, which it actively transforms into ob-
jects of experience and knowledge. The activity through which the subject
constructs cognitive objects is unconscious and spontaneous, hence invol-
untary, not under the control of the subject.
IV. Spontaneity, Synthesis and the Understanding
Kant, who acknowledges the limits of the understanding, also limits what
he can say about it. His theory points to a relation between the uncon-
scious, spontaneity and synthesis in the understanding, a relation, which
he infers but cannot claim to know through experience.
At the beginning of the “Transcendental Logic,” he claims cognition
arises from intuition and concepts.37 He defines sensibility as “the recep-
tivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in
some way” in distinguishing it from the understanding, which he describes
as “the faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the spontaneity
of cognition ….”38 The reception of sensation is passive, not active, and
also unconscious. With respect to sensation, the subject is passive and un-
conscious. We do not perceive that we are affected. Rather we infer that
this is necessary as a condition for consciousness and self-consciousness.
Knowledge requires both receptivity and spontaneity.39 Spontaneity com-
bines or synthesizes the manifold in an action of the understanding
known as synthesis.40 This synthesis cannot be given by the objects by is
36 See Preface to the New Essays, in Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, p. 297.
37 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 74, p. 193.
38 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 75, p. 193.
39 See Kant Critique of Pure Reason, A 97, p. 228.
40 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 130, p. 245.
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carried out by the subject itself in what Kant unclearly describes as “an
act of its self-activity.”41
Spontaneity and synthesis are related, since synthesis occurs sponta-
neously in the unconscious activity of the subject as a condition of knowl-
edge. Both spontaneity and synthesis remain unclear. The account of
spontaneity is further complicated by differences between the deductions
advanced in the A and B editions. In the A edition, spontaneity is descri-
bed in a footnote in which Kant refers to imagination as a necessary in-
gredient in perception in suggesting that “the senses do not merely afford
us impressions but also put them together, and produce images of objects,
for which without doubt something more than the receptivity of impres-
sions is required, namely a function of synthesis of them.”42 This reads in
part like a concession to Hume, who features an explanation of causal re-
lations through the spontaneous association by the mind of unassociated
sensory perceptions. Kant similarly holds that on the a posteriori level the
senses combine contents of mind. His account of the way the mind spon-
taneously puts together sensations together on the a priori level is more
elaborate than Humes a posteriori account. For Kant, under the influ-
ence of Tetens,43 spontaneity functions as the “ground of a threefold syn-
thesis” of apprehension of representations as intuition, reproduction in
imagination, and recognition in a concept.44
Kant further describes synthesis in three numbered sections. In sec-
tion 1, he stresses that the synthesis of apprehension in intuition is a pri-
ori, not empirical, and that, as inner sense, it is limited by time. In the ac-
count of synthesis of reproduction in the imagination he brings out that
the synthesis of apprehension is combined with the synthesis of reproduc-
tion, which he also calls the transcendental faculty of the imagination,
since otherwise no whole representations would be possible. This is a ver-
sion of the important point he urges in the B deduction in insisting against
Humes bundle theory of the subject that the subject must endure from
moment or, as he also says, as “one consciousness.”45
In both the A and B deductions Kant curiously insists on conscious-
ness as necessary to show that “that which we think is the very same as
41 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 130, p. 245.
42 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 120, p. 239.
43 See J. N. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche ber die menschliche Natur und ihre En-
twicklung, Leipzig: Weidmann, 1777, pp. 104–107.
44 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 97, p. 228.
45 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, § 16, B 133, p. 247.
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what we thought a moment before” since otherwise, according to Kant,
“all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain.”46
Yet it does not follow that, if the subject endures through time, it is
also conscious. Kant appears here to conflate the unconscious activity
through which the synthesis of reproduction occurs with the problem of
conscious memory. In the B deduction, where Kant is moving increasingly
from a representational to a constructivist approach to knowledge, he
identifies synthesis with the productive imagination in introducing a dis-
tinction, in an exceedingly complicated passage, between reproductive
imagination, which is subject to empirical laws, such as association47
and which is similar to Humes analysis of causality, and productive imag-
ination, which is spontaneous. In the account of synthesis of recognition
in a concept, where Kant distinguishes clearly between appearances or
representations of an object, which can be thought of as something in
general, he further seems to conflate the necessary unity of the subject,
or transcendental unity of apperception, with consciousness of the condi-
tions of knowledge. According to Kant, “this unity of consciousness
would be impossible if in the cognition of the manifold the mind could
not become conscious of the identity of the function by means of which
this manifold is synthetically combined in one cognition.”48 There is an
equivocation here, since, though it is arguably possible to elucidate the
conditions of consciousness of objects of experience and knowledge, we
are not and cannot become conscious of what Kant calls “the identity
of the function.” Kant writes: “Thus the original and necessary conscious-
ness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an
equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance
with concepts ….”49 Yet ordinary self-consciousness does not yield this re-
sult, which follows, if it follows at all, from a transcendental deduction
only.
Kants account of synthesis in the B deduction is very similar. Synthe-
sis, which can be either pure or applied, is the “action of putting different
representations together with each other and comprehending their man-
ifoldness in one cognition.”50 According to Kant, transcendental logic re-
lies on synthesis as a necessary prerequisite “to bring under concepts not
46 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 103, p. 230.
47 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 152, p. 257.
48 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 108, p. 233.
49 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 108, p. 233.
50 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 103, p. 210.
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the representations but the pure synthesis of representations.”51 In antici-
pating the later passage on the limit of the understanding, Kant declares
that synthesis, which is “blind,”52 includes in order “the manifold of pure
intuition,” then “the synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagina-
tion” and finally “the concepts that give this pure synthesis unity….”53
Absent here is the difficult claim, which is apparently inconsistent with
the view that synthetic activity is spontaneous, hence not consciously
brought about, that the subject is conscious of this process.
V. Unconscious Activity, Subjective Perception and Objective Knowledge
Knowledge claims are always claims for objective knowledge, hence for
knowledge of the real or reality however understood. What one means
by “knowledge” and by “real” depends on the particular theory. But in
general, cognitive theories must acknowledge the difference between sub-
jectivity and objectivity. This problem is traditionally addressed through
adducing a claim for realism. The ancient claim to know the mind-inde-
pendent world as it is beyond mere appearance, not only that it is, but
also as it is, is often called metaphysical realism or sometime Platonic re-
alism. This claim, which goes back in the tradition at least until Parme-
nides, is often later identified with Platonism. The invention of the mod-
ern subject changes the theory of knowledge. But it does not change the
commitment to realism as a central element in cognitive claims that re-
mains roughly the same as before after the invention of the modern sub-
ject.
The invention of the modern subject does not simplify but rather
complicates the epistemological problem in that after this invention, if
not before, access to objectivity necessarily runs through subjectivity.
The need to approach objectivity through subjectivity introduces a com-
plication in explaining the possibility of knowledge. At stake is a distinc-
tion between different levels and types of the general claim to know.
Kant, who is aware of this difficulty, responds in introducing a triple dis-
tinction between sensation, perception, and experience and knowledge of
objects. In the critical philosophy, sensation is not conscious but rather a
necessary condition for consciousness of all kinds. Perception, which lies
51 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 104, p. 211.
52 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 103, p. 211.
53 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 104, p. 211.
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between sensation on the one hand and experience and knowledge on the
other, is always conscious, hence cannot occur without a prior sensation.
A perception is at most a precondition for experience and knowledge.
The triple distinction between sensation, perception, and experience
and knowledge, which is intended to overcome the difficulty, which arises
if objective knowledge depends on the subject, objectivity on subjectivity,
leads to two further questions. How is it possible to go from sensations to
perceptions? How is it possible to go from perceptions to experience and
knowledge of objects.
Kants account of the transition from sensations to perceptions and
experience and knowledge of objects is given in the complex deductions
in both the A and B editions. It remains unclear how perception differs
from experience and knowledge of objects, and how, if one acknowledges
this crucial difference, the transition from one to the other can be under-
stood.
Perceptions, which are individual reports, are not knowledge claims.
The former are subjective and the latter, which are general or universal,
are objective. In a perception, an individual reports on a person-centered
individual claim for experience. In other words, a perception records no
more than a subjective impression, which can and in fact routinely does
differ from observer to observer. Such a claim is personal, not general
or universal. In the case of knowledge, an individual or group makes a
claim, which not only records what the individual or the group experien-
ces, but, since it is based on a general rule, for instance a so-called univer-
sal law of nature, such as Newtons second law, is in principle binding on
all individuals in all times and places. At least in theory in normal condi-
tions all observers have the same experience and knowledge of objects,
whose movements are casually determined by general laws. There is an
obvious difference between saying that I observe that water freezes at
0 C. and the claim that it is a law of nature that water freezes at 0 C.
The former is an individual observation, hence, subjective and cannot
count as an objective knowledge claim. The latter is in principle an illus-
tration of a law of nature, which presumably justifies the observation,
which, if it is in fact based on a universal law of nature, is in fact always
the case, hence can be made in an identical way by any individual.
Kant uses these terms in different ways in his various writings and
often in different ways within each of them. Merely in the Critique of
Pure Reason, he refers to perception i. A. as appearances “combined
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with consciousness,”54 as “that which is immediately represented, through
sensation, is immediately represented as real in space and time,”55 as
“representations accompanied by sensation,”56 as “empirical conscious-
ness,”57 that is, consciousness “in which there is at the same time sensa-
tion”58 as “merely subjective representation, by which one can only be
conscious that the subject is affected, and by which one relates to an ob-
ject in general,”59 and as “sensation of which one is conscious.”60
Kants remarks about experience are similarly confusing. In the Inau-
gural Dissertation, where he defines experience as “reflective cognition,
which arises when several appearances are compared by the understand-
ing,” he writes that “there is no way from appearance to experience ex-
cept by reflection in accordance with the logical use of the understand-
ing.”61 He seems to be suggesting that in comparing appearances, or per-
ceptions, we reach experience. His suggestion that the transition from per-
ception to knowledge and experience occurs through what he designates
as logical use of the understanding is presumably the basis of Sellars in-
fluential but obscure conception of the space of reasons62 leading to his
preference for science over folk psychology.63 In the Critique of Pure Rea-
son, Kant presents an account in which there is a so-called mutual adap-
tation of concept and intuition. The most basic claim seems to be that “all
synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands
under the categories; and since experience is cognition through connect-
ed perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experi-
ence, and are thus also valid a priori of all objects of experience.64 Yet if
sensations are already brought under the categories at the level of percep-
54 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 120, p. 238.
55 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 147, p. 254.
56 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 147, p. 254.
57 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 207, p. 290.
58 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 207, p 290
59 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 207, p. 290.
60 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 272, p. 325.
61 Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770, translated and edited by David
Walford in collaboration with Ralf Meerbote, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1992, §5, p. 386.
62 See “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception
and Reality, Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1991, p. 169.
63 See “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” in Sellars, Science, Perception and
Reality, pp. 1–40.
64 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 161, p. 262.
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tion, then the relation between perceptions, which do not qualify as expe-
rience, and knowledge, which presupposes experience, is unclear.
Kant focuses this distinction better in the Prolegomena, where he de-
fines experience as “the synthetic connections of appearances (percep-
tions) in a consciousness, insofar as this connection is necessary.”65 He
gives an example in the text with respect to the expansion of air and an-
other example in an important footnote.
If the sun shines on the stone, it becomes warm. This judgment is a mere
judgment of perception and contains no necessity however often I and oth-
ers also have perceived this; the perceptions are only usually found so con-
joined. But if I say: the sun warms the stone, then beyond the perception is
added the understandings concept of cause, which connects necessarily the
concept of sunshine with that of heat, and the synthetic judgment becomes
necessarily universally valid, hence objective, and changes from a percep-
tion into experience.66
Understood in this way, a perception is subjective, but experience and
knowledge is based on the identification of a causal relationship. But it
is unclear how to go from mere perception to experience and knowledge.
Suffice it to say that even the main outlines of Kants response remain
unclear for two reasons. First, there is an ambiguity about whether the
conceptual machinery invoked to grasp the contributions from the side
of sensory intuition as well as from the side of various types of synthesis
is intended to account for the possibility of perception, for the possibility
of experience and knowledge of objects, or both simultaneously. This re-
mains unclear in Kants exposition of his position.
Second, if Kant admits the distinction between perception on the one
hand and experience and objects of knowledge on the other, then it is fur-
ther unclear how to account for the transition from perception to knowl-
edge. An “ordinary” account would presumably talk about the historical
development of scientific research. Perhaps this is implied in the refer-
ence in the Inaugural Dissertation cited above in which Kant mentions
comparison of different perceptions in the understanding. From a histor-
ical perspective, in the scientific process individual perceptions are trans-
formed, through the study of causal relationships, into general laws. For
instance, as noted above, according to Kant further developments in
physics after Copernicus led to advances in astronomical theory culminat-
65 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics, translated by Gary Hat-
field, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, § 22, p. 56.
66 Kant, Prolegomena, § 20, p. 53.
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ing Newtonian mechanics, which Kant regards as the definitive solution
of the astronomical problem. Yet Kant, who claims that knowledge is a
priori, does not have that option available with respect to his own theory
in the Critique of Pure Reason. This work advances an a-historical ac-
count from the transcendental perspective, which is different from and in-
compatible with a historical analysis. Hence it remains unclear how on the
basis of the critical philosophy the distinction between subjective percep-
tion and objective experience and knowledge can be explained.
VI. Kant and the Subject
So far I have brought out some of the ways that Kant relies on uncon-
scious activity in his theory of cognition. Unconscious activity is a type
of activity. Now I want to call attention to the link between the theory
of activity, including unconscious activity, and Kants theory of the sub-
ject. In pointing to four questions, Kant famously contends that the theo-
ry of human being is the central question in the critical philosophy.67 His
theory of the philosophical subject, which, in virtue of his basic anti-psy-
chologism, differs from his theory of human being, but whose precise re-
lation to finite human being remains unclear, is also central to his critical
philosophy.
Kant was one of the first to teach the emerging science of anthropol-
ogy. His theory of human being is described in his book on the topic. His
theory of the subject, or perhaps more precisely his theory of the philo-
sophical subject is expounded in his three Critiques. The common thread
in all three Critiques is that in each case a form of human experience is
explained in a regressive argument through a form of activity. He explains
theoretical knowledge through the complex, but unconscious activity in
which the cognitive subject “constructs” the cognitive object. He de-
scribes morality in terms of conscious activity in which the moral subject
must freely determine the principle of its action on the level of pure prac-
tical reason and in fact so act on the level of practical reason. And he de-
scribes aesthetics in which human beings render aesthetic reflective
judgements based on generalizing an individuals personal reaction
when confronted with an aesthetic object to all possible observers.
67 Kant	s Introduction to Logic, translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, 1885, reprint
edition New York: Philosophical Library, 1963, p. 15.
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Kants approach to explaining different forms of human experience
through different forms of activity suggests the possibility of formulating
a unitary theory of the subject of experience by relating the different
forms of activity. He points toward but never carries out this task,
which is inscribed as it were in the general approach of the critical philos-
ophy. Yet he makes two attempts to subordinate theoretical to practical
reason, hence epistemology to ethics in the Critique of Judgment. In the
Introduction to the first edition, he introduces judgment as a third faculty
in an unsatisfactory attempt to create unity out of diversity.68 In the sec-
ond edition, he makes use of reflective judgment to unify pure and prac-
tical reason. Judgment, in bringing the particular under the universal, sub-
ordinates pure reason, or the capacity to deduce the particular from the
universal, to practical reason, or the capacity to form rules. Yet this fur-
ther effort also fails since it presupposes the indemonstrable possibility
of a harmony between the moral decision and its performance, which
can only be thought but cannot be known.69
Kants approach to understanding the subject in terms of conscious
and unconscious activity is arguably more successful in explicating differ-
ent forms of experience in terms of different forms of activity than in for-
mulating a general theory of the subject as active or activity. Kants ap-
proach to the subject through its activity goes back in the tradition at
least until Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle sketches a
theory of life as activity, and in the Poetics he describes artistic mimesis
as the imitation of life. An approach to human being as basically active
is further developed in modern times by a number of important thinkers,
including Descartes, Fichte and Marx.
Descartes is widely believed to hold a spectator theory of the subject,
which he apparently formulates, but never directly states, in the interval
between theDiscourse and theMeditations.An anticipation of this theory
goes back to Descartes earliest writings. His approach to knowledge in
the Rules already implies an as yet still unformulated theory of the cog-
nitive subject. The first rule concerns correct judgments.70 In the Dis-
course, in to the best of my knowledge one of only two passages in his cor-
68 See Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, edited by Paul Guyer, translated by
Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, Intro-
duction, III , pp. 64–66.
69 See Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, Introduction, IX, pp. 83–86.
70 See “Rules for the Direction of the Mind,” in The Philosophical Works of Descartes,
I, p. 1.
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pus that directly refer to the theory, he cautiously remarks about “trying
to be a spectator rather than an actor in all the comedies the world dis-
plays.”71 For various reasons, the spectator theory is routinely taken as
Descartes central theoretical commitment when his position is discussed.
Yet, as the passage cited suggests, he also has an actor theory of the sub-
ject. The little-known actor view, which Descartes never develops, and
which remains implicit in his writings, is worked out by his successors.
The actor view follows by denying the main principles of the spectator
view. For a human actor there is no bifurcation between mind and
body, since the complex object called a human being is directly situated
in the world, which we can know, and we have at best only indirect access
to the mind.
In replying to Humes attack on causality, Kant formulates a theory of
the subject largely inspired by the Cartesian view of the subject, especial-
ly the more familiar spectator theory. Though Kant denies we have direct
access to the contents of mind, his conception of the subject shares with
the spectator view the bifurcation of mind and body according to which
the mind is wholly free, whereas the body belongs to the causal frame-
work, and the depiction of the problem of knowledge as knowing a
mind-independent real external world. One way to understand the rela-
tion is to say that Kant brings together within a single theory a view of
the subject as both passive, like the Cartesian spectator, but active like
the Cartesian actor. Yet unlike the Cartesian subject, for which conscious-
ness unites thinking and being, the Kantian subject is both conscious and
unconscious. For Descartes consciousness, or conscious activity is the con-
dition of knowledge. But for Kant, it is not conscious but rather uncon-
scious activity, which makes consciousness, experience and knowledge
of objects possible.
VII. Conclusion: Kant and the Cognitive Unconscious
Views of unconscious spontaneous mental activity precede Kant, who
gives it a powerful new focus in countering Hume. In his attack on cau-
sality, Hume invokes the spontaneous unconscious activity of the mind
as the cause of the false perception of a causal relation among external
objects. In effect, Kant responds to Hume in advancing a different view
of unconscious spontaneous mental activity, hence a different view of
71 “Discourse on Method,” in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, I, p. 99.
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the cognitive subject. Unconscious mental activity or mental action,
which is rarely studied directly, is arguably central for any theory of the
mind.72 Kants theory of unconscious spontaneous mental activity,
which has also not often been studied, is central for his own position as
well as for the philosophy of mind.
Kant thinks that reason73 and the understanding are both spontane-
ous. In this paper I have focused mainly on the unconscious. The uncon-
scious is fundamental to Kants theory of knowledge in two ways: con-
cerning the passive reception of sensation as the contents of the sensory
manifold, and with respect to the unconscious spontaneous activity
through which it works up the sensory contents into objects of experience
and knowledge.
Kants theory of unconscious activity is intrinsic to the so-called Co-
pernican revolution, which can be paraphrased as the insight that the
epistemological subject does not find, uncover or discover but rather
“constructs,” makes or produces what it knows. Epistemological construc-
tion is not conscious but unconscious. Kants view of the subjects cogni-
tive activity as unconscious is central to the critical philosophy and to the
later post-Kantian German idealist debate. His approach to cognition
through unconscious but spontaneous mental activity is a central theme
in post-Kantian German idealism.
Kants theory of unconscious spontaneous mental activity belongs to
his claim to provide the only possible analysis of the general conditions of
knowledge. He says that if one were to change anything at all, reason it-
self would be destroyed.74 He further divides the Deduction of the Pure
Concepts of the Understanding into the objects of the pure understanding
and the pure understanding itself. He says that the latter considers a sub-
jective relation, which is important, but not the chief question, which con-
cerns what understanding and reason can know a priori.75 But in relying
on unconscious spontaneous activity, hence in surpassing the limits of ex-
perience, the only limit he sets himself in the critical philosophy, Kant
seems to go beyond the limits of the understanding, beyond what can pos-
72 See, e.g.,Mental Actions, edited by Lucy OBrien andMatthew Soteriou, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009.
73 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, he describes “reason” as “pure
self-activity.” See Kant, Practical Philosophy, p. 99.
74 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B xxxviii, p. 120.
75 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A xvii, p. 103.
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sibly be known, in a theory that, since it cannot be verified through expe-
rience, remains largely speculative.
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